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MANPOWER
REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FY 1986

VOLUME III:
FORCE READINESS REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
**MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
REPORT
FOR FY 1986**



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**VOLUME III:
FORCE READINESS REPORT**

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations and Logistics)

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Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Defense Agencies

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FY 1986 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

Table of Contents

<u>Chapter</u>		<u>Page</u>
I	Introduction	
	Organization of the Report	I-1
	The Total Force	I-2
	Manpower Mix	I-3
	Mobilization Manpower	I-4
	Manpower Counting	I-5
	Defense Planning and Programming Categories	I-6
II	Manpower Program Summary	
	National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower	II-1
	Manpower Request	II-4
	Manpower Overview	II-7
	Mobilization Manpower	II-11
	Manpower Program Summary	II-16
III	Army Manpower Program	
	Introduction	III-1
	Significant Program Highlights	III-8
	Army Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)	III-45
IV	Navy Manpower Program	
	Introduction	IV-1
	Significant Program Highlights	IV-6
	Navy Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)	IV-38
V	Marine Corps Manpower Program	
	Introduction	V-1
	Significant Program Highlights	V-5
	Marine Corps Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)	V-27
VI	Air Force Manpower Program	
	Introduction	VI-1
	Significant Program Highlights	VI-8
	Air Force Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)	VI-38

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
VII Defense Agencies Manpower Program	
Introduction	VII-1
Manpower Programs	VII-1
Programmed Manpower by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)	VII-11
VIII Cost of Manpower	
Introduction	VIII-1
Description of Defense Manpower Costs	VIII-1
Detailed FY 1986 Manpower Costs	VIII-4
Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates	VIII-12
IX Manpower and Forces by Location	
U.S. Strategic Forces	IX-1
U.S. Tactical/Mobility forces	IX-2
Active Component Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country	IX-10
European Troop Strengths	IX-26
<u>Appendixes</u>	
A Manpower Data Structure	
B Glossary of Terms	
C Defense Planning and Programming Category Definitions	
D Manpower Requirements Determination Process	

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report (DMRR) for FY 1986 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of Title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1986 Budget. This report is also Volume III of the FY 1986 Force Readiness Report.

I. Organization of the Report. This report explains the Department of Defense manpower program incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1986. To assist the Congress, the report includes detailed information concerning manpower plans for FY 1986 and a summary of manpower plans included in the five year defense plan. In response to a specific request of the Conference Committee on Armed Services, improved integration of Reserve Components and increased Reserve Component missions are addressed in Section III of this chapter and in each Service chapter. The report also discusses manpower readiness in detail in each Service chapter.

The report is organized into two major parts and three annexes that are submitted separately. The annexes are sent to Congress at the same time as this report.

Defense Manpower Program (Chapters I through VII). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a summary of the FY 1986 manpower program. Chapters III through VII contain details on manpower programs for each of the military Services and the Defense Agencies.

Special Analyses and Data (Chapters VIII and IX). This part contains special analyses or data on subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter VIII explains the cost of manpower. Chapter IX portrays data on forces and manpower by location. Appendix A contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) that have occurred since the FY 1985 DMRR. Appendix B provides a glossary of Defense manpower terminology. Appendix C describes in detail the Defense Planning and Programming Categories. Appendix D outlines the process each of the Services use to identify its manpower needs and the procedure it uses to determine the mix of active and reserve forces.

Base Structure Annex. The Base Structure Annex relates our FY 1986 base structure to the force structure for that period and provides estimates of base operating support costs.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided that describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force.

Officer Flow Annex. Section 138 (c)(3)(D), Title 10, USC (Public Law 96-513, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)), requires the submission of specified detailed data on the Services' officer corps. These data are contained in the Officer Flow Annex.

II. The Total Force.. There are three types of Defense manpower: active component military, Reserve Components military, and civilian employees. Each of these categories of manpower contribute to the total US military capability; they constitute the "Total Force".

A. Active Component Military. The active component military are those men and women who serve in combat units (units that engage enemy forces), combat support units (units that provide support in the combat theater), and other support units. These men and women are on call twenty-four hours a day and receive full-time military pay. There are about two million active component military people.

B. Reserve Component Military. Reserve Component military manpower is divided into three categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It has two principal elements: the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve includes three groups: (1) units organized, equipped, and trained to perform wartime missions; (2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) who are highly-trained, skilled people designated to provide wartime augmentation to active component units on or shortly after M-day; and (3) the training pipeline, which is composed of members of the Selected Reserve who have not completed sufficient training to be awarded a military skill designation. Training pipeline people may not deploy overseas upon mobilization until minimum training is completed (12 weeks by law). Selected Reservists assigned to units and IMAs train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training. As many as 100,000 Selected Reservists may be involuntarily recalled by the President for up to 90 days to augment active forces.

The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. In addition, the IRR includes a group of inactive National Guard members who are assigned to units but cannot participate regularly in training. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training. All members of the IRR are subject to call to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of the active and reserve forces who have retired. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserve do not generally participate in reserve training or

readiness programs. They may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the interest of national defense. However, standby reservists may not be activated until it has been determined that there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve.

The Reserve Component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress. The Selected Reserve strength is just over one million people as of the end of FY 1984.

C. Civilian Employees. Defense Department civilians provide support services to the active and reserve military in all of those functions that do not require military incumbents. Many perform essential functions that must continue to be accomplished during mobilization. Our civilian workforce repairs airplanes, ships, and tanks, provides logistical support, and operates and maintains military installations. They provide research and development support, medical support, and communications support. These activities contribute directly to the readiness of the armed forces.

III. Manpower Mix. Several Congressional Committees have expressed interest in the mix of active and Reserve Component forces. It has been suggested that more missions could be assigned to the Reserve Components, thereby reducing the need for active component military people. This section addresses our policy toward the Defense manpower mix. Each Service chapter explains why specific increases in military manpower, by mission (Defense Planning and Programming Category), were assigned to either the active or the Reserve Components. Appendix D provides additional details on the process each Service uses to determine the mix of its active and reserve forces.

Our policy is to maintain as small an active peacetime force as national security policy, our military strategy and our overseas commitments permit. Our overall military strategy dictates the missions that must be performed by military people, reserve or active, because they are trained to perform their duties in confrontation with the enemy.

The least costly way to fill overseas peace and war support requirements is to use host nation support (HNS). The agreements we have with the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, Italy, and the BENELUX countries, to provide port operations, surface transportation and many other support functions for deploying US units are examples of this support. The same type of arrangements also exist in Korea. Another type of host nation support is the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to activate 93,000 FRG reservists to support US forces in time of war. This innovative program allows us to provide essential wartime support for Army and Air Force combat units at a substantial reduction from the cost of equipping and maintaining US units to perform those missions. It is imperative that we be able to provide essential logistics support to our combat forces in Europe in wartime; we can provide this support via the US/FRG HNS agreement at a small fraction (one-tenth to one-fortieth) of the cost of any other solution. Increased reliance on HNS makes strategic warning and allied response even more important. We will continue to implement these programs that will be crucial to the safety and effectiveness of US combat forces in wartime.

We have substantially increased our reliance on Reserve Component units for more and more complex missions. The Army relies heavily on Reserve Component units to fill its active divisions and to provide essential tactical support to both active and reserve combat forces. Naval Reserve units form an integral part of the Total Force in most mission areas of the Navy. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team with balanced combat, combat support and combat service support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Air Force Reserve Component units bear considerable responsibility for many combat and support missions including tactical fighter, airlift, continental air defense, and aerial refueling missions.

The primary criterion that must be satisfied by a military unit (either active or reserve) is the responsiveness required to perform the mission. In some situations, only an active unit can meet this criterion. Some strategic units and overseas deployed units must be immediately ready for combat operations, so they must be manned with active component military manpower. Most Navy ships and squadrons must be manned by active component military because they routinely deploy and remain overseas. In peacetime, we also authorize active component military manpower to maintain a training and professional base and a rotation base to provide meaningful assignments in the United States for people who have been serving at sea or overseas.

Reserve Component units have demonstrated their capability to maintain high readiness levels. In general, however, the higher the readiness level required of a Reserve Component unit, the higher will be the cost of maintaining the unit because of the amount of training time and full-time support needed.

For support services, DoD uses civilians except where the positions must be military for the reasons discussed above. Decisions on whether to use government employees or contractors for support services are based on which can provide the services most efficiently. In certain cases, national security considerations--such as ensuring that a particularly critical job will be performed during wartime--dictate the use of DoD employees.

IV. Mobilization Manpower. Mobilization manpower is the increased manpower we need above our current peacetime strength to mobilize and conduct wartime military operations. It includes additions to both the military forces and new civilian hires. This additional manpower brings our current peacetime forces up to their full wartime strengths; provides the people to man the additional units, ships and squadrons that are activated to fight the war; and replaces casualties. Chapter II and the individual Service chapters describe the wartime manpower requirements and the overall mobilization manpower situation in more detail.

V. Manpower Counting. The discussion of manpower and personnel readiness in this report requires that the reader understand the terms describing manpower counting categories. For that reason, a glossary of defense manpower terms is provided in Appendix B. The basic distinction between "spaces", that is billets or positions, and "faces", people to fill the positions, must be kept clear. Our forces are made up of a variety of different types of units. Each unit has associated with it a collection of positions that must be filled by qualified people in order for the unit to perform its wartime mission. The sum of the wartime position requirements of all the units in the programmed force is termed the wartime manpower structure requirement.

During peacetime, it is not necessary or desirable to fill all the positions in all the units. Some units may not be staffed at all, because there is no peacetime requirement for that unit, e.g., a graves registration unit. Some units may be staffed with a combination of active and reserve people; as the unit is tasked to perform more in peacetime, the proportion of full-time people, whether active, reserve or civilian, may be expected to increase. The aggregation of positions describing the staffing needed for the programmed peacetime force is termed the programmed manpower structure.

The department work force does not change overnight to match changes in the programmed force and thus the programmed manpower structure. As the program is being prepared, the programmed manpower structure must be adjusted to best balance the requirements of force changes, available inventory, accession and separation predictions, fiscal constraints, manpower ceilings--the list seems endless. The collection of positions that results from these decisions is termed the programmed manning. Programmed manning is the primary subject of this report. It is programmed manning that is reflected in the Service manpower program tables throughout the report.

When reviewing programmed manning data in this report, it is important to understand the terms "operating strength" and "operating strength deviation". The operating strength of a Service is the portion of the end strength assigned to units in the force structure. Ideally it should be the same as programmed manning. The operating strength deviation is the difference between the operating strength and programmed manning. In this report the operating strength deviation is shown as of the end of each fiscal year. A negative operating strength deviation indicates there are less people assigned to units and more in the individuals account than programmed. A positive operating strength deviation is the reverse situation. In most of the tables in this report, a negative operating strength deviation is shown. This is primarily because the end of the fiscal year is in the Fall when large numbers of Summer accessions are being trained, thus swelling the individuals account.

VI. Defense Planning and Programming Categories. Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPCs) are used throughout this report to describe and explain the defense manpower program. All three types of Defense manpower are allocated to specific DPPCs, no individual or position being counted more than once.

DPPCs are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each program, all the resources that can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but also the base support personnel that sustain these units. The DPPCs, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPCs are listed below. Complete definitions are provided in Appendix C.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

<u>Strategic</u>	<u>Support Activities</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	Base Operating Support
Defensive Strategic Forces	Medical Support
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	Personnel Support
	Individual Training
	Force Support Training
	Central Logistics
	Centralized Support Activities
	Management Headquarters
	Federal Agency Support
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	
Land Forces	
Tactical Air Forces	
Naval Forces	
Mobility Forces	
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>Individuals</u>
Intelligence	Transients
Centrally Managed Communications	Patients, Prisoners, and
Research and Development	Holdees
Geophysical Activities	Trainees and Students
	Cadets

CHAPTER II

MANPOWER PROGRAM SUMMARY

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request and provides an overview of manpower strength trends.

I. National Security Objectives, Policy, and Defense Manpower. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international climate in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to deter potential enemies, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1986.

Defense manpower is made up of active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. However, the size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure is based on DoD's Total Force Policy, which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small an active component peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Service planning assumes that Selected Reserve units and pretrained military manpower will be made available for any contingency for which they are required to bring the total force to its required combat capability. Some reserve units must also be responsive to call up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active component units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization, for immediate deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed, and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

Civilians, the third component of the Total Force, provide 25 percent of Defense manpower. In addition to managing critical defense resources, Defense civilians repair ships, tanks, trucks, and airplanes; maintain military installations; operate communication systems; do research and development; perform intelligence analyses; operate the supply systems; and perform many other functions that do not require military personnel. The Department constantly strives to make the most efficient use of its civilian work force. Work is contracted out when it is economical and cost effective to do so. Programs for increasing productivity have a high priority in the Department. However, recent emphasis on increases in readiness and sustainability requires more

civilians in maintenance and supply functions. Borrowed military manpower must be replaced by civilians in order for military personnel to man combat units. Increased procurement activity as well as intensified spare parts management will also require more civilians. In fact, the increased tempo in the Department will require more civilians in nearly every phase of DoD's activities.

The following table is a summary of the major force elements planned for the end of FY 1985 and FY 1986 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1984.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBMs	1,031	1,023	1,009
Bombers (PAA) ^{1/}	297	298	315
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) ^{1/}			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	5	5	4
Guard/Reserve	11	11	11
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)	35	37	38
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	17	18
Guard	9	9	10 ^{2/}
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active ^{3/}	10	10	10
Guard/Reserve ^{4/}	26	26	24
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces ^{5/}			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	109	109	111
Guard/Reserve ^{6/}	58	57	58
Navy Squadrons			
Active	86	89	92
Reserve	16	15	15
Carriers (active only)	13	13	13
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	30	30	30
Reserve	10	10	10
Naval Forces			
Attack Submarines (active only)	97	99	99

Surface Combatants			
Active	193	199	200
Reserve	10	12	16
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	59	59	60
Reserve	2	2	2
Patrol Ships (active only)	6	6	6
ASW and FAD Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	55	58	60
Reserve	17	17	18
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active <u>7/</u>	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve <u>8/</u>	53	53	54
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet <u>9/</u>	96	118	132
Chartered Fleet	24	20	21

- 1/ Primary aircraft authorized (PAA).
- 2/ One division (29th Infantry (Light)) is activated in FY 1986 by combining the assets of two existing separate brigades that are no longer shown as separate brigades in this report.
- 3/ Includes one air cavalry combat brigade, three armored cavalry regiments and one ranger regiment.
- 4/ Includes three Reserve Component brigades that roundout active divisions, two Reserve Component brigades that roundup active divisions, one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization and five theater defense brigades. The two brigades that will round out the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Divisions have not yet been designated.
- 5/ Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and tactical electronic warfare/tactical air control/tactical airborne command and control system squadrons.
- 6/ Includes 2 KC-10 Reserve Associate Squadrons as of FY 1984.
- 7/ Includes 14 C-130, 13 C-141, 4 C-5, and 3 C-9 squadrons
- 3/ Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate Squadrons, but excludes rescue, weather, and C-9s.
- 9/ Includes naval fleet auxiliary force, mobility enhancement, nucleus fleet and scientific support vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command.

II. Manpower Request. The Department requests that Congress authorize manpower strength for FY 1986 and FY 1987 as shown in the following tables.

A. Active Component Strength

	<u>Active Component Personnel</u> (End Strength in Thousands)	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Army		780.8	780.9
Navy		586.3	593.4
Marine Corps		199.5	201.7
Air Force		611.5	620.5
Total		<u>2,178.1</u>	<u>2,196.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

B. Selected Reserve Strength. The following table shows the manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in both average and corresponding end strengths. These figures include Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) and full time Active Guard/Reserve members.

Selected Reserve Manpower
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Average Strength</u>		<u>End Strength</u>	
	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Army National Guard	444.0	456.0	450.5	462.2
Army Reserve	291.9	306.4	300.5	314.2
Naval Reserve	134.4	147.5	141.8	151.7
Marine Corps Reserve	41.9	43.6	43.0	44.2
Air National Guard	108.7	113.0	110.9	114.6
Air Force Reserve	75.6	78.5	77.4	81.0
DoD Total	<u>1,096.5</u>	<u>1,145.0</u>	<u>1,124.1</u>	<u>1,167.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The following table shows the number of personnel involved in full time support of the Reserve Components. The Guard and Reserve military technicians, who are also DoD civilians, are included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report.

FULL-TIME SUPPORT TO THE SELECTED RESERVE ^{1/}
(END STRENGTH IN THOUSANDS)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Army National Guard		
Active Guard/Reserve	30.7	41.1
Military Technicians	24.1	24.1
Civilians	.4	.4
Active Component	1.0	1.0
Total	<u>56.2</u>	<u>66.6</u>
Army Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	14.7	18.0
Military Technicians	7.6	7.6
Civilians	5.5	5.5
Active Component	5.5	5.5
Total	<u>33.3</u>	<u>36.6</u>
Naval Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	19.5	21.6
Civilians	3.2	3.2
Active Component	5.8	6.7
Total	<u>28.5</u>	<u>31.5</u>
Marine Corps Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	1.5	1.6
Civilians	.3	.3
Active Component	4.8	5.0
Total	<u>6.6</u>	<u>6.9</u>
Air National Guard		
Active Guard/Reserve	7.3	8.0
Military Technicians	22.8	22.9
Civilians	2.1	2.1
Active Component	.7	.7
Total	<u>32.9</u>	<u>33.6</u>
Air Force Reserve		
Active Guard/Reserve	.6	.7
Military Technicians	9.0	9.4
Civilians	4.5	4.6
Active Component	.7	.7
Total	<u>14.8</u>	<u>15.4</u>
DoD Total		
Active Guard/Reserve	74.3	90.9
Military Technicians	63.6	64.0
Civilians	15.9	16.1
Active Component	18.4	19.5
Total	<u>172.3</u>	<u>190.5</u>

1/ Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are included in Selected Reserve strength throughout the report.

C. Civilians

Civilian Employment Plan ^{1/}

Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions

End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Total DoD	1,106,828	1,116,056

- 1/ Includes approximately 62,400 Guard and Reserve military technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

As directed by Congress, these figures do not include anticipated reductions made possible by conversion of activities to contract under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76. Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1986 and FY 1987.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD, including Corps of Engineer Civil Works, cemetery activities, and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1986 and FY 1987 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1986 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Employment Plan For FY 1986
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army <u>1/</u>	346.1	60.0	406.1
Navy	329.9	10.9	340.8
Marine Corps <u>2/</u>	(19.2)	(2.9)	(22.1)
Air Force <u>1/</u>	252.5	14.3	266.8
Defense Agencies	91.3	1.8	93.2
Total DoD	1,019.8	87.0	1,106.8

- 1/ Includes military technicians in support of Guard and Reserve programs.
2/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

III. Manpower Overview. Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment
(End Strength in Thousands)

	Actual					FY 1986 Budget	
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 80	FY 82	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Military ^{1/}							
Active	2,687	3,547	2,040	2,097	2,138	2,152	2,178
Selected Reserve	953	922	861	974	1,046	1,077	1,124
Civilian ^{2/}	1,175	1,406	991	1,028	1,085	1,088	1,107

1/ Navy Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) strength is included in active strength in FY 1964 and FY 1968; they are included in Selected Reserve strength in FY 1980 and thereafter.

2/ Direct and indirect hires.

A. **Military Manpower.** The FY 1986 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,178,100. This request is 25,630 greater than the planned FY 1985 end strength. Most of this growth is associated with introduction of new capabilities that must be in the active component in order to develop doctrine, train people and deploy in peacetime. Each Service chapter discusses why reserve missions could not be expanded to offset this growth.

Selected Reserve end strength is programmed to increase by 47,096 in FY 1986 over FY 1985 levels. These increases reflect the increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve and are possible because of improved retention and vigorous recruiting by the Reserve Components.

Pretrained manpower consists of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Inactive National Guard (ING), the Standby Reserve, and retired military personnel who can be mobilized (Categories I and II retirees). The IRR and the ING will increase from 444,400 at the end of FY 1984 to 466,400 at the end of FY 1986. The Standby Reserve and the mobilizable portion of the retirees are estimated to remain approximately level during the period at 43,000 and 303,000 respectively.

Highlights of the military manpower programs by Service follow.

Army

The Army program will emphasize improved manning of combat forces, modernization, and strategic deployability in FY 1986 by continuing the transition of its forces to more modern, lighter designs with more effective equipment within essentially a constant, no-growth active component end strength. As discussed in last year's report, heavy divisions will continue to modernize by converting to the Division 86 design. The deployability of Army forces will improve as one light division continues to activate, another begins activation, an existing division converts to the light

infantry design, and the 7th Infantry Division (converted in FY 1985) validates the light infantry design. Shortfalls in tactical support for the Army will be reduced by increased reliance on external sources (such as Host Nation Support and contingency contracts for logistical support in Southwest Asia) and by the Reserve Components (RC), which will assume greater responsibility as RC strength increases by 26,994 people (a 3.7 percent increase) in FY 1986. The Army National Guard (ARNG) will add a light infantry division to the force structure in FY 1986, bringing the RC force composition to one light, four heavy, and five standard infantry divisions. The Army will continue to rely heavily on the civilian component to provide critical management, and quality of life and logistics support to the active and reserve forces in accomplishing these changes.

Navy

The Navy active end strength request in FY 1986 represents an increase of 15,000 or 2.6 percent over FY 1985 levels. Nothing is more central to readiness and overall Navy posture than people. Well established measurements show that personnel readiness in the Navy increased substantially between 1981 and 1984, and is without question the foundation of Navy's overall readiness improvement. To sustain this progress, the FY 1986 personnel request supports a measured increase in manpower to allow the Navy to man today's force, to support it adequately with shore based maintenance and support facilities, and to build the skill and experience levels needed for the near future. Reserve force structure growth stemming from total force initiatives to provide new or expanded missions to the Naval Reserve necessitates Selected Reserve end strength growth of 13,100 or 10.2 percent in FY 1986. Concomitantly, civilian personnel spaces will increase by 1,400.

These marginal increases are key elements in supporting future force levels. The active strength increase over FY 1985 is small in relative manpower terms, and small in dollar costs when compared to initial force level investment costs.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps active component end strength request represents an increase of 1,200 over that authorized for FY 1985. This increase supports the continuing effort to reorganize and modernize to maintain and enhance readiness, mobility, and fire power. Major changes to the force include the addition of the third light armored vehicle battalion, three more TOW anti-tank platoons, and the transition of a second artillery regiment to the M198, 155mm towed howitzer. The Marine Corps aviation units will continue to transition to the F/A-18 Hornet and will activate forward air defense platoons. Combat service support units continue to provide more maintenance and supply support for the weapons, equipment, and material upgrades occurring in the above combat and combat support units. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve program will grow by 1,262 spaces to support the reorganization of an artillery battalion to receive the new 155mm howitzer, the addition of a reconnaissance company, a civil affairs group, and a sensor control and management platoon.

Air Force

The Air Force active component end strength request represents an increase of 9,430 or 1.6 percent over FY 1985 levels. In the main, these increases support programs that have already won Congressional approval, such as the F-15, F-16, Ground Launched Cruise Missile, KC-10, TR-1, C-5B, and B-1B. More than one-third of the additional manpower is tied to readiness and sustainability initiatives in such areas as logistics and medical support. Another significant portion of the increase provides enhanced command, control, communications and intelligence by supporting additional satellite terminals and the Consolidated Space Operations Center. The remainder might be considered investments in our future to provide the additional training our people need to maintain highly technical equipment.

The Air Reserve Forces grow by 5,740 or about 3.1 percent. This increase supports force structure growth and modernization in C-5, C-141, and KC-10 aircraft. It also increases our readiness capability with aerial port personnel and enhanced aeromedical evacuation. Finally, the increases support a reduction in the significant civil engineering wartime manpower shortfall.

B. Civilian Manpower. Total DoD civilian manpower requirements rise by about 19.1 thousand in FY 1986 with about half the increase occurring in the Air Force. That Service plans to allocate the majority of these increases to improved readiness and sustainability, civilianizing military positions, expanding the force structure, and modernization. Other major growth will allow the Army to field and sustain new systems and support the training base. This FY 1986 rise in DoD civilian employment will continue a six year period of moderate growth which has been an integral part of the strengthening of this country's defense capability.

Between FY's 1980 and 1986, the Department's civilian work force is expected to rise by about 116,000, or 12 percent. It should be noted that this higher level of effort has been purchased with a declining share of DoD's total budget. Between FY's 1970 and 1979, about 17 percent of all dollars spent by the Department went for employing civilians. This portion has fallen to about nine percent in FY 1985. Expenditures on civilian employees have actually dropped in real terms. A lowering of civil service salaries in constant dollars led to a decrease of about 12 percent in real civilian costs between FY's 1978 and 1985. The Department is confident that recent congressional actions, combined with the returns from several management improvement programs now underway, will allow us to continue a record of steady gains in efficiency.

Congress exempted DoD's industrially funded activities from civilian ceilings on a trial basis beginning in FY 1983. After the favorable early results of that test, Congress extended freedom from employment constraints to the rest of DoD in FY 1985 and told the Department to expect a continued exemption during FY 1986. DoD first reported the benefits achieved from lifting civilian ceilings in its report to Congress on the FY 1983 experiences in the industrial fund. To summarize, the exemption caused

no unwarranted growth in employment, but did allow many improvements in industrial fund management. In March 1985, DoD will submit a description of the second year effects of suspending industrial fund ceilings. At that time, we will also discuss the Department-wide implementation of the ceiling exemption during FY 1985.

Removal of employment constraints will not cause the Department to slacken efforts to become more efficient. Specifically, we will work through the Commercial Activities (also known as the OMB Circular A-76) Program and Defense Productivity Programs to find the most efficient mix of resources--DoD civilians, contractor personnel, and labor saving capital equipment--for producing services to expand our defense capability.

The Commercial Activities Program is perhaps DoD's most effective means of increasing the efficiency of support activities. DoD has conducted over 1,000 A-76 cost studies. About half were won by in-house organizations and about half by private contractors. Approximately 25,000 positions have been "contracted out." These cost studies achieve a reduction averaging 30 percent of costs after competition, regardless of the winner, for an annual savings of \$410 million. In FY 1984, DoD completed studies on 7,400 civilian, as well as 1,100 military positions. This pace is expected to quicken somewhat during the subsequent two fiscal years.

The Defense Productivity Program (DPP) was established to improve DoD's effectiveness through more efficient use of human and capital resources. Major DPP efforts can be divided into three areas: productivity enhancing capital investments, efficiency reviews, and work force motivation. Although categorized for ease of policy direction and program management, these three are implemented as an integrated approach.

The Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program is a multi-faceted effort involving both the components and OSD. Initiatives focus on major investments in facilities and equipment that release resources for higher priority work. As part of PECI, \$139 million is earmarked by OSD in FY 1986 for major investments that are expected to produce a lifetime return of approximately \$18 for each \$1 invested. In addition to projects financed by OSD, the Services are also funding major productivity enhancing investments.

Efficiency reviews adapt the concepts of A-76 cost competitions to activities which must remain in the Federal Government. Reviews are required for all activities, civilian and military, that are not strategic, tactical, or subject to the Commercial Activities program. Efficiency reviews start with performance work statements which clearly describe the work to be performed. Managers then review operations to determine how the work can best be performed. DoD has set a goal of four percent in resource savings from efficiency reviews. Actual savings average about ten percent. The DoD Components can reapply these savings to other activities. In FY 1984, reviews saved 2,700 positions with an annual cost reduction of about \$40 million. The level of review will be raised to about 170,000 positions in FY 1985 and 240,000 in FY 1986.

Efforts to improve work force motivation within DoD have taken two forms that should assist in both improving the quality of working life and increasing productivity. The formation of committees of workers, called quality circles, allows employees to communicate ideas and suggestions directly to management. DoD now has more than 1,800 quality circles. These have resulted in both tangible and intangible improvements in worker productivity and morale for the time invested in the groups. We estimate that Quality Circles have returned from \$4 to \$28 for each \$1 invested of the participating employees' time. Another method of motivating employees is through sharing the gains from higher productivity. DoD has conducted experiments in incentive pay involving sharing of the benefits from exceeding past output levels. Results indicate that such gain sharing produces very worthwhile returns in reduced costs.

A recent DoD-supported study evaluated how the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency decide how many and what types of in-house and contractor workers to allocate to various support functions. The study found several areas for possible improvements and recommended the following actions:

- o Eliminating many constraints, such as high-grade controls, facing local civilian managers.
- o Increasing the use of objective, rigorous methods to develop manpower staffing standards.
- o Considering alternative mixes of civilian workers, e.g., a larger but lower graded combination of workers, in developing staffing standards.
- o Further decentralization of investment decisions for labor-saving equipment.

These suggestions will be considered in DoD's continuing efforts to strengthen manpower requirements determination.

C. Management Headquarters. The military and civilian manpower estimates in this report reflect the results of the congressionally directed two percent management headquarters reduction which was first imposed on the Department's FY 1985 estimates. This two percent reduction is in addition to the five percent reduction imposed by the Congress in FY 1984. The Department continues to maintain that the potential adverse effects of this reduction (through decreased control and ability to respond to management requirements) far outweigh any savings or economies that the Congress intended.

IV. Mobilization Manpower

A. Introduction. The Department of Defense uses a comprehensive, analytic framework to determine its wartime military and civilian requirements and supply. This framework is known as the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). Current WARMAPS calculations are based on a postulated scenario with a short warning period followed in sequence by partial and

full mobilization, phased deployment, and prosecution of a global conflict. Under this scenario, DoD continues to have significant wartime manpower shortfalls, particularly in combat enlisted military personnel.

B. Military Manpower

1. Requirements Determination. Our wartime force structure is designed to satisfy our national strategy for mobilizing and prosecuting a war. The size and structure of that force and, in turn, the manpower requirements to man and sustain the force are determined annually in the wartime manpower planning system (WARMAPS) in the following sequential process:

- o The programmed combat force is prescribed in conceptual form in the Defense Guidance (DG). The DG also establishes a warfighting scenario. Each Service makes its plans and sets a variety of planning parameters, such as warning time and theaters of operation, based upon the DG.
- o Organizational, manning and stationing guidance is developed by each Service, promulgated in program documents, and supported, from year to year, in the Services' programs and budgets.
- o The mix and mission of force units between the active and reserve forces is determined and programmed by each Service according to its required contribution to the DG and/or JSCP.
- o All of these requirements compete with other priority programs for the limited resources available, and thus are constrained by authorizations and budget limitations.
- o Concurrent with the development of the combat force, the support establishment, which enables the committed forces to prosecute a successful war/contingency/engagement, is determined. Also, the cumulative casualty replacement requirements to sustain both the combat and support forces are determined.

2. Military Manpower Demand. The total trained military manpower demand at any point during the warfighting scenario is determined by summing the manpower required to man the force and the cumulative casualty replacements required to sustain that force.

The peak demand for trained manpower occurs late in the six month scenario when the size and configuration of the force has stabilized in the theater and the cumulative replacement demand is at its highest point. The point of peak demand varies between Services because the programmed commitment of forces for each Service is scenario dependent.

The peak demand for trained manpower in each Service and DoD-wide is shown below:

Wartime Trained Military Manpower Peak Demand
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1986		FY 1990	
	Time Period	Demand	Time Period	Demand
Army	M+150	2210.7	M+120	2257.4
Navy	M+180	1009.5	M+180	987.4
Air Force	M+90	991.9	M+90	1047.1
Marine Corps	M+180	419.0	M+180	397.1
All DoD	M+150	4573.6	M+150	4618.7

3. Military Manpower Supply. The wartime requirement for forces is projected and programmed in peacetime by each Service. The required/desired/available forces are contained in the active and reserve force structure which is to be mobilized and available on M-Day. Thus, each unit is available at its authorized strength which, in most cases, is less than its required strength. This occurs because of peacetime authorization and budget limitations and because all wartime requirements are not needed in peacetime, e.g. graves registration. Early in the scenario, the forces are brought to, or near, their required wartime strength by the mobilization of pretrained individual reservists and retirees from the active and reserve components. This early surge in available manpower should be adequate to fill the force but, over the longer term, may be inadequate to sustain the force. Immediately upon mobilization, the training establishment is filled to wartime capacity from a combination of volunteers and inductees. However, these manpower assets are not available either to field or sustain the force until after they are trained, which is quite late in the scenario. The earliest that a significant number of trained replacements are available to units occurs at about M+120. Thus, the peak shortfalls of trained manpower usually occur in the early to middle portion of the scenario when the available pretrained reserves and retirees have been fully mobilized, no significant training output has occurred, and casualty replacement requirements are rising. The peak trained manpower shortfall for each Service is shown below:

Wartime Trained Military Manpower Peak Shortfalls
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1986				FY 1990			
	Time Period	Total	Combat	Time Period	Total	Combat	Time Period	Combat
		Trained	Enlisted		Trained	Enlisted		
Army	M+90	-117	-97	1/	M+90	-48	-112	1/
Navy	M+30	-45	NA		M+30	0	NA	1/
Air Force	M+40	-127	-6		M+40	-124	-8	
Marine Corps	M+150	-8	-68		M+180	0	-54	
All DoD	M+30	-151	-0		M+90	0	-135	

1/ Navy does not separately define its combat occupations since all ships at sea carry a great variety of occupations and expect to be in combat.

It is important to note that the shortfall of trained manpower in a particular occupational category (e.g., combat enlisted) may exceed the total shortfall of that Service. This is because the cumulative overages in other occupational categories will offset a particular shortfall as the numbers are aggregated.

When the supply of trained military manpower is compared with demand, we still find major shortfalls, particularly in the Army and Air Force. Because the timing of its peak demand and available supply is unique, each Service experiences a peak trained manpower shortfall at a different time. The Air Force's peak shortfall occurs at M+40 days, but the aggregate shortfall is eliminated rapidly thereafter; the Army's peak shortfall occurs at M+90, days but is reduced rapidly as large numbers of volunteers and inductees complete training and join units. While the Marine Corps total trained manpower shortfall is eliminated by FY 1990, the combat enlisted shortfall increases steadily as the conflict progresses. In FY 1990, the Army faces a particularly large shortage of 111,000 in combat enlisted skills at M+90.

4. Military Manpower Sustainability Improvements. DoD plans to reduce these shortfalls by increasing IRR strength. Specific skill shortages will take longer to resolve since the IRR inventory reflects the composition of peacetime active forces.

To increase the size of the IRR, Congress authorized the extension of the military service obligation (MSO) from six to eight years and the payment of IRR enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. The new eight-year MSO was implemented on June 1, 1984. The IRR reenlistment bonus program will help to reduce specific skill shortfalls in the IRR between now and FY 1990 when the longer service obligation will begin to take effect.

The demand for casualty replacements drives both the total demand and the total shortfall. Casualty replacement requirements are a function of casualties sustained and the availability of medical care.

for casualties, i.e. medical readiness. Enhanced medical readiness increases the rate at which patients become returns-to-duty. Higher returns-to-duty result in lower additional casualty replacement requirements. DoD is making progress in identifying and obtaining the medical resources (especially manpower) to provide quality medical treatment of our casualties in the field and their prompt evacuation, if necessary, to medical facilities in the U.S.

Military manpower sustainability has been greatly enhanced and actually exceeds the estimated sustainability of munitions and spare parts. Thus, without diminishing our efforts to improve manpower sustainability, the priority for resources should go to correcting logistic sustainability shortfalls.

C. Civilian Manpower. We are continuing to review our demand for additional wartime civilian manpower to identify the specific occupations, grades and locations of our requirements. We must ensure that we have adequate plans and procedures to find and hire the numbers of people needed to support our transition from peacetime to wartime. The following table summarizes our current estimates of civilian new hires required:

Wartime Civilian Manpower New Hire Requirements
(U.S. Direct Hire - Full-Time Permanent)
(Strength in Thousands)

	Demand	Current Supply	New Hires Required
Army	449	336	113
Navy	376	264	112
Air Force	251	174	77
Marine Corps	26	18	8
Defense Agencies	85	85	0
DoD Total	1,187	877	310

Current supply estimates are based on FY 1984 end strengths decremented to reflect estimated losses of civilian employees recalled to military duties in a mobilization. To provide a worldwide total, we must assume full utilization of all employees in new wartime positions; i.e., complete skill interchangeability.

Although our need for civilians in wartime has increased since last year's report, our estimate of the supply of civilian manpower has also increased. The result is the number of new hires required has decreased by over 100,000 since last year.

The Services plan to secure these additional personnel through the Department of Labor's U.S. Employment Service, by redistributing available assets, by using part-time personnel as full-time, and by rehiring retired personnel. The Services are beginning to put increased emphasis on improving their plans to obtain the civilians they need to meet their wartime support requirements.

V. Manpower Program Summary. The following tables summarize the FY 1986 Defense manpower programs and compare them to the FY 1984 and FY 1985 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

TABLE II-1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1984 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1985 FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1986 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>95.2</u>	<u>93.4</u>	<u>94.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	74.2	72.0	73.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	6.5	6.5	6.1
Strategic Control and Surveillance	14.5	14.9	15.2
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>998.5</u>	<u>1,027.0</u>	<u>1,042.2</u>
Land Forces	558.7	573.2	572.1
Tactical Air Forces	194.7	200.3	207.5
Naval Forces	205.1	213.6	222.3
Mobility Forces	40.0	39.8	40.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>107.2</u>	<u>110.2</u>	<u>110.0</u>
Intelligence	33.6	34.9	35.5
Centrally Managed Communications	39.3	40.0	40.0
Research and Development	23.8	24.9	24.9
Geophysical Activities	10.4	10.4	10.6
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>644.2</u>	<u>637.4</u>	<u>644.7</u>
Base Operating Support	310.1	298.4	300.7
Medical Support	44.3	44.2	45.3
Personnel Support	33.0	31.9	32.4
Individual Training	101.7	105.3	108.0
Force Support Training	48.7	50.1	51.1
Central Logistics	20.0	21.8	21.8
Centralized Support Activities	45.4	45.4	45.3
Management Headquarters	38.3	37.5	37.2
Federal Agency Support	2.8	2.8	2.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>1,845.1</u>	<u>1,868.0</u>	<u>1,892.8</u>
<u>Operating Strength Deviation</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-19.4</u>	<u>-16.3</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>293.1</u>	<u>303.9</u>	<u>301.6</u>
Transients	58.6	67.8	69.3
Patients, Prisoners and Holdees	14.1	10.8	10.9
Students and Trainees			
Cadets and Midshipmen			
<u>Total End-Strength</u>	<u>2,138.2</u>	<u>2,152.5</u>	<u>2,178.1</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

TABLE II-2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1984 Actual	FY 1985 FY 1986	FY 1986 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>24.6</u>	<u>24.6</u>	<u>24.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	13.3	13.0	13.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	10.6	10.9	11.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>784.5</u>	<u>797.4</u>	<u>819.2</u>
Land Forces	600.7	604.8	618.3
Tactical Air Forces	65.4	68.0	70.4
Naval Forces	63.4	66.5	70.5
Mobility Forces	54.9	58.2	60.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>22.2</u>	<u>23.3</u>	<u>24.1</u>
Intelligence	6.0	6.8	7.3
Centrally Managed Communications	12.9	13.4	13.6
Research and Development	1.8	1.5	1.6
Geophysical Activities	1.5	1.5	1.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>178.2</u>	<u>195.4</u>	<u>216.6</u>
Base Operating Support	49.9	51.3	57.6
Medical Support	19.3	26.8	29.9
Personnel Support	6.4	6.7	8.1
Individual Training	73.4	77.2	82.9
Force Support Training	1.1	0.7	0.7
Central Logistics	7.1	7.8	8.4
Centralized Support Activities	14.5	18.4	21.4
Management Headquarters	5.5	5.1	5.7
Federal Agency Support	1.0	1.4	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>1,009.6</u>	<u>1,040.7</u>	<u>1,084.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>36.2</u>	<u>36.3</u>	<u>39.9</u>
Transients	0.7	0.6	0.7
Patients, Prisoners and Holdees	*	0.0	*
Students and Trainees	35.5	35.7	39.2
<u>Total End-Strength</u>	<u>1,045.8</u>	<u>1,077.0</u>	<u>1,124.1</u>

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50

TABLE II-3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1984 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1985 <u>FY 1986</u>	FY 1986 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>11.3</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>12.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	5.9	6.1	6.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.3	3.4	3.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	2.1	2.2	3.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>59.6</u>	<u>62.2</u>	<u>64.4</u>
Land Forces	23.1	24.9	25.8
Tactical Air Forces	15.5	15.8	16.4
Naval Forces	1.1	1.2	1.2
Mobility Forces	19.8	20.4	21.1
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>101.1</u>	<u>101.0</u>	<u>100.9</u>
Intelligence	7.9	8.5	9.0
Centrally Managed Communications	11.8	12.1	12.1
Research and Development	70.6	69.6	68.1
Geophysical Activities	10.7	10.9	11.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>913.7</u>	<u>912.8</u>	<u>928.6</u>
Base Operating Support	355.8	352.4	358.0
Medical Support	22.3	23.0	23.3
Personnel Support	25.1	25.8	26.4
Individual Training	22.8	24.0	25.8
Force Support Training	5.5	5.7	5.7
Central Logistics	383.6	379.1	384.3
Centralized Support Activities	62.3	66.8	68.4
Management Headquarters	36.2	36.1	36.6
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Total	1,085.5	1,087.8	1,106.8

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50.

CHAPTER III
ARMY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction.

A. General. This chapter describes the Army's manpower program requested in the FY 1986 budget for the active military, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and civilian manpower components. It outlines causes for major changes in the manpower program, discusses peacetime manpower readiness, and explains efforts to develop and maintain a highly qualified, efficient, and dedicated military and civilian work force.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements. Army wartime forces are designed to defend our national interests and yet remain within available resources. There are several steps in the force design process:

1. Military Manpower.

- o The programmed combat force is prescribed annually in conceptual form by the Defense Guidance, which establishes the planning scenario and specifies such parameters as warning time and theaters of operation.
- o Support forces needed to sustain combat units are determined by computer-assisted analysis.

This process results in a wartime force structure that varies in strength from about 1.55 to 1.65 million soldiers. Casualty replacements needed to maintain units at fighting strength are then estimated using a warfight simulation. The estimated number of personnel in trainee, transient, prisoner, patient or student status is also calculated.

This establishes a total peak demand for trained military manpower shown below:

	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1990</u>
Peak demand for trained military manpower (in thousands)	2,211 at M+150	2,257 at M+120

The earlier peak demand in the FY 1990 scenario reflects combat simulation results of changes in the planned force structure.

2. Civilian Manpower. The Army's civilian work force provides a large portion of the U.S.-based support for the deployed and deploying military forces. The demand for civilian manpower is based on the number of people needed to ready, deploy and then sustain these forces. The majority of civilians would perform logistics activities, such as maintenance, transportation, supply, engineering and operation of installations.

With the sudden increase in workload from peacetime to wartime the Army's civilian work force must grow immediately in order to provide the support that will enable the military forces to accomplish their mission. Thus, the demand for civilian manpower peaks earlier than the demand for military manpower. The total estimated peak demand for civilian new hires is about 455,000 at M-day.

There are projected shortfalls in the supply of both military and civilian manpower. These shortfalls and plans to offset them are discussed beginning on page III-38.

C. Strength Request. Requested strengths for the Active and Reserve Component and the Civilian Employment Plan are shown below:

Army Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Active Military	780.8	780.9
Selected Reserve		
Army Reserve*	300.5	314.2
Army National Guard	450.5	462.2
Civilians	406.1	408.7

(*Includes 13,315 Individual Mobilization Augmentees in FY 1986 and 13,553 in FY 1987.)

Strengths requested for active forces are based primarily on peacetime missions and budgetary constraints, and do not include the significant increase in manpower which would be needed under full mobilization for global conflict.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Overview. Force structure/manpower plans for FY 1985 - FY 1990 are designed to improve the Total Army's deterrent capability by enhancing combat unit readiness, continuing the modernization program, improving the equipment posture of the Army, increasing productivity of logistics units, improving readiness of the Reserve Components, and expanding Special Operations Forces. The Army will increase its reliance on our Allies and on the US Army Reserve for wartime logistics support of combat forces. The following tables display the strength changes which will result, by major Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) for the active, Selected Reserve, and civilian components. (Note: Due to rounding, detail in the tables may not add to the totals shown.)

Army Active Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5
Tactical/Mobility	474.6	472.0	474.9	476.6	475.7	475.8
Auxiliary Activities	30.4	29.9	29.8	29.6	29.6	29.6
Support Activities	171.9	173.9	173.1	171.0	171.1	170.3
Individuals 1/	103.4	104.5	102.6	103.2	104.0	104.8
TOTALS	780.8	780.8	780.9	780.9	780.9	780.9

U.S. Army Reserve Manpower Program by DPPC.
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC 2/	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3	.3
Tactical/Mobility	187.9	194.3	205.3	212.2	217.8	219.9
Auxiliary Activities	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7	.7
Support Activities	74.2	79.0	80.5	82.4	83.6	84.0
Individuals 3/	10.6	12.9	13.8	12.9	11.4	10.8
Indiv Mob Aug	11.9	13.3	13.6	19.6	22.9	24.9
TOTALS	285.6	300.5	314.2	328.2	336.7	340.6

Army National Guard Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC 2/	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Tactical/Mobility	386.9	392.4	396.7	409.0	422.2	429.9
Support Activities	34.5	39.6	42.6	45.8	46.7	46.9
Individuals 3/	17.0	18.5	22.8	22.8	22.8	22.8
TOTALS	438.4	450.5	462.2	477.6	491.7	499.7

Army Civilian (Direct and Indirect Hire)
Manpower Program by DPPC
(End Strength in Thousands)

DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2	.2
Tactical/Mobility	26.7	27.6	27.2	27.7	27.9	28.2
Auxiliary Activities	28.2	26.3	27.0	27.1	27.1	27.1
Support Activities	346.3	352.0	354.3	353.3	353.9	353.5
TOTALS	401.4	406.1	408.7	408.3	409.1	408.9

1/ Includes force structure deviation (over and under manning)

2/ End Strength totals for DPPC shown for USAR and ARNG do not agree with DPPC totals in Tables III-4 and III-7 because the DPPC data in the tables is based upon programmed manning, not end strength.

3/ Training/Pay Category F only.

2. The FY 1986 Program. FY 1986 will again be a year of dynamic change designed to improve manning of Reserve Component units, continue modernization and improve strategic deployability. Heavy divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) will continue conversion to a streamlined Division 86 design and will gain a marked increase in capability. Implementation of light infantry improvements will also continue. The 7th Infantry Division (converted in FY 1985) will validate the new light infantry design, the 25th Division will convert to the light design, the 6th Division (Light) will begin activation in Alaska, and the 10th Mountain Division will continue activation in both New York and Georgia. Reserve Component (RC) responsibilities will increase as their strength increases. The Army National Guard (ARNG) will increase manning of its combat units. It will also consolidate two separate infantry brigades from Virginia and Maryland to form a light infantry division in FY 1986, bringing ARNG total divisional structure to four heavy, one light, and five standard infantry divisions. The US Army Reserve will continue to provide a large part of the tactical support for the Total Force in any conflict. Total Army support structure, constrained by resources and the resultant Army decision to maintain a constant active end-strength, remains below current estimates of Total Army needs. However, the Army continues to "scrub" its support force needs, increase the productivity of existing and planned support units, and increase its reliance on civilian manpower, contingency contracting, and Host Nation Support (HNS). Despite those efforts, when the unmanned, unequipped structure not shown in Table III-1 but needed in a global scenario for wartime support of the existing combat structure is considered, some shortfall in tactical support for combat forces will almost certainly remain. Civilian strength will also increase slightly to provide additional needed support for force modernization, to improve family support, and to release military personnel for duty in tactical units.

3. Active Component. FY 1986 active force structure changes occur in the Continental United States (CONUS), Europe, and the Pacific regions. New Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) will be implemented in the combat structure of most divisions.

a. CONUS. The 10th Mountain Division, activated in FY 1985 at Fort Drum, New York, will form the second of its two active component brigades and its reconnaissance battalion. The 6th Infantry Division will activate in Alaska using the existing 172d Infantry Brigade as a nucleus. Six heavy divisions will reorganize their existing aviation elements into combat aviation brigades. Three attack helicopter battalions will be equipped with the AH-64 Apache helicopter. Other activations include an attack helicopter company and support squadron for the CONUS-based armored cavalry regiment, and three air defense artillery battalions (PATRIOT). The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) will be restructured to a smaller size, and the 9th Infantry Division will complete its transition to a High Technology Motorized design. One combat aviation battalion, an air defense battery (Chaparral), and a maintenance company will be inactivated.

b. Europe. The Army will activate two long range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) companies (one for each corps), one field artillery battalion (MLRS), and two heavy truck companies. Conversion to a streamlined Division 86 configuration will continue with three divisions reorganizing their aviation elements into combat aviation brigades.

Three air defense battalions (HAWK) and one air defense battalion (Gun/Stinger) will also be modernized. Four engineer battalion headquarters and one air defense battalion (HAWK) will inactivate. These changes will be accomplished within end-strength constraints prescribed for military units in European NATO countries. Host Nation Support will continue to be a vital ingredient to necessary tactical support for Army Forces in Europe.

c. Pacific. The 25th Infantry Division will convert to light infantry design. In so doing, it will activate a third active component brigade and a field artillery battalion, and will reorganize its aviation elements. In Korea, the 2d Infantry Division will reorganize its armor and signal battalions.

4. Reserve Component.

a. Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

(1) The Total Army must be prepared for a broad spectrum of conflict. The mix of active and reserve forces is predicated on several factors, the most important of which are the potential mission and required responsiveness. Other factors include the number and type of skills required, recruiting ability and overall costs. Recruiting is discussed in more detail in later sections. Affordability is achieved by increasing reliance on the ARNG and USAR as essential elements of the national defense. This increased reliance will be possible due primarily to a 26,994 increase in the FY 1986 RC end strength at a time when the AC end strength remains essentially constant. Most of this increase is to improve manning of RC combat units. The use of RC soldiers will provide a less costly means of enhancing the Army's ability to meet increasing world-wide contingencies. Approximately 50 percent of the Total Army force structure and 68 percent of the non-divisional combat service support force are in the RC.

(2) An increase in RC force structure alone, however, will not solve problems anticipated during the early stages of conflict. The role of the RC has become increasingly important because the early demand for combat and support forces has outstripped the ability of the active component to provide them. A fully integrated AC/RC force is now essential. This integration is achieved through a variety of programs:

- Modernization/Unit Conversions. In FY 1986, RC heavy units will continue to convert to Division 86 design. These conversions will allow RC units to adopt the latest Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs), compatible with AC unit designs. Units converting include:

17 Hospitals	5 Attack Helicopter Battalions
14 Engineer Companies	1 Target Acquisition Battery
5 Artillery Battalions	5 Ordnance/Ammunition Companies
22 Artillery Brigade Headquarters	9 Support Battalions
11 Infantry Div/Brigade Headquarters	3 Cavalry Regiments
16 Infantry Battalions	10 Cavalry Squadrons
6 Armor Battalions	2 Truck Companies
3 Chemical Companies	1 Maintenance Battalion
	1 Chaparral Battalion

- Equipment Modernization. The Army will continue to distribute new systems to the RC at a total cost of approximately \$1.5 billion in FY 1986. These include communications systems, tanks, helicopters, artillery radar, automatic data processing systems, and trucks. This new equipment will eventually provide the RC with modern systems compatible with those in AC units.

- Training. RC units continue to achieve substantial training success through AC/RC combined training efforts both in local training and in field exercises such as BOLD EAGLE, GALLANT EAGLE, REFORGER, etc. In FY 1986 the RC will send three maneuver battalions for field exercises at the National Training Center. Training simulation devices will also begin to be provided to RC units in increasing quantities (e.g., the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System).

- Command Relationships. The Army's extremely successful CAPSTONE program provides greatly improved continuity in wartime planning and training. Under CAPSTONE, many AC and RC units train together for the wartime missions which they will be performing. In addition, to eliminate layering and duplication of missions, the Army replaced nine Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions (ARMR) with two Continental Army (CONUSA) headquarters in FY 1984 and FY 1985.

- Assignment of New Missions. Additional non-divisional support missions are being transferred to the RC in FY 1986. As the RC assumes these new responsibilities, additional active component military manpower will be available to the AC for other Army missions. The rationale used to determine these transfers is at Appendix D. FY 1986 AC-to-RC mission transfers are one engineer battalion and two engineer companies.

- Roundout Program. This is a program in which RC maneuver battalions and brigades are integrated in AC divisions and separate brigades to alleviate structure shortfalls in AC organizations. Five RC brigades and six maneuver battalions will round out AC units in FY 1986. Eight of eighteen AC divisions will have maneuver roundout units. The Roundout Program improves RC capability by allocating resources to the roundout unit consistent with those provided to their affiliated AC units and by establishing closer planning and training relationships.

b. US Army Reserve (USAR).

(1) The USAR will focus on improving force readiness and modernizing the force in FY 1986. This will be accomplished by converting many USAR units to modernized structures with modern equipment compatible with the AC or ARNG unit supported, by participating in joint and combined training exercises, and by assuming responsibility for and training for new missions. The Full Time Support Program will increase by 3,218.

(2) In FY 1986, the USAR will activate two chemical smoke companies, four chemical decontamination companies, a water supply company, two heavy equipment maintenance companies, two light equipment maintenance companies, three military intelligence companies (of which two will support AC separate heavy brigades), and three combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) battalions (in support of ARNG divisions).

c. Army National Guard (ARNG).

(1) The ARNG will continue in FY 1986 to improve force readiness by increasing combat unit manning, activating new combat units, and modernizing equipment and organizations. The Full Time Support Program, which assists Reserve Component units in achieving the required levels of readiness by providing individual reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission, will increase by 10,114 personnel. ARNG units will also continue conversion to Division 86 design as the Total Army standardizes its organizational structure and equipment. Where appropriate, additional missions will be transferred from the active component to the ARNG.

(2) In FY 1986, the ARNG will activate the division headquarters and one brigade headquarters for the 29th Infantry Division (Light), three aviation battalions, four aviation companies, three combat support battalions, and eight combat support companies. In addition, the ARNG will modernize four air defense battalions, six armor battalions, two attack helicopter battalions, four aviation companies, five ammunition companies, ten cavalry squadrons, one engineer battalion, thirteen engineer companies, twenty-eight field artillery batteries, sixteen infantry battalions, eight support battalions, and nine brigade headquarters companies.

5. Civilian Component. The FY 1986 increase in Army civilian manpower is due to increased reliance on the civilian component to support force modernization and force structuring initiatives as active component strength remains constant. Civilians will perform additional spare parts management, ammunition management in Europe, and medical functions in addition to the significant roles they continue to perform in management, logistics, procurement, research and quality of life programs.

E. Key Manpower Issues. FY 1986 Army manpower initiatives seek to improve the quality and stability of the Army's work force.

Quality: The quality of manpower has significantly improved in the last four years and has resulted in better training, higher quality reenlistments and improved readiness. The success of modernization programs will depend heavily on maintaining this quality as national economic conditions create an environment less favorable to recruiting and retaining soldiers. Enlistment bonuses, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, special incentives, competitive compensation, the new Educational Assistance Program and family life programs will need continued Congressional support as the Army seeks to recruit and retain soldiers with high-tech skills.

Stability: Stability will also be emphasized in FY 1986, as the Army force structure adjusts to the recent light division initiatives and other extensive change due to modernization and restructuring of heavy divisions. A fair and competitive level of compensation for both active and retired personnel will help support the personnel stability the Army needs, as will the New Manning system, which enables soldiers to train, deploy and remain with the same units under the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system. Continuation of the FY 1985 Authorization Act provision which eliminates statutory civilian end strength ceilings will also enhance stability, since it provides significant flexibility to respond to changing workloads and reduce the use of borrowed military manpower.

II. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General. The active Army entered FY 1984 with an authorized strength of 780,000 and was successful in meeting recruiting and retention goals. Active Army military end strength is programmed to continue at about 781,000 through 1990 as the Army modernizes its forces without increasing active military end strength. This will be achieved while restructuring the force, activating two additional light divisions, refining the heavy division design, reconfiguring two divisions to light division design, and integrating Reserve Component units with the active force.

2. Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength.

a. Table III-1 shows that from FY 1984 to FY 1986 the manning of the active Army structure will decrease from 91 to 90 percent. In FY 1986 the Army plans to man 676,200 of the total 750,800 peacetime programmed structure, leaving 74,600 spaces unmanned, mostly in divisional forces. Although the overall combat structure declines slightly, combat structure is more fully manned than in 1984. Tactical support structure increases more rapidly than manning with the result that tactical support manpower fill decreases from 83 to 79 percent of structure. Furthermore, there is a significant amount of tactical support structure that the Army's requirements analyses say is needed, but not included in the programmed manpower structure tables in this report.

b. Structure estimates by DPPC for Army TDA activities, reflected mostly in Auxiliary and Support Activities, are approximations.

c. The FY 1984 operating strength deviation of -11,900 means that the number of soldiers actually manning the force structure on the last day of the fiscal year was 669,500 instead of the 681,400 programmed. On the average, however, throughout the year (as opposed to just the last day of the fiscal year), the Army force structure was only undermanned by 900 soldiers. This undermanning is programmed to be nearly eliminated in FY 1986.

TABLE III-1
ACTIVE ARMY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000s)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	PROG MNPWR STRCT*	FY 84		FY 85		FY 86	
		PROG MAN- NING	% MNG	PROG MNPWR STRCT*	% MNG	PROG MAN- NING	% MNG
TACTICAL/MOBILITY							
Land Forces	525.4	475.7	91	517.8	474.6	92	519.9
Division Forces	525.0	475.3	90	517.4	474.3	92	519.6
Divisional Increment	477.6	432.4	90	473.3	434.8	92	475.1
Non-divisional Combat Increment	(265.7)	(255.3)	(96)	(253.8)	(247.7)	(97)	(248.8)
Tactical Support Increment	(82.9)	(70.6)	(85)	(81.2)	(75.6)	(93)	(85.9)
Theater Forces	(129.0)	(106.5)	(83)	(138.3)	(111.5)	(81)	(140.4)
Mobility Forces	47.4	42.9	91	44.1	36.5	90	44.5
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES							
Intelligence	32.3	29.9	93	33.9	30.4	90	33.2
Centrally Managed Communications	10.1	9.2	91	10.5	9.4	90	10.5
Research and Development	15.9	15.0	94	16.9	15.5	92	16.2
Geophysical Activities	6.1	5.5	90	6.3	5.4	86	6.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES							
Base Operating Support	192.9	175.3	91	197.0	171.9	87	197.1
Medical Support	60.2	54.8	91	61.5	51.7	84	62.1
Personnel Support	20.4	18.4	90	21.2	18.5	87	21.4
Individual Training	13.5	13.0	96	13.9	12.9	93	13.9
Force Support Training	49.0	44.6	91	50.5	45.1	89	50.5
Central Logistics	4.4	4.3	98	4.5	4.1	91	4.5
Centralized Support Activities	10.3	8.8	85	10.6	9.0	85	10.6
Management Headquarters	22.4	21.5	96	21.7	20.8	95	21.4
Federal Agency Support	12.5	9.9	79	12.9	9.5	74	12.5
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE							
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION: (MANYEARS)	-	-11.9	-	-	-3.5	-	-3.7
INDIVIDUALS	-	(-0.9)	-	-	(-0.1)	-	(-0.3)
END-STRENGTH	-	110.5	-	-	106.9	-	108.2
		<u>780.2</u>			<u>780.8</u>		<u>780.8</u>

NOTE: Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

* Programmed manpower structure values for TDA auxiliary and support activities are approximate since structure for these units/activities cannot be computed by specific DPPC.

3. Skill and Grade. The data in Table III-2 indicate that the Army remains misaligned (over and underfilled) within many skills and grades. For example, approximately 25 percent of enlisted skills are short and nearly 30 percent are over; about 55 percent of field grade officer skills are short. An integrated Force Alignment Plan to alleviate both officer and NCO branch and skill imbalances through promotions, voluntary reclassifications, reenlistments and force structure changes has been approved for implementation beginning in January 1985 and continuing through 1990. These actions should help increase readiness. Centralized selection boards will convene quarterly to consider other than Regular Army officers for conditional voluntary indefinite and voluntary indefinite status.

4. Experience. The data in Table III-3 indicate that the Army has a seasoned leadership cadre. No significant changes are projected for either FY 1985 or FY 1986.

TABLE III-3
ACTIVE ARMY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY*
(Strength in 000s)

	ACTUAL FY 1984			PROGRAMMED FY 1985			PROGRAMMED FY 1986		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVG YOS
E1-E4									
PMI**	386.7			387.4			388.3		
Inventory	392.0	46.3	2.2	391.1	42.6	2.1	392.5	42.6	2.2
E5-E9									
PMI	27.5			276.3			278.6		
Inventory	275.7	259.0	10.4	276.4	258.9	10.4	274.0	256.2	10.4
TOTAL E1-E9									
PMI	664.1			663.7			667.0		
Inventory	667.7	305.4	5.6	667.6	301.4	5.5	666.5	300.5	5.5
WARRANT OFFICER									
PMI	15.7			16.2			16.7		
Inventory	15.3	14.8	13.5	15.6	14.7	12.9	15.7	14.9	12.8
O1 - O3									
PMI	59.0			60.7			61.6		
Inventory	59.7	29.5	7.5	60.0	30.0	7.2	60.8	30.3	7.1
O4 - O6									
PMI	35.3			35.8			36.7		
Inventory	32.8	32.2	15.3	33.2	32.7	15.4	33.7	33.0	15.3
TOTAL O1 - O6									
PMI	94.8			96.5			98.4		
Inventory	92.5	61.7	10.3	93.2	62.7	10.1	94.4	63.2	10.0

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding. Excludes US Military Academy Cadets.

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

TABLE III-2 ACTIVE SKILL AND GRADE
AND PROTECTED INVENTORY VERSES DOCUMENTED MANNING AND INDUSTRY

ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED HANING AND INDIVIDUALS (LPN)*** (Strength in 000s)									
FY 1984					FY 1985				
OVER*		BAL*		TOTAL	OVER*		BAL*		TOTAL
EL - E4	Number of Skills	123	104	160	267	168	101	169	378
	PHM	107.7	159.0	119.8	386.7	95.4	210.4	90.6	387.4
	Inventory	139.0	159.6	93.3	392.0	111.6	210.6	77.9	391.1
	Over/Short	+31.4	+5.5	-26.5	+5.3	+16.2	+2.2	-12.7	+3.7
ES - E9	Number of Skills	109	151	127	387	88	215	75	378
	PHM	45.3	154.2	78.0	277.5	33.2	206.7	36.5	276.3
	Inventory	58.3	155.2	62.2	275.7	41.4	209.1	25.9	276.4
	Over/Short	+13.0	+1.0	-15.8	-1.8	+8.2	+2.5	-10.6	+1.0
Total EL - E9	Number of Skills	116	174	103	387	109	171	98	378
	PHM	118.9	378.8	106.4	664.1	112.8	431.7	119.2	663.7
	Inventory	154.4	381.0	132.3	667.7	133.1	434.3	100.1	667.6
	Over/Short	+35.4	+2.2	-36.1	+3.6	+20.3	+2.6	-19.1	+3.8
Warrant Officer	Number of Skills	54	10	64					
	PHM	7.1	8.6	15.7					
	Inventory	7.3	8.1	15.3					
	Over/Short	+2.2	-5	-4					
01 - 03	Number of Skills	5	39	1	45	5	40	1	46
	PHM	6.0	52.3	-8	59.0	8.3	51.6	8	54.9
	Inventory	6.7	52.3	-7	59.7	9.0	50.3	-7	53.3
	Over/Short	+7.7	+7.7	-1	+7.7	+1.7	-1.3	-7	+8.8
04 - 06	Number of Skills	1	19	25	45		21	46	
	PHM	-8	6.2	28.4	35.3		8.7	27.1	35.8
	Inventory	-8	5.9	26.1	32.8		8.6	24.6	33.2
	Over/Short	+1.1	+1.2	-2.3	-2.5		-1.1	-2.5	-2.6
TOTAL 01 - 06	Number of Skills	44	1	45			1	43	44
	PHM	94.5	-3	94.8	5.0		89.5	2.0	96.5
	Inventory	92.2	-3	92.5	5.3		86.1	1.6	93.2
	Over/Short	-2.3	+3.4	-2.4	+3.4		-3.4	-3.4	-3.5

* See definitions in Appendix B, numbers may not add due to rounding
** Excludes cadets

5. Personnel Management.

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting.

(a) Overview. The Army met its overall recruiting objective in FY 1984 and improved the quality of its accessions. The active Army recruited 90.8 percent high school graduates, an increase of 2.2 percent over FY 1983. Force modernization requires that the Army continue to emphasize the need for high quality enlistees. In order to achieve this goal in an increasingly competitive recruiting environment (declining labor pool, improving economy, decreased unemployment), the Army must rely on such incentives as fair and competitive compensation, the new Educational Assistance Program, and enlistment bonus incentives.

Enlisted Accession Plan.
(In thousands)

<u>Category</u>	FY 84		FY 85	FY 86
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	10.4	10.6	7.5	10.0
Non-Prior Service	131.4	131.7	132.1	136.6
Male	114.2	114.5	115.6	120.1
(Male I-IIIa)	70.5	70.7	67.1	68.1
(HSDG)	102.2	102.3	103.5	107.3
(HSDG I-IIIa)	58.4	58.4	55.0	55.4
Female	17.2	17.2	16.5	16.5
(Female I-IIIa)	13.0	12.9	13.0	12.5
(HSDG)	17.2	17.2	16.5	16.5
(HSDG I-IIIa)	13.0	12.9	13.0	12.5

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding

(b) Quality. In FY 1985 and beyond, the Army will continue its objective of recruiting the number of high school graduate and Test Category I-IIIa people required to build a more ready force. The Army accession goal is to recruit 59-63 percent Test Category I-IIIa soldiers each year, to recruit at least 90 percent High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG), and to limit Test Category IV accessions to less than 10 percent each year. These goals are well within the Congressional floor of 65 percent high school graduates and the ceiling of 20 percent Test Score Category IV. Failure to achieve the Army recruiting goals for quality would adversely affect force readiness and modernization since non-high school graduates tend to have higher attrition rates and recruits from lower mental categories tend to be more difficult to train. This results in decreased unit stability and cohesion, increased training requirements and added expense.

(2) Retention. While the Army achieved its aggregate reenlistment objective and improved enlisted force alignment in FY 1984, the outlook for FY 1985 and FY 1986 is not as bright. Success in retaining the right numbers and skills in the enlisted career force will be contingent,

as in recruiting, upon the state of the national economy. In addition, a fair, competitive, and reasonably secure level of compensation, for both active and retired personnel, adequate Selective Reenlistment Bonus funding, and various educational opportunities will be extremely important to maintenance of the career force.

Reenlistments
(in thousands)

	FY 84		FY 85	FY 86
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Initial Term	28.4	28.4	27.8	30.4
Mid Term	25.0	24.3	22.6	21.3
Career	23.4	23.2	22.5	22.1
Total	76.8	76.6	72.9	73.8

(3) NCO Shortages. One of the keys to an effective fighting force is having a qualified NCO of the right grade and MOS in every position. As the Army modernizes and adds two new divisions, the need for NCOs in the top five grades will increase. Despite this increased need and possible shortfalls in reenlistments, the Army's fill of the top five enlisted grades is expected to be maintained in FY 1985 and FY 1986 through promotion of eligible soldiers. However, some spot shortages or overages will continue to exist, with shortages concentrated in the electronic warfare, intelligence, and chemical specialties.

(4) Overseas Extension Incentive Program (OEIP). Public Law 96-579 offers incentives to soldiers in designated skills who elect to extend their overseas tours for a minimum of 12 months. Initially, the incentive program targeted 34 space imbalanced MOS (SIMOS). The program now includes approximately 33,000 soldiers in 88 SIMOS which are experiencing short turn-around times in CONUS assignments. The incentives currently are either \$50 per month for the period of the extension, 30 days of non-chargeable leave, or 15 days of non-chargeable leave and travel to and from CONUS at government expense. About 2,800 soldiers are extending under the current program each year. The program benefits both the Army and the soldier. By slowing the rotation rate, there is less family turbulence and more time in CONUS for soldiers and their families, while Army readiness improves through the resultant stability and cohesion in units.

b. Officer/Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions.

(a) Accession Program. FY 1984 was a good year for the recruitment of active component officers. In FY 1984, the Army met its accession goal and achieved an officer end-strength of 107,883. In FY 1986, the Army plans to access 9,526 commissioned officers and warrant officers into the active component to meet an end-strength objective of 110,000 needed for force modernization and for the Army's new light divisions. Accession goals and achievements by fiscal year are shown below:

Active Component Officer/Warrant Officer

	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Programmed	11,030	10,616	9,893	9,526
Actual	10,640	11,080*		

*Actual accessions were higher than originally programmed to compensate for greater losses than originally programmed.

(b) Accession Trends.

[1] The primary source of officer accessions continues to be the ROTC units located in over 300 colleges across the nation. Although senior ROTC enrollment has decreased by 3 percent from FY 1984, the Army expects to continue to graduate approximately 8,300 commissioned officers annually from ROTC in FY 1985 and FY 1986. While this will satisfy active component needs, the reserve components will suffer the shortfalls shown in section IIB.

[2] ROTC will increase the number of officer graduates in academic disciplines which meet Army skill needs. The 12,000 Army ROTC scholarships (covering 2, 3, or 4 years) currently in effect will continue to be used to attract high quality students majoring in the fields of science and engineering. In FY 1986, ROTC will produce an academic mix of:

	<u>Business</u>	<u>Engineering</u>	<u>Science</u>	<u>Social Sci</u>	<u>Others</u>
Required, FY 86	30%	20%	20%	20%	10%
Historical Experience	24%	8%	10%	42%	16%

(2) Retention. Officer retention in FY 1984 was not a problem due in large measure to improved public attitudes toward the military. Retention in FY 1985 and FY 1986 will be maintained partly by selective continuation of captains and majors in shortage specialties who are not selected for promotion and by extension of minimum time in grade for voluntary retirement. Also, beginning in November 1984, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) requires 3 years time-in-grade for retirement (as opposed to 2 years previously) for lieutenant colonels and colonels. As with the enlisted force, a fair, competitive and reasonably stable level of compensation for both active and retired personnel will continue to be an important factor in retaining experienced, high quality officers as the economy continues to improve.

6. Stability.

a. Aggregate Population Stability. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in service over the period of a year. Lower attrition, higher overall personnel quality, and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1980 to FY 1984.

Aggregate Population Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	90.1	91.7	91.8	92.6	91.8
Enlisted	78.7	81.7	82.5	80.1	80.8

b. Unit Personnel Stability. This measure reflects the number of personnel who remain in the same unit over the course of a year. Unit stability for officers and enlisted personnel has been relatively constant from FY 1980 to FY 1984. The primary cause of relatively low unit stability is the large proportion of first-term enlistees on three year or less contracts. Stability is expected to remain constant in FY 1985 and FY 1986 as the improvements due to the Army's New Manning System are offset by the inevitable temporary turbulence caused by light division activation and conversion and Division 86 redesign. Officer stability declined in FY 1984 due to increased attendance at schools.

Unit Personnel Stability

(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	40.2	42.4	43.1	42.9	40.5
Enlisted	36.5	39.8	36.6	35.9	36.0

7. Readiness Assessment.

a. The rising quality of active component soldiers has greatly contributed to improved personnel readiness. The Army has experienced significant gains in the percentage of recruits with high school diplomas and a major reduction in low test score recruits. While a diploma or high test scores do not guarantee better performance, they do indicate that the soldier is more likely to complete his enlistment, is less prone to problems of indiscipline, and is demonstrably more trainable. These gains in first-term quality also allow the Army to limit reenlistment to competent, professional soldiers with demonstrated leadership potential. Reduced crime statistics, lower AWOL and desertion rates, and a significant decrease in drug abuse further attest to the quality and professionalism of today's soldiers.

b. Another important personnel readiness improvement has been the near elimination of our long-standing NCO shortage during 1984. This improvement is expected to continue in FY 1985 and FY 1986, although there is still concern about shortages in high-tech, highly marketable skills.

c. Readiness has also been enhanced by efforts to foster cohesion throughout the Active Army. Innovative leadership and management actions, regimental affiliation, and broadening of the COHORT unit rotation system are working to strengthen unit cohesion and the bond among soldiers.

d. Manpower readiness of combat units is expected to improve as planned manning levels of these units increase from the 96 percent in FY 1986 toward the goal of 100 percent. Tactical support units will be manned at 79 percent in FY 1986. This support manning shortfall remains an area the Army is trying to improve.

8. New Manning System.

a. The Army's New Manning System (NMS) was created to increase combat effectiveness by stabilizing soldiers and enhancing cohesion in units. This goal is being achieved through implementation of two major initiatives: a unit movement system (supplemented by the existing individual replacement system) to achieve stability and cohesion; and a regimental system to enhance esprit and give soldiers a long-term sense of identification with a specific set of unit colors.

b. For the past three years the Army has been evaluating the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) unit replacement system as a means of stabilizing soldiers and enhancing unit cohesion. Under the unit replacement system, combat arms soldiers are recruited, go through initial entry training in groups, and report as a group to a Continental United States (CONUS) installation. Upon arrival, initial entry soldiers join their company level leaders for a stabilized three-year unit life cycle. These units complete collective training and remain in CONUS for 18 months, if deploying to a long-tour area, such as Europe; for 24 months, if preparing for deployment to a short-tour area such as Korea; or for 36 months, if designated not to deploy overseas. Units scheduled to deploy overseas do so at a predesignated time. Upon completion of the overseas tour, a unit is replaced by another unit deployed from CONUS.

c. Initial COHORT unit assessments have been encouraging, with apparent improvements in several measured activities such as higher personnel stability, lower attrition rates, and higher skill qualification test scores. More important are the perceptions of improved combat effectiveness expressed by commanders and soldiers identifying a greater psychological strength to withstand the stress of war.

d. The Army is studying the possibility of expanding the current company/battery replacement system to a battalion rotation system. This program will also keep first-term soldiers with their leaders for three years, while allowing fully combat ready battalions to rotate between CONUS and overseas every three years.

First term soldiers are assigned to the rotating battalion at the 18-month point of the unit's tour, both CONUS and overseas. Leaders are assigned to units only during specific time periods. The COHORT battalion does not disestablish as in the company/battery replacement model but continues to serve as a fully manned and trained unit indefinitely. Battalion rotation will build upon the positive aspects of COHORT company/battery replacement and will result in increased combat effectiveness.

e. As of the end of January 1985, 77 COHORT companies/batteries and two COHORT battalions are in the Army with 77 and 13, respectively, programmed by the end of FY 1985. Approximately 74 COHORT companies/batteries and 24 battalions are programmed for the end of FY 1986. Eleven COHORT company-size units have deployed to Europe, seven to Korea, and one to Alaska.

f. The US Army Regimental System is based on groupings of linked, similar battalions, both in the continental United States and overseas linked under one regimental flag or "color". The regiment is a community of battalions to which a soldier is assigned and with which the soldier identifies. The regimental system is non-tactical and does not replace current tactical organizations. The regimental system fosters cohesion, esprit, and identification by affiliating soldiers with a single regiment throughout their careers, with repetitive troop assignments to units of the same regiment. A regimental program has been implemented, and to date 15 regiments have been designated.

g. The evaluation of the NMS is being conducted with infantry, armor and cannon field artillery units. Application of the concept to other combat arms units along with combat support, and combat service support units is under development.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve:

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Army Reserve (USAR).

(a) General. The growth in the USAR that began in FY 1979 continued through FY 1984 with the Selected Reserve showing an increase in end strength of 8,874 over FY 1983. This trend should continue due to Congressional support of the Selected Reserves Incentive Program (SRIP), the increasing use of full time personnel, and recruiting, training and retention efforts. The FY 1984 Selected Reserve end strength of 275,062 includes paid drill strength (PDS) (255,393), Active Guard Reserve (AGR) (8,822), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) (10,847). The achievement of this PDS was the result of successful recruiting and retention. The quality of soldiers recruited for USAR units also improved. The number of high school graduates increased to an all-time high of 81.8 percent, while the percentage of USAR personnel in test score category I-IIIA improved 7.1 percent to 46.7 percent.

(b) Structure, Manning and Operating Strength.

[1] The Army Reserve structure shown in Table III-4 increases by 4,700 in FY 1985 and 7,000 in FY 1986 to a total of 302,400. The programmed manning of this structure increases 2,500 in FY 1985 and 3,900 in FY 1986 (excluding Individual Mobilization Augmentees, which do not man USAR structure), to a total of 283,300. As force structure increases faster than the programmed manning of that structure, there is a slight decrease in the percentage of the structure which is manned. This is particularly true for tactical support forces, where the structure increases by 16,900, yet programmed manning increases only 7,200.

(Strengths in thousands)

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Force Structure	290.7	295.4	302.4
Program Manning ^{1/}	276.9	279.5	283.3
Difference	13.8(95)	15.9(95)	19.1(94)

[2] However, actual manning of units is based on trained end strength in units, not programmed manning. As the data in Table III-4 show, the USAR has not requested sufficient end strength to man its units at the programmed manning level. USAR units will actually be manned by trained personnel at 84 percent in FY 1986 rather than the 94 percent shown.

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Force Structure Allowance (FSA) (Prog Manning) ^{1/}	276.9	279.5	283.3
Planned Operating Strength	<u>236.4</u>	<u>244.0</u>	<u>256.6</u>
Operating Strength Deviation (OSD)	-40.5	-35.5	-26.7

[3] As operating strength continues to increase, the number of trainees in the individuals account increases by 2,700 to insure actual manning of the force structure does not decline. End strength increases are proportional to the increase in operating strength.

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Operating Strength	236.4	244.0	256.6
IMA	+10.8	+11.9	+13.3
Individuals	+27.9	+29.7	+30.6
End Strength	<u>275.1</u>	<u>285.6</u>	<u>300.5</u>

[4] A significant aspect of Table III-4 is the increase of the individuals allowance from 7,100 last year to 27,900. Previously, only those personnel in Pay Category F were reported. However,

^{1/} Excludes IMA's

TABLE III-4
US ARMY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000's)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1984				FY 1985				FY 1986			
	PRGMD	PRGMD*	% MNPWR	% MAN- NING	PRGMD	PRGMD	% MNPWR	% MAN- NING	PRGMD	PRGMD	% MNPWR	% MAN- NING
	MNPWR	STRCT	MNC	STRCT	MNPWR	MAN- NING	MNG	MNG	MNPWR	STRCT	MNG	MNG
STRATEGIC												
Defensive Strategic Forces	.3	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	.3	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	.3	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	.3	100	.3	.3	.3	100
Land Forces	207.6	199.6	[.5]	96	220.6	206.6	[.6]	93	228.6	210.7	[.7]	92
Division Forces	205.9	197.9	[.5]	96	218.8	204.8	[.6]	93	226.8	208.9	[.7]	92
Division Increment	183.7	177.0	[.5]	96	196.4	183.5	[.6]	93	204.4	187.5	[.6]	92
Non-divisional Combat Increment	(2.9)	(2.7)	(93)	(2.9)	(2.7)	(93)	(2.7)	(93)	(4.6)	(4.5)	(4.6)	(98)
Tactical Support Increment	(31.6)	(29.3)	(93)	(33.1)	(30.8)	(93)	(30.8)	(93)	(33.0)	(30.8)	(33.0)	(93)
Theater Force	(149.2)	(145.0)	(97)	(160.4)	(150.0)	(94)	(166.8)	(152.2)	(166.8)	(152.2)	(166.8)	(91)
Mobility Forces	22.2	20.9	[.5]	92	22.4	21.3	[.6]	92	22.4	21.4	[.7]	92
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES												
Intelligence	.5	2.2	[1.7]	100	.5	2.4	[1.9]	100	.5	2.6	[2.1]	100
Central Managed Communications	.1	1.4	[.9]	100	.5	1.5	[1.0]	100	.5	1.6	[1.1]	100
Research and Development	.1	.1	[.1]		.2	.2	[.2]		.2	.2	[.2]	
Geophysical Activities	.3	.3	[.3]		.3	.3	[.3]		.3	.3	[.3]	
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES												
Base Operating Support	82.3	85.6	[8.6]	94	72.7	82.1	[9.4]	100	73.0	83.1	[10.6]	99
Medical Support	5.4	6.0	[.6]	100	5.7	6.4	[.7]	100	5.7	6.5	[.8]	100
Personnel Support	9.2	10.4	[1.2]	100	8.6	9.9	[1.3]	100	8.7	10.1	[1.5]	99
Individual Training	4	4	[.4]		4	4	[.4]		4	5	[.5]	
Force Support Training	63.6	59.9	[1.6]	92	54.5	56.3	[1.7]	100	54.9	56.0	[1.9]	99
Central Logistics	1.6	1.6			1.6	1.6			1.6	1.8		
Centralized Support Activities	3.7	3.8	[1.1]	100	3.7	3.9	[1.2]	100	3.7	3.9	[1.2]	100
Management Headquarters	.1	1.2	[1.1]	100	.1	1.3	[1.2]	100	.1	1.4	[1.3]	100
Federal Agency Support	.3	.8	[.5]	100	.6	[.6]			.3	1.0	[.7]	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	290.7	287.7	[10.8]	95	295.4	291.3	[11.9]	95	302.4	296.6	[13.3]	94
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION:												
(MANYEARS)												
INDIVIDUALS		(-48.5*)										
END-STRENGTH		27.9*										
		275.1										
		285.6										
		275.1										
		29.8										
		30.6										
		300.5										

*The Individuals Account and Operating Strength Deviations shown include Training/Pay Categories F, P, Q, U, and T. If the data reflected Category F only, the Individuals Account would have been 7.1K rather than 27.9K and operating strength deviation would be -19.7K.

**Force Structure Allowance (IMA's shown in brackets are included in programmed manning totals for USAR, but not included in percent manning, since they are members of the Selected Reserve but man active structure.)

the Secretary of the Army directed the establishment of a Reserve Components Individual Account Allowance (effective 1 October 1984) as a better way to portray the non-deployability of personnel in the training pipeline. Historically, these personnel (Pay Categories T, P, Q, and U) were counted in unit operating strength, yet they were not deployable because they had not completed 12 weeks of Initial Entry Training (or equivalent) as required by law. This distorted the measurement of a readiness target of 90 percent trained in unit strength (measured against wartime required strength) prescribed by Defense Guidance. To attain that goal, the Secretary stated that the individuals account would include only lower graded enlisted personnel and would not exceed the units' peacetime authorized strength by more than 10 percent, a percentage derived from historical analysis of the true size of the reserve component training pipeline. The individuals account data shown in Table III-4 give a more accurate picture of the training pipeline from FY1984 to FY1986.

(c) Skill and Grade. The skill and grade, actual and projected inventory are displayed in Table III-5. The USAR will continue to have a shortage of trained noncommissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers in the medical, aviation, maintenance, and transportation specialties. Enlisted shortages are being resolved through the Selected Reserves Incentive Program (SRIP) enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, by recruiting active component soldiers with critical skills for reserve units, and by retraining prior service individuals. The enlisted shortage is caused by the shortage of NCOs, which will continue after 1986 and remain an area which adversely affects readiness. Warrant officers will be recruited from the Reserve enlisted force and trained in the WO Pre-commissioning and Basic Course. A WO enlistment option for selected skills is also being considered. Officer shortages will not be resolved until there is an increase in ROTC graduates in FY 1987 and beyond. Meanwhile, the involuntary direct assignment of obligated officers to units where they are needed will be the principal method of relieving shortages.

**U.S. ARMY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI) (Strength in 000s)*****

		FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986					
		OVERT*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVERT*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVERT*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL
E1 - E4													
Number of Skills	154	34	105	293	150	59	84	293	144	85	64	293	
PMI	45.7	16.0	70.2	131.9	40.2	29.5	64.3	133.9	34.0	43.5	58.5	136.0	
Inventory	83.7	13.2	29.7	126.6	80.1	27.6	23.6	131.4	77.2	42.7	17.9	137.8	
Over/Short	+38.0	-2.9	-40.5	-5.3	+39.9	-1.9	-40.6	-2.6	+43.1	-8	-40.6	+1.7	
E5 - E9													
Number of Skills	9	73	213	377	82	9	204	377	72	110	195	377	
PMI	22.8	15.8	87.6	126.3	16.7	29.5	82.1	128.2	10.4	43.0	76.8	130.2	
Inventory	24.8	12.7	55.8	93.3	21.3	22.3	53.3	96.8	17.3	33.5	50.8	101.5	
Over/Short	+2.0	-3.1	-31.9	-33.0	+4.6	-7.2	-28.8	-31.4	+6.8	-9.5	-26.1	-28.7	
Total E1 - E9													
Number of Skills	118	100	159	377	116	116	145	377	108	134	135	377	
PMI	68.5	31.8	157.8	258.2	56.9	59.0	146.4	262.2	44.4	86.5	135.3	266.2	
Inventory	108.5	25.9	85.5	219.9	101.4	49.9	76.9	228.2	94.4	76.2	68.7	239.3	
Over/Short	+40.0	-5.9	-72.3	-38.3	+44.6	-9.1	-69.5	-34.0	+50.0	-10.3	-66.6	-26.9	
Warrant Officer													
Number of Skills	9	12	27	48	8	15	25	48	7	19	22	48	
PMI	1.0	1.1	2.2	4.3	.7	1.8	1.9	4.3	.1	2.9	1.4	4.4	
Inventory	1.4	1.2	1.5	4.1	1.2	2.0	1.3	4.5	.7	3.3	.8	4.8	
Over/Short	+4.4	+1.1	-7	-2	+5.5	+2.2	-6	+1.1	+5.5	+4.4	-.6	+4.4	
O1 - O3													
Number of Skills	11	11	27	49	11	12	26	49	10	15	24	49	
PMI	6.3	5.1	13.4	24.9	5.8	6.5	12.8	25.1	4.3	9.7	11.4	25.4	
Inventory	8.1	5.1	10.3	23.5	7.5	6.7	9.9	24.1	6.3	10.1	8.8	25.3	
Over/Short	+1.7	**	-3.1	-1.3	+1.7	+2.2	-2.9	-1.0	+3.0	+4.4	-2.6	-.2	
O4 - O6													
Number of Skills	15	14	20	49	15	15	19	49	14	17	18	49	
PMI	4.6	3.9	9.0	17.5	4.1	4.9	8.6	17.6	3.0	7.2	7.7	17.9	
Inventory	5.0	3.3	8.3	16.6	4.6	4.1	8.3	17.0	3.8	6.8	7.3	17.9	
Over/Short	+4.4	-6	-7	-9	+5.5	-8	-7.4	-6	+7	-.4	-.4	-.2	
Total O1 - O6													
Number of Skills	13	12	24	49	13	23	49	42.7	12	15	22	49	
PMI	10.9	8.7	22.7	42.3	9.8	11.5	21.4	42.7	7.4	16.8	19.1	43.3	
Inventory	13.1	8.4	18.6	40.2	12.1	10.9	18.2	41.1	10.1	16.9	16.2	43.1	
Over/Short	+2.2	-3	-6.1	-2.2	+2.2	-6	-3.3	-1.6	+2.7	+5	+3.0	+4.2	

* See definitions in Appendix B; Numbers may not add due to rounding

** Less than 50

***Excludes IMA's

(d) Experience. The data in Table III-6 indicate that the experience of USAR personnel is increasing commensurate with the requirement.

TABLE III-6
USAR EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in thousands)

	ACTUAL FY 1984			PROGRAMMED FY 1985			PROGRAMMED FY 1986		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVE YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVE YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	AVE YOS
E1 - E4									
PMI**	131.9	N/A	N/A	134.0	N/A	N/A	136.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	126.6	31.3	2.5	131.4	32.6	2.5	137.8	34.0	2.5
E5 - E9									
PMI	126.3	N/A	N/A	128.2	N/A	N/A	130.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	93.3	87.1	16.5	96.8	90.9	16.5	101.5	94.8	16.4
TOTAL E1 - E9									
PMI	258.2	N/A	N/A	262.2	N/A	N/A	266.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	219.9	118.4	6.8	228.4	122.7	6.8	239.3	128.1	6.8
WARRANT OFFICER									
PMI	4.3	N/A	N/A	4.3	N/A	N/A	4.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	4.1	4.2	19.7	4.5	4.4	19.8	4.8	4.6	19.9
01 - 03									
PMI	24.9	N/A	N/A	25.1	N/A	N/A	25.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	23.5	18.7	7.4	24.1	19.6	7.4	25.3	20.7	7.4
04 - 06									
PMI	17.5	N/A	N/A	17.6	N/A	N/A	17.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	16.6	20.9	21.5	17.0	23.2	21.1	17.9	25.5	21.1
TOTAL 01 - 06									
PMI	42.3	N/A	N/A	42.7	N/A	N/A	43.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	40.2	39.6	13.6	41.1	42.8	14.3	43.1	46.2	14.3

* Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.
 ** Programmed Manning plus Individuals.

(e) Personnel Management.

[1] Accessions.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR recruiting performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table.

<u>Accessions</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service (PS)	34,650	40,958	37,871	37,540
Non Prior Service (NPS)	34,475	28,538	32,231	37,503
Male	26,375	22,732	23,533	26,642
(HSDG)	19,900	17,532	19,413	21,803
Female	8,100	5,806	8,698	10,861
(HSDG)	8,100	5,806	8,101	10,861
TOTAL	69,125	69,496	70,102	75,043

The USAR achieved its revised programmed strength of 275,087 while simultaneously implementing higher recruiting (ceiling on Category IIIB and IV accessions) standards for NPS personnel. Prior service personnel were accepted in lieu of lower quality accessions in these two categories. The result was that category I-IIIA/NPS quality rose by nearly 6 percent to 50.4 percent. The overall HSDG/NPS quality went to an all time high of 81.8 percent. In FY 1985, 650 personnel will be added to recruiting duty to ensure accomplishment of FY 1985 and FY 1986 objectives. In addition, the new Selected Reserve educational assistance program authorized by the FY 1985 DoD Authorization Act (P.L. 98-525) will be implemented 1 July 1985.

[b] Officer. Officer accessions for the USAR come primarily from ROTC, direct appointments, and transfers from the Active Component. In FY 1985 and FY 1986, annual ROTC production for the USAR will be approximately 1,000 officers against a requirement of 3,000. This will result in a shortfall which will adversely impact on personnel readiness. In FY 1987 through FY 1989, annual ROTC production is projected to be from 1,500 to 2,000 USAR officers against a requirement of 3,000. Actual USAR officer accession performance and goals from all sources are shown in the following table.

<u>Officer Accessions (USAR)</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
		<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	8,297	8,561	8,011	8,012

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. Actual USAR retention performance and projected requirements are shown in the following table.

<u>Reenlistments</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
		<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	6,751	6,110	7,227	7,060
Career	19,430	22,294	21,525	21,022
TOTAL	26,181	28,404	28,752	28,082

[b] Officer. Losses from the USAR may not be losses to the Army overall, as some USAR officers transfer to the Active Component or Army National Guard. However, these losses do create USAR vacancies which must be filled to maintain readiness. The actual and projected overall loss for the USAR is shown below. Achieving FY 1986 projections for both accessions and losses should assist in reducing personnel shortages.

(Percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Losses	16.9	16.5	16.6

[3] Inventory Stability. Both USAR aggregate population stability and unit personnel stability were evaluated in the same manner as for the active force. Aggregate stability has remained nearly constant. Unit stability improved because of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses which require continued membership in the unit.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officers	85.4	87.6	87.3	86.9
Enlisted	78.4	78.6	75.4	77.0

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officers	70.6	73.2	66.7	71.2
Enlisted	68.0	69.2	57.3	65.7

(f) Readiness Assessment.

[1] The readiness of the USAR will continue to improve with the current programs of improved manning and more full time unit support personnel. As operating strength moves toward programmed manning in FY 1986, USAR units will become more capable of performing their missions at their authorized level of organization. Critical skills in those organizations are being filled with persons who have responded to selective recruiting and reenlistment bonuses. The quality of soldiers is improving with fewer Category IIIB and IV soldiers being accepted. While this trend of improved manning is critical to an improved readiness posture, the force structure has expanded faster than programmed manning. This will tend to depress overall reported manpower readiness levels, mostly in tactical support units, despite increases in manning.

[2] Full time support personnel are essential to the USAR and are needed to assist units in achieving the levels of readiness now required of them. The past increases in full time support have resulted in improvements in readiness levels and responsiveness. These results have been confirmed by USAR field commanders and annual general inspections.

[3] Overall, since 1980, there has been an improvement in the USAR's ability to meet current wartime requirements. This increase in readiness will continue if current and programmed expenditures remain unchanged.

(g) Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program.

[1] The purpose of the IMA program is to preassign individual selected reservists to active component units in peacetime to train for their wartime duties. The Army adopted the program in October 1981 by transferring members of the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES) program from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to the Selected Reserve. These soldiers fill active Army wartime required force structure and provide the resources for rapid expansion of the Army prior to and during mobilization.

[2] This change in the IMA program gave the active Army the necessary manpower resources to expand rapidly in periods of national emergency. Since its inception, approximately 27,000 positions have been identified in response to increased requirements to support the Active Army. Funding is programmed to support two weeks of annual training of 21,900 IMAs by the end of FY 1990.

(3) The IMA program strength increases by 1,041 in FY 1985 and 1,427 in FY 1986. Actual and projected strength is shown below:

	<u>FY 1984</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>
Pay Category D	10,847	11,888	13,315

(h) Full Time Support Program.

[1] The Full Time Support Program assists Reserve Component units in achieving the required levels of readiness by providing drilling reservists the maximum available training time to prepare for the wartime mission. Full time support personnel (Active Guard/Reserve personnel, civil service personnel, active Army members, and military technicians) improve readiness by assisting in training, supply, maintenance, administration, and mobilization planning.

[2] As shown in the following chart, the USAR is requesting increases in the number of AGR personnel assigned to the

Full Time Support Program. Today, many reserve component units will deploy with or before active component units in case of war. These units must receive additional full time support to be capable of employing modernized equipment, conducting proper training and maintenance, planning for more complex missions, and reacting to shorter deployment times. Full time support personnel are required to improve unit readiness and to help RC commanders prepare for mobilization by training the drilling reservist in go-to-war skills and also by performing many daily military tasks which previously detracted from mission accomplishment. AGR personnel are assigned in the functional areas of training, logistics, maintenance, mobilization planning, and recruiting. Military technicians are concentrated in the functional areas of maintenance and logistics, and administrative support. The recently enacted legislation requiring all military technicians hired after 8 December 1983 to maintain membership in the troop program unit in which employed, or if other than a TPU be a member of the Selected Reserve, also contributes to readiness. The RC is now assured of these individuals' expertise in the event of mobilization.

	FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
USAR			
AGR	8,822	10,700	14,714
Military Techs	6,973	7,585	7,623
Active Army with			
USAR	6,653	5,712	5,467
DA Civilians	5,648	6,087	5,498

(2) Army National Guard.

(a) General. The aggregate ARNG FY 1984 Selected Reserve strength increased 17,081 (or 4.1 percent) over FY 1983, from 417,178 to 434,259, which exceeded the FY 1984 end strength objective of 433,000 by 1,259. The ARNG strength growth trend is expected to continue into the future, with the ratio of non-prior service to prior service accessions programmed at 56:44 for FY 1985 and FY 1986.

(b) Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength. As the data in Table III-7 show, the ARNG structure increases 2,100 in FY 1985 and 2,300 in FY 1986 for a total of 4,400 as the ARNG consolidates existing ARNG units into two new divisions. Programmed manning increases 10,500 in FY 1985 and 6,000 in FY 1986 for a total of 16,500, with nearly all manning increases allocated to combat units. At the end of FY 1984, programmed manning was 93.6 percent of programmed structure and is projected to be 95.5 percent by end FY 1985 and 96.3 percent by end FY 1986 as shown in Table III-7. The greater rate of increase in programmed manning relative to programmed structure provides structure fill objectives that are within the goal of sustained manning at 90.0 percent of required structure. Bringing the operating strength structure fill within acceptable range of programmed manning will largely depend on influences of the economy, population availability, propensity to enlist/reenlist, and resource funding. Table III-7 shows that, even with the projected strength increases, there will be a shortfall of 44,100 trained soldiers strength in units compared to manning that is programmed.

TABLE III-7
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG)
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (In 000s)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PROGMD MAN- NING	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MAN- NING	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MAN- NING	% MNG
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Land Forces	434.8	405.4	93	437.0	415.9	95	438.7	421.2	96
Division Forces	413.7	386.2	93	415.8	396.4	95	417.4	401.6	96
Division Increment	(165.7)	(154.1)	(93)	(164.8)	(157.9)	(96)	(186.6)	(182.3)	(98)
Non-divisional Combat Increment	(141.3)	(130.7)	(93)	(143.4)	(136.0)	(95)	(123.5)	(116.8)	(95)
Tactical Support Increment	(106.7)	(101.4)	(95)	(107.6)	(102.5)	(95)	(107.3)	(102.5)	(96)
Theater Forces	21.1	19.2	91	21.2	19.5	92	21.3	19.6	92
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Base Operating Support	30.0	29.8	99	29.9	29.8	100	30.5	30.5	100
Medical Support	22.8	23.1	101	22.7	23.1	102	23.5	23.8	101
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100	0.2	0.2	100
Centralized Support Activities	5.5	5.0	90	5.5	5.0	91	5.3	5.0	94
1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	100	1.5	1.5	1.5	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	464.8	435.2	94	466.9	445.7	95	469.2	451.7	96
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION:									
(MANYEARS)	-45.8*			-48.9			-44.1		
INDIVIDUALS	(-48.7)*			(-44.8)			(-40.2)		
END-STRENGTH	444.9*	416	41.6	41.6	41.6	41.6	42.7	42.7	42.7
	434.3			438.4			450.5		

*The Individuals Account and Operating Strength Deviations shown include Training/Pay Categories F, P, Q, U and T.

(c) Skill and Grade.

[1] The data on actual and projected inventory by skill and grade in Table III-8 show that the mismatch of NCO skills improves through FY 1986. A key contributor to this continuing problem is the location of existing ARNG structure compared to availability of manpower. Unlike the active Army, reassignment of ARNG personnel between units in different locations to fill structure is not practical because of the community orientation of the ARNG units. Enlistment bonuses under the Selected Reserve Incentive Program are targeted toward improving the ARNG fill in shortage skills and units. A promotion and reduction plan combined with application of revised tenure, maximum age, service, and grade constraint criteria is also being evaluated as a partial solution.

[2] The ARNG is also experiencing a shortage of officers in professional skills, including doctors, dentists, lawyers, and chaplains. Structure modernization will aggravate the problem of retention of field grade officers during FY 1985 and FY 1986 as certain skills are expected to become obsolete. Short-term efforts will continue to focus on selected retention measures (e.g., retraining/reclassification) and special recruiting programs for critical warrant officer and professional skills throughout FY 1986.

(d) Experience. The average years of service of ARNG enlisted personnel shown in Table III-9 are projected to decrease as a result of the projected increase in the ratio of non-prior to prior service accessions during FY 1986. However, this trend should enable the ARNG to correct enlisted grade imbalances as shown in Table III-8. Currently, a disproportionate number of E5-E6 positions are filled by accession of prior service personnel, as opposed to progression of non-prior service members through the ranks. The ARNG is working to improve recruitment and retention of both officers and enlisted personnel.

TABLE III-8
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI) (Strength in 000s)***

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986					
	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVER*	BAL*	SHORT*	TOTAL	OVERT	BAL†	SHORT‡	TOTAL
E1 - E4												
Number of Skills	48	42	116	206	45	51	110	206	55	56	95	206
PMI	15.1	88.6	134.7	238.5	14.4	102.9	128.0	245.3	17.5	118.8	110.7	247.0
Inventory	39.1	85.9	97.5	222.5	38.0	100.3	92.6	230.9	36.5	117.1	87.8	241.5
Over/Short	+24.0	-2.7	-37.3	-16.0	+23.6	-2.6	-35.4	-14.4	+19.0	-1.7	-22.8	-5.5
E5 - E9												
Number of Skills	111	74	109	294	114	74	106	294	122	76	96	294
PMI	70.7	23.8	53.2	149.7	67.2	33.9	53.7	154.8	72.0	35.8	48.5	156.4
Inventory	103.0	23.3	43.6	170.0	88.0	33.4	42.3	163.7	86.9	35.5	41.3	163.7
Over/Short	+32.3	.5	-11.6	+20.2	+20.8	-.5	-11.4	+9.0	+14.9	-.3	-7.3	+7.3
Total E1 - E9												
Number of Skills	100	49	113	240	102	57	109	240	99	61	95	240
PMI	85.8	112.5	190.0	368.2	81.6	136.8	181.7	400.1	89.5	154.7	159.2	403.4
Inventory	142.1	109.2	141.1	392.4	125.9	133.8	134.9	394.6	123.4	152.7	129.1	405.1
Over/Short	+56.3	-3.2	-43.9	+4.2	+44.4	-3.1	-46.8	-5.5	+93.9	-2.0	-30.2	+11.7
Warrant Officer												
Number of Skills	1	19	23	43	3	25	16	44	2	28	14	44
PMI	**	8.1	1.7	9.8	**	9.0	1.1	10.0	**	9.0	1.1	10.0
Inventory	**	7.7	1.3	9.0	**	8.3	.9	9.3	**	8.7	.7	9.4
Over/Short	**	-5	-4	-.8	**	-.6	-.1	-.7	**	-.2	-.3	-.6
01 - 03												
Number of Skills	13	-20	14	47	7	30	10	47	5	36	8	47
PMI	2.1	9.8	11.7	23.6	2.2	12.1	9.8	24.1	2.2	14.4	8.9	25.5
Inventory	3.9	8.9	10.2	23.1	4.2	11.9	8.5	24.6	3.8	16.8	7.1	25.7
Over/Short	+1.8	-.8	-1.5	-.5	+2.0	-.2	-1.3	+4.5	+1.6	+4.4	-1.8	+2.2
04 - 06												
Number of Skills	7	34	6	49	7	37	5	49	6	39	4	49
PMI	1.0	6.0	.8	9.8	.9	8.0	.9	9.8	.9	8.1	.9	9.9
Inventory	1.5	7.8	.5	9.8	1.5	7.8	.5	9.9	1.7	7.9	.5	10.2
Over/Short	+4.5	-.2	-.3	-.3	+.6	-.2	-.4	+1.1	+.8	-.2	-.4	+1.3
TOTAL 01 - 06												
Number of Skills	22	54	20	49	14	67	15	49	11	73	12	49
PMI	3.1	11.7	12.6	33.4	3.1	20.1	10.7	33.9	3.1	22.5	9.8	35.4
Inventory	5.4	16.7	10.7	32.9	5.7	19.7	9.1	34.5	5.6	22.8	7.6	35.9
Over/Short	+2.3	-1.0	-1.8	-.5	+.5	-1.8	-.4	-1.6	+.5	+2.4	+3	+2.5

* See definitions in Appendix B; numbers may not add due to rounding
** Less than 50
***Excludes IMA's

TABLE III-9
ARNG EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY* (Strength in 000s)

	ACTUAL FY 1984			PROGRAMMED FY 1985			PROGRAMMED FY 1986		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YOS
E1-E4									
PMI**	238.5	NA	NA	245.3	NA	NA	247.0	NA	NA
Inventory	222.5	60.5	3.3	230.9	57.4	3.6	241.5	54.5	2.6
E5-E9									
PMI	149.7	NA	NA	154.8	NA	NA	156.4	NA	NA
Inventory	169.9	160.5	12.8	163.7	154.6	10.9	163.7	154.6	10.3
TOTAL E1-E9									
PMI	388.2	NA	NA	400.1	NA	NA	403.4	NA	NA
Inventory	392.4	221.0	7.3	394.6	211.1	6.3	405.1	209.0	5.9
WARRANT OFFICER									
PMI	9.8	NA	NA	10.0	NA	NA	10.0	NA	NA
Inventory	9.0	8.9	21.0	9.3	9.1	20.3	9.4	9.3	20.1
01 - 03									
PMI	23.6	NA	NA	24.1	NA	NA	25.5	NA	NA
Inventory	23.1	17.2	9.1	24.6	17.6	8.7	25.7	18.7	8.5
04 - 06									
PMI	9.8	NA	NA	9.8	NA	NA	9.9	NA	NA
Inventory	9.8	9.7	21.5	9.9	9.8	21.3	10.2	10.2	20.1
TOTAL 01 - 06									
PMI	33.4	NA	NA	33.9	NA	NA	35.4	NA	NA
Inventory	32.9	26.9	12.7	34.5	21.5	14.3	35.9	28.8	14.3

*Detail may not add to totals due to rounding

**Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(e) Personnel Management.

[1] Accession.

[a] Enlisted. The following table shows that the Army National Guard experienced difficulty in meeting its enlisted recruiting goals in FY 1984 as the enlisted strength increased by 16,912 to 392,412. This increased recruiting difficulty was due to the recent national economic recovery and the trend is expected to continue in FY 1985 and FY 1986.

	<u>Accessions (000s)</u>			
	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Prior Service	50.0	43.9	37.9	44.0
Non-Prior Service*	(60.0)	(45.9)	(49.0)	(55.0)
Male	54.0	43.4	46.0	52.0
(HSDG)	35.1	29.0	34.5	38.0
Female	6.0	2.8	3.0	3.0
(HSDG)	6.0	2.7	3.0	3.0
TOTAL	110.0	90.1	86.9	99.0

* Includes pay group "L," non-paid members of the ARNG.

[b] Officer. ARNG officer strength increases continued in FY 1984, though at a lesser rate than in FY 1983, reaching 41,847 (97.3 percent) of a total programmed strength objective of 43,000 officers. Shortages of professional and warrant officers remain significant, however, with warrant officer skills at 91.1 percent fill. Shortages of Army Medical Department (AMEDD) officers and Chaplains, despite improvement in FY 1984, continue to be of particular concern. Recruiting programs designed to attract these key personnel will continue to be necessary.

ARNG FY 1984 officer accessions came primarily from ROTC, state OCS, USAR transfers and direct appointments. In FY 1985 and FY 1986 annual ROTC requirements will average approximately 2,000 officers against projected gains of 1,200 per year. This will result in a shortfall that could result in lower unit personnel readiness. During FY 1987 through FY 1989 annual ROTC gains are projected to increase to approximately 1,500 to 2,000 against a requirement that will approach 2,200 annually. Actual ARNG commissioned officer accession performance and goals from all source are shown on the following tables.

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Officer Accessions (ARNG)	6,115	4,837	6,507	6,414

[2] Retention.

[a] Enlisted. ARNG retention performance and projected requirements shown in the following table reflect a steady requirement through FY 1986. A reduction of losses, primarily non-ETS losses, offset the accession shortfall in FY 1984 compared to FY 1983. However, overall ARNG extension of enlistments (reenlistments) decreased 17.8 percent. Although reenlistments did not achieve goals in FY 1984, the overall ARNG strength still exceeded the FY 1984 objective of 390,000 by 2,412. As the economy continues to improve, meeting strength goals will be increasingly difficult.

Reenlistments (000s)

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
First Term	11.3	10.5	13.2	14.4
Career	61.8	50.1	47.9	47.5
TOTAL	73.1	60.5	61.1	61.9

[b] Officer. Officer retention problems are limited to Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and chaplains. Specially tailored retention programs will be developed to coincide with increased recruiting emphasis in these officer specialties.

[3] Inventory Stability. Lower attrition, higher personnel quality and greater job satisfaction have contributed to the relatively constant trend for both officer and enlisted stability from FY 1980 to FY 1984.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	82.2	82.6	82.2	84.1
Officer	90.1	91.3	90.8	90.7

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY-83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	72.7	74.5	72.3	75.6
Officer	72.0	72.8	66.1	69.4

[4] Success Factors.

[a] Enlisted. The successful strength growth of the ARNG was due to programs such as enlistment, extension of enlistment (reenlistment), educational financial assistance programs, and the non-prior service split option training program. The non-prior service split option training program allows the ARNG to recruit high school students -- a market not otherwise available.

[b] Officer. Thirty-six percent of new ARNG officers in FY 1984 received their commissions from ROTC and 28 percent from State Officer Candidate Schools. The remaining 36 percent are direct appointments into the ARNG, Reserve Component-OCS (RC-OCS) production, or individuals who previously held commissions in other components. The ROTC

program is providing an increased proportion of new officers, due to assignment of ARNG officers as Assistant Professors of Military Science (APMS) under the Expand the Base Program (ETB), the increased use of Guaranteed Reserve Force Duty (GRFD) contracts, and the award of ROTC Scholarships to ARNG members. ROTC will continue to be the major source of commissioned officers for the ARNG.

(f) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the combat forces in the ARNG will continue to improve with current and proposed programs to improve manning, recruiting, and retaining members of the ARNG. As ARNG combat unit strengths improve over the next several years, the percentage of trained and deployable strength in those units will improve. Programs designed to improve the level of MOS qualification in ARNG units will also improve the readiness of those units to perform their mobilization missions. As a result, reported unit manpower readiness is expected to improve for combat units. It will probably remain essentially constant for tactical support units.

(g) Full Time Support Program.

[1] The goal of the full time support program is to provide the Army with operationally ready units prior to mobilization. In order to accomplish this, sufficient full time manpower must be available to train, supply, maintain, administer, and manage the force. There is not sufficient time between mobilization and deployment to correct significant deficiencies. The units must be ready before mobilization. Full time support for ARNG units consists primarily of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) program and the military technician program. Active component soldiers and civil service personnel are also involved.

[2] The AGR program provides unit commanders with the full time personnel necessary to improve training, logistics and mobilization planning and readiness. In the event of mobilization, AGR soldiers mobilize and deploy with the unit to which they are assigned.

[3] The ARNG technician program provides full time support to units and other activities. Although technicians are civilian employees, they are required to be members of the National Guard and must be available to enter military active duty when their units are mobilized. The largest number of technicians are concentrated in maintenance and logistics.

[4] National Guard Bureau Headquarters and Field Operating Activities (FOA) are staffed with civilian employees. Unlike ARNG technicians, these employees do not mobilize.

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
ARNG			
AGR	16,656	20,583	30,679
Military Technicians	24,589	24,119*	24,129*
Active Army with ARNG	1,604**	966**	974**
DA Civilians	439	424	424

* Congressional floor

** Includes 55 aviator advisors

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

(1) With a current strength of approximately 276,651, the IRR is the largest pretrained individual manpower pool available during mobilization. The IRR 3 year is used to provide filler personnel for both Active Component and Reserve Component units as well as casualty replacements for theaters of operations.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	276.7	289.9	295.4

(2) The Army plans on approximately 70 percent of the enlisted IRR and 90 percent of the officer IRR being available for use during mobilization. On 1 June 1984, the military service obligation for new members was increased from six to eight years. This policy will increase the IRR end strength by approximately 155,000 by the end of FY 1992. An IRR 3 year reenlistment bonus was initiated in June 1984 and approximately 2,000 soldiers reenlisted by the end of FY 1984. The bonus program is funded for FY 1985 and is anticipated to yield approximately 5,000 reenlistments a year.

(3) The Army is continuing to study IRR skill retention and decay. These studies are scheduled for completion by the end of FY 1986. IRR refresher training programs are under development. Trial skill-level one refresher training programs were conducted on a limited scale during FY 1983 and FY 1984. The Army will expand to skill level two and three training in designated skills in FY 1986. The refresher training program is based upon mobilization requirements. The IRR will continue to be a vital mobilization manpower pool throughout the program years.

c. Inactive National Guard (ING). The ING consists of those ARNG members who are unable to participate in peacetime training (training assemblies and/or annual training), but who wish to retain

their Guard affiliation. They will join and deploy with their units when called to active duty. The ING are not members of the Selected Reserve; therefore, they are not available for mobilization unless a national emergency or a war is declared. ING members muster for one training session each year and are qualified in a military skill. Actual and projected strengths for the ING are shown below:

Inactive National Guard
(Strength in 000s)

<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
9.5	9.3	9.3

2. Standby Reserve. The Standby Reserve consists of reserve personnel who have a remaining military service obligation or a desire for a voluntary commitment, but who, because of a temporary conflict such as being an elected official, cannot be readily available for immediate mobilization. The strength of the Standby Reserve is screened regularly to ensure all eligible members are transferred to the Ready Reserve. Actual and projected strengths of the Standby Reserve are shown below:

Standby Reserve
(Strength in 000s)

<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
0.2	0.4	0.4

3. Retirees. Regular Army and Reserve retirees with 20 years or more active duty and who are receiving retirement pay, can be recalled to active duty at any time in the interest of national defense. The Army's retiree recall program preassigns retirees to mobilization positions suitable for fill by retirees. The program has been expanded to include preassignment to USAR training divisions and brigades. Exercise "Grey Thunder" was conducted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina in October 1984. The exercise recalled 100 volunteer retirees to active duty to test mobilization procedures at the installation level. Program enhancements to be implemented in the next five years include expansion of retiree positions, improvement of preassignment procedures, and provisions for retiree program managers at the installation level. The number of actual and projected preassigned retirees is shown below:

Preassigned Retirees
(Strengths in 000s)

<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
125.9	132.9	134.4

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General.

a. Role of Civilian. The Army depends heavily on its civilian component for logistical support, management, and quality of life programs. The civilian component, which comprises nearly 34 percent of the Army's work force, manages and operates most bases. It supports active and reserve forces by performing a full range of logistics functions, including depot maintenance, supply and acquisition management, and transportation management. Civilians also provide essential support in training, medical care, research and development, engineering, and facilities management. Nearly 24 percent of the Army's appropriated fund civilian force occupies overseas positions which provide a critical mobilization base needed for transition to wartime operations.

b. Civilian End Strength Ceilings.

(1) The Army's ability to manage its civilian work force efficiently and economically will be significantly enhanced through Section 501 of the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act, which eliminates statutory civilian end strengths ceilings for FY 1985. Based on the Army's experience in operating without end strength ceilings in industrially funded activities during FY 1983 and FY 1984, Section 501 will provide the Army much greater flexibility in responding to changing work load requirements in all programs. The Army will be able to expand the use of temporary hires to reduce work load peaks and to eliminate backlogs in depot maintenance and foreign military sales programs where the work load is subject to frequent fluctuations.

(2) Elimination of civilian end strength statutory controls will enable the Army to avoid the personnel turbulence and associated administrative costs which result from the requirement to release temporary employees on the last day of the fiscal year in order to meet end strength ceilings. The Army released about 6,500 temporary hires in FY 1984 simply to meet end strength ceilings in non-industrial fund activities. A potential exists in FY 1985 for a cost avoidance ranging from \$3-4 million which is based on an administrative cost of \$500 for each temporary employee separated.

c. Civilian Substitution. The civilian substitution program, which releases military service members for duty in essential combat, combat support, and combat service support units, continues to expand.

During FY 1983 and FY 1984, the Army converted 2,967 military positions to civilians. Civilian substitution will be further expanded by 1,707 in FY 1985 and 526 in FY 1986. A total of 8,200 military positions are programmed for conversion to civilian incumbency from FY 1983 to FY 1990.

d. Borrowed Military Manpower. The Army will continue efforts to reduce borrowed military manpower and troop diversions in FY 1986. Since the mid-1970s, because of insufficient civilian authorizations to meet Army manpower requirements, commanders have been required to "borrow" or "divert" soldiers from their primary duties to fill the shortfall. Congress recognized this problem by providing the Army 14,300 civilian spaces in FY 1983 to be used to return soldiers to their primary duties. In FY 1984, the Army exceeded the Congressional target and filled 14,461 positions. Currently, there are approximately 4,000 soldiers still borrowed or diverted from troop units. The Army will strive to maintain the use of borrowed/diverted military manpower at or below the 4,000 level during FY 1985 and will attempt to reduce this level to 3,600 in FY 1986.

2. Major Program Changes. The total of 406,059 civilians requested for FY 1986 reflects an increase of nearly 4,700 compared to the FY 1985 estimate contained in the President's Budget. Additional civilians are requested in FY 1986 to support projected training work load (+1,300); to sustain newly fielded equipment, weapons systems, and force restructuring actions (+2,100); to improve ammunition management in Europe (+500); to expand civilian substitution efforts (+500); and to support specialized medical care programs, including exceptional family member care and the medical quality assurance program (+300). A major change in the internal distribution of the civilian force during FY 1985 resulted from Congressionally directed removal of Research and Development activities from the industrial fund.

TABLE III-10
ARMY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH

(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in 000s)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Strategic	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Offensive Strategic	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.2	0.2	0.2
Tactical/Mobility	<u>26.3</u>	<u>26.7</u>	<u>27.6</u>
Land Forces	24.2	24.9	25.7
Division Forces	(22.9)	(23.4)	(24.2)
Theater Forces	(1.3)	(1.5)	(1.5)
Mobility Forces	2.1	1.9	1.9
Auxiliary Activities	<u>27.6</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>26.3</u>
Intelligence	1.7	1.7	1.8
Centrally Managed Communications	5.1	4.8	5.0
Research and Development	20.8	21.7	19.5
Geophysical Activities	*		
Support Activities	<u>345.8</u>	<u>346.2</u>	<u>352.0</u>
Base Operating Support	166.4	164.6	167.4
Medical Support	15.0	15.0	15.1
Personnel Support	9.3	9.2	9.3
Individual Training	13.4	14.2	15.3
Force Support Training	2.0	2.1	2.0
Central Logistics	90.5	89.2	90.4
Centralized Support Activities	35.2	37.5	38.0
Management Headquarters	13.9	14.5	14.4
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Overmanning	3.5		
Total	<u>403.4</u>	<u>401.4</u>	<u>406.1</u>

NOTE: Detail may not add due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

3. Civilian Fitness and Sick Leave Control. Excessive use of sick leave can result in a loss of productivity and reduction in mission support. While the Army encourages employees to save sick leave hours accrued, it fully supports legitimate sick leave use. To reverse a rising trend in sick leave usage, the Army began emphasizing in 1982 the education of employees and supervisors on the sound use of sick leave. Latest figures indicate an average decline

from 1980 levels of annual usage of over 14 hours per person, equating to a three-year dollar savings of approximately \$40M, or a gain of about 2,300 productive work years. The Army will continue these efforts to ensure proper use of sick leave. In addition, the Army is currently supporting the development of voluntary civilian fitness programs to relieve job-related mental and physical stress factors in employee illness and absenteeism. The program includes physical exercise sessions (conducted during non-duty hours) and classes on weight control, good nutrition, stress management, smoking cessation, and substance abuse control.

4. Position Management.

a. The Army allows commanders maximum flexibility in managing the civilian work force to support readiness, force modernization, civilian substitution, and improved resource management initiatives. Commanders are expected to manage the high grade civilian work force prudently through effective position management, accurate job grading, Army Performance Oriented Review and Standards (APORS) management studies, and Commercial Activities reviews.

b. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has recognized the Army's position management program as being especially effective. During FY 1983 OPM conducted on-site reviews at eighteen installations to determine how well the Army carried out its personnel programs and responsibilities. OPM concluded that most installations have been successful in their efforts to identify and correct position management problems. In a recent analysis of Army position management performance under the GS/GM 11-15 "bulge" program, OPM also commended the Army for the steps it is taking to improve the Army's position management program. Army managers will continue to ensure that new GS/GM 11-15 positions are mission essential and cost effective, particularly considering the need for highly skilled and experienced employees to meet increased workload demands associated with readiness and force modernization improvements.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military Manpower. As shown in Table III-11, "Wartime Manpower Requirements," the peak trained military manpower demand occurs late in the scenario (at about M+150) when the expanded size and composition of the force has stabilized and the cumulative demand for casualty replacements is at its peak. Peak shortfalls normally occur in the middle of the scenario (at about M+90): early battle losses are high; returns to duty of personnel previously evacuated have not yet started; and newly trained personnel are not yet output in significant quantities from the mobilized training base (until M+113 or later).

Early military manpower demand can only be filled, therefore, from manpower assets already under military control (mobilized early in the scenario). Such resources include:

TABLE III-11
WARTIME TRAINED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY (000s)

<u>MILITARY MANPOWER*</u>	<u>Pre-M</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>				<u>M+150</u>
		<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+30</u>	<u>M+60</u>	<u>M+90</u>	
Trained Demand	1,455	1,595	1,674	1,897	2,098	2,168
Trained Supply	1,397	1,370	1,658	1,826	1,981	2,089
Over/Short	-38	-225	-17	-71	-117	-79
			<u>FY-1990</u>			
Trained Demand	1,505	1,645	1,725	1,992	2,210	2,257
Trained Supply	1,485	1,457	1,802	1,996	2,163	2,307
Over/Short	-20	-187	77	4.4	-48	49
<u>CIVILIAN MANPOWER**</u>						
Demand	349	455	<u>FY 1984</u>			
Supply	340	275	449	449	449	449
New Hires Required	9	180	174	174	174	174

* From FY 86-90 WARMAPS POM submission.

** From latest civilian WARMAPS submission.

- o Pretrained individual manpower: Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Individual Ready Reservists (IRR), Inactive National Guardsmen (ING), retirees, and Standby Reservists. With the exception of the retirees, we estimate these resources will be fully mobilized by M+60.
- o Non-operating (non-unit) Trained Individuals: Transients, holdees (primarily prisoners and patients), and students (THS). These manpower assets will be returned as rapidly as possible to the operating force. We estimate this will also occur by M+60).
- o Training Output: Accelerated output of active and reserve personnel already in the training base on M-Day.

The trained manpower shortfall is expected to decline from FY 1986 to FY 1990. This is due primarily to increased manning of the Selected Reserve and the IRR. However, even with this improvement, if our manpower demand does not change significantly, further increases in Active and Selected Reserve manning or additional pretrained manpower will be needed to reduce or eliminate the shortfall at M+90. The success of our efforts beyond M+90 will depend largely on current Army efforts to increase our training base capabilities to meet our mobilization needs.

Critical skill shortfalls are expected in the enlisted combat arms, medical, and engineering areas. There will also be shortages of enlisted intelligence, chemical, petroleum, and ammunition personnel as well as communications/electronic equipment maintenance, intelligence, and automotive repair warrant officers. Key commissioned officer shortfalls are expected in the infantry and medical specialties, with shortages also in chemical, legal, foreign area officers and chaplains.

2. Civilian Manpower. Before M-Day, the requirement for US Direct Hire full time civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian workforce. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for employment/deployment. A total of about 212,000 additional civilian requirements are created at that time. Concurrently, about 105,000 peacetime positions that are not required in wartime will be terminated (including virtually all the support positions for the USAR and ARNG). This causes a net peak demand of about 455,000 positions at M-Day, shown in Table III-11.

Prior to M-Day, the only component of the civilian manpower supply is the peacetime full-time permanent work force of 340,112. At M-Day, this number is reduced to about 275,000 by the loss of 65,000 civilian employees called up for military duty (ready reservists and retirees). To avoid calling up civilians in essential positions, the Army continuously screens individuals who hold such positions and who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired military personnel eligible for recall. The combination of new positions, terminated positions and losses to military duties causes an M-Day shortfall of about 180,000 civilians.

The Army plans to offset this shortfall by converting about 61,000 civilian employees from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status and reassigning all available personnel from terminated positions. After M-day, the new hire requirement for 113,000 civilians will be filled from other manpower sources including new hires provided by the US Employment Service offices and the Office of Personnel Management, and the rehiring of retired Federal employees.

Significant skill shortages in transportation management, engineering, logistics management, procurement, and data processing make such critical occupations prime targets for the use of retired Federal civilian employees. During exercise POWDER RIVER 85, conducted in October 1984, the Army tested a new system for identifying and recruiting retired Federal civilian employees. The results of that test are still being evaluated.

E. Manpower Management Improvements. The Army has implemented many programs to improve both personnel and manpower management as part of its concerted effort to become more efficient using available resources. Some of these programs are described below:

1. Army Performance Oriented Review and Standards (APORS). In FY 1984, the Army initiated this new program to conduct efficiency reviews of non-deployable activities that would not be reviewed in the Commercial Activities Program. APORS has the potential to generate significant savings for reprogramming to other higher priority missions over the next six years. At present, the program is being conducted only in the CONUS commands; however, it will be implemented overseas during FY 1985. Savings of 989 spaces and \$11.5 million were realized under APORS in FY 1984.

2. Commercial Activities (CA). This efficiency program is based upon OMB Circular A-76 and operates through competition between the government work force and private companies. A cost study is performed that compares estimated cost of performing the workload by in-house civilian personnel to the cost if the work is performed by contract. Savings to the government accrue regardless of the outcome since either a more efficient in-house operation or a cost effective conversion to contract is achieved. During FY 1984, 55 cost studies were completed, covering 2,234 civilian and 364 military spaces. The savings (964 civilian and 351 military spaces) were redirected to higher priority Army missions. In FY 1985, additional savings in manpower will be achieved as studies begun in FY 1982 and 1983 (over 7,000 spaces) are completed.

3. Productivity Capital Investment Programs. These programs indicate the Quick Return on Investment Program, Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program, and OSD Productivity Investment Funds. Under the Productivity Capital Investment Programs, money is set aside for fast payback capital tools, equipment, and facilities that save manpower, reduce costs, increase productivity, and improve readiness. Projected savings are \$1.2 billion between FY 1984-1990. Modernized

equipment and facilities provided through these programs raise organizational productivity and improve the quality of support services. In addition, troops are trained with state-of-the-art equipment leading to a more ready force. For example, the types of equipment purchased under these programs include loading ramps; weapons training simulators which enhance feedback on marksmanship while saving live ammunition; hand-held radios which assisted in the Granada incident; and asphalt reclaimers which refurbish roads damaged by training exercises. For every \$1 invested, \$14 is returned in benefits.

4. Value Engineering (VE). Value Engineering, an organized approach to obtain optimum value for every dollar spent, is a technique that has proven successful in effective cost-savings. The Army Value Engineering Program is currently producing over \$400 million in net annual savings and cost avoidance. As a result of the introduction of Value Engineering Programs at TRADOC and FORSCOM in FY 1985 and the increased emphasis on VE regarding spare parts and contractor VE Change Proposals, net VE savings are targeted to reach a total of \$600 million by the end of the FY 1986. The Value Engineering (VE) Program has an extremely high (20:1) return on investment. Private sector contractors help in this program through exercising the incentive clauses in their contracts which allow contractors and the Army to share in net savings resulting from Value Engineering Change Proposals.

5. Reshaping the Logistics Force. During FY 1986, the Army will continue actions to reduce major U.S. logistical structure shortfalls in some areas. Shortfall reductions will be achieved by increased reliance on external support (e.g., Host Nation Support and American contractor contingency support for rear area logistics functions in Southwest Asia), through better analysis of requirements, and through improved productivity of logistics units. For example, productivity in supply units will be improved through increased automation. In petroleum units the Army will use commercially available 20,000-gallon collapsible storage tanks instead of 10,000-gallon collapsible tanks. Further labor savings are anticipated through a new field feeding concept, elimination of headquarters elements, and reductions in planned support to Marines in Southwest Asia.

6. The Army Family Action Program (AFAP). Emphasis on efforts to improve soldier, civilian and family working and living conditions within the Army has been dramatically increased. The AFAP represents a major manpower management improvement because it fosters service member and civilian employee retention and undistracted job performance. Included in the FY 1986 Army Budget are resources to accelerate the upgrade and construction of Child Care facilities, to provide additional support for the handicapped family member program, to support programs operated by the Army Community Service Centers, to establish a family safety program, to conduct research about family quality of life as it impacts upon readiness and retention, to fund overseas student travel, and to make improvements in the working and living facilities for single and married soldiers.

7. Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS). The Vertical Force Development Management Information System (VFDMIS) is being designed as a vertically extended, secure, on-line, interactive, accounting system for Army structure and manning worldwide. As a "vertical" system, VFDMIS will be deployed to a minimum of three levels of the Army: headquarters, major commands/field operating agencies; and subordinate commands/installations. It will serve 156 customers at 107 sites worldwide. VFDMIS will provide support unit actions (activation/organization, assignment, deployment, reorganization, inactivation/discontinuance); account for planned, programmed, budgeted, and allocated military/civilian manpower and civilian manpower funding; and document the mission, capabilities, structure, and authorized personnel and equipment for each Army unit. System deployment is tentatively scheduled to begin during FY 1986.

8. Manpower Staffing Standards System (MS-3) Program. Approximately 400,000 of the Army's 600,000 peacetime TDA requirements are workload-driven and, as such, should be determined through application of staffing standards developed by performing detailed work measurement studies or by using statistical analysis of historical data. The objective of the MS-3 Program is to develop workload-based staffing standards to be used as the basis for manpower requirements determination. To date, MS-3 standards have been completed for safety (some functions), dining facilities (CONUS only), fire prevention and protection (CONUS only), Service School instructors, some finance and accounting functions, civilian personnel offices, and commissaries.

9. The Army Functional Dictionary (AFD). The AFD provides definitions for all Army functions. Codes associated with the AFD are to be applied to Army manning documents to provide a link between Army functional manpower requirements determination and the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution System (PPBES). Accomplished in coordination with the Army Management Structure Code (AMSC) restructure effort at the US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAAC), AFD development has been completed for all Army TDA functions.

10. Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Program. MARC (formerly MACRIT) is the Army's revised process for determining wartime combat support and combat service support positions in TOE units through a credible, systematic and scientific method. In 1983, the Army approved MARC for implementation and has begun a five year transition to the new process. Applicable to approximately 500,000 of the Army's AC and RC TOE positions, MARC features the following enhancements: use of computer simulation, development of scenario-oriented data elements, and creation of a responsive maintenance data system. During FY 1983-1984, nonavailability (nonproductive time) factors were re-evaluated, with the net effect of reducing manpower requirements under MARC. Early in FY 1985, a MARC functional study for aviation maintenance was completed. Functional studies for warehousing and automotive maintenance are scheduled for completion during FY 1985-1986.

11. Force Alignment Plan II (FAP II). Since 1983, HQDA has been issuing grade ceilings designed to align field grade officer authorizations with constraints contained in the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). FY 1984 and FY 1985 ceilings resulted in a total reduction of 4,400 field grade authorizations (900 conversions to civilian, 600 MTOE downgrades, and 2,900 TDA downgrades). Ceilings for FY 1986-1988 will require further downgrades of 900 (675 TDA, 225 MTOE) due to Army structure changes. It has become apparent that DOPMA understates Army requirements for experience in key training and readiness-related positions. The Army is supporting a joint request for an increase in the DOPMA ceiling for 1,000 field grade officers.

III. Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC)

A. Strategic Force.

1. Defensive Strategic Forces.

**Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Reserve Component</u>			
USAR	0.3	0.3	0.3

Manpower in this subcategory is for manning strategic military intelligence detachments which support national-level strategic planning.

2. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces.

**Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)**

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Manpower in this subcategory is for support of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), including airborne command posts and an alternate National Military Command Center

B. Tactical/Mobility Forces.

1. Land Forces.

a. Division Forces.

Division Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	432.4	434.8	431.4
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
ARNG	386.2	396.4	401.6
USAR	177.0	183.5	187.5
<u>Civilian</u>	22.9	23.4	24.2

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to or in support of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments, and tactical support units.

There is considerable change in divisional forces manning due to modernization and restructuring. Although the net increase in active military manpower in FY 1985 is only 2,450, there are many increases in manning due to standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+784), addition of non-divisional units to I Corps (+311), improved support for force modernization (+1,551), Heavy Corps restructuring (+107), creation of a logistics support unit in the Sinai (+356), increased tactical support to units (+4,149) activation of the 10th Mountain Division (+1,268), activation of a third ranger battalion (+575), and improved manning of Special Operations Forces (+297). These increases are offset, however, by manpower made available through light division restructuring (-2,228), Division 86 redesign (-3,177) (which resulted in moving some divisional units to corps control), and reorganization of aviation battalions (-1,543).

The net decrease in FY 1986 of 3,464 does not reflect the many changes which will continue due to modernization and restructuring. Reductions in size of current infantry and heavy divisions will produce available manpower of 11,822 for redistribution. Tactical support will be reduced (-2,623) and aviation units will reorganize into smaller attack battalions causing an additional 1,195 manpower decrease. These decreases are offset by increases for improved manning of Special Operations Force (+301), standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal design (+1,510), restructuring of Heavy Corps (+3,870), and continued fill of the 10th Mountain Division (+4,915), I Corps strength increases (+398), and force modernization initiatives (+1,182).

The increase in ARNG strength in FY 1985 (+10,200) is to increase unit manning and improve readiness. FY 1985 was the first year that Division 86 design requirements applied to the National Guard and accounted for the majority of the structure increases. Conversions and activations involving ARNG separate brigades and heavy division roundout units also contributed to the FY 1985 increases. The FY 1986 increase of 5,200 is to improve manning of the 35th Division and to activate the new 29th Infantry Division (Light).

The USAR increase (+6,500) in FY 1985 is a result of unit activations of five engineer companies, two aviation companies, and one CEWI battalion. Manning of units will also be increased. The increase in FY 1986 (+4,000) is to activate three CEWI battalions, two chemical smoke companies, four chemical decontamination companies, one water supply company, two heavy equipment maintenance companies, two light equipment maintenance companies, and three military intelligence companies.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 is to improve ammunition supply management in Europe (+217), to permit civilian substitution for military personnel (+162), and to improve operations and maintenance support of Pacific Forces (+224).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 is to further improve ammunition supply management in Europe (+502), to increase operations and maintenance support for the 9th Infantry Division (+161), to permit substitution of civilians for military personnel (+73), and for force modernization initiatives (+79).

b. Theater Forces.

Theater Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	42.9	39.5	40.5
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
ARNG	19.2	19.5	19.6
USAR	20.4	20.7	20.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.5	1.5

Manpower in this subcategory is assigned to theater-wide and specialized units such as three active and five reserve component separate infantry brigades, and one scout group; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The net decrease (-3,400) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from Heavy Division restructuring (-3,150), force modernization reductions (-208), force structure realignments (-277), and reduction in intelligence forces (-103). These increases were offset by increased manning of Special Operations Forces (+338).

The net increase (+948) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from increases for force modernization (+996), SOUTHCOM defense enhancements (+318), and standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+51), offset by decreases for Special Operations Force alignments (-148), and restriction of European growth (-269).

The increase in FY 1985 for the ARNG (+300) is for improved unit manning. The increase in FY 1986 (+100) supports force structure initiatives of ARNG units assigned special missions.

The increase in USAR manpower in FY 1985 is to activate two ordnance companies, one signal company and one transportation company. Additionally, there are some force structure adjustments due to modernization.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 (+134) results from increases in force modernization and force restructuring initiatives.

2. Mobility Forces.

Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	.4	.3	.2
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
USAR	1.7	1.8	1.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.1	1.9	1.9

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The decrease in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from reductions in port terminal operations (-103).

The increase in FY 1985 USAR manpower is a result of the activation of several transportation detachments that support terminal port operations.

The decrease in civilian manning in FY 1985 results from decreases in port terminal operations (-289).

C. Auxiliary Activities.

1. Intelligence.

Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.2	9.4	9.5
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.9

Manpower in this category supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

The increase (+157) in active military manning in FY 1985 results from increases to cryptologic activities (+93) and classified programs (+64).

The increase (+117) in active military manning in FY 1986 results from increases to HUMINT activity (+40) and classified programs (+117.)

The increase in civilian manning in FY 1986 results from increases in support of classified programs.

2. Centrally Managed Communications.

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.0	15.5	15.0
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	4.8	5.0

Manpower in this category supports defense consolidated telecommunications and the worldwide command and control system, and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in Base Operations Support).

The increase (+519) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from increased manning of strategic command, control and communications units (+312) and standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+207).

The decrease (-487) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from decreases in signal units to support other force structure requirements (-311) and from other force structure realignments (-176).

The decrease in civilian Manning in FY 1985 results from decreases in long distance communications support (-386), offset by increases for civilian substitution for military manpower (+68).

The increase in civilian Manning in FY 1986 results from increases in long distance communications support (+197), offset by decreases in EQUATE equipment support (-18) and support for the National Service Center for Communications and Electronics (-9).

3. Research and Development Activities.

Research and Development Activities (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.5	5.4	5.3
<u>Civilian</u>	20.8	21.7	19.5

Manpower in this category performs in-house efforts and directs contractor efforts for basic and applied research; exploratory, advanced, and engineering development; and, test and evaluation for the Army's weapon systems and other equipment items. In addition, it provides administrative and logistical support for other RDTE installations and activities.

The net decrease (-172) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases for range and test support (-152) reduced Army Industrial Fund staffing (-12) reductions in research and development TDA activities (-45), and replacement of military manpower with government civilian employees or contractors (-12). This is offset by increased tactical electronic countermeasures and EW/vulnerability testing (+49).

The net decrease (-125) in active military spaces in FY 1986 results from reduced range and test support (-43) and Army Industrial Fund staffing reductions (-171), offset by increases for chemical/biological defense and protective material testing (+62), and increased small caliber and ballistic testing (+27).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in support of force modernization initiatives (+620), and range and test support (+490), offset by decreases in Army Industrial Fund staffing (-250).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from decreases in Army Industrial Fund Staffing (-3,122) offset by increases in range and test support of (+943).

4. Geophysical Activities.

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	*	--	--

Manpower in this category is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

D. Support Activities.

1. Base Operating Support.

a. Base Operating Support Manpower

Combat Installations

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	23.6	22.3	22.3
Civilian	88.7	86.4	88.3

Manpower in this subcategory supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe, US Army Japan, Eighth US Army-Korea, US Army Forces Command, and the US Army Western Command.

The net decrease (-1,278) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases to restrict European growth (-312), reliance on the commercial sector or government civilian employees to perform functions more appropriate for civilian employees than military (-904), and reductions in the operation and maintenance of 80 Army installations in Forces Command and Pacific Commands (-597). This is offset by increases for force modernization (+99), standardization of unit organizational structure to doctrinal designs (+320 spaces), light division training enhancements (+48), and Division 86 support requirements (+68).

The net decrease (-51) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from decreases for reliance on the commercial sector or

government civilian employees to perform functions more appropriate for civilian employees than military (-225), and Army-wide air traffic control reductions (-91). This is offset by increases for force modernization (+108), adjustment of US Army Europe strength to NATO troop ceilings (+76), and additional operations and maintenance support of 80 Army installations (+81).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in civilian substitution initiatives (+65), base operations support for the 7th Infantry Division (Light) (+200), and support for force modernization initiatives (+68).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from increases in civilian substitution initiatives (+510), base operations support for the 6th Infantry and 10th Mountain Divisions (+216), base operations support for FORSCOM installations (+154), and force modernization initiatives (+1033).

b. Base Operating Support Manpower.

Support Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military			
Active	31.2	29.4	29.5
Reserve Components			
ARNG	23.1	23.1	23.8
USAR	5.4	5.7	5.7
Civilian	80.1	78.2	79.1

Manpower in this subcategory is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Command, US Army Information Systems Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The net decrease (-1,809) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from reliance on the commercial sector or government civilian employees (-1,433) and reductions for communications, audio-visual, and training and education support (-427). This is offset by increased support of the US Army Reserve (+65).

The net increase (+56) in active military manpower in FY 1986, though small, results from increased force modernization requirements (+160) and improved station hospital services (+90), offset by reductions for training and education (-137), and reliance on the commercial sector or government civilian employees to perform work formerly performed by military personnel (-57).

The increase in FY 1986 for the ARNG (+700) supports the fill of the authorized base operations support structure in order to permit increased reliance on the ARNG and improve force readiness. These personnel are primarily to provide support to ARNG training sites that also are designated as mobilization sites. Both current training and mobilization capability are improved.

The increase in USAR manpower in FY 1985 is to support activations of two legal detachments and a personnel service company supporting garrison operations.

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in Army Industrial Fund Activities (-1,207), decapitalization of Research and Development Activities from the Industrial Fund (-701), functional realignment and commercial contracting in base operations activities (-650), offset by increases in civilian substitution initiatives (+405) and base operations support of training activities (+150).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from decreases for functional realignment and commercial contracting at USAR installations (-438), reduction in Army Industrial Fund activities (-702), offset by increases in support to station hospitals (+350).

2. Medical Support Activities.

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.4	18.5	18.8
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	9.2	8.6	8.6
<u>Civilian</u>	15.0	15.0	15.1

Manpower in this category supports health care activities.

Active military increases in FY 1985 (+135) and FY 1986 (+206) support research and development efforts in combat maxillofacial injury, drug and vaccine development, medical defense against chemical warfare and medical and dental services in Army and regional defense facilities.

The decrease in USAR medical support manpower spaces results from realignment of the force structure.

3. Personnel Support Activities.

Personnel Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.0	12.9	13.0
Civilian	9.3	2.1	9.3

Manpower in this category is used in the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC Program, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in USAR recruiting activities (-133) offset by increases in Active Army recruiting activities (+28)..

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from increases for special recruiting programs to support fielding of new equipment and weapons systems (+93).

4. Individual Training Activities.

Individual Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	44.6	45.1	46.8
Reserve Components			
ARNG	5.0	5.0	5.0
USAR	58.3	54.6	54.1
<u>Civilian</u>	13.4	14.2	15.3

Manpower in this category supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee and cadets portions of the Individuals account.

The net increase (+501) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in recruit training (+264), general skill training (+700), crypto/SIGINT training (+128), training establishment support (+736) and flight training (+110). This is offset by decreases for increased reliance on the commercial sector or government civilian employees (-370), reduced service academy training (-84), reduce integrated skill training (-550) and reductions to training developments requirements (-433).

The increase (+1,698) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from increases in general skill training (+1,346), increased training establishment support (+584), and flight training enhancements (+135), offset by a decrease in recruit training (-367).

The USAR training divisions have reduced wartime requirements, resulting in a proportional reduction in manpower through FY 1986.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from increases to support projected general skill training workload (+753).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from increases to support projected general skill training workload (+1,118).

5. Force Support Training Activities.

Force Support Training Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military			
Active	4.3	4.1	4.0
Civilian	2.0	2.1	2.0

Manpower in this category supports the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

The net decrease (-169) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in European forces related training (-119) and decreased training support to units (-84), offset by increases for light division training (+34).

The net decrease (-122) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from reductions related to training for the M-1 Abrams tank (-165), reductions in NCO training of (-44) and increased reliance on the commercial sector or civilian employees to replace military personnel (-20). These reductions are offset somewhat by increases to improve training in Europe (+65) and for training support to units (+42).

6. Central Logistics Activities.

Central Logistics Manpower (End strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military			
Active	8.8	9.0	8.9
Civilian	90.5	89.2	90.4

Manpower in this category serves in supply, maintenance and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentrations in the US Army Material Command and US Army Europe.

The net increase (+233) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in logistical support for overseas port units (+266), supply depot operations (+40) and maintenance support activities (+15), offset by decreases in maintenance support for missile facilities (-26) and logistics support activities (-16).

The net decrease (-108) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from reduced logistics support activities for overseas port units (-199). This is offset by increases in logistic support activities (+56), supply inventory control points (+16), and maintenance support for missile facilities (+19).

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in depot maintenance operations (-1,235).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from increases in supply operations (+2,307) and logistics support operations, (+1,423), offset by decreases in depot maintenance operations (-738).

7. Centralized Support Activities.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.5	20.8	20.9
<u>Reserve Component</u>			
ARNG	1.5	1.5	1.5
USAR	3.7	3.7	3.7
<u>Civilian</u>			
	35.2	37.5	38.0

Manpower in this category supports joint and international activities (less management headquarters), combat development, counterintelligence and investigative activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigation, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

The net decrease (-747) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in personnel administrative support (-106), foreign military sales support (-41), combat developments and administrative support for commands (-61), and increased reliance on reserve readiness support (-1,080) spaces. This is offset by increases in service support to OSD (+85), foreign counterintelligence (+88), security and investigation activities (+24), service-wide support to align with public law requirements (+49), and enhancements to international activities (+295).

The increase (+132) in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from increases in combat development (+88) and administrative services support (+44).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in administrative support to activities in Europe (+218), combat developments administration (+891), centralized support to reserve forces (+1,047) and financial systems redesign (+157).

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1986 results from increases in combat developments administration (+414), support to reserve forces (+28), and administrative support to activities in Europe (+21).

8. Management Headquarters Activities.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.9	9.5	9.7
Reserve Components			
USAR	.1	.1	.1
Civilian	13.9	14.5	14.4

Manpower in this category is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support-combat commands, and service support-support commands.

The increase in active military manpower in FY 1986 results from increases for Third US Army in support of HQS Army Central as the Army component of US Central Command (+155).

The decrease (-351) in active military manpower in FY 1985 results from decreases in support to international military organization and unified commands.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1985 results from increases in management of communications and testing activities (+614).

The decrease in civilian spaces in FY 1986 results from a decrease in management of communications and testing activities (-98).

9. Federal Agency Activities.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

(*Fewer than 50 spaces)

Manpower in this category is assigned to non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

10. Operating Strength Deviation.

Operating Strength Deviation

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-11.9	-3.5	-3.7
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
ARNG	-45.8	-48.9	-44.1
USAR	-40.5	-35.6	-26.7

Operating strength deviation is the number of spaces in the force structure (units) that are not filled (undermanning) or are over filled (overmanning), because of the seasonal nature of gains and losses, fluctuations in the force structure, and changes in the individuals subaccounts. End strength deviations shown reflect a snapshot situation as of 30 September and are not necessarily representative of the average deviation throughout the year. Active component average deviations throughout the year (-0.9 for FY 1984, -0.1 for FY 1985, and -0.3 for FY 1986) are generally lower in magnitude than year end deviations, and are a more representative indicator of year-long performance.

11. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs).

Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs)
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84 FY 85 FY 86

Military

Reserve Component

USAR

10.8

11.9

13.3

An IMA is an individual reservist (officer or enlisted) who is preassigned to an Active Component organization in peacetime to train for wartime duty with that organization. Increases are the result of growth in the program.

12. Individuals.

The Individuals subaccounts are comprised of manpower in transient, holdee (patient, prisoner, separatee), trainee, student, and US Military Academy cadet status.

a. Transients.

Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84 FY 85 FY 86

Military

Active

24.9

19.9

20.3

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves. The changes in transient end strengths are a result of changes in volume and duration of PCS moves.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84 FY 85 FY 86

Military

Active

5.1

5.2

5.3

Holdee numbers generally remain fairly stable over time. Progressive increase shown above is not considered to be significant.

c. Trainees, Students, and Cadets.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military			
Active	80.6	81.8	82.7
Trainees/Students	76.0	77.3	78.2
Cadets	4.6	4.6	4.6
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students*			
ARNG	44.9	41.6	42.7
USAR	27.9	29.8	30.6

The active component trainee data largely mirror the flow of non-prior service accessions, which are increasing through FY 1986.

The Reserve Components Individual Account consists of Troop Program Unit junior enlisted personnel who have not completed initial entry qualification training and are not deployable. ARNG increases support increased accessions, primarily of non-prior service personnel, to attain quality, skill, and grade goals within planned strength objectives. USAR decreases through FY 1986 correspond to a programmed increase in the number of soldiers trained in the unit.

*Pay Categories F, P, Q, U, and T.

CHAPTER IV

NAVY MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction.

A. Summary. This chapter describes the Navy's manpower program for FY 1986 in terms of its active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower components. It also depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from FY 1984 to FY 1986. In addition, it discusses the programs and initiatives that provide the Naval Reserve with new missions and greater integration with the active forces in keeping with Congressional guidance on Active/Reserve mix. The Navy manpower program derives from the force structure required to accomplish Navy missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy.

The Navy is committed to building a 600 ship, 15 carrier battle group Navy that can execute our military strategy. The crux of Navy's plan is to increase overall Navy manpower levels to achieve modest increases each year to man new ships and squadrons as they come on-line, and simultaneously to increase the base of petty officers in order to support a substantially larger Navy by the end of this decade.

Because of previous Congressionally imposed active strength constraints, Navy faces significant difficulties in properly manning shore activities to support the operating force, and consequently, sea-intensive ratings are forced to stay at sea longer. Reductions to the FY 1985 personnel request aggravated this problem. If the trend established by Congressionally mandated strength constraints from FY 1983 through FY 1985 continues in FY 1986 and beyond, the Navy will be 15,000 people below programmed manning objective in FY 1990, creating a critical inventory shortfall and robbing us of the base from which to promote required numbers of petty officers. This inevitably will cause serious readiness degradations much as we faced in the 1970s.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements. The following military and civilian data are summarized from the most recent Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) report, which is an annual, DoD directed manpower study based on the wartime scenario discussed in the Defense Guidance. The projected reduction in military peak demand in FY 1990 is due primarily to an increase in theater medical assets, resulting in a reduction in both the length of hospitalization required for casualties, and the number of personnel replacements required.

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+180	M+180
Peak Demand	1009.5	987.4	375.7

C. Navy Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan. The Navy requests resources for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1986 and FY 1987 as follows:

Navy Manpower Program
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Military		
Active	586.3	593.4
Selected Reserve	141.8	151.7
Civilian	318.7	320.8

The Navy is requesting an active manpower increase of 2.6 percent for FY 1986 and 1.2 percent for FY 1987. Approximately 95 percent of the growth in FY 1986 is going to the strategic and the tactical and mobility forces and will provide modest increase in the auxiliary and support forces. The Navy's request for reserve and civilian manpower increases will ensure a balanced force in keeping with the total force concept. The FY 1986 growth provides a baseline from which to reach the manpower requirements for the 600 ship Navy while sustaining an adequate balance with readiness-related support functions.

The Navy manpower program reflects only the authorized end strength required to effectively operate the Navy during peacetime while wartime requirements reflect the end strength which would be necessary during mobilization. Wartime requirements are neither desirable nor achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints during peacetime.

Naval Reserve programmed growth will reach the validated wartime requirements from the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) in FY 1987 for all selected reserve requirements except medical requirements, which will be attained in FY 1988.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Program.

1. Manpower Program by Major DPPC. The distribution of military manpower during the expansion period reflects growth not only in the number of ships and squadrons but also in the support elements of the force. The following tables depict the growth profiles as currently programmed. The right-hand column shows growth planned for each Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) over the five-year period ending in FY 1990. The specific figures may change as a result of annual budget decisions; however, the general proportions should remain relatively stable.

Navy Active Strength Distribution By DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Strategic	20.5	21.7	22.2	23.1	23.8	24.4
Tactical/Mobility	283.6	296.9	302.0	305.2	312.1	313.5
Auxiliary/Activities	24.2	24.9	25.1	24.9	25.0	25.2
Support Activities	146.7	150.2	152.3	152.4	154.9	157.3
Individuals	96.2	92.6	91.8	92.5	93.5	93.7
TOTALS*	571.3	586.3	593.4	598.1	609.3	614.1

1/ Operating Strength Deviation removed from these numbers.

* Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Selected Reserve Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Strategic	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Tactical/Mobility	77.2	81.8	87.2	90.2	92.8	93.1
Auxiliary Activities	6.6	7.2	7.8	7.9	7.8	7.8
Support Activities	40.4	46.9	50.5	53.8	54.3	54.4
Individuals	4.1	5.3	5.7	6.3	6.5	6.5
TOTALS*	128.7	141.8	151.7	158.6	161.9	162.2

*Totals may not add due to rounding.

Navy Civilian Strength Distribution by DPPC
(Strength in Thousands)

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 90</u>
Strategic	2.9	3.1	3.5	3.8	4.1	4.2
Tactical/Mobility	7.2	7.3	7.8	8.1	8.5	8.5
Auxiliary Activities	36.6	36.5	35.7	35.6	35.6	35.6
Support Activities	270.6	271.8	273.8	274.8	275.6	275.7
TOTALS*	317.3	318.7	320.8	322.3	323.8	324.0

*Totals may not add due to rounding.

2. Major Force Structure Changes. Major force structure consists of total ship battle forces, local defense and miscellaneous support forces, and Naval aviation forces.

a. Total Battle Forces. In FY 1986, the total ship battle forces will increase by 13 to a total of 555 ships. Changes in each of the four categories comprising total ship battle forces (strategic forces, battle forces, support forces, and mobilization forces category "A") follows:

(1) Strategic Forces. Strategic forces will contain 44 ships in FY 1986, an increase of one from FY 1985 as one OHIO Class TRIDENT is commissioned.

(2) Battle Forces. The number of other battle force ships will grow from 433 to 439 between FY 1985 and FY 1986. The number of carriers will remain at 13 in both years. There will be a net gain of one surface combatant to 200 during FY 1986: two new TICONDEROGA Class cruisers will be commissioned, one IOWA Class battleship will be transferred from inactive status, and two FFG-7 Class guided missile frigates will be commissioned while four other FFG-7s will be transferred to the Naval Reserve Force. The attack submarine force will have a net loss of one: one SKIPJACK Class, one SEAWOLF Class, and two SKATE Class submarines will be decommissioned and transferred to inactive status simultaneously with the commissioning of three LOS ANGELES Class submarines. There will be six patrol combatants in both years. Amphibious assault ships will increase by one to a total of 60 from FY 1985 to FY 1986 as one LSD-41 Class ship is commissioned. Mine warfare ships will increase from three to seven during FY 1986 with the commissioning of four MCM-1 AVENGER Class ships. The commissioning of the USS HENRY J. KAISER (AO-187) will increase the number of mobile logistics ships by one.

(3) Support Forces. The number of support forces will increase by two vessels, from 52 to 54; three ARS-38 BOLSTER Class ships will transfer to the Naval Reserve force and one will transfer to the Naval Defense Reserve force, one new ARS-50 will be commissioned, and five new ocean surveillance ships (TAGOS) will be added.

(4) Mobilization Forces Category "A". Mobilization forces category "A" ships increase by a net of 4 ships to a total of 18 with the aforementioned transfer of four FFG-7s from the active duty force into the Naval Reserve force in FY 1986.

b. Local Defense and Miscellaneous Support Forces. Auxiliaries and Sealift force levels increase from 118 to 132 ships with the addition of two TAKXs, two TAVBs, eight TAKs, one TACS, and one TAOT. Mobilization forces category "B" ships increase from 20 to 21, with the addition of three ARSs, and the decommissioning of one ARS and one MSO.

c. Naval Aviation Forces. A total of 83 Navy deployable active and 15 reserve tactical squadrons will be operating during FY 1985. In FY 1986, the number of active tactical squadrons will increase to 85. A total of 77 active and 17 reserve fixed-wing and rotary-wing antisubmarine warfare and fleet air defense squadrons will be operating in FY 1985 increasing to 80 active and 18 reserve squadrons in FY 1986 with the addition of LAMPS squadrons. The number of active direct-support squadrons remains at 30 active and 18 reserve squadrons during FY 1985 and FY 1986.

E. Key Manpower Issues

1. Military End Strength. Today's environment is one of growth and change for both the active and Reserve components of the Navy. Within this environment, the Navy's leadership is fully committed to supporting balanced growth and accommodating beneficial changes. The Navy carefully scrutinizes all proposed manpower increases to ensure that only those which truly reflect requirements for full-time effort in peacetime (and, hence, cannot be accomplished by drilling Reservists) result in requests to the Congress for greater active component end strength. The FY 1986 active end strength growth of 15,000 reflects the net active growth required after this detailed analysis. Proposed changes to the Navy's structure of the total force are analyzed for their impact on wartime readiness and on our ability to man the reserve forces, and for their cost.

The rapid growth line required to bring the current Reserve manpower inventory level up to the requirement level is the primary challenge facing the Navy Reserve over the next five years. Since the Naval Reserve must compete for recruits in the same shrinking market as the active forces, new initiatives will be necessary to attract qualified men and women. This challenge is increased by the fact that a majority of the requirements are in specific critical skill areas (e.g., construction and medical ratings). As inventory nears requirements, recruiting will become even more difficult as we must target our efforts to obtain specific qualifications. Therefore, accessions of critical skilled personnel must be coupled with retention to meet requirements.

2. Obtaining Desired Quality and Quantity of Personnel. Career satisfaction and compensation remain the most desirable and effective ways to obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed for the 1980s and beyond. A Navy career, to remain attractive, must depend on a fair and competitive compensation package, special and incentive pays, bonuses, in-kind benefits, a stable retirement system and of utmost importance, full reimbursement for all necessary expenses incurred during government directed travel. Attractiveness is further enhanced by improved training and quality-of-life improvements in living conditions and adequate family services. Recruiting success is directly related to the national economy and available male market pool. With the significant decline over the past year in unemployment and a corresponding reduction in the male population, Navy programmed increased resources levels to ensure our recruiting success. Most importantly, an increase in the size of the recruiting force is necessary to produce continued high quality accessions.

3. Growing Shortage of Experienced Nuclear Trained Surface and Submarine Officers. Our most serious problem is the 18 percent shortage of nuclear trained submarine and surface officers in the grades of lieutenant commander to captain. Sea tours are extended beyond career pattern lengths, most officers are assigned back-to-back sea tours, and some key fleet support shore billets are not manned. Accessions are again

declining and retention has not reached required rates. The situation is getting worse and the inventory shortage is projected to be 22 percent by FY 1986. Of equal concern is the critical inventory shortfall of experienced post-command submarine officers, which is projected to grow from four percent in FY 1984 to 22 percent in FY 1990. These officers are essential for manning major sea command billets (Trident Submarines, Submarine Tenders, and Submarine Squadrons). Additionally, their expertise is indispensable in key shore billets involving submarine force operation and safety, strategic planning, tactical development, and program management.

4. Aviation Officer Retention Problem. Aviation Officer retention has emerged as a serious problem for FY 1985. As a result of the increased pilot resignation submission rate in FY 1984 (75 percent increase over FY 1983), shortages are still being realized. The tactical aircraft community is the most affected with 141 percent increase in losses in FY 1985 compared to FY 1984 (229 versus 95). These losses have resulted in decreased instructor pilot manning in Fleet Replacement Squadrons and some training squadrons. With the economic recovery continuing and civilian airline hires projected at 6000 for 1985, our aviation retention problem can be expected to get worse without immediate action. Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) remains as the primary compensation initiative designed to combat this problem. Its full effectiveness in stemming the aviator losses in FY 1981 and FY 1982 is a matter of record. However, AOCP incentive value has been reduced over the earlier programs through implementation of a flat payment rate coupled with the continued reduction of Aviation Career Incentive Pay. Additionally, the loss of entitlement to Hazardous Duty Incentive Pay while under an AOCP contract further reduces the attractiveness of the program and our ability to fill demanding billets requiring aviation skills. AOCP will remain a key compensation initiative to preclude a return to the high aviator loss experience of FY 1979 and FY 1980. Its principal focus will remain on pilots and Naval flight officers (NFOs) in those communities that continue to be undermanned.

II. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General. The Navy plans to man and support the 600 ship Navy by FY 1989. Active Navy manpower growth in FY 1984 was 0.8 percent. For FY 1985, Navy asked for 1.9 percent active growth (compared to a ship growth of 3.8 percent) but only received 1.2 percent growth authorization. This authorized growth approximated the increased number of billets at sea; however, the fleet support requirements have not been met.

There are several critical steps to be taken to complete the transition to a 600 ship Navy. First, we must attain end strength growth. This is our highest priority. Our FY 1986 request supports a measured increase and will allow us to man today's force, to support it adequately with shore based maintenance and support facilities, and to build the skill and experience levels needed for the near future. Second, we need

to focus on retaining greater numbers of those enlisted and officer personnel who possess mission critical skills, who contribute directly to readiness and capability and whose talents are in shortest supply. The Navy is focusing on the critical areas of nuclear trained surface and submarine officers and aviation officers. And third, we need to make improvements to the quality of life of service members and their families by relieving requirements to pay "out of pocket" costs associated government-directed travel. These improvements are long overdue.

As we begin the second half of the eight year transition from 480 ships to the 600 ship Navy, we must note the several important areas of manpower and personnel support for the expanding Navy which have not kept pace with force structure growth. The FY 1986 budget request addresses these shortfalls and allocates resources to enable Navy to meet its personnel commitments at the end of the decade. People are as integral to new weapons as is the hardware. The decision to provide the manpower was implicit in the hardware procurement decisions. Failure to provide the personnel portion of these new systems at this juncture jeopardizes system operation and effectiveness, introduces costly personnel system inefficiencies and adversely affects combat readiness. Recent experience has shown that clear ties exist between manning and material readiness in both ships and airplanes. For instance, while squadron manning levels have increased by 20 percent in recent years, mission capable rate has risen 8 percent and the fully mission capable rate has increased more than 20 percent. Similarly, a 20 percent decline in the number of destroyer serious material casualty reports (C3/C4 CASREPS) has coincided with improvements in the manning in ratings that maintain the equipment.

As the House Armed Services Committee noted last year, the contribution that quality personnel make to overall readiness can hardly be overstated. In 1981 readiness degradation attributable to personnel shortfalls was Navy's most serious problem. Central to the problem was a decline in the experience level of mid-grade petty officers since the mid-70's time frame. For example, Navy had about 23,000 fewer petty officers with over 10 years of service in 1981 than we had in 1974. Coupling this lack of experience with acute shortages in electronic, propulsion and nuclear trained ratings presented an intolerable situation. Navy took some immediate actions such as sea tour extensions, shore tour reductions and beefing up deploying ships with personnel assets from ships in between deployments to improve manning in the short term. Although these actions were successful, we knew that a long term solution hinged on our ability to increase experience levels through marked retention improvements. With Congress's help, we have increased the personnel experience and manning levels of ships and squadrons, which in turn have produced concomitant readiness improvements.

Because inadequate manning has a devastating impact on the readiness of ships and squadrons, Navy has absorbed strength cuts by substantially restricting shore and fleet support growth. Although successful recruiting and retention has helped to increase readiness during this period, we cannot continue to degrade the maintenance,

training, medical and logistics support that operating units require to accomplish their missions. Considerable effort has been expended analyzing manpower alternatives, such as civilian substitution, shifting missions to the Reserve and using private contractors. The strength request reflects this effort. Navy cannot afford further reductions or defer growth in this vital area.

2. Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength. Navy's growth in FY 1986 is oriented primarily toward operating forces. Modest growth in auxiliary and support DPPCs has been oriented toward Congressionally-directed medical programs, combat installations, and fleet communications installations. The active manpower shown in table IV-1 supports the increasing demands of the fleet operating forces, while sustaining an adequate balance with readiness-related support functions.

3. Skill and Grade. Table IV-2 reflects corrective Navy management actions in the areas of on-the-job training and formal school training programs. Lower paygrade excesses are for the purpose of achieving two critical objectives. First is the counter-balancing of the senior petty officer shortages. Second, by accessing more personnel into the base of a growing enlisted force pyramid, the Navy will achieve a larger future petty officer population designed to become more self-sustaining by occupation -- that is, an increased "flow" of reenlistees from the first-term into the careerist population. This will reduce the need for careerist occupational conversion and retraining.

Table IV-2 depicts an O-4 to O-6 shortage in inventory as compared to programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) each year. Although PMI accurately reflects Navy O-4 to O-6 requirements, the associated control grade inventory is constrained below PMI by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. As a result, the Navy maintains an excess of O-1 to O-3 inventory to attempt to satisfy the remaining O-4 to O-6 PMI.

The term "skills" as used in table IV-2 is synonymous with enlisted ratings and the logical grouping of officer designators (i.e., surface, submarine, intelligence, chaplain corps, etc.) used in inventory planning.

4. Experience

Table IV-3 shows programmed experience level versus actuals and displays vividly Navy's efforts to correct both of the experience shortfalls of the past decade. Over the last few years Navy has been able to retain first term reenlistable petty officers. However, shortfalls in the more senior paygrades (people with greater than 4 years of service (YOS)) remain. The experience shortfalls in the more senior paygrades are in the supervisory and training areas, so essential to effective junior personnel skill development in repair and maintenance of our sophisticated weapons systems and highly technical shipboard systems. Navy's objective is to continue retaining personnel at the first and second term reenlistment points, and to grow the experience in the force structure through advancements and training.

TABLE IV-1
ACTIVE NAVY PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000's)

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% HNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% HNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% HNG
STRATEGIC	22.8	20.7	91	22.9	20.5	90	23.2	21.7	94
Offensive Strategic Forces	20.9	18.8	90	20.8	18.4	88	21.0	19.5	93
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.9	1.9	100	2.0	2.0	100	2.2	2.2	100
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	287.1	278.0	97	297.5	281.6	95	301.9	296.9	98
Land Forces	4.2	4.0	95	4.3	4.2	98	4.3	4.3	100
Division Forces	(4.2)	(4.0)	(95)	(4.3)	(4.2)	(98)	(4.3)	(4.3)	(100)
Tactical Air Forces	66.2	65.9	99	70.5	66.0	94	72.6	70.5	97
Naval Forces	216.9	207.8	96	222.2	213.0	96	224.5	221.7	99
ASW and Fleet Air Def. Forces	(130.8)	(125.9)	(96)	(135.8)	(128.5)	(95)	(137.6)	(134.9)	(98)
Ambibious Forces	(32.6)	(32.1)	(99)	(33.0)	(32.7)	(99)	(33.7)	(33.6)	(99)
Naval Support Forces	(53.7)	(49.8)	(93)	(53.7)	(51.8)	(96)	(53.2)	(53.2)	(100)
Mobility Forces	.4	.3	75	.4	.4	100	.4	.4	100
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES	38.1	23.9	63	38.7	24.2	63	38.9	24.9	64
Intelligence	12.0	8.5	71	12.1	8.6	71	12.1	8.9	73
Centrally Managed Cos.	12.9	7.5	58	13.3	7.7	58	13.4	8.0	60
Research and Development	11.2	6.0	54	11.3	6.0	53	11.3	6.0	53
Geophysical Activities	2.1	1.9	90	2.1	1.9	90	2.1	2.0	95
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	226.0	145.2	64	226.8	146.7	65	227.8	150.2	66
Base Operating Support	114.4	58.0	51	115.7	59.7	51	115.7	60.4	52
Combat Installations	(53.2)	(22.6)	(42)	(53.5)	(22.9)	(43)	(53.3)	(23.4)	(44)
Support Installations	(61.2)	(35.4)	(58)	(62.0)	(36.2)	(58)	(62.4)	(37.0)	(59)
Medical Support	15.3	11.6	76	15.4	12.0	78	15.4	12.8	83
Personnel Support	8.4	7.8	93	8.0	7.8	98	8.2	8.2	100
Individual Training	29.8	29.8	100	29.8	28.8	97	30.5	29.6	97
Force Support Training	16.0	15.4	96	16.4	15.8	96	16.4	16.0	98
Central Logistics	22.2	6.7	30	22.2	6.9	31	22.1	7.0	32
Supply Operations	(7.3)	(1.7)	(23)	(7.3)	(1.7)	(23)	(7.2)	(1.8)	(25)
Maintenance Operations	(12.7)	(3.1)	(24)	(12.8)	(3.1)	(24)	(12.1)	(3.1)	(24)
Logistics Support Operations	(2.2)	(1.9)	(86)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(95)	(2.2)	(2.1)	(95)
Centralized Support Activities	9.4	6.6	70	9.4	6.7	71	9.3	6.7	72
Management Headquarters	9.2	8.4	91	9.2	8.5	92	9.2	8.4	91
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.0	91	1.1	1.1	100	1.1	1.1	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	574.6	467.7	81	585.8	475.0	81	591.7	493.7	83
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION (MAN-YEARS)	-7.1			-7.1			-7.1		
INDIVIDUALS	104.2			(-7.4)			(-7.6)		
END STRENGTH	564.8			103.3			99.6		
				571.3			586.3		

TABLE IV-2
ACTIVE NAVY SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)***
(Strength in 000's)

		FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
		BAL+*	SHORT+*	TOTAL	BAL+*	SHORT+*	TOTAL	BAL+*	SHORT+*	TOTAL
E1 - E4										
Number of Skills	47	21	22	90	68	11	90	67	18	90
PHL	106.7	86.2	73.2	266.2	138.8	26.3	265.8	138.9	60.0	273.4
Inventory	128.4	88.3	58.6	275.3	175.4	27.6	270.6	192.5	32.8	273.6
Over/Short	+21.7	+2.1	-16.7	+9.1	+36.5	+1.3	-33.0	+4.8	+54.6	+2.2
E5 - E9										
Number of Skills	3	42	56	101	3	74	24	101	2	82
PHL	2.7	110.5	110.7	233.9	2.2	183.8	44.0	230.0	.7	206.3
Inventory	2.9	117.0	94.6	214.5	2.5	182.7	40.0	225.2	1.0	215.7
Over/Short	+.2	-6.4	-16.1	-9.4	+.3	-1.1	-4.0	-4.8	+.4	+9.4
Total E1 - E9										
Number of Skills	27	31	43	101	43	39	19	101	60	30
PHL	122.0	210.0	158.0	450.1	220.3	159.4	116.1	495.8	312.2	110.8
Inventory	142.8	213.0	134.0	469.8	245.6	168.3	81.9	495.8	362.5	91.1
Over/Short	+20.8	-3.0	-24.1	-7.3	+25.3	+9.0	-34.3	0	+50.3	-19.7
W0										
Number of Skills	0	3	1	4	0	3	1	4	0	3
PHL	0	0	0	2.8	3.3	0	3.2	.2	3.4	0
Inventory	0	0	0	2.6	3.1	0	3.1	.1	3.3	0
Over/Short	0	*	*	-2.2	0	-1.2	*	-1.1	0	-1.1
01 - 03										
Number of Skills	9	13	5	27	8	13	6	27	6	18
PHL	18.2	9.8	10.9	38.9	16.3	13.3	11.0	40.7	16.5	24.3
Inventory	21.1	10.1	10.2	41.3	19.1	13.6	9.9	42.6	16.7	24.6
Over/Short	+2.9	+3	-7	+2.5	+2.8	+1.3	-1.1	+1.9	+2.2	+3
04 - 06										
Number of Skills	4	9	13	26	5	8	13	26	4	11
PHL	7.2	5.7	13.0	26.0	7.4	3.5	15.6	26.6	3.1	7.8
Inventory	7.7	5.7	10.8	24.2	8.2	3.4	13.3	24.9	3.4	7.8
Over/Short	+.5	-1.1	-2.2	-1.8	+.7	-1.1	-2.3	-1.7	+.3	*
TOTAL 01 - 06										
Number of Skills	5	19	3	27	5	19	3	27	2	24
PHL	13.6	48.0	3.3	64.8	14.7	49.8	2.8	67.3	7.5	59.6
Inventory	14.9	47.6	3.1	65.5	15.8	49.2	2.5	67.5	7.9	59.5
Over/Short	+1.3	-4	-2.2	+1.1	+.7	-1.1	-1.6	+.2	+.4	-1.1
* Less than 50.										
** See definitions in Appendix B.										
*** Navy's terms for PHL are Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA). However, they will not be used here for consistency with the other Service chapters.										

* See definitions in Appendix B.

** Navy's terms for PHL are Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA). However, they will not be used here for consistency with the other Service chapters.

*** See definitions in Appendix B.

**** Navy's terms for PHL are Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA).

TABLE IV-3
ACTIVE NAVY EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
 (Strength in 000s)

	FY 1984				FY 1985				FY 1986			
	TOTAL PEOPLE	Avg. with > 4 YOS	PEOPLE	Avg. with > 4 YOS	PEOPLE	Avg. with > 4 YOS						
E1-E4 PMI*	266.2	27.1	2.6	265.8	27.5	2.6	273.4	28.3	28.3	2.6	28.3	2.6
Inventory	276.0	39.4	2.9	270.6	45.7	2.9	273.6	42.7	42.7	2.9	42.7	2.9
E5-E9 PMI	223.9	209.0	12.7	230.0	214.8	11.6	236.3	220.4	220.4	11.6	220.4	11.6
Inventory	213.9	197.7	11.0	225.2	205.9	10.9	236.1	214.5	214.5	10.9	214.5	10.9
E1-E9 PMI	490.1	236.0	6.7	495.8	241.1	6.8	509.7	-	-	6.8	509.7	6.8
Inventory	489.8	237.1	6.4	495.8	251.6	6.6	509.7	257.2	257.2	6.6	257.2	6.6
WO PMI	3.3	N/A	3.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.1	3.1	20.8	3.3	3.3	21.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	21.5	21.5
01-03 PMI	38.9	N/A	40.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	41.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Inventory	41.3	25.9	6.2	42.6	26.4	6.1	43.5	26.9	26.9	6.1	26.9	6.1
04-06 PMI	26.0	N/A	26.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	27.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Inventory	24.2	24.1	17.4	24.9	24.7	17.4	25.1	24.9	24.9	17.3	24.9	17.3
01-06 PMI	54.8	N/A	67.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	68.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Inventory	65.5	49.9	10.5	67.5	51.2	10.3	68.6	51.8	51.8	10.2	51.8	10.2

*Programmed manning plus individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Navy achieved its "One Navy" recruiting objectives in FY 1984. While the total number of accessions required was lower in FY 1984 than in previous years, Navy capitalized on this situation, as well as on economic conditions, to access the best quality applicants. As a result, trainee attrition losses have declined during this fiscal year. Additionally, the quality achievements accomplished in FY 1984 are expected to result in reduced first term attrition in future years. Navy's delayed entry program (DEP) posture, however, suffered a decline with a FY 1984 end size of 36,649 as compared to 40,894 at the end of FY 1983.

The Navy has had notable success in the prior service market. In past years, due to severe petty officer shortages, prior service recruiting was basically unconstrained, with qualified veterans of all ratings eligible for a return to active service. As many as 13,000 veterans were recruited annually. Today, the recruitment of prior service personnel is being focused on specific shortage skills. While the recruiting market will not support such numbers of veterans in these shortage skills, we did attain 4,979 prior service veterans in FY 1984. These veterans, of whom 84.3 percent were petty officers, were made available for immediate assignment to fleet billets, a factor which contributed to improved fleet readiness in FY 1984.

With respect to quality, the Navy accessed 64,657 non-prior service (NPS) male high school diploma graduates (HSDG), exceeding its target of 57,000. The number equated to 92.3 percent of the total NPS male accessions. The mental group I - IIIU (upper mental group) goal of 65 percent was exceeded by 4.7 percent, while Navy remained 3.8 percent below the 12 percent NPS male mental group IV ceiling with all mental group IV recruits being high school diploma graduates. The Navy's mental group IV attainment was well under the Congressionally mandated ceiling for FY 1984 of 20 percent of mental group IV NPS males.

Navy's recruiting success in FY 1984 was attributable to reduced accession goals, sound management of scarce resources, and the national economic situation. The FY 1984 success should not cause undue optimism when considering future year recruiting objectives. While Navy anticipates achieving its FY 1985 goals, it will become more difficult to achieve quality goals in FY 1985 and beyond. These goals will require accessing approximately 93,000 active duty accessions per year. Eighty percent HSDGs will be necessary to assure Navy can sustain its present force structure and provide trained personnel to meet the scheduled growth in inventories prior to FY 1990.

Attainment of this quantity and growth is directly dependent on the success of Navy's recruiting efforts. Because we see more competition in the high quality recruiting market, both private sector and military, recruiting costs will rise. Any resource cuts, coupled with the decline

in the market of recruitable non-prior service males and the predicted improving economy, will negatively affect Navy's ability to attain its accession goals. In light of this predicted recruiting environment, recruiting resources must be sustained.

Another pivotal indicator of recruiting success is the status of the DEP pool. A large DEP is an invaluable aid in recruiting; Navy's objective is to increase the DEP to approximately 45 percent of the next year's recruiting objective and maintain a high quality profile in the DEP to assure both quantity and quality requirements. A DEP of this size with relatively high quality will mitigate against fluctuations in the recruiting market. Navy is programming personnel and fiscal resources to provide for continued attainment of annual recruiting objectives while concurrently maintaining an adequate DEP posture.

To be certain that Navy can grow future petty officers to meet the 600 ship force structure, Navy will attempt to maintain high quality objectives in FY 1985 and beyond. These goals, as stated above, will not only meet trainable quality requirements, as determined by mental group, but also will improve survivability which correlates directly to HSDG status.

Active Navy Enlisted Strength Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84		FY 85		FY 86	
	Actual	Goal	Goal	Actual	Goal	Actual
<u>End Strength</u>	491,288	491,173	495,802	509,698		
<u>Accessions</u>						
Prior Service	4,979	4,979	5,002	5,558		
Non-Prior Service						
Male	70,071	70,071	71,117	81,338		
HSDG	64,657	57,000	57,000	65,070		
(%)	(92.3)	(73.1)	(77.0)	(80.0)		
Female	7,857	7,857	9,805	9,823		
(%)	(10.1)	(10.1)	(11.7)	(10.8)		
HSDG	7,821	7,664	9,314	9,331		
(%)	(99.5)	(97.5)	(95.0)	(95.0)		

Navy's major management initiatives center around virtual elimination of the petty officer imbalance in the near future, while concurrently balancing the skill inventories to meet skill demands in FY 1990. To accomplish this objective, Navy must retain its technically trained petty officers, provide professional development to assure attainment of necessary experience, train new accessions to support inventory growth in seriously undermanned ratings, and recruit quality accessions to ensure trainability and survivability during the first enlistment.

(2) Retention. FY 1984 retention rates were stable with only slight drops from the record high rates of FY 1983. First term retention rates exceeded goal by eight percentage points and second and third term retention rates were within one percentage point of goal. The continued high retention rates have contributed to reducing the number of undermanned ratings and improved balancing of Navy's force structure. Retention results versus goals are as follows:

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
1st Term	58%	50%	58%	56%
2nd Term	64%	65%	66%	65%
3rd Term & beyond	95%	95%	95%	95%

Economic recovery and concurrent increases in civilian employment opportunities have made the market place more competitive now and for the foreseeable future. Competitive compensation, retirement system stability, selective reenlistment bonus funding and continued education opportunities and benefits will be major determinants shaping the retention decisions of our highest quality careerists and molding the overall retention climate for the rest of this decade. The FY 1986 goal reflects Navy's best estimate of enlisted retention behavior as the net result of the above factors.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. As shown, the Navy has experienced fluctuations, but shows a relatively level aggregate population stability (defined in Appendix B).

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	90.5	91.7	92.7	92.6	91.9
Enlisted	81.2	81.4	84.1	85.9	84.8

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The Navy also shows a relatively level unit personnel stability (defined in Appendix B).

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	51.5	50.1	51.0	50.8	47.9
Enlisted	45.9	44.6	47.3	50.2	49.7

(a) Enlisted Attrition. First-term enlisted attrition for FY 1984 showed an insignificant increase to 11.95 percent from the FY 1983 level of 11.3 percent. Project Upgrade '84, a special

discharge program designed to weed out marginal performers, discharged 75 percent fewer personnel than Project Upgrade 83, indicating that the aggregate quality of the force is improving.

(b) Enlisted Desertion and Unauthorized Absences (UA). The desertion rate continued to decline in FY 1984 for the seventh consecutive year. The FY 1984 rate of 11.6 per 1000 is the lowest the Navy has experienced since FY 1972, and it represents a 10.1 percent improvement when compared to the FY 1983 desertion rate of 12.9 per 1000. The unauthorized absence rate also continues to improve. The FY 1984 UA rate of 43.5 per 1000 represents a 10.9 percent improvement when compared to the FY 1983 UA rate of 48.8 per 1000. This is the fifth consecutive year the UA rate has declined and the FY 1984 UA rate was the lowest in the Navy since FY 1973.

b. Officer and Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions. Active officer procurement goals and attainment for the FY 1986 budget period are as follows:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

	FY 84		FY 85		FY 86
	Actual	Goal	Goal		Goal
	6,104	1/	5,952	6,971	6,594

1/ End strength constraints caused a delay of commissioning 438 FY 1984 accessions to FY 1985.

Accessions to the Navy officer corps come from both regular and reserve officer commissioning sources. Of the 6,104 officers commissioned in FY 1984, 2,613 (43 percent) were commissioned in the regular commissioning programs and 3,491 (57 percent) through reserve commissioning programs. Of the 2,613 regular officers, 1,725 come from the US Naval Academy or the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship program.

The majority of Navy officers are commissioned through reserve officer programs. The recruiting command met 101 percent (2,547) of its FY 1984 reserve officer recruiting goal. Attainment was the result of emphasis on officer recruiting, improved recruiter training, an uncertain economy, and a lower overall goal compared to prior years.

Although Navy has met overall officer requirements the Navy continues to experience difficulty in accessing critical physician specialties through reserve commissioning programs. Navy also experiences shortfalls in attainment of nuclear power officer requirements from regular commissioning programs. Navy achieved only 92 percent (760 of 830) of FY 1984 requirements for nuclear power officer accessions compared to 96 percent (791 to 821) in FY 1983.

(2) Officer Retention. FY 1984 was a pivotal year for officer retention, showing the first signs of a retention slowdown. Although retention of NFOs and surface warfare officers rose seven percentage points and five percentage points, respectively in FY 1984, Navy forecasts that retention will decline to 75 percent and 47 percent, respectively in FY 1985. Year end results posted a modest loss of one percentage point for general unrestricted line. Pilot retention dropped two percentage points to 56 percent and is continuing to decline to a projected 54 percent in FY 1985. Nuclear surface and submarine officer retention was the lowest of the unrestricted line communities. The rate for nuclear submariners rose only one percentage point, which was four percentage points below projected retention and 13 percentage points below required retention for that cohort. Nuclear surface officers declined 3 percentage points to 42 percent compared to a cohort requirement of 66 percent. We project that nuclear surface officer retention will decline to 38 percent in FY 1985. The current economic recovery and greater civilian employment opportunities are the main reasons for the transitional period of officer retention. With civilian employment alternatives improving, an increasing number of officers are resigning.

The following data show relative success in retention among the Navy Unrestricted Line communities:

Unrestricted Line Officer Retention Rates
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u> (projected)
Naval Flight Officer	71	65	73	74	81	75
Surface Warfare	39	42	43	45	50	47
General URL	23	46	44	60	59	62
Pilot	30	42	49	58	56	54
Nuclear Submarine	36	33	39	46	47	50
Surface Nuclear	42	33	21	45	42	38

Improving retention rates throughout the 1980s are central to alleviating mid-grade officer shortages and supporting force structure expansion. Improved pay and restoration of incentive pay values are essential to maintaining a favorable retention climate.

c. Women in the Navy. FY 1984 marked steady progress toward reaching the Navy's goal of 46,500 enlisted women and 7,199 women officers on active duty by FY 1987.

In FY 1979, the Navy's Enlisted Women's Utilization Study developed a methodology for determining the maximum number of women that could be used effectively without adversely affecting sea/shore rotation Navy wide and still provide a career path and upward mobility for the women. The FY 1979 study showed that the Navy could use about 45,000 enlisted women and projected that the goal could be reached in FY 1985. Because of accession cuts based on end strength constraints in the past two fiscal years, the Navy had to revise when it could reach the goal to FY 1987.

However, a healthy inventory and good retention should allow us to reach this number ahead of schedule (FY 1986). In addition, we project growth for FY 1987 to 46,500 based on additional patrol squadron (VP) sea duty billets for women.

Female Navy Strength
Total (Enlisted/Officer)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Active	48,217 (41,611/6,606)	50,436 (43,576/6,860)	51,346 (44,236/7,110)
Reserve	10,360 (8,920/1,440)	11,132 (9,677/1,455)	12,383 (10,854/1,529)

As part of the 46,500 enlisted women's end strength goal, the Navy needs at least 31 percent (14,415) in "non-traditional" skill areas for women, such as engineering/hull, deck, and electronics/precision instrument ratings. In FY 1984, we continued to increase the number and percentage of enlisted women in the non-traditional skill areas.

Enlisted Women in Traditional/Non-Traditional Navy
Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Admin/Technical Supply	12,840	14,516	16,229	16,858
Medical/Dental	5,020	5,229	5,510	5,794
*Aviation	5,056	5,365	5,713	5,916
*Electronic/Precision	615	671	855	1,018
*Engineering/Hull	896	1,045	1,315	1,696
*Deck	794	977	1,152	1,221
*Ordnance	280	349	462	487
*Construction	162	203	247	298
*Miscellaneous	148	169	178	194
Non-Rated/Non-Designated	9,726	8,500	8,816	8,776

*Considered non-traditional occupational groups for women.

As a proportion of all officers, women increased to 9.4 percent in FY 1984. Navy projects 7,199 women officers on active duty FY 1987. This projection is based on the number of women in each officer community that can be effectively employed given existing legal constraints on their assignment.

Navy policy is to employ women to the fullest extent, assigning them to positions commensurate with their expertise. Under the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 6015, Navy may not permanently assign women to ships or aircraft squadrons engaged in combat missions. Consequently, 14 of the Navy's 99 enlisted occupational specialities are closed to women because these fields are almost exclusively on board combatant ships and aircraft squadrons or because they lack a viable career path for women.

Because of their combat relationship, two officer communities, submarine warfare and special warfare, are also closed to women. It should be noted, however, that both officer and enlisted women are assigned to non-combatant ships and to aviation force support and training squadrons and deploy regularly to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific.

As of the end of FY 1984, 3,648 enlisted women and 178 women officers were serving in 33 ships. Current plans call for 5,125 enlisted women and 200 women officers to be in shipboard assignments by end FY 1985. At the end of FY 1984, there were 109 women pilots (including trainees) and 45 women are NFOs (including trainees). Approximately 14 percent of enlisted women serve in aviation rating specialties.

6. Readiness Assessment. Overall Navy personnel readiness has continued to show improvements for the past four years. As the senior enlisted manning at sea during this period increased 13.4 percent, the personnel readiness factor of the combat readiness equation improved for ships by 46.1 percent, aviation squadrons by 38.3 percent, and submarines by 32 percent. Despite the excellent improvements made in recent years in reducing enlisted occupational imbalances, particularly within the petty officer population, the personnel readiness trend has slowed as skill imbalances and personnel shortages in certain areas continue to exist. Also, cuts in requested end strength have contributed to the slowdown in the personnel readiness improvement trend. Regarding officer imbalances, pilot shortages may worsen slightly; the severe shortage of experienced nuclear trained surface and submarine officers will continue to worsen; the shortage of post-command experienced submarine officers will significantly worsen; and surface warfare officer shortages may worsen. Programs are planned or in place to ameliorate the officer shortages, enlisted imbalances, and petty officer shortages e.g., recruiting and reenlistment policies which will enable shoring up of undermanned ratings; continued competitive pay; bonus programs such as Selective Reenlistment Bonus; AOCP; and Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve Manpower. Navy Selected Reserve manpower for FY 1986 and FY 1987 is as follows:

Navy Selected Reserve Manpower Program
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Total Selected Reserve	141.8	151.7
Unit Reservists and Trainees	121.1	128.3
SAM ¹	(3.6)	(3.8)
OSAM ²	(.2)	(.3)
Active Duty Reservists	19.5	21.6
TARs	(17.8)	(19.9)
Recruiters	(.1.5)	(1.6)
10 U.S.C. 265	(.2)	(.2)
IMAs ³	1.2	1.8
CAT A	(.9)	(.9)
CAT D	(.3)	(.9)

1/ Sea and Air Mariner Program

2/ Officer Sea and Air Mariner Program

3/ Category A Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) perform 24 paid drills per year plus 2 weeks of active duty. Category D IMAs perform 24 non-paid drills per year plus 2 weeks of active duty.

(1) General. The Navy is growing toward the goal of 600 ships. A major component of this growth is occurring in the Naval Reserve, which is embarked on its most ambitious expansion effort in recent history. It is essential that the Navy total force growth is properly structured and balances warfighting capabilities and readiness. Limited resources must be used with optimum efficiency. Rapid crisis response, heavy training requirements, and fleet readiness all must be accommodated.

The gap between peacetime capability and wartime requirements must be filled with qualified reserve units and individuals. One major function of the Naval Reserve in peacetime is to man, equip and train for a high state of readiness upon mobilization. In training to fill this gap and ensure effective integration upon mobilization, the Naval Reserve provides active forces with direct support which is mutually beneficial to Selected Reserve mobilization and training requirements. The phrase "mutual support" has been adopted to describe those Naval Reserve training evolutions which also provide direct assistance to active

duty units in the performance of their missions. Examples are air logistics support for the continental U.S. (CONUS), air tanker services, predeployment air combat refresher training, fleet intelligence production, fleet exercise support, ship intermediate level maintenance, cargo handling support, construction support, chaplain and medical support, and security group signal analysis.

(2) Structure Manning, and Operating Strength.

Expansion of the Naval Reserve is integral to expansion of the total force. Increases in Selected Reserve manpower will be distributed among the DPPC categories previously discussed as shown in table IV-4. Note that the force structure grows at a much slower rate than the programmed manning. So between FY 1984 and FY 1986, we increase our percent manning from 86 percent to 96 percent. The Navy FY 1986 budget submission indicates that Selected Reserve strength is programmed to reach the full requirement by the end of FY 1987, with medical support activities by FY 1988. Reserve force ships and squadrons received highest priority followed by ship and squadron augmentation units, combat and combat support units such as special warfare units, shore intermediate maintenance activities (SIMAs), and mobile construction battalions. Auxiliary activities, which include intelligence, communications, research and weather units, are incrementally increased to reach full funding by the end of FY 1987. Augmentation for support activities is incrementally funded to reach the full requirement by the end of FY 1987 with medical by FY 1988.

A total of 940 category A and 306 category D Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) will be funded in FY 1986. The increase in Training and Administration of Reserves (TARs) between FY 1984 and FY 1986 supports the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships and squadrons, aircraft intermediate maintenance departments, SIMAs, and base support. The drilling Reserve increases between FY 1984 and FY 1986 by 15,800, which includes 7,000 medical support personnel, with 7,600 for ships, squadrons, SIMAs and operational staffs, and the balance of the increase distributed throughout the DPPC structure.

The Sea and Air Mariner (SAM) Program has been developed to meet junior enlisted personnel mobilization requirements. The SAM program will generate increased use of "A" schools, non-traditional accession methods (i.e., VOTECH), and other command-sponsored training to enable the Naval Reserve to satisfy its General Detail E-3 and below skill requirements for NRF ships, squadrons, SIMAs, mobile construction battalions (SEABEPS), and medical units. The SAM program will deliver 10,000 non-prior service accessions into the Naval Reserve each year.

It must be noted that TAR personnel distribution is in the programmed manpower structure by DPPC, but TAR manpower is not reflected in NAF's projections by DPPC.

**Table IV-4
NAVY RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000's)**

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PROG MANN STRUCT	PROG+ IND MNG	% MNG	PROG MANN STRUCT	PROG+ IND MNG	% MNG	PROG MANN STRUCT	PROG+ IND MNG	% MNG
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE Strategic Forces									
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	1,3	.4	80	1,5	.5	100	1,5	.5	100
Land Forces	80.5	71.8	89	80.7	77.2	96	83.0	81.8	99
Division Forces	(2.3)	(1.4)	(61)	(2.3)	(2.1)	(91)	(2.3)	(2.2)	(96)
Tactical Air Forces	7.0	5.7	81	7.1	6.3	89	7.1	7.0	99
Naval Forces	69.1	63.4	92	69.2	66.5	96	71.6	70.5	98
ASW and Fleet Air Def. Forces	(29.9)	(28.7)	(92)	(29.7)	(29.0)	(98)	(30.5)	(29.8)	(98)
Amphibious Forces	(7.4)	(5.3)	(72)	(7.3)	(6.3)	(86)	(7.1)	(6.9)	(91)
Naval Support Forces	(31.6)	(29.5)	(93)	(32.2)	(31.2)	(97)	(34.0)	(33.7)	(99)
Mobility Forces	2.1	1.4	67	2.1	2.3	109	2.1	2.1	100
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES	1.5	-6.2	83	1.6	6.6	87	1.8	7.2	92
Intelligence	4.9	3.9	80	4.9	4.4	90	4.9	4.7	96
Centrally Managed Com.	1.4	1.4	100	1.5	1.3	87	1.7	1.4	82
Research and Development	1.4	1.6	75	1.4	1.7	88	0.8	0.8	72
Geophysical Activities	3.3	3.3	100	3	3	100	0.3	0.3	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	44.1	35.9	11.81	47.2	40.4	11.01	51.1	46.9	11.21
Base Operating Support	12.4	11.1	162	12.4	13.5	81	16.3	16.7	69
Combat Installations	(8.0)	(8.9)	(111)	(8.8)	(7.5)	(85)	(9.2)	(9.5)	(9.2)
Support Installations	(4.9)	(4.2)	(86)	(6.0)	(6.1)	(102)	(7.5)	(7.5)	(101)
Medical Support	16.0	6.31	11.51	16.9	12.9	10.61	18.5	15.3	11.01
Personnel Support	8	8	100	8	8	100	0.8	0.8	100
Individual Training	2	4.1	200	0.2	0.2	[0.2]100	.2	[0.2]100	
Force Support Training	4	1.1	138	4	4	88	.8	.7	88
Central Logistics	7.6	6.1	80	7.6	7.6	92	7.6	7.4	97
Supply Operations	(3.2)	(2.5)	(78)	(3.2)	(2.8)	(88)	(3.2)	(3.1)	(97)
Maintenance Operations	(3.6)	(3.0)	(83)	(3.6)	(3.5)	(97)	(3.6)	(3.5)	(97)
Logistics Support Operations	(1.6)	(1.6)	(75)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(68)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(100)
Centralized Support Activities	1.7	1.8	106	1.7	1.5	88	1.8	1.7	94
Management Headquarters	4.1	4.2	102	4.2	3.7	88	4.3	4.1	95
Federal Agency Support	1	1	N/A	1	1	100	0.1	0.1	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	112.6	116.3	11.81	126.0	126.7	11.01	142.4	136.4	11.21
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION (THOUSANDS)	1			1			1	1	
INDIVIDUALS	(-20.0)			(-14.0)			(-6.6)		
END STRENGTH	6.2			4.1			3.3		
	120.6			129.7			141.8		

* Less than 50
** What is shown in brackets are included in programmed Manning totals for Naval Reserve, but not included in percent meaning; since they are members of the Selected Reserve but man active structure during mobilization.

Note: Programmed Manpower Structure reflects the presence of full-time Support personnel (TARS) in addition to Manning requirements.

(3) Reserve Skill and Grade. Table IV-5 reflects a marked rate imbalance in the FY 1984 Selected Reserve. The imbalance results from the increased emphasis on placing E-3 and below requirements and junior officer requirements in the Reserve Force. The SAM program has been designed to meet these junior enlisted mobilization requirements. Targeted bonuses for enlisted personnel in critical rates will also alleviate this imbalance.

Naval Reserve skill and grade requirements are dependent on active force structure which is reviewed annually. The Naval Reserve is unable at this time to project skill and grade requirements for the outyears. Therefore, table IV-5 contains only FY 1984 data. However, the required computer support funded and is scheduled to be operational in 1985.

The term "skills" as used in table IV-5 is synonymous with enlisted ratings and the logical grouping of officer designators (i.e., surface, intelligence, etc.) used in inventory planning.

(4) Reserve Experience. The Naval Reserve does not have the necessary computer capacity to determine the average years of service or to separate those personnel with greater than 4 years of service for PMI. In addition, only current year data is available; the data on full-time support personnel is not maintained in the Naval Reserve data base. The lack of computer capacity and multiple data bases for full-time support personnel are being addressed in the redesign of the Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System, scheduled for completion in FY 1986. The FY 1984 data are in table IV-6 and show a high imbalance of junior officer and enlisted inventory to requirements. The SAM program, along with targeted bonuses and incentives, is designed to reduce the imbalance.

(5) Reserve Personnel Management.

(a) Enlisted.

[1] Recruiting. Most Reserve accessions come from the Naval veterans (NAVETS) program. Reserve recruiting efforts were very successful in the newly enacted SAM program. Significant achievements were also recorded in the other service veteran (OSVET) and advanced pay grade (APG) programs. The rapid programmed increase in Selected Reserve strength has driven a related increase in TAR recruiting to secure the necessary full-time support personnel to manage this growing force and man the NRF ships. Navy experienced difficulties in meeting its goals in these two areas in FY 1984, but recent management changes and added recruiting resources are addressing the FY 1984 problems. Navy expects to meet the SAM and TAR accession plans in FY 1985, with the use of targeted incentives and TAR reenlistment bonuses.

The actual number of Selected Reserve Personnel recruited in FY 1984 and the accession goals for FY 1985 shown below:

TABLE IV-5
 NAVY RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
 ACTUAL & PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS
 PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS (PMI)***
 (Strength in 000s)

	FY 1984			1/
	<u>Over**</u>	<u>Balanced**</u>	<u>Short**</u>	
<u>E1-E4</u>				
Number of Skills	13	4	67	84
PMI	4.0	.8	43.1	47.8
Inventory	4.9	.8	25.5	31.2
Over/Short	+1.0	*	-17.6	-16.6
<u>E5-E9</u>				
Number of Skills	41	26	31	98 2/
PMI	18.8	15.6	14.4	48.8
Inventory	22.7	15.4	12.0	50.1
Over/Short	+3.9	-.2	-2.4	+1.3
Total E1-E9				
Number of Skills	23	27	52	102
PMI	15.0	16.8	64.7	96.6
Inventory	17.7	16.9	46.7	81.3 3/
Over/Short	+2.7	*	-18.0	-15.3
<u>WO</u>				
Number of Skills	13	6	13	32
PMI	.2	.2	.3	.8
Inventory	.3	.2	.1	.6
Over/Short	+.2	*	-.1	-.2
<u>O1-O3</u>				
Number of Skills	14	3	36	53
PMI	.5	.3	11.4	12.2
Inventory	1.6	.3	4.0	5.9
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-7.4	-6.3
<u>O4-O6</u>				
Number of Skills	14	6	27	47
PMI	5.2	1.2	5.1	11.5
Inventory	11.5	1.7	1.5	14.2
Over/Short	+6.3	*	-3.6	-2.7
Total O1-O6				
Number of Skills	18	6	35	59
PMI	7.2	1.0	15.5	23.7
Inventory	11.9	.9	7.3	20.1
Over/Short	+4.6	*	-8.2	-3.6

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B.

***Navy's terms for PMI are Enlisted Personnel Authorizations (EPA) and Officer Personnel Authorizations (OPA), but will not be used here for consistency with the other Service chapters.

1/ Total billets taken from DASH 7 Report. SELRES end strength not funded to total DASH 7 billet file.

2/ Ratings not included: AN, FN, SW, NU.

3/ 21 "Others" not included.

Note: Table IV-5 does not contain TAR personnel, because the Navy cannot allocate them to the categories used here at this time.

TABLE IV-6
NAVY RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(Strength in 000s)

	TOTAL	FY 1984	
		PEOPLE WITH > 4 YOS	AVG. YOS
PEOPLE			
E1-E4			
PMI**	51.3	*	*
Inventory	40.1	16.9	4.2
E5-E9			
PMI	57.7	*	*
Inventory	58.1	55.4	19.3
E1-E9			
PMI	109.0	*	*
Inventory	98.1	72.3	14.8
WO			
PMI	.6	*	*
Inventory	.6	.6	24.8
O1-O3			
PMI	12.7	*	*
Inventory	6.4	5.2	7.4
O4-O6			
PMI	12.6	*	*
Inventory	15.3	15.2	19.5
O1-O6			
PMI	25.3	*	*
Inventory	21.7	20.4	14.8

* Data not available

** Programmed manning plus individuals

Enlisted Reserve Accession Plans

	FY 84		FY 85		FY 86
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>
NAVETS	17,076	20,496	16,872	20,023	
SAM	10,049	10,000	10,000	10,000	
OSVETS	1,283	756	1,500	1,500	
APG	1,602	1,404	1,253	1,326	
TAR (TRADITIONAL)	705	925	756	723	
TAR (SURFACE)	333	437	600	600	

[2] Retention. To analyze retention within the Selected Reserve, it is necessary to review retention data for those people who have been affiliated with a unit for less than one year separately from data for those who have been affiliated with a unit for more than one year. Since many Selected Reservists are non-obligors who may cease to participate at any time, a breakdown by length of unit affiliation allows reserve units to direct special retention efforts toward newer affiliates.

Enlisted Reserve Retention
(Percent)

<u>Affiliated</u>	FY 84		FY 85		FY 86
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>		<u>Goal</u>
Less than one year	82	85	85	85	
More than one year	91	88	88	88	

(v) Officers. The Naval Reserve is investing significant additional efforts into new junior officer recruiting areas while expanding and publicizing those ongoing accession programs which include direct commissions into the Naval Reserve in some areas. The Officer Sea and Air Mariner (OSAM) recruiting program will result in direct accessions of junior Selected Reserve Officer personnel with no prior naval experience. The OSAM college program provides \$100 per month stipend for qualified college students during their junior and senior year. The service obligation requires up to 2 years of active duty to attain a qualification in a designator speciality. The remaining military service obligation is served on inactive duty in the Selected Reserve. FY 1985 implementation provides 50 quotas for the college program. In addition, 25 OSAM quotas are provided to the Naval recruiting command for officer candidate school accessions without stipend. The OSAM option is open to unrestricted line and selected restricted line and staff corps designators.

Officer Reserve Accession Plans

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
VETERAN AFFILIATIONS	2,741	2,911	3,642
DIRECT APPOINTS	570	600	954
OSAM	-	-	75
TARS	136	203	142
			337

(6) Reserve Readiness Assessment. The personnel readiness posture of the Naval Reserve is likely to improve through FY 1986 due to a reduction in variances from mobilization billet requirements. The improvement in personnel stability has also been assisted by reduced enlisted skill imbalances.

(a) Reserve Aggregate Population Stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	80.4	83.3	85.0	86.2	88.6
Enlisted	71.8	74.2	76.7	75.4	81.6

(b) Reserve Unit Personnel Stability.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	62.0	*	58.5	59.7
Enlisted	61.1	*	47.2	54.5

* Date not available.

(7) Individual Mobilization Augmentee. An IMA is an officer or enlisted person in the Ready Reserve who will fill a specific billet in the active force upon mobilization. Each IMA will be assigned to a mobilization billet within the active force and will train in that billet during peacetime.

The increase in IMAs from FY 1985 to FY 1986 reflects NAMMOS medical corps requirements to staff fleet hospitals in conjunction with the rapid deployment force of this increase, approximately 35 percent of the IMAs will be in Training and Pay Category D, which means they will not receive drill pay but will be paid for 12 days annual Active Duty for Training. The remaining 65 percent of IMAs will be in training/pay category A and will receive both drill and active duty for training pay.

This program is used primarily to recruit and retain medical service corps officer personnel in critical specialties.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Category A</u>			
Officer	92	350	200
Enlisted	-	450	740
Subtotal	92	800	940
<u>Category D</u> ^{1/}			
Officer	*	170	246
Enlisted	*	60	60
Subtotal	*	230	306
Total IMAs	92	1,030	1,246

*Less than 50.

1/ The possibility exists that medical personnel with whom the Navy will fill these requirements are also being counted by civilian medical facilities when they project the number of beds and other medical support they could provide DoD in case of a major war.

(8) Full-Time Support Programs. The Active Duty TAR community is being expanded to achieve the proper Active/Reserve mix. This will enable the Naval Reserve force ships to achieve maximum operability while at the same time providing optimum training to assigned Selective Reserves. For the first time in the 31 year history of the TAR program, Ensigns (0-1s) were accessed to the TAR officer community for afloat assignments. A new program to allow direct active Navy-to-TAR accessions has also proved important in meeting end strength requirements. Also, full time reserve recruiters will be introduced in FY 1986 to assist in the achievement of total force recruiting goals. The Navy's Reserve active duty support programs are shown below:

Reserve Active Duty Support Programs
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Sect. 265 ^{1/}	0.2	0.2	0.2
TAR Officer	1.4	1.5	1.7
TAR Enlisted	11.7	13.5	16.0
Reserve Recruiters	-	-	1.5
TOTAL	13.3	15.2	19.5

1/ Officers recalled to active duty pursuant to Section 265 of title 10, U.S. Code

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Navy IRR is comprised of personnel with previous military experience, either active duty or reserve, who still have a military service obligation (MSO) or who have voluntarily extended. IRR strength declined again during FY 1984, as it has since 1981. Retention of active duty personnel and recruitment and retention of ex-active duty personnel in the Selected Reserve program have been the main causes for this decline.

In June 1984, the 8 year MSO began and in August 1984 the \$900 bonus for 3 year IRR reenlistment was instituted. The extension of the MSO from 6 to 8 years and the IRR bonus implementation should gradually reverse the decline and the IRR should grow to over 90,000 by FY 1990. We expect that 80 percent of the IRR will respond to a call-up.

IRR Strength
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 86</u> (Projected)
66.0	68.3	76.1

A breakout of the FY 1984 IRR actuals follows:

<u>Drilling Without Pay (VTU)</u>	
Officers	3,685
Enlisted	4,114
Total	<u>7,799</u>
<u>Not Drilling</u>	
Officers	13,051
Enlisted	45,136
Total	<u>58,187</u>
<u>Total</u> <u>65,986</u>	

2.. Standby Reserve. The program is comprised of reserve personnel who are unable or are ineligible to participate in the Selected Reserve (drilling) or the IRR (non-drilling). Standby Reserve active (S1) consists primarily of enlisted and totals approximately 900 personnel. Inactive (S2) includes over 10,000 officers (25% of which are medical designators) and less than 100 enlisted. We expect that 50 percent of the Standby Reserve will respond to a call-up.

Standby Reserve Strength
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u> (Projected)	<u>FY 86</u> (Projected)
11.5	11.3	10.3

A breakout of the FY 1984 Standby Reserve actuals follows:

Active (S1)	
Officers	87
Enlisted	815
Total	902
Inactive (S2)	
Officers	10,505
Enlisted	77
Total	10,582
Total	11,484

3. Retirees. This program includes regular and reserve retirees who have completed 20 years active duty and, separately, reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. Twenty year active duty retirees are liable for recall to active duty at any time by the Secretary of the Navy in the interest of national defense. The latter category are liable for recall only in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law. We expect that 80 percent of the fleet reserve retirees will respond to a call-up, 70 percent of the Retired USN/USNR Class I and II (includes those non-disabled, under age 60, retired 0-10 years) and 10 percent of the retired USN/USNR Class III (includes non-disabled, under age 60, retired over 10 years). The Navy has 213,000 retired personnel over age 60 who are not included in retired strength. They are subject to mobilization; however, Navy does not plan to mobilize these personnel unless absolutely necessary. Exceptions may include but are not limited to doctors, dentists, chaplains, lawyers, etc.

Retired Strength
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85 (Projected)	FY 86 (Projected)
Fleet Reserve (Enlisted Only)	66.7	70.3	66.4
Retired-USN/USNR Class I and II	61.9	63.8	64.5
Retired USN/USNR Class III	180.8	181.2	182.5

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General. Civilian manpower comprises a vital segment of the Navy's overall resources. The majority of Navy civilian employees are directly related to our readiness posture. More than half work in industrial activities comprising a wide ranging spectrum of depot maintenance and repair, engineering, RDT&E, printing, public works and transportation functions essential to the readiness of the Fleet. Many of the Navy's civilians employed at operation and maintenance activities perform essential readiness support in supply centers, air stations, and ship repair facilities. The balance of the civilians provide essential

support in functions such as training, medical care, engineering, development and acquisition, which have a definite, although longer range impact on readiness.

The FY 1986 request is for 318,700 civilians. This request by DPPC is shown in table IV-7.

2. Major Program Changes. The FY 1986 civilian estimate represents the manpower level which balances the work force with workload. The FY 1986 level reflects an increase of 1,405 above the FY 1985 level and will result in increased physical security for bases and stations, and the placement of civilians into positions currently filled by military personnel to allow their diversion to more critical operational billets. Additional civilian positions will be dedicated to management and oversight of acquisition contracts, both for major systems and spares, thus improving the integrity of our procurement operations. Likewise, additional personnel will be available to oversee our growing military construction/facilities acquisition programs. Other adjustments have been incorporated in industrial activities to ensure that work force and workload are in balance. Manpower levels for aircraft maintenance have been increased in consonance with growing workload, while manpower levels for ship repair and overhaul and public works have decreased to match workload.

3. Civilian End-Strength Ceilings. The FY 1985 DoD Authorization Act contains a provision which waives, for FY 1985, the requirement for a civilian personnel end-strength authorization. This provision provides for the most efficient use of its civilian workforce. Historically, the Navy maintained that manpower should be determined by the level of funded workload as reviewed and approved by Congress. The level of civilian employment in the Navy is carefully determined and funded to match the level of funded program and associated workload throughout the development and review process of the planning, programming and budgeting system.

The Industrially Funded Activities have been operating under the ceiling exclusion provision since first approved in the FY 1983 Defense Appropriation Act and reaffirmed by the FY 1984 and FY 1985 Authorization Acts. Industrial Activities experience shows the following gains:

- Experienced personnel were retained at the end of the year thereby avoiding the loss of critical trade skills and the creation of trade skill imbalances.
- Costly procedures devoted to the termination and reappointment of non full-time permanent employees were avoided.
- The Naval Laboratories had greater flexibility in hiring and retaining qualified scientists and engineers for critical assignments. Also expanded was the ability to attract qualified junior professionals following their graduation in June.

TABLE IV-7
 NAVY CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
 (Direct and Indirect Hire in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	2.8	2.9	3.1
Offensive Strategic	2.7	2.8	3.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	7.1	7.2	7.3
Tactical Air Forces	0.4	0.4	0.4
Naval Forces	1.3	1.4	1.5
Mobility Forces	5.4	5.4	5.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	37.0	36.6	36.5
Intelligence	1.4	1.6	1.6
Centrally Managed Communications	1.7	1.7	1.7
Research and Development	32.8	32.2	32.1
Geophysical Activities	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	273.7	270.6	271.8
Base Operating Support	77.3	78.2	78.7
Medical Support	3.9	4.2	4.4
Personnel Support	1.7	1.7	1.8
Individual Training	3.3	3.4	3.5
Force Support Training	1.6	1.7	1.7
Central Logistics	170.5	165.4	165.2
Centralized Support Activities	6.8	7.3	7.7
Management Headquarters	8.7	8.7	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>320.6</u>	<u>317.3</u>	<u>318.7</u>

*Less than 50.

Detail may not add due to rounding.

- Greater ability to respond to unexpected workload changes was provided.
- Freedom to devote more emphasis to employee training as well as contract monitoring was allowed.

The benefits derived from the exemption from ceilings constraints at Industrial Activities demonstrate that positive results can be achieved in the economic and efficient utilization of civilian manpower. The Navy welcomes the added flexibility that the waiver of statutory end-strength provides in the management of civilian resources and strongly supports the continuation of the civilian ceiling exemption.

4. Improvements and Efficiencies

The Navy estimate of civilian manpower requirements reflects a continuing commitment to increase the efficiency of the civilian work force. The majority of the Navy's efforts in this area are concentrated in the Commercial Activities (CA) and Efficiency Review (ER) programs.

During FY 1984, we completed 128 CA program studies on about 3,900 civilian positions. About 1,700 positions were converted to more cost effective contractor performance for a savings of \$11 million. These results have been incorporated into our civilian estimates. The Navy plans to study about 4,500 additional positions in both FY 1985 and FY 1986. In compliance with Congressional direction, no adjustment has been made for any anticipated contracting out decisions.

The ER program applies to those activities exempt from competition with the private sector. The ER process challenges existing directives, policies, and procedures to evaluate unnecessary tasks. Following various organizational analyses and methods improvement studies, a most efficient organization is developed. The FY 1986 submission includes ER civilian savings in FY 1986 of 500 positions, with total cumulative savings since FY 1984 estimated at 1,500 civilian positions.

The Navy also participates in a number of programs designed to enhance productivity and achieve economies of operation. The productivity investment fund and the Navy industrial fund capital investment programs invest in modern equipment, methods and labor-saving devices to replace labor-intensive costly operations and bring activities to a state-of-the-art position. The defense retail interservice support program and productivity enhancing inventive fund provide local commanders with a means to achieve cost effectiveness and economies of operation through interservice consolidations and acquisition of capital investments in areas of fast payback potential.

5. Position Management. In May of 1981, action was initiated to ensure that the focus of the Navy's position management program was on results rather than procedures. Headquarters-level components were tasked with establishing quantitative criteria in order to judge the

success of subordinate echelons in structuring positions and organizational effectiveness. The quantitative criteria for measuring success in position management were made uniform throughout the Navy to permit comparisons among all major commands.

To provide a department-wide monitoring capability, the Chief of Naval Operations established an automated system for aggregating data on key position management trends over a ten-year period. These trends include average grade, high-grade positions, supervisory ratios, and several other utilization ratios. Analyses of these indicators are now provided annually to each major claimant to permit managers to assess the progress of their own command relative to that of other commands and the Department of the Navy as a whole.

The ability to monitor trends in the composition of the work force provides managers with a powerful tool for viewing the aggregate effect of many thousands of position management decisions. These decisions determine the way positions and organizations are structured.

A second dimension of work force composition is the accuracy with which positions are classified. To monitor this dimension, Navy embarked on a program on 1 October 1982 to desk-audit a randomly-selected sample of civilian positions regularly to determine whether they are correctly described and classified. This process results in the auditing of 3,600 positions (more than one percent of the work force) every three years.

Attention to position management has resulted in a reduction in the percentage of the white collar work force comprised of positions at grade GS-13 to GS-15 from 12.8 percent at the end of FY-74 to 10.4 percent at the end of FY 1984.

A large percentage of the Navy's high grade positions are in the scientific and engineering fields and significantly enhance the Navy's ability to carry out its basic mission. Many others are in areas directly related to the procurement of weapon systems and associated logistical support. High grade employees at these levels provide critical expertise in the research, design, development, evaluation, and procurement of Naval weapon systems. Additionally, the ability of the Navy's industrial establishment to repair and maintain aircraft, ships and missiles properly depends upon highly qualified and competent employees. A secondary effect of maintaining sufficient numbers of high grade positions is the ability to attract and retain highly talented engineers, scientists and computer experts. Adequate career opportunities afforded by high grade positions enhance the Navy's competitive posture to convince recent graduates and other individuals to pursue employment with the Navy.

6. Civilian Recruiting and Retention. The Navy is experiencing a shortage of professional engineers. The special salary rates for engineers established by the Office of Personnel Management have helped the Navy to compete with the private sector in recruiting and retaining engineers in various disciplines. However, we are still understaffed in this important field and we are looking for ways to make further improvements.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. **Military Manpower.** The Navy experiences a manpower shortfall early in the mobilization scenario but it is overcome relatively quickly. These shortfalls are the result of peacetime active Navy and mobilized Naval Reserve manning at less than initial deployment requirements as well as from early casualties not yet offset by returns to duty. There is also the inevitable time lag in the mobilization and training process. As shown in table IV-8, the shortfall is smaller and overcome earlier (by M+30) in FY 1990 than in FY 1986.

The initial shortfall is across all occupations. However, all categories except medical personnel are quickly accommodated. A medical enlisted manpower shortfall of almost 25% of requirement persists throughout the scenario. A small medical officer shortfall in FY 1986 is overcome by FY 1990. Although all other occupational groups show an adequate supply to meet the demand by M+30, significant shortfalls in such specific skills as construction and engineering persist.

In an effort to address this problem, major emphasis is being placed on enhancements to the mobilization and training process which will get pretrained individuals to their assignments earlier. The upgrade of automated data processing capability in place at the Naval Reserve Personnel Center now allows rapid matching of personnel to wartime requirements, thereby minimizing delay in processing orders. The improved training of Naval Reserve personnel mobilization teams in processing of Reserve mobilization manpower continues with periodic mobilization exercises, more training at mobilization sites, and augmentation of new billets in each unit and six more units demographically located to expedite on scene processing.

2. **Civilian Manpower.** The peacetime civilian authorizations in the Navy manpower data accounting system form the baseline for civilian mobilization manpower planning. On M-Day and after, the peacetime numbers increase to reflect the growth in support required to build toward and sustain full mobilization. During mobilization, civilian positions will be created to support the buildup and concurrently, positions will be terminated in activities that do not directly support the war effort.

Wartime manpower requirements total over 80,000 new positions and some 30,000 additional people are needed to replace peacetime employees recalled to perform military duties. Therefore, the Navy needs to procure about 112,000 new hires over the 180-day mobilization scenario. These requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations such as depot-level maintenance and repair of ships, planes, and missiles, as well as associated equipment and supply support.

Navy plans for offsetting the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-day include substantive recruitment efforts using the Emergency Indefinite appointing authority for the rapid acquisition of new personnel. Other efforts include recall of recently retired civilian personnel, and cross training of on-board staff. It is expected that continued refinements of these plans during FY 1985 will result in substantial improvements.

TABLE IV-8
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY (Thousands)

<u>MILITARY MANPOWER</u>		<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>M+30</u>	<u>M+60</u>	<u>M+90</u>	<u>M+120</u>	<u>M+150</u>	<u>M+180</u>
<u>Pre-M</u>	<u>M-Day</u>							
669.5	777.3	804.7	864.4	913.9	962.0	990.6	1,009.5	
659.9	661.8	759.3	916.1	956.3	989.8	1,016.2	1,035.2	
-9.6	-115.5	-45.4	51.7	42.4	27.8	25.6	25.7	

	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994
Trained Demand	722.1	782.3	802.5	860.9	906.9
Trained Supply	712.5	712.9	809.0	991.7	1,029.7
Total Over/Short	-9.6	-69.4	6.5	130.9	122.8

CIVILIAN MANPOWER

Demand	296.7	296.7	35.4	362.2	372.9	372.9	375.7
Supply	314.6	281.9	276.8	272.4	267.9	267.9	263.6
New Hires Required		14.8	74.6	89.8	105.0	105.0	112.1

af.cs FY 86-90 WARMAPS POM input

From latest civilian WARMAPS input:


E. Manpower Management Improvements.

1. Navy Total Force. Within the context of Navy total force development, the Chief of Naval Operations has institutionalized the Active/Reserve mix planning efforts undertaken last year. A permanent flag officer billet has been established within the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to serve as Total Force Advocate (OP-64). Subordinate to this flag officer is the Active/Reserve mix branch (OP-646) whose function is to continually assess the Navy's forces to structure the optimum mix of active and Reserve component units to meet warfighting needs. With analytical support from the Center for Naval Analyses, the Active/Reserve mix branch evaluates potential changes in total force composition to determine whether the Naval Reserve can shoulder a larger share of naval operations in peacetime (thus relieving pressure for growth of active duty end strength), and whether the Naval Reserve will be properly trained and equipped to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in wartime.

Navy gives consideration on a continuing basis either to transfer existing resources from the active to the Reserve component or to procure new resources directly for the Reserve. Such changes to the composition of the Navy total force are judged first of all on their potential impact on the Navy's overall readiness for war. Other key determinants are the predicted geographic availability of reservists and the likelihood of cost savings. This Active/Reserve mix determination process is detailed in Appendix D.

The extent of the undertaking can best be appreciated by recognizing that within a single decade the U.S. Naval Reserve (measured in manpower, ships and aircraft) will become the tenth most powerful Naval force in the world. Combined and thoroughly integrated with the active Navy (and, in wartime, with the Coast Guard), this total force will ensure that the United States will prevail in any conflict at sea. In some cases, most or all of the Navy's mission capability resides in the Reserve component (i.e., U.S.-based logistic air transport (VR), helicopter, light attack (HAL), and combat search and rescue squadrons (HC), and naval control of shipping (NCS) units). In others, from one-third to more than three-quarters of the assets available for traditional Navy missions are provided by the Reserve (cargo handling, mine countermeasures, Military Sealift Command personnel, composite aircraft squadrons, SEABEES, special boat operations, maritime air patrol, and personnel for medical support). It is significant that those warfighting areas which exhibit relatively small Reserve participation (less than 15 percent) are essentially surface or subsurface missions supporting the maritime strategy through extended, forward deployments.

The Naval Reserve Force presently contributes to the Navy total force capability as follows:



NAVAL RESERVE PARTICIPATION IN TOTAL FORCE MISSION AREAS (by percentage of Total Force)

¹/ 85 percent of MSC manpower. Active forces retain all MSC ships which use Reserve manpower.

The Navy has increased the Reserve participation as promised in FY 1984, including increased participation in aviation, surface combatant, mine countermeasure, and fleet support.

Aviation improvements include modernization of two Reserve carrier airwings; establishment of the first of three programmed maritime patrol air master augment units and the first of three programmed squadrons of LAMPS I helicopters; and the programming for FY 1988 of Naval Air Reserve augment units in support of two carrier on-board delivery squadrons.

Surface Combatant improvements include transfer of nine of the twenty-six frigates programmed for transfer to the NRF. Amphibious Warfare improvements consist of the transfer to the NRF of one tank landing ship (LST) in FY 1990. In addition, Navy has programmed Naval Reserve augment crews for each of the planned 16 light air-cushioned amphibious crafts (LCACs).

Improvements to Mine Countermeasures are eight new construction mine countermeasure ships (MCMs) and 17 new minesweepers/hunters (MSHs) programmed for the NRF; programming of transfer of two heavy helicopters to the Naval Air Reserve in two new mine countermeasures helicopter squadrons; programming of craft of opportunity (for harbor clearance) for homeporting in each of 22 locations in the United States; and a programmed increase of Naval Reserve mobile inshore undersea warfare units from 16 to 28.

Fleet Support improvements are several: contingent on the acquisition of new fleet replenishment oilers (to be civilian manned), five "jumboized" oilers are programmed for transfer to the NRF; three salvage ships (ARS) are also programmed for transfer to the NRF for a total of four (one of two NRF ARSs will be retired); Naval Reserve cargo handling battalions have doubled from 6 to 12, and Naval Reserve construction battalions will increase from 17 to 19; Naval Reserve augment crews are programmed to support two new Navy hospital ships, with overall Reserve medical support personnel programmed to increase from 9,000 to 22,000; and four SIMAs, augmented by Reservists, are programmed for ports where NRF frigates will be assigned (15 SIMA-type activities already exist to support both active and Reserve ships).

2. Civilian Substitution Initiatives.

Continuing efforts are underway within Navy to reduce the overall level of military manpower requirements through civilianization of functions. Specific functional areas in which progress has been achieved include review of military staffing requirements for pay and personnel administrative support system offices, commissaries, and Naval manpower engineering center offices. FY 1986 savings of some 500 military spaces have been achieved as a result of these efforts and are reflected in a corresponding reduction of the overall military manpower requirement in the budget. Additionally, intensive efforts are being focused on the potential use of civilians in billets in shore-intensive enlisted ratings in relation to established sea-shore rotation goals, provision of an adequate rotation base for women in the Navy, and overall military career progression requirements. This review is expected to produce significant savings in terms of trained military manpower which in turn can be used to fill critical operational billets and partially offset the increasing manpower and readiness needs of Navy's growing force structure.

III. Navy Programmed Manpower By Defense Planning and Programming Categories. This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes resulting in year-to-year adjustment in overall Navy strength.

A. Strategic. The Strategic category includes nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces having the objective of deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, its military forces, bases overseas, and allies. The majority of Navy manpower in this category are associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communication and Automated Data Processing support are also included.

Navy Strategic Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.7	20.5	21.7
Offensive Strategic	(18.8)	(18.4)	(19.5)
Strategic Control and Surveillance	(1.9)	(2.0)	(2.2)
Reserve	0.4	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	2.8	2.9	3.1

1. Active Offensive Strategic Forces. The FY 1985 active duty military manpower decrease occurred because of 6 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (FBMS) which entered overhaul (-758), precommissioning crews for 3 new TRIDENT Submarines (+462), increases for 3 Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines which are coming out of overhaul (+236), decreases for FBMS support ships (-98), other support for FBMS (-25), and other support for the TRIDENT submarines (-243).

The FY 1986 active duty military increase occurs when 4 FBMS are coming out of overhaul (+685), 3 FBMS are going into overhaul (-391), precommissioning crews for two new TRIDENT Submarines (+295), increases for FBMS support ships (+309), other FBMS support (+32), and other TRIDENT support (+102).

2. Active Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. The FY 1985 and FY 1986 increases are due to slight increases in all areas of Navy's Control and Surveillance operations, e.g., information systems, intelligence, communications, etc. (FY 1985, +165; FY 1986, +191).

3. Reserve and Civilian Strategic Forces. Naval Reserve increases are programmed to meet full NAMMOS requirements by FY 1986. The increase in civilian spaces through FY 1986 provides support to the TRIDENT facilities in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington.

B. Tactical and Mobility. The Tactical and Mobility manpower is associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units.

The active duty growth in Tactical/Mobility forces supports the increase in the number of ships and squadrons, all of which require full time manpower due to deployment requirements.

1. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces include doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps devisions, regiments, and air stations.

Navy Land Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.0	4.2	4.3
Reserve	1.4	2.1	2.2

There are minor active manpower increases throughout all Marine Divisions and Marine Forces Service Support Groups (FY 1985, +248; FY 1986, +102). Reserve growth reflects the increased number of ships with planned full manning by FY 1987.

2. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; multipurpose aircraft carriers; and tactical air operational headquarters units.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	65.9	66.0	70.5
Reserve	5.7	6.3	7.0
<u>Civilian</u>	0.4	0.4	0.4

The active increase in FY 1985 is due to the following changes: one aircraft carrier has to meet new Ship Manning Document (SMD) requirements (+54), one carrier is going into a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) (-1,065) while another is coming out of SLEP (+493), precommissioning crew for one carrier (+722), minor losses of personnel on 11 other carriers (-239), minor increases to 13 A-6 squadrons (+30), one A-7 squadron (-276) changed to an F/A-18 squadron (+230), minor reductions to 21 A-7 squadrons (-103), 2 F/A-18 precommissioning crews (+175), minor decreases to a 4 F/A-18 squadrons (-8), and minor increases to 2 F/A-18 squadrons (+2), slight increases to 8 F-14 squadrons (+40), and minor decreases to 13 F-14 Squadrons (-74), reductions to 13 Early Warning (EW) ACFT Squadrons (-39), precommissioning crew for one Sea Based EW Squadron (+53), minor reductions to 10 Sea Based EW Squadrons (-10), (+9) to 2 Shore Based EW Squadrons, (+137) to tactical air operational headquarters units, (+2) to a Tomahawk Cruise Missile Unit, (+2) to a Reserve F-14 Squadron, and (+47) to Marine Air Wings providing tactical combat support.

The active increase in FY 1986 is caused by the following: one aircraft carrier has to meet new SMD requirements (+101), one carrier is coming out of SLEP (+438) while another is reaching its full complement of people after leaving SLEP a year earlier (+71), a precommissioning crew for one carrier (+2,343), minor increases of manpower on 10 other carriers (+292), one new A-6 squadron (+129), minor increases to 13 other A-6 squadrons (+91), 3 A-7 squadrons (-782) moved to F/A-18 squadrons (+690), minor increases to 15 A-7 squadrons (+30) and minor decreases to 3 A-7 squadrons (-25), 1 F/A-18 precommissioning crew (+92), 2 newly commissioned F/A-18 squadrons (+285), minor increases to 4 F/A-18 squadrons (+6), and minor decreases to 3 F/A-18 squadrons (-6), slight increases to 21 F-14 squadrons (+240), precommissioning crew for one F-14 squadron (+94), reduction to one Early Warning ACFT Squadron (-2), (+85) for precommissioning crew for one Early Warning ACFT Squadron, and increases to 11 Early Warning ACFT Squadrons (+14), a newly commissioned Sea Based EW Squadron (+153), precommissioning crew for one Sea Based EW Squadron (+65), increases of (+20) to 10 Sea Based EW Squadrons, (+35) to 2 Shore Based EW Squadrons, (-1) to a tactical air operational headquarters unit, (+2) to a Tomahawk Cruise Missile Unit, (-6) to Reserve A-7 squadrons, (-3) to Reserve F-4 squadrons, (-1) to Reserve F-14 squadron, (+1) to a Reserve Reconnaissance squadron, (-2) to a Reserve Sea Based EW Squadron, and (+17) to Marine Air Wings providing tactical combat support.

Reserve growth reflects increases associated with aircraft carrier (CV) augmentation requirements and modernization of the Reserve carrier air wings.

3. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower for antisubmarine warfare and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces and support forces. It is the largest subcategory of active military and Selected Reserve manpower in the Navy. Naval Forces include virtually all ship manpower requirements except the fleet ballistic missile manpower in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower in Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	207.8	213.0	221.7
Reserve	63.4	66.5	70.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.4	1.5

The FY 1985 active increase is caused by the following: (+275) precommissioning crew for battleship coming out of inactive status, one newly constructed cruiser (+305), 2 precommissioning crews for cruisers (+143), (-180) 2 Missile Frigates moving to the Naval Reserve Force, (+1,206) precommissioning crews for 7 Missile Frigates, (-270) one Missile Frigate becoming Inactive, (+458) precommissioning crews for 2 LAMPS

Squadrc , precommissioning crews for 5 attack submarines (+268), (+61) precommissioning crew for one Mine Countermeasure ship, (+119) for Undersea Surveillance System , (+188) for operational headquarters for sea control air units, (+90) Amphibious Tactical Support Units, (+262) one newly constructed amphibious assault ship, (+337) precommissioning crew for one amphibious assault ship, (+250) for Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments, (+180) 2 newly commissioned minor fleet support ships, (+90) precommissioning crew for one major fleet support ship, (+165) at Naval Air Stations for direct squadron support, (+397) new congressionally-directed Seabee Battalion, (+713) for Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) due to fleet expansion, (+108) for Reserve SIMAs due to fleet expansion, (-117) decommissioned two minor fleet support ships for the Reserves, (+87) on eight non-missile frigates.

The FY 1986 active increase is caused by the following: (+1,243) full complement for battleship coming out of inactive status, 2 newly commissioned cruisers (+563), precommissioning crews for 4 cruisers (+376), (-360) 4 Missile Frigates moved to the Naval Reserve Force, (+413) pre-commissioning crews for 4 Missile Frigates, 9 support ships attaining their full SMD requirement (+1,167), precommissioning crew (+120) for one S-3 Squadron, (+272) newly commissioned LAMPS Squadron, (+214) precommissioning crew for one LAMPS squadron, (-122) one attack submarine becoming inactive, (+68) one newly commissioned attack submarines, precommissioning crews for 6 attack submarines (+447), (+288) 4 newly commissioned mine countermeasure ships, (+217) growth in air mine countermeasure squadrons which created requirement for additional aircraft, (+163) Amphibious Tactical Support Units, (+420) Naval Special Warfare Forces, e.g., Seal Teams, (+200) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Forces, (-310) one amphibious assault ship moving to Naval Reserve Force, (+146) one major fleet support ship is reaching its SMD requirement, (-411) four minor fleet support ships transferring to the Naval Defense Reserve Force, (+192) new Seabee battalion reaches its full complement of people, (+464) for Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) due to fleet expansion, (+119) for Reserve SIMAs due to fleet expansion, (+166) slight increases for 9 cruisers, (+361) slight increases for 28 destroyers, (+158) for 37 Missile Frigates, (+78) for 8 Non-Missile Frigates, (+36) for 13 SH-3 Squadrons, (+39) for 11 SH-3 Squadrons, (+74) for 9 LAMPS Squadrons, (+250) for 88 attack submarines, (+413) for 14 support ships, (+346) for 29 amphibious assault ships, (+84) for COD Squadrons, (+72) for 13 underway replenishment ships, (+139) for 11 major fleet support ships, (+257) for 8 Seabee Battalions and their support, (+47) for undersea surveillance systems, (+78) for operational headquarters for sea control of air, surface, and subsurface, (+145) for special strike warfare projects, (+62) for Reserve Minor Fleet Support Ships.

The Reserve increase between FY 1984 and FY 1985 is primarily an increase in TARs and drilling reservists for two additional NRF frigates and their supporting SIMAs. The Reserve increase for FY 1986 consists of TARs and drilling reservists for an additional four NRF frigates and their supporting SIMAs. Increases in other combat/combat support units including construction forces, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare, direct support squadrons, and other augmentation units account for the remaining increases as the drilling reserve strength builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987.

The civilian increases in FY 1985 and FY 1986 provide direct support to the Fleet in the areas of electronic warfare, readiness training, tactical readiness, Fleet logistics, and ship maintenance and overhaul.

4. Mobility Forces. This subcategory includes Navy strength for airlift and sealift capability, plus port terminal and traffic management operations.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.4	0.4
Reserve	1.4	2.3	2.1
<u>Civilian</u>	5.4	5.4	5.4

The active increase of (+62) in FY 1985 is caused by only minor adjustments to the military sealift and airlift commands. The increase in Reservists is to meet the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987 and will improve manning of units in this category.

C. Auxiliary Activities. The Auxiliary Activities category includes manpower associated with Department of the Navy programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence. This category includes strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities within the Department of Defense.

Navy Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.5	8.6	8.9
Reserve	3.9	4.4	4.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.4	1.6	1.6

The FY 1985 active increase of (+172) and the FY 1986 increase of (+233) are split among various Cryptologic activities and communications units, intelligence offices, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Naval Security Administration support staffs. The increase in Reservists is to meet the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987. The civilian increase in FY 1985 provides for Navy Intelligence related support.

2. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory includes strength associated with the Defense Communication System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications system, communications security, and other related communications units.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.5	7.7	8.0
Reserve	1.4	1.3	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7

The FY 1985 active increase (+182) is comprised of the following: (+16) at Defense Communications Agency, (-82) at Communications Security Activities, (-34) for Long Haul Communications, (+163) at other Navy Communications Activities, and (+119) Satellite Communications. The FY 1986 active increase (+367) is caused by (+48) to the Defense Communications Agency, (-14) at Communications Security Activities, (+6) for Long Haul Communications, (+246) at Navy Communications Activities, and (+81) for Satellite Communications.

3. Research and Development. The Navy's Research and Development (R&D) community comprises headquarters, laboratories, Research and Development, Test and Evaluation project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. A large portion of the manpower is attached to R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, involving land, sea, air, and undersea operations.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.0	6.0	6.0
Reserve	0.6	0.7	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	32.8	32.2	32.1

The increase in drilling Reservists builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987. The civilian decrease through FY 1986 reflects reductions in funded workload, savings from economies and efficiencies, and a projected decline in the overall research in-house work force.

4. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical programs include the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities throughout the world. These employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, directed by a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.9	1.9	2.0
Reserve	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.1

The active increase of (+76) in FY 1986 is caused by minor adjustments throughout all elements of this category.

D. Support Activities. The support Activities category includes strength associated with base operating support for combat and support installations. Also included are medical and personnel support; individual and force-support training; logistics, management headquarters, and federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Active manpower growth for Support Activities is critical to ensure adequate full-time support ashore for the growing fleet. Reserve manpower is utilized when possible and, in fact, the Selected Reserve growth in this category is greater than the active growth, especially for Medical Support Manpower.

1. Base Operating Support (BOS). Manpower in the BOS subcategory provides operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base Operating Support for combat forces covers strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including base communication and air traffic control. Support forces BOS includes auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	58.0	59.1	60.4
Reserve	13.1	13.5	16.7
<u>Civilian</u>	77.3	78.2	78.7

The active increase for FY 1985 is for base operating support (BOS) at submarine bases (+254), at Reserve Air Bases (+106), at Personnel Support Detachments (+254), at Naval Reserve Centers (+118), and at Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics (+848). Some activities transferred into Medical Support from BOS (-433). The net active increase for FY 1986 is for base operating support at submarine bases (+97), at Naval Stations (+289), at Naval Reserve Centers (+118), for real property maintenance at Seabee Battalions (+65), at Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics (+864), and a final accounting adjustment to identify TARS as reserve personnel (RPN) instead of active personnel (MPN) (+565). Some activities transferred into Medical Support from BOS (-654).

The Reserve increase from FY 1985 to FY 1986 is a result of continued increases in TAR manning in operations, training, and administration at Reserve activities. Increase in drilling reservists continue to build toward the NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from increased base support for TRIDENT, staffing for Ship Repair Facilities ship maintenance, staffing for three new commissary stores, Navy activities' physical security, aviation depot level repairables, and construction battalion supply operations and training support, offset by reductions through increased economies and efficiencies. The civilian increase in FY 1986 provides for increases in Navy activities' physical security, TRIDENT base support, Reserve retired pay accrual system, civilian substitution initiatives of non-military essential positions, and civilian staffing of one new commissary store, offset by reductions through increased economies and efficiencies.

2. Medical Support. Navy manpower in this category provides medical care in DoD military medical facilities and to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities.

Navy Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.6	12.0	12.8
Reserve	8.3	12.9	15.3
<u>Civilian</u>	3.9	4.2	4.4

The FY 1985 increase of (+433) and the FY 1986 increase of (+654) are to improve wartime medical capability. During peacetime this manpower provides healthcare to active duty and retired members and their dependents. The FY 1986 increase of (+85) adds dental technicians to provide more and better dental care so that Navy's active force will be physically ready at all times.

The increase in Reservists from FY 1984 through FY 1986 builds to meet NAMMOS requirements by FY 1988 and will improve manning of the units in this category.

The civilian increases in FY 1985 and FY 1986 relate to the remaining increments of a three year expansion of the Navy Occupational Health Program of hazard identification, medical surveillance, and recording of personnel exposure data.

3. Personnel Support. This subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy recruiting and examining, education of overseas dependents, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career-training and intern programs. The Personnel Support category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.8	7.8	8.2
Reserve	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.8

An increase of (+351) at Recruiting Activities makes up the majority of the 378 active growth in FY 1986. The remainder of (+27) is caused by minor adjustments throughout all other personnel support activities.

The FY 1986 civilian increase provides for civilian substitution initiatives of non-military essential billets.

4. Individual Training. This category includes manpower for formal military and technical training, as well as for professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category include recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care, individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category is dedicated to training of active Navy students and trainees and Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in permanent change of station status are carried in the Individuals subcategory; those in temporary additional duty status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	29.8	28.8	29.6
Reserve	0.4	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.3	3.4	3.5

The FY 1985 active decrease is caused by the contracting out of maintenance for T-2 training aircraft (-99). The FY 1986 active increase is for general skill training (air +119), (ships +183), (submarines +275), at the service school commands and fleet training centers, (+40) for training of medical support personnel, (+31) for professional military education at the War College and Armed Forces Staff College, and (+75) other slight increases throughout the training commands.

The FY 1984 to FY 1985 Reserve reduction reflects adjustments to requirements for flight training personnel.

The civilian increases in FY 1985 provide for teaching staff and training support at the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Post Graduate School and the Naval War College and the establishment of a physical security training program. The civilian increase in FY 1986 provides for additional teaching staff at the Naval Post Graduate School and the establishment of an Aegis Training Center that will satisfy the increased training requirements for new ship deliveries.

5. Force Support Training. Force Support Training manpower supports units providing training to organized crews or teams in conjunction with performance of a specific mission. Civilian support in this area consists of maintenance and clerical support for fleet air training units.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.4	15.8	16.0
Reserve	1.1	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.6	1.7	1.7

The FY 1985 active increase is the result of a new readiness squadron (+219) and growth for the training of manpower for LAMPS Mark III program (+145). The FY 1986 active increase is the result of the new readiness squadron reaching its full training requirement (+192).

The Reserve reduction from FY 1984 to FY 1985 reflects adjustments to NAMMOS requirements for force support training personnel.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 provides for the establishment of the Defense Training Data and Analysis Center at the Naval Training Equipment Center, Orlando, Florida, and for acquisition, support, operation and maintenance of training systems and simulators for the Navy and Marine Corps.

6. Central Logistics. Manpower in this subcategory is associated with supply, maintenance, operations and logistics support operations. This manpower provides critical support to the fleet and directly affects readiness.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.7	6.9	7.0
Reserve	6.1	7.0	7.4
<u>Civilian</u>	170.5	165.4	165.2

The FY 1985 active increase is the result of (+300) for 15 AEGIS and support ship operational facilities, (-242) at 22 Naval Air and Naval Sea Systems Command Detachments for procurement operations, (+371) at seven Logistics Support Activities, (-322) at seven Logistics Support Activities, (+114) at six Facilities Engineering Divisions. The FY 1986 active increase (+76) is for supply support at various logistics activities and detachments.

The increase in Reserves is to build toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987 and improve manning in these units.

Civilian changes for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are discussed separately by type of operation as summarized below:

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Supply Operations	23.7	24.6	24.5
Maintenance Operations	129.7	123.6	122.6
Logistics Support	17.1	17.2	18.1
Total	170.5	165.4	165.2

a. Supply Operations. Included are Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and procurement operations activities that provide fleet support and contract expertise for ship and aircraft systems acquisition.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 supports the continuation of the Navy initiative to identify and correct high inventory adjustments at the Naval Supply Centers; implements the spare parts acquisition program to pay fair and reasonable prices for spare parts; and supports increased supply depot workload. Additional support is provided for contract administration at Navy Procurement Offices and Supervisors of Shipbuilding.

The civilian change in FY 1986 results from increases in contact administration services at the Navy Procurement offices and the Supervisors of Shipbuilding, and the spare part acquisition program, offset by a reduction in Supply Depot workload and efforts to achieve increased economies and efficiencies.

b. Maintenance Operations. Included are Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARFs), Shipyards, Ordnance Activities and Maintenance Support Activities. The NARFs perform depot-level maintenance of aircraft frames, engines and components. Shipyards provide logistic support for ships and service craft in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking and outfitting. Ordnance activities receive, renovate, maintain, store and issue ammunition, explosives, weapons and ordnance material. These activities provide technical engineering and logistics support for combat systems, manage underwater acoustic ranges and provide support for weapons systems acquisition. Maintenance support activities include Naval Aviation Engineering Service Units, Shipyard Planning, Engineering Repair and Alteration Activities and Fleet Combat Directional Systems Support Activities. These activities provide logistics planning, design and engineering services for the operating forces and provide technical assistance to the shore establishment.

The civilian decrease from FY 1984 through FY 1986 results primarily from a rephasing of funded shipyard workload precipitated by a ship maintenance strategy that continues a shift towards longer operating cycles coupled with selected and restricted availabilities which tend to be performed on contract. Additional reduced civilians result from a determined effort to reduce shipyard overhead staffing and promote increased productivity at ordnance activities. These reductions are offset in part by a moderate FY 1986 increase in funded aircraft and component rework requirements at the Naval Air Rework Activities.

c. Logistics Support Operations. Logistics support comprises a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service and technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, Facilities, and Electronics Systems Commands.

The civilian increases from FY 1984 through FY 1986 provide resources for increased in-house construction oversight; military construction contract monitoring; updating of engineering and design documents; logistics engineering support and R&D test and evaluation for the mechanical and electrical systems within ship hulls; surface ship extended life cycle program; and direct fleet support by the Naval Sea Centers.

7. Centralized Support Activities. This subcategory includes non-management headquarters strength for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense Agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.6	6.7	6.7
Reserve	1.8	1.5	1.7
<u>Civilian</u>	6.8	7.3	7.7

The active increase (+90) in FY 1985 is caused by minor changes at the centralized support activities listed above. The decrease in Reserve strength from FY 1984 to FY 1985 reflects SELRES overmanning in FY 1984. The Reserve increase from FY 1985 to FY 1986 builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987.

The civilian increase in FY 1985 is mostly additional spaces for selected intelligence programs and more investigative agents for prevention of waste, fraud and abuse. The civilian increase in FY 1986 provides for civilian substitution initiatives of non-military essential billets. Additional civilian spaces are provided for increased audit capability and for pay and personnel systems.

8. Management Headquarters. This subcategory includes management headquarters manpower required to support Defense Agencies; International Military Organizations; and Unified, Combat, and Service Commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.4	8.5	8.4
Reserve	4.2	3.7	4.1
<u>Civilian</u>	8.7	8.7	8.8

1/ Includes intelligence activities and military reserve personnel that are not counted in management headquarters ceiling. Excludes activities directly in support of management headquarters that appear in other subcategories by reason of program element stratification.

The FY 1985 increase of (+98) and the FY 1986 decrease of (-66) are minor adjustments which were made throughout all Management Headquarters Activities. The decrease in Reserve Strength from FY 1984 to FY 1985 reflects SELRES overmanning in FY 1984. The Reserve increase from FY 1985 to FY 1986 builds toward the full NAMMOS requirement by FY 1987 and improves manning in these units. The FY 1986 civilian increase is for support to the growing Selected Reserve Program and selected intelligence programs.

9. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support sub-category includes Navy manpower assigned to other federal departments and agencies. Normally, such cross assignment is made on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.0	1.1	1.1
Reserve	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50

The active increase in FY 1985 is only (+55).

E. Operating Strength Deviation. The Navy's internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force structure Manning. Average strength for the force differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning, usually related to Permanent Change of Station moves and accessions. These seasonal fluctuations may result in undermanning (fewer people than spaces) or overmanning (more people than spaces) in both the active and reserve force. Through proper management of the distributable force, Navy endeavors to maintain a steady active force deviation. The strength deviation of the Selected Reserve reflects the programmed growth of the Selected Reserve to the NAMMOS requirements by FY 1987 for all but medical support, which will meet the requirement by FY 1988.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-7.1	-7.1	-7.1
Reserve	-18.3	-11.3	-6.0

F. Individuals. The Individuals account is sized according to several factors. The number of students is related to overall end strength and the implicit training requirements (discussed in detail

in the Military Manpower Training Report). The major portion of the transient strength requirement is projected by multiplying the average time to execute a move by the total number of moves scheduled in each year's Permanent Change of Station move program. Requirements for patients, prisoners, and personnel awaiting separation are derived from actual monthly data from the previous year and projected total end strength.

1. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.9	27.0	27.7
Reserve	0.7	0.6	0.7

The percentage of active transients increases from 4.6 percent of the force in FY 1984 to 4.7 percent in FY 1985 and FY 1986. Navy is experiencing increased enlisted retention rates which creates a requirement for additional operational, rotational, and training moves since these people will not be separating. Force structure billets in the transient account increase by 1074 in FY 1985. The FY 1986 increase of 674 results from an increased force level.

The FY 1985 and FY 1986 Reserve fluctuations result from fluctuations in force levels and do not result from any growth in the factors used to estimate the account.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees.

Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdees Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.8	4.2	4.3

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

The decrease from FY 1984 to FY 1985 is partially a result of the dropping of prisoners on appellate leave from strength beginning in FY 1985. A more stringent enforcement of standards of conduct in FY 1983 created a higher than expected actual number of prisoners in FY 1984, while involuntary and adverse administrative separations related to these programs caused an increased number of separations in FY 1984. These new and revised policies have been incorporated into the prisoner and holdee accounts beginning with FY 1985.

3. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen. Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. Midshipmen are students attending the United States Naval Academy. Upon completion of their college education, these young men and women are commissioned Ensigns in the U.S. Navy.

Navy Trainees/Students/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	67.0	67.6	63.1
Midshipmen	4.5	4.5	4.5
Total	<u>71.5</u>	<u>72.6</u>	<u>67.6</u>
Reserve			
Trainees/Students	1.1	3.5	4.6

The number of Midshipmen seldom fluctuates by as much as 100.

The FY 1985 active increase in trainees and students is due to perturbations in the enlisted accession plan which is driven by end strength requirements which are affected by retention and attrition.

Active trainee and student billets dropped by 2,756 from FY 1985 to FY 1986, reflecting reduced specialized skill training.

Fluctuations in Reserve trainee and student billets between FY 1984 and FY 1985 and between FY 1985 and FY 1986 are due to an expanding SAM program and available "A" School seats.

CHAPTER V

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction.

A. General. This chapter describes the Marine Corps active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower program, presents the manpower levels requested for FY 1986 and FY 1987, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year. It also contains the changes that provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment and greater integration with the active forces in keeping with the Total Force concept.

The Marine Corps is unique among the four Services because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of and shall provide:

- "Three combat divisions, air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services... organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet."
- "Detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy."
- "Security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases."
- "Marines to perform other such duties as the President may elect."
- "Guards for U.S. embassies...as a result of a memorandum of agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended."

The National Security Act of 1947 also requires that the Marine Corps provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly has resulted in a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) that provides a balance between strategic mobility and tactical capability that is well suited to meet assigned United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) missions.

To support its missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains an FM posture as follows: one Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) composed of a command element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing and a Force Service Support Group (FSSG) located on the East Coast of the United States; one MAF forward deployed in the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States.

The employment roles of the Marine Corps Reserve forces are to augment and reinforce the active forces, and to provide a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) or a nucleus for constitution of the Fourth Marine Division, Aircraft Wing, and FSSG. As a general rule, individual reserve units are mirror images of their active counterparts in order to facilitate their integration

into the total force. The structure and equipment found in the Marine Corps Reserve are similar to those found in the active component, thus enhancing the Marine Corps Reserve's augmentation and reinforcement capabilities.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements. The Marine Corps obtains its total wartime military and civilian manpower requirements from the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS) data submission for the Defense Guidance scenario. These requirements are shown below:

Wartime Peak Demand for Trained Manpower
(Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 90</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Time at which peak demand occurs	M+180	M+180	M+180
Peak Demand	419.0	397.1	26.4

The FY 1986 and FY 1990 WARMAPS scenarios consisted of the same combat intensities, similar deployment and employment schedules, and similar structures. The larger demand for military manpower in FY 1986 compared with FY 1990 can be attributed to today's paucity of in-theater health care capability. There will be improved medical care capability in FY 1990.

C. Marine Corps Military Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan. Although the National Security Act of 1947 specifies that the Marine Corps will have a minimum of three wings and divisions with supporting units, it does not specify the size, composition, or manning of these units. These factors, as well as the nature, size, and composition of the supporting establishment, are matters of Marine Corps determination.

The Marine Corps selectively mans its force structure to maximize combat capability while maintaining the minimum necessary acceptable support to the combat forces. Historically, except during wartime or mobilization, the active forces are manned at less than 100 percent of requirements and will be augmented by reassigning active duty or mobilizing Individual Reservists in time of emergency. In peacetime, some functions, such as salvage platoons, do not require manning, and there are constraints on manpower levels and funding. These constraints cause bases and stations to be unable to provide necessary manpower support to tenant units. FMF units share in the support responsibility through the FMF Augmentation Personnel (FAP) program. FAP personnel fulfill a significant portion of the base operating support workload requirements and are returned to their parent units when they are committed to an operational mission. The Marine Corps would require 219,300 Marines to fully man all authorized Marine Corps units and organizations in FY 1986.

The Marine Corps request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1986 and FY 1987 is as follows:

<u>Marine Corps Manpower Program</u> <u>(Strength in Thousands)</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Active Military	199.5	201.7
Marine Corps Reserve	43.0	44.2
Civilian Personnel	22.1	22.5

The difference between the peacetime manpower program and wartime demand for manpower includes requirements to fill unfilled billets in the FMF, increases in the non-FMF (from peacetime requirements to wartime requirements), and casualty replacements. In order to meet the demand for wartime manpower, the Marine Corps will use all available assets: active duty personnel, Selected Marine Corps Reserve personnel, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Individual Ready Reservists, Standby Reserves, Retirees, Returns to Duty from casualties, and draftees. Manpower assets are phased in according to legislative authorizations in the Defense Guidance scenario, e.g., a 100 thousand call-up authorizes the Marine Corps to call a portion of its Selected Reserves.

D. Major Force Structure Changes. The Marine Corps' program includes a carefully planned restructuring of the force structure to modernize the force and to impose the same structure on all similar units. The program provides for increased active and reserve force capabilities. The Marine Corps retains or places in the active component only those forces essential for the timely compliance with stated contingencies and readiness missions, all others are placed in the Reserves.

From FY 1985 to FY 1991 the Marine Corps will make several significant changes to its structure that will enhance tactical mobility and firepower to meet the potential threat and requirements involved with USCENTCOM missions. These improvements will add significantly to the mission capabilities of the ground combat, combat service support, and aviation elements of the Marine Corps.

1. Active Structure Changes. By FY 1986, the Marine Corps will complete the reorganization and modernization of the infantry battalions and another artillery regiment; double the divisions' anti-tank (TOW) capability; and activate the final Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Battalion. Additionally, we will continue the five year program to establish permanent Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) headquarters with the activation of a MAB and MAF nucleus headquarters.

Increases to the FSSGs will improve combat service support. The improvement will enable FSSGs to provide required support for new ground combat equipment such as TOW and LAV. The Marine Corps adds several platoon size units to enhance the bulk liquid transportation capability. We concentrate

aviation growth in ongoing activation and equipping of light antiaircraft missile units. These missile units are necessary to insure Fleet Marine Forces are provided a minimally acceptable level of air defense. Additionally, in FY 1986, the Marine Corps activates a CH-53E helicopter squadron.

2. Reserve Structure Changes. The Marine Corps' continuous review of requirements within the total force has produced plans for increasing the reserve structure. In FY 1986, the Corps will continue to reorganize the infantry battalion in order to make it similar to its active counterpart. Additionally, in FY 1986, we will increase ground combat and support capability by adding one civil affairs group, and an air naval gunfire liaison company, and a reconnaissance company. The Corps will continue to enhance the reserve artillery organization in FY 1986 as the direct support artillery battalions continue to reorganize for and receive the M198, 155mm towed howitzer, thus acquiring a substantial increase in firepower. The Reserves will also activate their sensor control and management platoon in FY 1986 and four TOW platoons in FY 1987. Of the four TOW platoons, one platoon completes the anti-tank company within the 4th tank battalion, while each of the others will enhance an infantry regiment with an improved anti-tank capability. Finally, in FY 1988, the Reserve artillery regiment will acquire and activate a target acquisition battery giving it an essential capability.

The increases in the Reserve combat service support in FY 1986 include the addition of two salvage platoons, a bridge platoon, a dental battalion, three medical companies, and a medical logistic company. The Marine Corps considers the modernization within Reserve aviation to be of the utmost importance.

3. Manpower Plan. The Marine Corps Manpower Plan is given in the following tables:

Marine Corps Active Manpower Plan
(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	*	*	*	*	*	*
Tactical/Mobility	120.6	121.1	122.3	124.8	126.0	126.2
Auxiliary Activities	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Support Activities	45.0	45.1	45.0	44.7	44.8	44.8
Operating Strength Deviation	- 0.3	+ 1.0	+ 0.3	+0.4	- 0.8	- 0.7
Individuals	31.5	30.7	32.3	32.3	32.4	32.3
TOTALS	198.3	199.5	201.7	204.0	204.2	204.3

* Less than 50.

Marine Corps Reserve Manpower Plan

(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Tactical/Mobility	36.0	36.9	37.9	39.0	40.1	41.2
Support Activities	1.6	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4
Individuals	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
TOTALS	41.8	43.0	44.2	45.5	46.6	47.8

* Less than 50.

Marine Corps Civilian Manpower Plan

(Strength in Thousands)

	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Support Activities	21.7	22.1	22.5	22.9	23.2	23.2
TOTALS	21.7	22.1	22.5	22.9	23.2	23.2

E. Key Manpower Issue.

1. Reduction in Strength Requests. An area of concern, but not yet a significant problem, is the congressional reduction in active Marine Corps end strength requests which are necessary to fill valid requirements. The Marine Corps validated these requirements (FY 1983-1990) early in the FY 1983 and 1984 programming process and prior to final FY 1985 and 1986 budget consideration. They evolved through proper planning and the Marine Corps' requirements determination process. The Marine Corps did not increase the FY 1986-1990 plans above that previously programmed. Decrements to requested end strength increases impact on personnel readiness because they drive lower manning levels in Fleet Marine Force units.

II. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Military Manpower.

1. General. Congress authorized the Marine Corps a FY 1985 end strength of 198,300. In view of economic factors and the cumulative effects of continued successful recruitment and retention, the Marine Corps considers that an FY 1986 end strength request of 199,500 is achievable. The requested end strength increase supports new units and equipment approved for introduction in FY 1986.

2. Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength.

a. Programmed Force Structure and Programmed Manning. To support previously approved force modernization programs and Fleet Marine Force unit activations, the Marine Corps increases total force structure from 178,200 in FY 1984 to 184,300 in FY 1986 --- an increase of 6,100 structure spaces. During this same period, we requested manning increases totalling 2,900. Since structure is growing at a faster rate than programmed manning, percent manning decreases. The number of billets we cannot staff is 2,900 more in FY 1986 than in FY 1984 -- a 22 percent increase in unfilled structure. Table V-1 provides an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure and programmed manning.

ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000's)

	FY 1984	PRGM'D MNPWR STRUCT	%** MNG	FY 1985	PRGM'D MNPWR STRUCT	%** MNG	FY 1986	PRGM'D MNPWR STRUCT	%** MNG
Defense Planning And Programming Categories									
STRATEGIC	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.0
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.00
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Land Forces	132.1	118.6	89.6	134.4	120.6	89.8	137.5	121.1	88.4
Tactical Air Forces	100.6	90.5	90.0	102.6	92.3	90.0	105.5	92.8	88.4
Naval Forces	30.8	27.5	89.3	31.1	27.6	88.7	31.3	27.6	88.2
ASW and Fleet Air Def. Forces	0.6	0.6	100.0	0.7	0.7	100.0	0.7	0.7	100.0
Amphibious Force	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.5)	(0.5)	100.0
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES									
Intelligence	1.7	1.7	100.0	1.6	1.6	100.0	1.6	1.6	100.0
Centrally Managed Com.	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.8	0.8	100.0
Research and Development	0.9	*	0.9	100.0	*	100.0	*	*	100.0
Geophysical Activities	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.0	*	*	100.0
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Base Operating Support	44.4	44.3	99.8	45.1	45.0	99.8	45.2	45.1	99.8
Combat Installations	20.6	20.6	100.0	21.1	21.1	100.0	21.3	21.3	100.0
Support Installations	(15.8)	(15.8)	100.0	(16.2)	(16.2)	100.0	(16.3)	(16.3)	100.0
Personnel Support	(4.8)	(4.8)	100.0	(4.9)	(4.9)	100.0	(4.9)	(4.9)	100.0
Individual Training	4.7	4.7	100.0	4.7	4.7	100.0	4.7	4.7	100.0
Force Support Training	8.8	8.8	100.0	8.8	8.8	100.0	8.8	8.8	100.0
Central Logistics	3.5	3.5	100.0	3.7	3.7	100.0	3.7	3.7	100.0
Supply Operations	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.8	0.8	100.0	0.8	0.8	100.0
Maintenance Operations	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0	(0.4)	(0.4)	100.0
Logistics Support Ops.	(*)	(*)	100.0	(*)	(*)	100.0	(*)	(*)	100.0
Centralized Support Act.	2.4	2.4	100.0	2.4	2.4	100.0	2.4	2.4	100.0
Management Headquarters	2.4	2.2	91.6	2.2	2.1	95.8	2.2	2.1	95.8
Federal Agency Support	1.3	1.3	100.0	1.3	1.3	100.0	1.3	1.3	100.0
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	178.2	164.6	92.4	181.1	167.1	92.3	184.3	167.8	91.0
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION		-0.8			-0.3			+1.0	
INDIVIDUALS		32.4			31.5			30.7	
END STRENGTH		196.2			198.3			199.5	

* Less than 50

b. Operating Strength. Actual staffing of programmed manning targets, in the aggregate, is contingent upon adequate operating strength. For FY 1985 and FY 1986, the Marine Corps has programmed operating strength "supply" (in manyears) equal to programmed manning "demand" (again, in manyears). In other words, the Marine Corps has structured a "balanced" manpower plan in the sense that if all elements of the program are executed (recruiting, training, staffing, etc.) the average operating strength population will be sufficient to staff the billets programmed for manning. Actual execution of the plan in FY 1985 and FY 1986 may deviate somewhat from the program, but these deviations have historically proven to be minimal.

3. Skill and Grade. Table V-2 summarizes the existing and projected officer inventory as they compare to programmed manning and individuals for officer and enlisted. In the aggregate, the enlisted population is sufficient to meet the programmed manning demand, although there are and will be both overages and shortages in specific military occupational specialties (MOSSs). The overall trend, however, is extremely favorable. The total number of enlisted in unbalanced skills should be reduced by more than half from FY 1984 to FY 1986. The number of enlisted skills that are unbalanced should drop from 207 to 131. We project improvement based on continued quality accessions, pay comparability, effectiveness of the enlisted bonus, and the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP).

4. Experience. Table V-3 displays the average years of service (YOS) by grade for officer and enlisted. The enlisted force is becoming more experienced. In FY 1984, the career force totaled 62,328 increase and equates to a more seasoned and experienced leadership cadre -- the Corps will have more experienced Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) and more of them.

TABLE V-2
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING AND INDIVIDUALS (PMI)
(Strength in thousands)

		FY 1986			FY 1985			FY 1986				
		OVER/H*	BAL/H*	SHORT/H*	OVER/H	BAL/H	SHORT/H*	OVER/H	BAL/H	SHORT/H*	TOTAL	
11-16	Number of Skills	75	83	133	291	79	86	124	291	57	158	
PMI	16.2	40.8	45.1	100.1	14.7	53.4	34.6	102.7	16.6	70.1	291	
Inventory	17.1	40.7	36.9	94.6	17.9	53.4	27.5	98.9	19.4	68.7	103.4	
Over/Short	-2.9	-4.2	-8.3	-5.5	+3.2	+1.1	-7.1	-3.8	+2.8	-1.4	-2.6	
17-19	Number of Skills	91	129	134	358	81	158	119	358	81	200	358
PMI	12.6	22.7	18.6	53.9	10.4	25.3	18.2	53.9	12.9	31.2	10.7	56.8
Inventory	15.6	22.8	14.9	53.3	14.1	23.1	15.6	54.8	15.8	30.3	8.1	56.2
Over/Short	+3.0	+4.1	-3.7	-5.5	+3.6	+1.1	-2.3	+0.9	+2.9	-0.9	-2.6	-0.6
Total 11-19	Number of Skills	61	151	166	358	56	181	121	358	52	227	358
PMI	23.8	72.2	58.1	154.0	22.6	90.0	63.9	156.6	26.5	105.3	26.5	158.2
Inventory	26.4	71.8	49.4	148.0	23.6	88.6	37.5	151.7	31.0	101.8	20.3	155.1
Over/Short	+3.1	+4.4	-8.7	-6.0	+2.9	+1.4	-6.4	-4.9	+2.5	-1.4	-4.2	-3.1
W1-W4	Number of Skills	20	12	31	63	22	11	30	63	16	13	32
PMI	1.5	4	5	1.4	.5	.4	.5	1.4	.4	.4	.6	1.4
Inventory	-1.6	-3	-4	-1.4	-1.6	-1.1	-1.2	-1.4	-1.6	-1.2	-1.2	-1.4
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-1.2	0	+1.1	*	-1.2	*	+1.2	*	*	*
01-03	Number of Skills	8	26	56	86	10	27	49	86	8	28	86
PMI	1.7	6.2	6.5	13.4	.8	6.2	6.5	13.5	.8	6.2	50	86
Inventory	1.7	6.4	4.8	13.6	1.7	6.4	5.3	13.4	1.7	6.5	6.6	13.5
Over/Short	+1.0	+0.8	-1.6	+0.2	+1.0	+0.2	-1.2	*	-0.9	+0.3	-1.3	13.4
04-06	Number of Skills	23	8	46	77	24	9	46	77	20	10	47
PMI	1.3	1.8	2.3	5.3	1.3	1.8	2.3	5.3	1.3	1.8	2.3	5.4
Inventory	2.2	1.8	1.3	5.3	2.2	1.8	1.4	5.3	4.2	1.8	1.4	5.3
Over/Short	+0.9	*	-0.9	*	+0.9	*	-0.9	*	+0.9	*	-0.9	*
07-08	Number of Skills	31	32	109	163	34	36	93	163	26	38	97
PMI	2.0	7.9	8.7	16.7	2.1	7.9	8.8	16.8	2.0	8.0	8.9	18.9
Inventory	4.0	6.7	6.2	16.9	3.9	6.2	6.7	16.9	3.9	6.2	6.7	18.8
Over/Short	+1.9	+0.8	-2.5	+2.1	+1.9	+0.2	-2.1	*	+1.8	+0.2	-2.1	-0.1
*Less than 50.												

Note: Table V-2 does not include basic or training skills, for enlisted personnel, in PMI or inventory.

*See definitions in Appendix B.

TABLE V-3
 ACTIVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH IN 000s)

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.
	WITH >	4 YOS	YOS	WITH >	4 YOS	YOS	WITH >	4 YOS	YOS
PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE	PEOPLE
<u>E1-E4</u>									
PMI*	121.6	N/A	N/A	123.1	N/A	N/A	123.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	121.2	10.6	2.6	123.1	15.5	2.8	123.3	17.7	2.9
<u>E5-E9</u>									
PMI	54.8	N/A	N/A	54.9	N/A	N/A	55.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	54.7	51.7	10.6	54.9	52.9	11.4	55.9	54.6	11.5
<u>E1-E9</u>									
PMI	176.4	N/A	N/A	178.0	N/A	N/A	179.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	175.8	62.3	5.1	178.0	68.4	5.4	179.2	72.3	5.6
<u>W1-W4</u>									
PMI	1.4	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A	1.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.4	1.4	13.0	1.4	1.4	13.0	1.4	1.4	13.0
<u>01-03</u>									
PMI	13.4	N/A	N/A	13.5	N/A	N/A	13.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	13.6	6.9	7.1	13.4	7.0	7.0	13.4	7.0	7.0
<u>04-06</u>									
PMI	5.3	N/A	N/A	5.3	N/A	N/A	5.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	5.3	5.3	16.0	5.3	5.3	16.0	5.3	5.3	16.0
<u>01-06</u>									
PMI	18.7	N/A	N/A	18.8	N/A	N/A	18.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	18.9	12.2	13.0	18.8	12.3	13.0	18.8	12.3	13.0

*Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Marine Corps achieved 109.2 percent of the combined prior service and non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals in 1984. The Marine Corps recruited 2,724 three-year, 35,729 four-year, and 1758 six-year enlistees. Future enlistments will be for three or more years, with a goal of 90 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality accessions. In FY 1984, 95.4 percent of non-prior service enlistees were high school diploma graduates. High school diploma graduates are the best source of quality manpower in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to discipline. The Marine Corps minimum standard is for 75% of all male non-prior service recruits to be high school graduates; however, we have set a recruiting goal for FY85 of 93 percent. The goal for female non-prior service accessions is 100 percent high school graduates.

The Enlisted Bonus Program (EBP) increased from a budgeted amount of \$7.7 million with 3,400 bonuses in FY 1980 to \$7.9 million with 4,244 bonus allocations in FY85. The FY 1986 EBP is budgeted for \$8.6 million with approximately 4,500 allocations. These increases have helped substantially in reducing occupational imbalances.

In addition, the EBP is also being used to spread the historic high summer accessions more evenly through the year by increasing the bonus amounts during low input months -- February through May -- and by allocating more bonuses to those months. A more even flow of accessions will permit a better match of recruits qualified for technical training to the available school seats.

Enlisted Accession Plans

Accessions	FY 84		FY 85	FY 86
	Actual	Goal		
Prior Service	1,984	1,200	1,997	1,920
Non-Prior Service	40,221	37,465	37,391	33,294
Male	38,014	35,665	35,184	31,094
(HSDG)	(36,152)	(33,169)	(32,721)	(29,539)
Female	2,207	1,800	2,207	2,200
(HSDG)	(2,207)	(1,800)	(2,207)	(2,200)

(2) Retention. FY 1984 was a banner year in total re-enlistments for the Marine Corps. By retaining well-qualified and proven Marines, the leadership and experience levels of the force were raised substantially. Additionally, considerable monetary savings were made in that replacements did not have to be trained to replace those Marines who could have decided to leave the Marine Corps. The combination of good retention and a vigorous lateral movement program have both contributed to the fact that skill imbalances are fewer than at any time in recent years. It must be stressed, however, that the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRBP) is still the most significant factor in retaining skilled and experienced personnel in the Marine Corps. Thus far in FY 1985, the Marine Corps is experiencing a continuation of the success realized in FY 1984. The same manpower management and career planning techniques used throughout FY 1984 and FY 1985 are projected to be used into FY 1986.

Enlisted Retention Plans

RETENTION	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>		
First Term	8,622	6,961	7,172	6,171
Career	10,275	10,663	10,014	11,013

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. Since 1980, the Marine Corps has kept a high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	78.0	78.5	80.2	79.3	79.2

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The improvement in retention and the population stability have translated into greater unit stability. This unit stability provides the commander with the ability to maintain a trained, cohesive unit throughout the year. Consequently, FMF readiness increases and deployment preparation improves.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	32.7	36.2	38.0	38.0	41.1

(5) Other. The degree of difficulty in meeting the FY 1986 enlisted accession plan will depend on the youth unemployment rate, now projected to be approximately 18 percent and the comparability of military pay with civilian pay.

b. Officer and Warrant Officer.

(1) Accessions. Officer end strength will level out at 20,266 in FY 1985 and hold there into FY 1986. Improved officer retention will permit the maintenance of officer requirements with fewer accessions. The strength will permit the Marine Corps to provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and support functions, while continuing to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Objectives

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	
	1,761	1,761	1,677
			1,645

(2) Retention. Overall officer retention continues higher than historic averages. Current retention rates are expected to remain high for the duration of FY 1985 and into FY 1986.

Active Marine Corps Officer Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Ground Unrestricted	58	58	59
Aviation Unrestricted	85	84	85

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. High officer retention contributes to high population stability.

Aggregate Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	90.3	91.1	92.3	93.3	92.6

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. The officers show a steady improvement in unit stability.

Unit Personnel Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	38.0	42.0	42.4	42.4	44.4

c. Women in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps assigns Women Marines to billets based on both the roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the necessity to provide women with rewarding careers. The Marine Corps does not classify women in combatant Military Occupational Specialties and restricts the numbers of women who may be assigned to deployable FMF units. The Marine Corps completed a review of classification, assignment, and deployment policies. The new policies resulting from this review will ensure that: Force Commanders have sufficient men to meet deployment requirements, women will not be assigned to specialties or to units that have an unacceptable combat risk, and men and women will have a fair and equitable career progression. Women will continue to serve in 35 of 39 occupational fields.

The end-strength goal for enlisted woman Marines is about 10,500. Most of the growth from the current strength will occur in the supporting establishment with the numbers of women Marines in the FMF approximating what it is today. Increases in FY 1985 and FY 1986 woman Marine strength reflect a continued effort to realize the intent of DoD equal opportunity programs, which are concerned, in part, with expanding the number of women in the military consistent with unique service mission requirements. Increases also reflect improving retention and successful recruiting of women Marines.

Female Marine Strength
Total (Enlisted/Officer)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Active	9,225 (8,577/648)	9,321 (8,659/662)	9,515 (8,838/677)
Reserve	1,446 (1,345/101)	1,545 (1,437/108)	1,591 (1,480/111)

Enlisted Women in
Traditional/Nontraditional DOD Occupational Groups

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Infantry/Gun Crew	0	0	0	0
Electronic Equipment Repair	243	304	349	492
*Communication/Intelligence	578	733	779	1,014
Other Technical	141	183	223	289
*Support & Admin	2,958	3,511	3,788	4,386
Mechanic Equipment Repair	421	482	552	669
Craftsmen	179	177	159	167
*Service Supply	925	1,055	1,149	1,238

Remainder are in individuals category.

* Considered traditional fields by USMC

6. Readiness Assessment. Although the Marine Corps FY 1986 end strength request of 199,500 is the same as the original request made for FY 1985 last year, it still represents an increase of 1200 over what Congress authorized for FY 1985 (198,300). Necessary structure improvements continue to reflect growth, based upon previous programmed structure decisions. Since programmed manning is increasing at a lesser rate than the programmed structure growth, a subsequent decrease in the manning percentage is noted. However, readiness improvements will still result from improving trends in occupational imbalances and personnel stability through continued quality accessions; retention bonus programs; and the decreased enlisted population turbulence expected to be provided by the level-based accession program established in FY 1984.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower. The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to maintain highly trained units and qualified individuals for active duty in time of war or national emergency. The Marine Corps Reserve is divided into two categories: Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve. The primary source of units and individual manpower upon mobilization is the Ready Reserve consisting of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and the Individual Ready Reserve.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Marine Corps Reserve

(1) General. The SMCR units taken together form a Division, Aircraft Wing, and Force Service Support Group. They present a balance of combat, combat support, and combat services support forces of the same type as active force counterpart units. Also included within the SMCR are individuals who are not members of the Division, Wing or FSSG, but are preassigned to mobilization billets which must be filled on or shortly after M-Day.

(2) Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength.

(a) Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. During FY 1985 programmed manning for the division and force service support group decreases slightly as new structure is introduced. These near term shortfalls are then recouped by FY 1986. The reserve wing is manned at a lower level. Table V-4 provides an overview of the changing relationship between the programmed manpower structure, and programmed manning.

(b) Operating Strength. Table V-4 also provides the relationship between average programmed manning and average operating strength. As shown, the trained strength in units (operating strength) will be sufficient to staff the USMCR at the average programmed manning goal in this fiscal year and the next.

(3) Skill and Grade. Table V-5 summarizes the existing and projected reserve inventory as compared to programmed manning. It shows that out-of-balance skills for officers are projected to decrease from 154 in FY 1984 to 139 in FY 1986 and those for enlisted decrease from 450 in FY 1984 to 407 in FY 1986.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH (000's)

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD* MNPWR STRCT	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT
			MNG						
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Land Forces	41.4	35.3[0.4]	84	40.8	36.0[0.5]	87	41.0	36.9[0.5]	89
Tactical Air Force	33.6	28.6[0.3]	84	33.9	28.9[0.3]	84	34.3	30.2[0.3]	87
Naval Forces	7.8	6.6	85	6.9	6.9	99	6.7	6.5	96
		.1[0.1]		0.2[0.2]			0.2[0.2]		
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Base Operating Support	0.8	1.2[0.4]	100	1.1	1.6[0.5]	100	1.5	2.0[0.5]	100
Personnel Support		0.1[0.1]			0.2[0.2]			0.2[0.2]	
Centralized Support		0.3[0.3]			0.3[0.3]			0.3[0.3]	
Activities	0.8	0.8	100	1.1	1.1	100	1.5	1.5	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	42.2	36.5[0.8]	85	41.9	37.5[0.9]	87	42.5	38.9[1.0]	89
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION									
				0		0		0	
INDIVIDUALS									
				4.1		4.2		4.1	
END-STRENGTH									
				40.6[0.8]		41.8[0.9]		43.0[1.0]	

* IMAS shown in brackets are included in programmed manning totals for Navy Reserve, but not included in percent manning, since they are members of the Selected Reserve but man active structure during mobilization.

TABLE V-5
RESERVE MARINE CORPS SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED PLANNING INDIVIDUALS^{*} (PHI)

		(Strength in 000's)						FY 1986						
		FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986			OVERALL			
		OVER*	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	OVER*	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	BAL**	SHORT**	TOTAL	BAL**	SHORT**
E1-E4	Number of Skills	49	12	203	264	46	25	193	264	44	37	183	264	33.2
PHI	3.3	.1	28.8	32.1	2.2	2.3	27.1	32.6	3.0	3.6	26.7	26.7	28.4	
Inventory	4.6	.1	22.2	27.0	6.4	2.5	20.7	21.6	4.0	3.7	20.8	-6.0	-6.6	
Over/Short	+1.4	*	-6.5	-5.1	+1.2	+2	-6.3	-5.0	+1.0	+1	-6.0	-1.1	-3.6	
E5-E9	Number of Skills	129	25	69	223	123	36	66	223	117	43	63	223	7.5
PHI	3.0	.2	3.7	6.8	3.0	.8	3.3	7.2	3.3	1.2	3.0	1.9	11.1	
Inventory	3.0	.2	2.2	10.5	7.8	.9	2.0	10.7	7.8	1.3	1.3	-1.1	-1.1	
Over/Short	+5.1	*	-1.4	+3.6	+4.8	*	-1.3	+3.6	+4.6	+1	-1.1	-1.1	-3.6	
Total E1-E9	Number of Skills	178	37	212	487	169	59	259	487	161	80	246	487	40.7
PHI	6.2	.3	32.4	38.9	6.3	3.1	30.4	39.8	6.3	4.8	29.7	29.7	39.5	
Inventory	12.7	.3	24.4	37.4	12.3	3.3	22.8	38.4	11.8	5.0	22.6	-7.1	-7.1	
Over/Short	+6.4	*	-8.0	-11.5	+6.0	+2	-7.6	-1.4	+5.6	+2	-7.1	-7.1	-1.3	
VI Wa	Number of Skills	37	6	25	68	35	10	23	68	33	14	21	68	.5
PHI	.1	*	.2	.3	.1	.1	.2	.4	.1	.1	.2	.1	.6	
Inventory	.3	*	.2	.5	.3	.1	.1	.6	.3	.2	.1	.1	.1	
Over/Short	+3	*	*	*	+2	+2	*	+2	+2	+2	*	-1.1	-1.1	
01-03	Number of Skills	13	3	66	82	11	7	64	82	10	10	62	82	1.6
PHI	.2	.1	1.9	2.1	.1	.2	1.7	2.1	.1	.3	1.3	1.3	1.6	
Inventory	.2	.1	.7	1.0	.2	.2	.7	1.1	.1	.3	.7	.7	1.2	
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-1.2	-1.1	*	*	-1.0	-1.0	*	+1	-6.6	-6.6	-5.5	
06-06	Number of Skills	41	3	36	78	39	7	32	78	37	11	30	78	.4
PHI	.4	*	.3	.7	.5	.1	.2	.8	.2	.1	.1	.1	1.8	
Inventory	1.5	*	.1	1.6	1.5	.1	.1	1.7	1.4	.3	.3	.3	1.4	
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-1.2	-1.1	*	*	-1.0	-1.0	*	+1.2	+1.2	+1.2	+1.4	
Total C1-06	Number of Skills	54	6	100	160	50	14	96	160	47	21	92	160	2.1
PHI	.6	.1	2.1	2.8	.6	.3	1.9	2.9	.3	.3	1.4	1.4	2.9	
Inventory	1.7	.1	1.8	2.6	1.7	.4	1.8	2.8	1.6	.6	1.8	.6	1.9	
Over/Short	+1.1	*	-1.3	-1.2	+1.0	*	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	+1.2	+1.2	+1.2	+1.4	

*Less than 50.

**See definitions in Appendix B.

(4) Experience. Table V-6 reflects the SMCR experience and grade mix.

TABLE V-6
RESERVE MARINE CORPS EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VERSUS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORY
(STRENGTH in 000s)

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.	TOTAL	PEOPLE	AVE.
		WITH >			WITH >			WITH >	
E1-E4									
PMI *	32.1	N/A	N/A	32.6	N/A	N/A	33.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	27.0	2.7	2.3	27.6	2.8	2.2	28.4	2.8	2.3
E5-E9									
PMI	6.8	N/A	N/A	7.2	N/A	N/A	7.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	10.5	9.9	10.5	10.7	10.2	10.4	11.1	10.5	10.5
Total E1-E9									
PMI	38.9	N/A	N/A	39.8	N/A	N/A	40.7	N/A	N/A
Inventory	37.4	12.6	6.4	38.4	13.0	6.3	39.5	13.3	6.4
W1-W4									
PMI	.3	N/A	N/A	.4	N/A	N/A	.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	.5	.5	13.0	.6	.6	13.1	.6	.6	13.0
O1-O3									
PMI	2.1	N/A	N/A	2.1	N/A	N/A	1.6	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.0	.5	7.0	1.1	.6	7.1	1.2	.6	7.0
04-06									
PMI	.7	N/A	N/A	.8	N/A	N/A	.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	1.6	1.6	16.0	1.7	1.7	16.0	1.8	1.8	16.0
Total 01-06									
PMI	2.8	N/A	N/A	2.9	N/A	N/A	2.1	N/A	N/A
Inventory	2.6	2.1	12.0	2.8	2.3	12.1	2.9	2.4	12.0

* Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

(a) Recruiting. Recruiting goals and actual for the SMCR are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals (Non-Prior Service)

FY 84		FY 85		FY 86
Actual	Goal			
8,693	7,785	8,119		9,000

For FY 1984, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve did not meet its projected programmed end strength of 43,883 as established in the FY 1985 Presidential Budget submit. The shortfall was caused by management actions which improved the overall MOS qualifications within the units. Each unit was screened to ensure every individual was a mobilization asset and that each individual in the unit possessed a skill as required by the unit wartime requirements. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve ended FY 1984 with a total paid strength of 40,619.

The previous established SMCR goal of reaching wartime requirements by FY 1987, in view of the strength shortfall, has been reevaluated. The SMCR manpower program has been redirected to achieve at least 90 percent wartime required strength by the end of FY 1990 as established by Defense Guidance. Management actions will concentrate on reducing and eliminating skill and grade mismatches in Selected Marine Corps units.

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Prior Service)

FY 84		FY 85	FY 86
Actual	Goal		
4,175	4,134	5,848	5,848

For FY 1984, the SMCR attained 101 percent of the prior service enlistment goal. This marked the second consecutive year that the goal was attained.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the SMCR are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

(b) Retention. Attrition for the Reserve forces exceeded accessions by 2071. An increase in accessions is forecast for FY 1985 by increasing non prior service accessions by 400 to a total of 8119 and prior service quota increased by 2214 to a total of 5848. Emphasis is being placed on abating attribution by providing a professional career planners course and an inspector - instructor Orientation course. Also being implemented in FY 1985 will be contract lodging at home armories for drilling reservists commuting more than 50 miles. Increased emphasis will also be placed on the reserve referral credit program coordinated with the active force recruiters. Under this program, active force recruiters receive credit for referrals enlisted into reserve units.

(c) Inventory Stability. Both aggregate enlisted population stability and unit personnel stability have declined somewhat, as shown below. However, it should be noted that nearly 30 percent of the personnel are non-mandatory participants who can leave the SMCR "at will."

Enlisted Population Stability
(Percent)

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Aggregate Stability	75.7	74.6	77.8	73.1	68.4
Unit Stability	65.6	66.1	59.0	57.2	57.7

(d) Officer Recruiting. An effort is underway to attract more company grade officers leaving active duty by contracting them 90 days prior to expiration of service and by more advertising of officer billets available. Research is presently underway on how best to initiate an officer commissioning program to alleviate the large shortage of O-1 and O-2 officers in the Reserve Force.

(6) USMCR Readiness Assessment. From 1980 to the present the combat capability of the SMCR from a manpower perspective has been consistently improving. As the SMCR end strength rises, there has been a corresponding increase in MOS match within the units. Although there was a decrease in end strength between FY83 and FY84, overall there has been a steady reduction in unit MOS imbalances. Continued recruitment for each MOS within each unit by the recruiting service will reduce the enlisted MOS imbalances by as much as 10 percent by the end of FY 1986.

(7) Other. SMCR personnel requirements are 41,757. These requirements provide sufficient personnel to ensure SMCR units report to Station of Initial Assignment with full wartime manning, maintain a training pipeline; and maintain ancillary mobilization manpower requirements. Without considering active force mobilization requirements, the SMCR unit wartime requirements for FY 1986 will be met by 36,403 selected Marine Corps Reserve Unit Personnel, 6,306 active duty support personnel, and 4,641 Individual Ready Reservists. The FY 1984 IRR end strength was 48,429. IRR strength is projected to increase to 52,000 by the end of FY 1986. The strength of the Standby Reserve will be 2,800 at the end of FY 1986.

The SMCR average strength authorization for FY 1986 is 41,900. This strength supports the force structure contained in the UNITREP and ancillary personnel support requirements. The end strength authorization also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for fulltime active duty personnel for administrative and training of reserves.

(8) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program. The IMA Program is composed of those members of the SMCR, serving in a paid drill status and who are not members of the 4th Marine division, aircraft wing, and FSSG. These individuals are pre-assigned to mobilization billets which must be filled on or shortly after M-day. Typical assignments for IMA's include Headquarters, Marine Corps, FMF staffs, Mobilization Process Centers, the Naval Readiness Command, selective service offices, at recruit depots, and other schools.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(In Thousands)

Category ¹	FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
A (48)	.6	.6	.7
B (24)	.2	.3	.3
C (36)	*	*	*
D (varied)	*	*	*
TOTAL	.8	.9	1.0

*Less than 50.

^{1/} IMAs listed in this table serve 2 weeks of active duty a year plus the number of drills shown in parentheses. They are paid for all duty and, except for category D IMAs, for all drills.

(9) Full-Time Support Program (FTS). FTS Reservists contribute to mobilization readiness and the accomplishment of the reserve mission in two ways. First, they are qualified Marine reservists on active duty for periods of one to four years to support the Marine Corps Reserve. Their knowledge and efforts greatly assist the active forces with administration and understanding of reserve programs. Secondly, knowledge and expertise gained by FTS reservist on active duty are taken back to SMCR units thereby enhancing their effectiveness. FTS personnel can be found in administrative, recruiting, and instructor training billets, throughout the SMCR and at Headquarters Marine Corps.

Full Time Support Personnel
(In Thousands)

	FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
Reserve	.8	1.1	1.5
Civilian	.2	.2	.3
Active Duty	5.0	4.7	4.8
Total	6.1	6.1	6.6

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR consists of individuals who have some period of obligated service remaining on their contracts and individuals who have completed their military service agreements and elected to remain in the IRR. The IRR provides qualified individuals to fill shortfalls in active operating forces and reserve units and also provide for the expansion of the supporting base as necessary to meet wartime contingency requirements.

Individual Ready Reserve
(In Thousands)

FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
48.4	50.0	52.0

2. Standby Reserve. The Standby Reserve consists of members of the reserve component other than those in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve forces in a national emergency declared by the Congress. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

Standby Reserve
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
2.6	2.7	2.8

3. Retirees. The retired military population is composed primarily of (1) retirees, both regular and reserve, who have completed 20 years active duty; these retirees are liable for recall at any time by the Service Secretary in the interest of national defense, (2) reserve retirees who are eligible for reserve retired pay at age 60. The second category may only be recalled in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law.

Number of Retirees Available for Recall
(In Thousands)

<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
41.0	41.0	41.0

C. Civilian Manpower. Marine Corps military and civilian manpower resources are integrated to maximize efficiency and avoid duplication of effort. Marine Corps policy is that civilian personnel will be used to meet the requirements of supporting activities to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the requirements for use of military personnel by reason of law, training, security, discipline, rotation and readiness.

Employment of civilian personnel permits more effective FMF manning with Marines, enhances FMF training, readiness and sustainability, provides continuity in operations and provides specialized experience that is not otherwise available within the military structure. Marine Corps civilian personnel are employed in a wide variety of professional, technical, trades and administrative functions.

The Marine Corps actively pursues opportunities to achieve economies and efficiencies in the application of civilian manpower resources. Savings are pursued, for example, under the Commercial Activities, Efficiency Review, and Productivity Programs.

The FY 86 request for 22,124 civilians is necessary to continue mission responsibilities while maintaining current military strength levels. The request by DPPC is shown in Table V-7.

TABLE V-7
MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN PROGRAMMED MANPOWER
(DIRECT AND INDIRECT HIRE END STRENGTH IN 000s)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	21.5	21.7	22.1
Base Operating Support	15.7	15.7	15.9
Personnel Support	0.2	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	0.2	0.3	0.3
Force Support Training	*	0.1	0.1
Central Logistics	3.0	3.0	3.0
Centralized Support Activities	1.6	1.7	1.8
Management Headquarters	0.7	0.7	0.8
<u>Total</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>22.1</u>

* Fewer than 50.

1. Major Program Changes. There are no major program changes from last year's DMRR. FY 1986 requirements reflect a net increase of 403 civilians. Principal increases are to provide support at Marine Corps Air Stations. There is an offsetting decrease of 35 civilians attributable to the Efficiency Review Program.

2. Position Management. The success of the Marine Corps' Position Management Program can be attributed to position control. The Marine Corps screens all recertified and proposed high grade positions to ensure that the positions are sound from the standpoint of economy and effectiveness. There is constant monitoring and review of the number of high grade positions by the Civilian High Grade Resources Group which determines the urgency and validity of establishing each proposed position so as to remain within the authorized numbers established by the Department of the Navy.

3. Civilian End-Strength Ceilings. With the removal of civilian personnel ceilings, the Marine Corps' Industrially Funded Activities were able to adjust their work force to workload fluctuations without the constraint of attaining an end strength on 30 September 1984.

The ability allowed management the flexibility to increase productive output for urgent, high priority requirements (MPS-1 requirements) while maintaining scheduled production on routine workload. For example, during FY 1984, 62.2 additional work years of direct effort were applied in support of the MPS-1 Program for supply support. This type of manpower surge capability can be attributed to the lifting of civilian personnel

ceilings. If ceilings had been imposed, the additional MPS-1 requirements would have been satisfied, but routine workload output would have been hindered.

In the area of personnel, this flexibility enhances personnel recruitment by providing the capability to respond to critical skill requirements needed to support an increased workload requirement. This recruitment of temporary employees is used to support short-term requirements as well as workload requirements that are not considered stable enough to warrant full time permanent employees. In areas where future workloads are not certain, hiring of temporaries allows the activities to manage personnel requirements without making long-term commitments.

4. Recruiting. The Marine Corps has been able to fill the majority of its civilian positions without undue recruiting difficulties. Some problems continue to exist, however, in the recruitment for clerical positions and professional engineering positions. Clerical and typing positions are filled at each Marine Corps activity through the local area office of the Office of Personnel Management.

5. Commercial Activities (CA) Program. Program progress to date has been slower than expected due to lack of trained personnel to perform cost studies and management studies. It is anticipated that the program will increase in effectiveness and provide increased savings through not only lower cost contract performance but also reduced in-house staffing levels resulting from management studies.

Cost Comparison Studies Completed FY 84

Number of Studies Completed	End Strength Involved in Studies Completed Civ. Mil. Total	Number of Activities Converted to Contract	End Strength Involved in Activities Converted Civ. Mil. Total
11	130 2 132	4	64 2 66

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military Manpower. The Marine Corps enjoys an adequate amount of total manpower until quite late in the FY 1986 scenario and throughout the FY 1990 scenario. As shown in the charts at the end of this section, the modest overage in FY 1986 increases somewhat in FY 1990. The increased active component and Selective Reserve end strength is sufficient to meet our initial deployment requirements.

The shortfall in FY 1986 is due primarily to a steady accumulation of combat casualties, particularly in the combat enlisted category. This major shortfall in combat enlisted personnel is greatly reduced by FY 1990. All other manpower categories have a supply which is adequate to the demand. Yet, there are transitory shortages of specific skills which are generally overcome by the end of the scenario. Of course, the Marine Corps is

seriously affected by medical manpower shortages in the Navy. The decrease in the total shortfall for FY 1990 is attributed to an assumed improved medical evacuation policy.

Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training process to reduce mobilization time for pretrained individual manpower and to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, Marine Corps will be able to meet its wartime shortfalls with pretrained and current service personnel more quickly. By establishing a better match between peacetime skills and wartime requirements, the Marine Corps will ensure the availability of mobilization manpower for the needed skills.

2. Civilian Manpower. In peacetime, the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the authorized civilian workforce. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment. Civilian positions are created to support the buildup and concurrently positions are terminated in activities that are not required in wartime. At M-Day, the peacetime supply is reduced because some civilian employees are subject to call-up as reservists or military retirees. To avoid the loss of civilians in essential positions, the Marine Corps continuously screens individuals who hold key positions in the Federal government and who are either members of the Ready Reserve or retired military personnel eligible for recall.

The Marine Corps needs to procure more than 8,000 new civilian hires both to fill wartime position requirements and to replace peacetime employees recalled to military duties. Although these requirements cover a wide range of skills and occupations, our needs are concentrated in logistics support personnel.

The Marine Corps' plans to meet the requirements for civilian new hires after M-Day include the use of civilian employees who may be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status. Additional manpower sources include new hires procured by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management as well as retired Federal civilian employees. Skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, clerical, and materiel handling make such positions prime targets for the use of retired Federal civilian employees. While our mobilization planning for civilian manpower has room for improvement, we have made progress in defining the problems and developing possible solutions. During FY 1985, we plan to make continued refinements in this area.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY

(In Thousands)

	Pre-M	M-Day	M+30	M+60	M+90	M+120	M+150	M+180
MILITARY MANPOWER:								
Trained Demand	217.9	224.8	269.2	278.5	322.4	371.6	405.6	419.0
Trained Supply	218.2	230.2	280.1	314.3	342.5	373.5	397.8	414.6
Over/Short	.3	5.4	10.9	35.8	20.1	1.9	-7.8	-4.4
						FY 1990		
Trained Demand	224.3	227.9	268.4	274.4	315.0	359.8	389.3	397.1
Trained Supply	224.5	243.7	297.9	332.5	362.4	395.0	416.8	430.0
Manpower Over/Short	.2	5.8	29.5	58.1	47.4	35.2	27.5	32.9
						FY 1984		
Demand	18.6	20.2	25.4	26.2	25.9	26.2	26.2	26.4
Supply	18.6	18.1	18.1	18.1	18.1	18.1	18.1	18.1
New Hires Required		2.2	7.3	7.9	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.3

* From FY 86-90 POM WARMAPS input.

** From latest direct hire U.S. civilian WARMAPS input.

E. Manpower Management Improvements. The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with initiatives designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. These initiatives include conversion of Western Pacific unaccompanied billets, the unit deployment program, and development of automated systems and models which improve the planning and assignment process.

1. Conversion of Unaccompanied Billets. The Marine Corps expansion of accompanied tours in the Western Pacific improves tour stability and promotes unit integrity. Many one year unaccompanied tours are being converted to three year accompanied tours. During FY 1984, the Marine Corps changed two hundred billets from one year unaccompanied tours to three year accompanied tours. An additional 225 billets are scheduled to be similarly converted during FY 1985. Over 5,400 billets will be converted to accompanied tours by FY 1992. Overall cost in transients and permanent change of station (PCS) moves will be reduced as a result of this action.

2. Unit Deployment Program. The Marine Corps unit deployment program is designed to enhance uniform readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence. It permits Marines assigned to infantry battalions and tactical aviation squadrons and to be homebased in CONUS or Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean commitments. This program reduces requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours. There is a net annual budget savings associated with this program. Additionally, man year savings are also realized from the reduction of the transient pipeline in comparison with 12 month PCS moves. Although not part of the formal Unit Deployment Program, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, also deploys units for approximately six-month periods to the Mediterranean.

As a result of the program's success, a plan to expand the program has been initiated. This initiative will incorporate several combat support units into the established Unit Deployment Program. The expansion will further decrease PCS moves to the Western Pacific while strengthening uniform readiness and reducing personnel turbulence.

3. Military Manpower Management Initiatives. To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is developing a computer-based planning and assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of first-term manpower resources among all units in the active structure and particularly in the Fleet Marine Force. Inventory projection and tour optimization models tested in FY 1982-83 will provide improved readiness through a procedure that reconciles first-term requirements with first-term assets consistent with approved manning policies.

In addition to management actions that improve tour stability and support unit deployments, models dedicated to providing by-grade projections in specific skill areas and management of the career force are improving enlisted force management. The Enlisted Assignment System is responsible for about 36,000 enlisted orders every year. The Marine

Corps has begun work on models that will support the same goals for the officer force and would extend our capabilities in the management of the mobilization force.

Classification and assignment of enlisted Marines is currently supported by very sophisticated models providing optimal recommendations to decision makers - the system will become even better as testing is completed near the end of FY 85 for the Precise Personnel Assignment System (PREPAS). PREPAS integrates both planning and execution of the manpower plan for the first term enlisted force. The models will maximize the use of this portion of the force through the reduction of turbulence, improvement in tour stability, and uniform staffing. Recommended assignments will support the total plan over time, rather than merely making the best use of manpower resources to solve the short term assignment problem as they do today.

Level load recruiting, first implemented in FY 1984, was designed to correct both manpower and training plan imbalances that resulted from the past cyclic nature of accessions which were disproportionately higher in the summer months. These patterns caused seasonal fluctuations in manpower readiness and resulted in numerous occupational skill shortages and imbalances through difficulty in meeting essentially "even spread" formal school quotas. By reducing the disproportionate spread, the accession plan strives for as even a monthly spread as possible within the realm of recruiting. The result has been the stabilization of readiness (seen by a reduced operating strength deviation) and a marked reduction in the number of missed school seats (also evident in reduced skill shortages and imbalances). Many other associated areas have improved through level load recruiting including a more evenly distributed separation pattern (beginning in fiscal year 1987) which will reduce average strength levels within the manpower plan.

III. Marine Corps Manpower by DPPC.

A. Tactical and Mobility Forces. Marine Corps tactical and mobility forces include land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. About 121,100 Marines (61 percent of the Corps) will be in this category in FY 1986. Tactical and mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

With the exception of reserves filling Individual Mobilization Augmentation billets, undergoing initial active duty for training, or serving on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to tactical and mobility forces.

1. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting force service support groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays land forces for FY 1984 to FY 1986.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	90.5	92.3	92.8
Reserve	28.6	28.9	30.2

The strengths in FY 1985 and FY 1986 provide manning to accommodate additional force structure, primarily for land forces aviation units, artillery improvements, light armored vehicle units, and combat service support enhancements.

A light antiaircraft missile battalion (LAAM) and a CH-53E helicopter squadron were added to aviation units in FY 1985. FY 1986 addition to land forces aviation manpower include an additional CH-53E squadron. The LAAM battalion will be at a forward deployed location and will provide a minimally acceptable level of air defense for active force units. The CH-53E squadrons provide additional tactical heavy lift capability required by Marine air-ground combat teams which are prepared for immediate world-wide deployment.

The artillery increases support reorganization of existing active units which are transitioning to the M-198 howitzer, adding self-propelled artillery, and forming a target acquisition battery. This planned improvement will bring all regiments to the same level of capability by the end of the program period. This evolution will include the reserve force in the future giving them the same capabilities as an active artillery regiment.

During 1985, the Marine Corps will activate the second in a series of three light armored vehicle battalions. They will activate the third and final LAV battalion in FY 1986. The LAV will be fielded first with the active force to develop tactics, doctrine, organization and training techniques for the new weapon. The Marine Corps will field an LAV battalion in the reserve force in FY 1987.

A TOW missile platoon is being added to each infantry regiment headquarters providing increased heavy anti-armor capability for the active operational forces and to improve their readiness posture. Two TOW platoons were added in each of FY 1983, FY 1984, and FY 1985. The last three will be activated in FY 1986.

Combat service support units are being increased to provide maintenance support commensurate with the fielding of new equipment (e.g. LAV, TOW), a water supply platoon, and bulk liquid and fuel support. These assets are required in the active force to ensure continued high quality of equipment maintenance support and to permit timely access of improved combat service support capabilities.

Reserve increases in FY 1984, FY 1985, and FY 1986 reflect realignment of the Reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the tactical air forces category in order to parallel the active forces. Additionally, Reserve Component numbers reflect strength improvements resulting from exceeding the FY 1983 non-prior service recruiting goals and continued improvements in the gain-to-loss ratio. Increases also reflect programmed growth necessary to meet wartime requirements and to support mobilization. These increases are primarily associated with manning reserve force service support group units previously in cadre status.

2. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve Component support, Marine security detachments in aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	27.5	27.6	27.6
Reserve	6.6	6.9	6.5

The reserve manpower program will support ten fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

Decreases in Reserve tactical air forces reflect realignment of the reserve helicopter, observation, and air defense units to the land forces category in order to parallel the active forces. The slight increase in FY 1985 reflects manning for increases in aerial refueling aircraft.

3. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for naval forces includes Marines assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in tactical air forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders and missile support ships, and Marine Corps staff billets for Naval operational and amphibious commands and ships.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.7	0.7
Reserve	0.1	0.2	0.2

B. Auxiliary Activities. The Marine Corps program for the auxiliary activities category totals approximately 1,600 active military people, most of whom are in either intelligence or research and development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the auxiliary activities category.

1. Intelligence. The manpower in the intelligence category supports the national intelligence effort under the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The manpower program also provides for a small number of people who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval Intelligence Centers.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8

The Marines in the Intelligence function in peacetime are cryptologic specialists gaining valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Marine general intelligence specialists assigned to DIA also gain valuable training and experience while supporting the national intelligence effort. Under wartime conditions, approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine amphibious force.

2. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.9	0.8	0.8

Most of the Marines who perform research and development functions are assigned to the Development Center of Marine Corps Development and Education Command located at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine, tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force during amphibious operations. All development activity is

closely coordinated with the other Services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies that identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services.

3. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1986, fewer than 50 Marines will be in the remaining auxiliary forces categories. The Marines in the centrally managed communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the geophysical activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

C. Support Activities.

1. Base Operating Support. The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of combat installations and support installations.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
	Total of Sub-Categories		
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.6	21.1	21.3
Reserve	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	15.7	15.7	15.9

Combat Installations

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.8	16.2	16.3
<u>Civilians</u>	11.1	11.1	11.2

Support Installations

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.8	4.9	4.9
<u>Civilian</u>	4.6	4.6	4.7

Civilians in this sub-category reinforce capabilities that directly affect the readiness and sustainability of Marine Corps operating forces and support safety and quality of life functions.

Base operating support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the base operating support-combat installations sub-category is assigned to operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The support installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for base operating support-combat installations using a fixed and variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the base operating support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services that are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the tactical and mobility forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to base operating support-combat installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training. Increases to this category are necessary to enhance the daily support provided to the deployed forces.

The base operating support-combat installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit and other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for base operating support-support installations is based on an analysis of the functional and work load requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for base operating support manpower at all combat and support installations. All support functions are reviewed periodically to determine if economies can be achieved by changing the method of performance from in-house to contract (and vice versa), consistent with military readiness requirements. A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels

are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have improved support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, improving staffing efficiency, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need.

2. Personnel Support. Marine Corps activities in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. The manning profile in this category is level. The increase in civilians is due to the realignment of civilian training spaces from the base operating support category.

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.7	4.7	4.7
Reserve	0.3	0.3	0.3
Civilian	0.2	0.3	0.3

3. Individual Training. Individual Training manpower is required to conduct formal military and technical training and professional education of Marine Corps personnel through the use of other Service and Marine Corps schools. The individual training manpower requirements in excess of school capabilities are trained through alternative methods such as on-the-job or field skill training. During FY 1985, approximately 5 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. This percentage will decrease to approximately 2% by the end of FY 1986. The increase in formal school training requirements from FY 1984 to FY 1986 is the result of the opening of several formal schools during this period. This is a continuation of the Marine Corps' training philosophy of offering formal courses of instruction to as many entry-level Marines as is possible. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1986 Military Manpower Training Report. The increase in Marine Corps individual training manpower in FY 1985 is a result of the fielding of new equipment, and expansion and formalization of initial skill training. The billets for all instructor and support personnel at Marine Corps and Joint Service Schools are fully manned since training is done daily on a continuous basis. A reduction, or failure to increase, instructor and instructional support billets will require the Marine Corps to reduce the number of personnel that would receive initial skill training. Without these additional personnel, an increase in student load leads to a backlog of students awaiting initial skill training and overtaxes billeting and messing facilities. Excessive delays due to reduction in class capacity will increase personnel shortages in FMF units and subsequently reduce unit readiness because of manpower shortages.

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.8	8.8	8.8
Civilian	0.2	0.3	0.3

4. Force Support Training. Force support training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps combat readiness training group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the need to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. It also includes instructor personnel for unit training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California. The following table summarizes the manpower profile for the force support training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	3.5	3.7	3.7
Civilian	*	0.1	0.1

5. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
Civilian	3.0	3.0	3.0

6. Centralized Support Activities. The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include the Marine Corps Personnel Administration Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records, the Marine Corp. Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System, and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the Joint Uniform Manpower Pay System for the Marine Corps. Reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category. Increases in the reserve program reflect support of additional aviation assets and full manning of the centralized Individual Reserve Management Organization.

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.4	2.4	2.4
Reserve Components	0.8	1.1	1.5
<u>Civilian</u>			
	1.6	1.7	1.8

7. Management Headquarters. The manpower requirement for this function is associated with three sub-categories of management headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, North American Air Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The service support-combat commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands. The reduction in FY 1985 reflects actions taken to comply with the Congressionally-directed reduction in the manning of management headquarters.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.2	2.1	2.1
Civilian	0.7	0.7	0.8

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines so assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps keeps current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs stay aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations.

8. Federal Agency Support. Federal agency support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps security guard battalion, which furnishes security guards for Foreign Service Posts around the world for the Department of State.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.3	1.3	1.3

D. Operating Strength Deviation. The Marine Corps' internal manpower management is based on an average strength projected for force unit manning. Average strength for a given unit differs from the actual end strength because of seasonal fluctuations in manning. The projected undermanning for September 30 is expressed as operating strength deviation, or undermanning factor. This undermanning is shown as a minus entry in the active military programmed manpower DPPC table for FY 1984 and FY 1985. For FY 1986, the figure is positive because improvements in accession management are projected to cause a small positive seasonal fluctuation.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-0.8	-0.3	+1.0

E. Individuals. The estimates for the individuals accounts are based on historical data modified by current and projected manpower plans and policies. The individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, because shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	7.3	6.9	6.7
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	0.9	0.9	0.9
Trainees/Students	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.6</u>	<u>23.0</u>
Total	32.4	31.5	30.7
<u>Reserve</u>			
Trainees/Students (Category F)	4.1	4.2	4.1

The general decline in transient and student strengths in FY 1985 and FY 1986 is attributable to reduced accessions which are made possible because of improved retention rates. The reduction in training requirements produces higher FMF manning levels. Additionally, in light of the continued end strength increases, lower individuals requirements imply a better trained force.

CHAPTER VI

AIR FORCE MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction

A. General. This chapter describes the Air Force manpower requirement in terms of active military, U.S. Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian manpower components. The manpower need derives from the force structure required to accomplish Air Force missions within the scope of the national political and military strategy. In that light, the chapter identifies wartime manpower requirements, requested manpower strengths for this budget year and major changes by component. It also provides a readiness assessment, highlights key manpower issues and discusses initiatives taken to improve management of manpower resources.

B. Wartime Manpower Requirements. The Air Force's annual total wartime manpower requirement flows from the Joint Strategic Planning Document and the Secretary of Defense's Defense Guidance (DG). The DG establishes a warfighting scenario which serves as a baseline against which we can compare our aggregate capability, and thus influences planning and programming activities. Each Air Force major command identifies its total wartime requirements and these are compared against the total active component and Selected Reserve manpower resources. Consideration is also made for casualties and the availability of Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and retired personnel. Finally, the supply and demand data are broken out by occupation and time phased over the DG scenario. Peak demand for trained military manpower occurs at M+90. The requirement is 991.9 thousand in FY 1986 and increases to 1,047.1 thousand in FY 1990. The peak requirement for wartime civilian new hires is 251 thousand and occurs on M-Day.

C. Strength Request. The FY 1986 request for active military, reserve military, and civilian manpower for FY 1986 and FY 1987 is as follows:

Air Force Strength Request and Civilian Employment Plan
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
Active Military	611.5	620.5
Selected Reserve		
ANG	110.9	114.6
USAFR	77.4	81.0
Civilian	266.8	270.3
(Technicians)	(31.8)	(32.3)

The requested end strengths fall short of peak wartime demand. In fact, the wartime demand for trained Air Force manpower exceeds our supply for more than 120 days after mobilization (M-Day) begins. Our peak shortfall of 127,100 (FY 1986) occurs at about M+40. The Air Force plans to reduce the shortfall in a variety of ways, one of which is increased end strength requested in the President's Budget. Another action is a change to acceptance criteria applied to Pretrained Individual Manpower. For example, medical disabilities that previously disqualified people from service are being reevaluated against job requirements. The Air Force is also researching advances in technology, for example, special cement to fill runway holes versus the manpower intensive matting procedure now used. Even the mobilization process is being scrutinized. A study currently underway is considering mobilization of critical wartime shortfall skills at a few central locations prior to specific duty taskings. This may reduce the processing and personnel response time and thereby reduce the peak shortfall.

D. Major Changes Affecting Manpower Requirements. The tables below display manpower requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) for FY 1985 through FY 1990. (End strength in thousands)

Active Military

DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	72.4	72.7	76.1	77.4	77.2	77.5
Tactical/Mobility	148.2	152.3	157.3	159.2	161.1	161.9
Auxiliary Activities	53.9	54.6	54.3	55.0	55.2	55.4
Support Activities	273.8	275.4	279.1	280.1	281.0	280.9
Operating Strength Deviation	- 8.5	- 6.6	- 13.1	- 10.3	- 9.2	- 7.0
Individuals	62.2	63.1	66.7	66.3	66.1	66.4
Totals	602.1	611.5	620.5	628.5	631.5	635.1

US Air Force Reserve


DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
Tactical/Mobility	46.7	48.4	49.7	51.7	52.6	52.8
Auxiliary Activities	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7
Support Activities	21.0	21.7	24.2	25.4	26.4	26.4
Individuals	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Totals	74.8	77.4	81.0	84.3	86.1	86.4

Air National Guard

DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	22.1	22.3	22.8	23.4	23.3	23.5
Tactical/Mobility	62.4	64.8	67.2	69.3	69.7	69.8
Auxiliary Activities	12.6	12.6	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7
Support Activities	8.2	8.8	9.6	11.1	11.6	12.4
Individuals	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
Totals	107.7	110.9	114.6	118.9	119.7	120.8

	<u>Civilian</u>					
DPPC	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90
Strategic	8.0	8.8	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.5
Tactical/Mobility	29.2	30.7	31.5	32.4	33.0	33.3
Auxiliary Activities	22.3	23.4	23.7	23.8	23.8	23.7
Support Activities	197.0	203.9	206.1	207.4	208.6	209.9
Totals	256.5	266.8	270.3	272.8	274.4	276.4

The rate of growth by component is shown on the chart below. Significantly, the ANG/USAFR are growing about 2½ times faster than the Active Duty Military Component.



The following sections highlight Air Force major force structure changes and include a brief rationale of the factors that resulted in integrating them into either the active or Reserve component.

1. Strategic Offensive Forces. These forces consist of B-52 and FB-111 bombers totaling 241 and 56 Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA), respectively. In FY 1986 the B-1B inventory increases to 16 PAA. Active KC-135 tanker aircraft will remain stable at 487 PAA in FY 1986; however, flying hours will increase significantly. Minuteman missiles are reduced to 997 while Titan II missiles will decrease by 14 as they continue to be deactivated. Three Peacekeeper missiles are initially deployed and replace three Minuteman missiles. ANG/USAFR Strategic Offensive forces consist of 104 PAA KC-135 aircraft in the Air National Guard and 24 PAA in the US Air Force Reserve. Participation by the ANG/USAFR in the strategic offensive missions is limited to tanker operations because of the highly time-intensive nature of bomber and missile operations and training in peacetime.

The bomber force mission is more suitable for the active component. Aircrues on nuclear alert must be stationed 24 hours a day in the immediate vicinity of the bomber aircraft. In addition, extensive qualification and crew proficiency training is necessary for penetration of a high-threat target area. A Reserve Forces bomber unit could attain the proficiency of an active bomber unit; however, it would require the same demanding flying training program as that of the active force. The additional, costly manhours to support this time-intensive training and Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) alert duties would negate the cost advantages of Reserve Forces participation in this mission.

Similar factors make ICBM missile responsibilities more suitable for the active component. Missile forces are maintained at maximum readiness levels regardless of the international situation. They do not require appreciable augmentation in a wartime environment. The combination of the requirement that ICBM forces be maintained in a high state of readiness during peacetime and the limited availability of Reserve Forces personnel at mostly remote locations in the North Central United States mitigate against ANG/USAFR ICBM units.

The Air Force has successfully used the Reserve Forces to meet strategic offensive refueling requirements. ANG/USAFR tanker units are operationally capable, and availability is manageable because of the lighter alert commitment. (Currently one tanker in eight for ANG/USAFR versus a minimum of one tanker in four for the active force).

2. Strategic Defensive Forces. These forces include four active and eleven Air National Guard interceptor squadrons in FY 1986. In addition, strategic defensive forces include aircraft and ground radars for surveillance, control, and defense. In FY 1978, the Air Force began the phased transfer of military long range radars to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). The Air Force continues to operate eleven military radars in the Continental United States (CONUS) as a part of the joint USAF/FAA JSS program. When the four Region Operations Control Centers (ROCC) in the CONUS and the Alaskan ROCC achieved full operating capability (FOC) in early FY 1984, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), Back-up Intercept Control (BUIC) and manual air defense systems in the CONUS and Alaska were deactivated.

The air defense fighter mission is well suited to the Reserve Forces because of its in-place wartime role. For almost 30 years, ANG units have performed air defense alert in the United States and now provide 73 percent of the CONUS air defense force. There is, however, little fiscal savings for ANG forces in this mission area due to the high ratio of full-time personnel required to perform the alert requirement. The decision to transfer more missions to the Reserve Forces must consider the specific Guard or Reserve unit location; for example, there is a limited manpower base along the northern tier of states where most of

the active units are located. The Air Force must also consider the contribution that the remaining active units make to the CONUS/overseas rotation base. Additionally, the following factors support maintaining some of the operational capability for any mission area in the active component. There must exist: an active duty sponsorship responsible for continuing tactics development and evaluation of mission specific aircraft modifications; a pool of active duty mission experienced personnel to perform headquarters staff duties; a pool of active duty personnel, trained in the mission from which Reserve personnel can be drawn; and finally, a supply/depot system that remains responsive to the weapon system.

3. Tactical Air Forces. The tactical fighter force is measured in terms of tactical fighter wing (TFW) equivalents, each wing equivalent containing 72 PAA aircraft. The active tactical fighter force is building towards 26 wing equivalents which the Air Force plans to achieve by the end of the 1980s. The ANG/USAFR tactical fighter force is being modernized and expanded simultaneously with the active force. By end FY 1986, an ANG/USAFR increase to 12.2 wing equivalents of 43 fighter squadrons will enhance the Air Force Total Force. Reserve Forces tactical forces are being modernized and their mission is being expanded with additional F-16 aircraft. The active force will modernize with the addition of three F-16 fighter squadrons and one F-15 squadron. The USAFR associate tanker mission will be further expanded with the contribution of half of the aircrews for the KC-10 as new aircraft are delivered to the Air Force. The ANG has now assumed over half the total forces in tactical reconnaissance. Another change programmed in the active tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1986 is one additional EF-111 tactical electronic combat aircraft.

From a historical perspective, since 1972 active and Reserve Forces tactical fighter forces have shared in the growth from approximately 32 wing equivalents to the current 36 (end FY 1984). The Reserve Forces have increased from 10 TFW equivalents to 12.2, while the active force grew from approximately 22 to 24 plus wing equivalents. Additionally, through our modernization efforts the A-10, F-15, and F-16 now comprise better than 55 percent of the active inventory while the Reserve Forces have received F-4, A-7, A-10, and recently, F-16 aircraft. Concomitantly, the older, less capable F-105, F-104, and F-100 aircraft have been retired from the ARF.

To meet current tactical commitments the Air Force must have strong, flexible, in-place forces to support a forward defense. Overseas commitments represent roughly one-third of our total tactical fighter forces (roughly one-half of our active tactical fighter forces), with another third providing stateside rotational and training units. The final third is made up of Reserve Forces units able to provide a responsive surge of military capability during a national crisis. This force posture has been developed so that the rotation base supports overseas tactical force commitments.

Training requirements must be considered in developing the total tactical force structure. Close air support, interdiction, and counterair missions are complex and require high levels of training and, in many cases, specialized training ranges to retain proficiency. The part-time nature of the Reserve Forces and physical location of individual units are carefully assessed when assigning roles and missions that require skills that must be continually exercised to achieve and maintain essential levels of proficiency.

4. Airlift Forces. In FY 1986, the Air Force will complete the transfer of 8 PAA C-5 aircraft from the active force to the Air Force Reserve (5 PAA) and to the ANG (3 PAA). Plans for transfer of 36 PAA additional C-5s are being developed providing measured, near simultaneous active/Reserve Forces expansion as the Air Force takes delivery of 50 C-5Bs by the end of FY 1989. In FY 1986, the Air Force will transfer 4 PAA C-141 aircraft from the active force to the Air Force Reserve (2 PAA) and to the ANG (2 PAA). Plans are to transfer an additional 12 PAA, 6 each to the ANG and USAFR, by the end of FY 1987. In FY 1986 the Air National Guard will replace C-130As with C-130Hs (8 PAA). The Air National Guard will have a total of 19 C-130 units and the US Air Force Reserve will have 14 units in FY 1986. The US Air Force Reserve associate units continue to provide nearly 50 percent of C-141, C-9, and C-5 wartime airlift capability. In addition to operating and maintaining airlift aircraft, the Reserve Forces provide substantial capabilities in aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery, aerial port, and weather reconnaissance.

Integration of MAC gained Reserve and Guard units is best demonstrated in the Associate Reserve units where reserve and active crews are used interchangeably and, in some cases, a single aircrew may contain a mix of active and reserve members. Since March 1968 the close relationship of the Associate Reserve and its associated active wing has provided a very rapid response to increased activity levels.

The requirement for airlift forces to surge to a level of activity many times greater than the peacetime flying requirements makes a significant Reserve Forces contribution desirable. However, several factors affect the ability of the Air Force to transfer more airlift missions to the ANG/USAFR. The mix as reflected in the FY 1986 Budget balances the requirement for immediate responsiveness with rapid emergency surge capability. Also, the active force C-9 and C-130 units located overseas need a reasonable rotation base. One further consideration in the airlift active/Reserve Forces equation is the responsiveness of our total airlift mission. Approximately 95 percent of our total wartime passenger airlift and about 23 percent of our cargo airlift is provided by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. The Reserve Forces and the active force provide the remainder in about equal proportions. Further substantial changes must consider the overall impact on responsiveness particularly during non-mobilized contingencies. Without the Presidential callup available only during declared emergencies, organically equipped ANG/USAFR units cannot be considered totally available. However, the great majority of ANG/USAFR units could be made available for at least two weeks utilizing existing secretarial authority.

5. Support Forces. There are several support and auxiliary missions which are full-time functions required for peacetime support of the combat forces. These missions include such things as centralized logistics, research and development, and intelligence. Because of their full-time requirement, these missions require full-time personnel. Transfer to the Reserve Forces would not diminish the required level of support but, it would increase the number of ANG/USAFR full-time personnel, offsetting some of the intended cost savings. Auxiliary and support activities have been and will continue to be established in the Reserve Forces when the active peacetime requirements are satisfied but the wartime requirements are not.

E. Key Manpower Issue - European Troop Strength Ceiling. In FY 1983 and FY 1984 Congress established a military troop strength ceiling in NATO Europe for the purpose of encouraging our NATO allies to increase their share of the total cost burden for the protection of Europe. The DoD under-manned the European theater in FY 1983 to meet ceiling constraints, but continuation of the ceiling in FY 1984 forced program and force structure cuts from the theater. The DoD requested 326,414 military authorizations in NATO Europe for FY 1985. The FY 1985 Authorization Act established a permanent DoD ceiling at an FY 1986 level of 326,414. The Air Force has requested 95,344 authorizations for NATO Europe in the FY 1986 President's Budget. This figure exceeds the estimated effect of the ceiling; however, adjustments to Air Force strength in Europe will be based on USCINCEUR priorities to comply with the FY 1986 ceiling.

Theater ceilings, and this one in particular, have severe flaws. Continuing ceiling pressures in the face of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force beddown in Europe give the impression that nuclear forces are being fielded at the expense of conventional capability. Lowering of the nuclear threshold has long been a subject of concern, and the continuing erosion of conventional support due to ceiling pressures will do little more than fuel that concern. In addition, ceilings are established outside the context of warfighting capability and ignore the necessary military balance to counter the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. If the Air Force is required to limit its military posture, support capabilities and certain growing programs must be decremented to allow continued force modernization and expansion in theater.

In Europe, the Air Force is responding to capabilities requested and supported by the theater commander. Examples of these critical growth programs include TR-1, F-15, F-16, Precision Location Strike System, equipment prepositioning, and enhanced intelligence capabilities. The theater commander must have the flexibility to structure the force mix, regardless of service, based on the threat.

Finally, the potential to reduce military levels by increasing Host Nation Support (HNS) must be examined closely. The Air Force continues to review the potential for expanded HNS. However, HNS is a negotiated agreement between countries and the AF cannot unilaterally make these arrangements. They currently have agreement with Germany for approximately 26,000 personnel during wartime and this will help augment the surge


requirement during the early stages of conflict. We see possible options in this area but have found HNS negotiations to be time consuming and politically delicate. For example, the FRG agreement initiated in 1980 with strong AF support, will not be fully implemented until at least 1987. Thus, while HNS may appear to be an attractive option it has not been a fix that can be quickly implemented to meet near term ceilings.

The Air Force position has been, and remains, that the force structure in Europe must be based on the threat and that ceilings detrimentally affect our ability to deter and repel conflict. For these reasons the European troop strength ceiling should be eliminated.

II. Significant Program Highlights.

A. Active Component Military Manpower.

1. General. The Air Force posture is steadily improving in response to a growing threat. The current administration and recent Congresses have actively supported force modernization and expansion. Some of the programs that have already been approved and are in production or deployment stages include the F-15, F-16, GLCM, KC-10, TR-1, C-5B and B-1B. Forty-six percent of the military manpower increases programmed for FY 1986 (see chart below) are tied to these force structure and modernization programs that already have Congressional approval. Another 37 percent provides readiness and sustainability improvements. An example of these improvements is the 1400 space increase in medical war readiness that will partially offset an existing 7,500 space shortfall. Command and control improvements in such areas as the satellite operations portion of the Consolidated Space Operations Center account for 12 percent of the growth. The remainder (5 percent) might be considered as necessary investments in our future. An example here is additional manpower required for our technical courses. Even here, however, the relationship with approved weapon systems can be made. Additional weapons require additional maintenance personnel and thus the training workload goes up.



Unfortunately, even approval of this entire request will leave shortfalls in particular functions and skills. Fiscal limitations and competing priorities force us to constrain requested manpower growth. In addition to the manpower levels which have been requested, but unfunded, most combat support areas have validated requirements which have been deferred. Day-to-day effectiveness is impacted in such areas as security police (over 1500 short), supply (over 1000 short), and service functions (almost 2000 short). The Air Force total peacetime shortfall is in excess of 20,000 spaces. Under current wartime scenarios, there are even more significant shortfalls. Examples include over 34,000 in civil engineering 25,000 in the medical area, and almost 12,000 in the security police specialty.

Perhaps the importance of this programmed growth can be seen more clearly when considering the impact if it is not approved. In that situation the Air Force will be forced to maintain force structure and programs without the necessary manpower. The results of this underfunding would be (and have been):

- Deterioration of facilities and equipment due to lack of periodic maintenance.
- Higher operating costs. One major command estimates 30-50% higher operating costs (\$10 - \$16 million per year) due to lack of maintenance personnel.
- Lack of an adequate logistics support base that impacts mission accomplishment through lack of parts.
- Slipping projects such as development of advanced explosives technology or stretching some development schedules such as air base survivability.
- More overtime and ineffective shortcuts that adversely effect morale, performance, and retention, all of which lead to a negative impact on force readiness.

There is an essential link between programs and the manpower resource. Congress has recognized the threat and approved the necessary programs. This submission asks Congressional support for the manpower growth linked to those programs.

2. Structure, Manning, and Operating Strength. Table VI-1 reflects Air Force Programmed Manpower Structure and Programmed Manning. As shown, the Air Force continues to program a high level of manning. The number of active military billets not planned for staffing in the FYDP equals 9,939 in FY 1984, 10,774 in FY 1985 and 10,963 in FY 1986.

3. Skill and Grade.

a. Enlisted. As shown in Table VI-2, inventory excesses and shortages existed in 39 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1984 (128 of 328 skills, E1-E9). In grades E5-E7, which are a convenient

gauge of mid-grade NCO manning, inventory imbalances existed in 48 percent of all occupations at the end of FY 1984 (124 of 256 skills).

b. Officer. At the end of FY 1984, there was an aggregate shortfall of 955 officers (see table VI-2). The shortages of pilots, navigators, and engineers in FY 1983 were eliminated. However, in FY 1984 there still remain shortages in fighter pilots, electrical engineers, some physician specialties and various types of support officers.

4. Experience. As shown in table VI-3 experience levels as measured by average years of service, both overall and within each grade, have shown relatively little change over the past several years. This results from the combined effect of improved retention of experienced personnel, and increased accessions to support end strength growth. The average experience level in FY 1985-1986 is expected to approximate the FY 1984 level.

ACTIVE AIR FORCE PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in 000s)*

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY	FY 1984						FY 1985						FY 1986					
	PRGMD	MNPWR	PRGMD	MNG	%	PRGMD	MNPWR	PRGMD	MNG	%	PRGMD	MNPWR	PRGMD	MNG	%	PRGMD	MNPWR	PRGMD
STRATEGIC																		
Offensive Strat Forces	54.0	54.0	72.4	99	72.7	53.6	72.7	72.4	53.5	99	72.1	72.7	72.7	99	99	72.1	72.7	72.7
Defensive Strat Forces	6.7	6.5	6.5	97	6.7	6.7	6.5	97	6.5	97	6.4	6.4	6.1	96	96	6.4	6.4	6.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	12.0	11.9	99	99	12.4	12.3	99	99	12.3	99	12.6	12.5	99	99	99	12.6	12.5	99
TACTICAL/MOBILITY																		
Tactical Air Forces	108.3	105.0	144.4	97	105.0	152.2	112.5	148.2	109.1	97	136.2	152.3	116.1	112.7	97	116.1	112.7	97
Mobility Forces	40.0	39.5	99	99	39.5	52.9	100	54.2	99	99	40.1	40.1	39.6	99	99	40.1	39.6	99
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES																		
Intelligence	15.8	15.7	15.7	100	15.7	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.1	100	16.5	16.5	16.4	100	100	16.5	16.4	100
Centrally Managed Comm	16.8	16.7	16.7	100	16.7	16.9	16.9	16.8	16.8	100	17.1	17.1	17.0	99	99	17.1	17.0	99
Research and Development	12.1	12.1	12.1	100	12.1	12.7	12.7	12.7	12.7	100	12.8	12.8	12.8	100	100	12.8	12.8	100
Geophysical Activities	8.4	8.3	8.3	99	8.3	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3	99	8.5	8.5	8.4	100	100	8.5	8.4	100
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES																		
Base Operating Support	166.9	163.8	272.8	98	166.9	280.0	168.6	273.8	164.9	98	281.4	281.4	169.5	165.7	98	169.5	165.7	98
Combat Installations	(120.5)	(118.3)	(118.3)	(98)	(118.3)	(45.5)	(46.9)	(46.9)	(121.8)	(98)	(121.3)	(98)	(48.2)	(47.1)	(98)	(121.3)	(118.6)	(98)
Support Installations																		
Medical Support	15.0	14.8	99	99	14.8	15.3	15.3	15.1	15.1	99	15.5	15.5	15.4	99	99	15.5	15.4	99
Personnel Support	6.5	6.4	38	38	6.4	6.6	6.6	6.4	6.4	98	6.6	6.6	6.5	98	98	6.6	6.5	98
Individual Training	22.5	22.4	99	99	22.4	22.7	22.7	22.6	22.6	99	23.0	23.0	22.9	99	99	23.0	22.9	99
Force Support Training	26.8	26.5	99	99	26.5	26.9	26.5	26.5	26.5	99	27.8	27.8	27.4	98	98	27.8	27.4	98
Central Logistics	6.1	5.0	83	83	5.0	6.2	6.2	5.2	5.2	83	6.2	6.2	5.1	83	83	6.2	5.1	83
Supply Operations	(3.5)	(3.4)	(98)	(98)	(1.3)	(3.6)	(3.6)	(3.5)	(3.5)	(98)	(3.6)	(3.6)	(3.5)	(98)	(98)	(2.3)	(2.3)	(57)
Maintenance Operations	(2.3)	(1.3)	(57)	(57)	(0.3)	(2.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(57)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Logistics Support Ops	(0.3)	(0.3)	(99)	(99)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(99)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Centralized Support Act.	16.1	15.9	99	99	15.7	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	99	15.4	15.4	15.2	99	99	15.4	15.2	99
Management Headquarters	18.2	17.5	98	98	17.7	17.3	17.3	17.3	17.3	98	17.3	17.3	16.9	98	98	17.3	16.9	98
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.3	100	100	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	0.3	0.3	0.3	100	100	0.3	0.3	100
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	552.4	542.5	98	559.1	548.3	98	565.9	565.9	98	555.0	555.0	98	-6.6	-6.6	63.1	63.1	611.5	
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION	-5.9																	
INDIVIDUALS	60.5																	
END STRENGTH	597.1																	

() subtotals

*Numbers may not total due to rounding.

TABLE VI-2
ACTIVE AIR FORCE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in 000s)

	FY 1984			
	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
E1 - E4				
Number of Skills	100	78	58	236
PMI**	94.9	111.1	62.4	268.5
Inventory	108.1	108.3	53.9	270.3
Over/Short	+13.2	-2.8	-8.5	+1.8
E5 - E7				
Number of Skills	58	132	66	256
PMI**	39.1	104.2	56.6	199.9
Inventory	44.3	106.4	50.9	201.6
Over/Short	+5.2	+2.2	-5.7	+1.7
E8 - E9				
Number of Skills	50	64	72	186
PMI**	2.1	4.8	8.2	15.1
Inventory	2.9	4.9	6.7	14.5
Over/Short	+.8	+.1	-1.5	-.6
Total E1 - E9				
Number of Skills	73	160	55	328
PMI**	82.2	358.1	43.1	483.5
Inventory	91.2	356.4	38.8	486.4
Over/Short	+9.0	-1.7	-4.3	+2.9
01-03				
Number of Skills	19	22	11	52
PMI**	22.8	29.3	13.5	65.5
Inventory	27.1	30.7	10.4	68.3
Over/Short	+4.3	+1.4	-3.1	+2.8
04-06				
Number of Skills	10	15	30	55
PMI**	7.4	10.8	16.8	34.9
Inventory	11.2	12.0	14.5	37.6
Over/Short	+3.8	+1.2	-2.3	+2.7
Total 01-06				
Number of Skills	5	39	11	55
PMI**	16.5	68.9	20.4	105.9
Inventory	17.9	68.7	19.3	105.9
Over/Short	+1.4	-.2	-1.1	0

*For definitions see Appendix B

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

TABLE VI-3
ACTIVE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED VS ACTUAL/PROJECTED INVENTORIES *
(in 000s)

	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	ACTUAL FY 1984			PROGRAMMED FY 1985			PROGRAMMED FY 1986		
	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YCS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YOS	TOTAL PEOPLE	PEOPLE 4 YOS	Avg YOS
E1-E4									
PMI** Inventory	268.5 270.3	NA 58.1	NA 2.3	272.9 268.8	NA 66.0	NA 2.3	276.8 268.3	NA 68.7	NA 2.2
E5-E7									
PMI Inventory	199.9 201.6	NA 199.7	NA 9.1	203.1 206.0	NA 205.2	NA 9.1	205.9 214.3	NA 213.3	NA 9.1
E1-E9									
PMI Inventory	483.5 486.4	NA 272.3	NA 6.8	489.5 489.5	NA 285.9	NA 6.8	497.4 497.4	NA 296.9	NA 6.8
O1-O3									
PMI Inventory	65.5 68.3	NA 36.4	NA 4.7	66.4 69.8	NA 36.9	NA 4.8	67.6 70.8	NA 38.2	NA 4.8
O4-O6									
PMI Inventory	34.9 37.6	NA 31.6	NA 15.7	35.1 38.1	NA 38.0	NA 16.7	35.4 38.5	NA 38.4	NA 16.7
O1-O6									
PMI Inventory	105.9 105.9	NA 68.1	NA 8.2	107.8 107.8	NA 74.9	NA 9.1	109.3 109.3	NA 76.6	NA 9.2

*Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

5. Personnel Management

a. Enlisted.

(1) Recruiting. The Air Force attained its Non-Prior Service (NPS) and Prior Service (PS) objectives for FY 1984. The Air Force measures NPS accession quality using a combination of High School Diploma Graduate (HSDG) rates, upper mental category (MCAT I&II) and lowest (acceptable) mental category (MCAT IV) scores from the ASVAB. In FY 1984, 98.6 percent of our NPS accessions were HSDGs and 50.7 percent were in the top two mental categories. Conversely, only 1.1 percent were MCAT IVs. While these indicators compare favorably with recent fiscal years, recruiting difficulty increased significantly during the year. The combined impacts of a recovering economy, declining unemployment and civilian competition (both industry and post-secondary schools) made recruiting tougher. We expect these conditions to continue into FY 1986 when we must recruit even more people from a 5 percent smaller youth population. We may experience a slight redistribution of enlistees within our standard quality indicators, as we respond to these external, environmental factors. We are cautiously optimistic about our ability to meet the FY 1986 requirement with the requested resources. Should the environment deteriorate at an unanticipated rate or our recruiting resources be arbitrarily reduced, success will be jeopardized.

Our FY 1986 Prior Service program is significantly larger than FY 1985. It will remain targeted at fully qualified NCOs in hard-to-fill skills. The reduced training costs of using NCOs qualified for direct duty assignment outweigh the increased recruiting resources needed to target specifically qualified applicants. Prior Service recruiting will continue to be difficult.

(2) Retention. In FY 1984 the Air Force retention rate declined slightly. First term was 62%, down from 66% in FY 1983, second term was 80%, down from 83% in FY 1983 and career was 96%, down from 97% in FY 1983.

Reenlistments

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
First Term	24,753	23,900	21,200
Career	38,036	44,600	50,700

Even with these continued high reenlistment rates there will continue to be shortages in the critical sortie generating skills, for example, aircraft maintenance, aircraft systems, avionics maintenance, and munitions. The Air Force has identified these and other chronic critical shortage skills and has implemented several initiatives to reduce and ultimately eliminate the shortages. Voluntary and directed retraining programs and full qualified prior service recruiting have been greatly increased, and focused on filling critical shortages.

A selected number of qualified volunteers are being allowed to remain on active duty past normal mandatory retirement. To improve manning and encourage retraining from overage skills, a two-tier enlisted promotion policy has been instituted that offers greater promotion opportunity for people in critical occupations. Also, the ongoing Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program has been focused to ameliorate some of the remaining personnel readiness deficiencies.

(3) Aggregate Population Stability. This personnel factor continues to improve for the enlisted population and dropped slightly for the officer corps.

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	91.7	93.5	94.0	93.9	92.6
Enlisted	84.1	85.8	87.2	88.6	88.8

(4) Unit Personnel Stability. This indicator declined for both the officer and enlisted populations.

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	52.9	57.2	56.9	55.0	52.9
Enlisted	51.8	53.1	53.6	55.6	52.8

(5) Other. The Air Force strives to maximize the contribution of women to the mission and provide them optimum opportunities for career progression and utilization. There were 66,569 Air Force women at the end of FY 1984. This was 11.2 percent of the total force. Accessions in FY 1984 included 10,426 which was 15.1 percent of all accessions. Approximately 12,500 FY 1985 accessions will be women. Air Force officials plan further increases in female officers and enlisted personnel each year of the FYDP and our planners are conducting a comprehensive review of the system to recruit, classify and utilize women. Results are expected in Spring 1985.

b. Officer.

(1) Accessions. The officer recruiting program supports line officer requirements for flight training (pilot and navigator), scientific, engineering, and a range of other skills necessary to sustain Air Force capabilities. The broad spectrum of Health Professionals, including physicians, nurses, etc., is also recruited under this program.

In FY 1984, we achieved 100 percent of our numeric goals for all programs. We met the accession requirements for engineers and for critical skill physicians. The quality of our line officer accessions remained high.

The major challenge in our FY 1986 officer recruiting program will be increased requirements for certain physician specialists. Our physician requirement will increase by 35 percent and remain limited to specific critically required skills. Our need for engineers will be largely in those skills (electrical, aeronautical and astronautical engineering) where competition from civilian industry is most keen. Any engineer shortfall would have direct impact on our research and development efforts. Physician shortages affect our ability to treat combat casualties, as well as the overall health and well-being of our members and their families. Referring those who need specialized treatment to CHAMPUS causes increased cost. Officer recruiting in FY 1986 will be difficult and challenging.

(2) Retention. Officer retention trends are measured by a Cumulative Continuation Rate--basically the percent of officers ending their initial obligation who would complete their 11th year of service if current retention continues. The rate declined in FY 1984 from a record high the previous year; however, continuation rates are still significantly higher than the low point in FY 1979.

Line Officer Retention
(Percent)

	<u>FY79</u>	<u>FY83</u>	<u>FY84</u>
Pilot	26	78	72
Navigators	44	76	75
Nonrated Line Officer	49	63	62

Personnel readiness signs are generally positive and our recruiting and retention efforts have been very successful. We recognize however that the recruiting and retention environment is extremely fragile. Economic improvements, private sector growth, and the increasing complexity of systems employed by other DoD Services increase competition for those highly qualified, technically oriented people. We are concerned about the potential loss to industry of pilots, computer analysts, engineers, physicians, procurement specialists, and aircraft maintenance personnel. Looking specifically at pilots in FY 1984 we saw a downturn in almost every major weapon systems category. At the same time commercial airline hiring has increased substantially and is now at the highest rate in its history. In fact, in the first four months of FY 1984 more MAC pilots indicated their intention to leave than left all last year.

6. Readiness Assessment. The need to maintain high readiness levels require approval of the FY 1986 President's Budget. Even if the Air Force does not receive the manpower resources it needs, it will not fail to field those systems considered vital to the national defense. But, in so doing, it will make the fundamental choice to mortgage the future by eroding the support base. Ultimately, the cost of adding new missions and forces without commensurate manpower must be paid--and that payment will be in terms of poor morale, low retention, inefficient management, higher cost, and a less ready force.

B. Reserve Component Military Manpower.

1. Ready Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve.

(1) US Air Force Reserve (USAFR).

(a) General. The US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) programmed end strength increases by 2,571 between FY 1985 and FY 1986. This increase is for force structure growth and modernization, including support for the first totally Reserve owned C-141 and C-5 units plus additional KC-10 aircrews and maintenance personnel (+1,194). A significant increase of aerial port personnel supports wartime surge requirements for the growing strategic airlift force (+208). Civil engineering authorizations increase to redress wartime shortfalls (+1026). Small increases in full-time personnel and in other support functions have been made to accommodate mission and personnel program changes.

(b) Structure, Manning & Operating Strength.

Table VI-4 displays by DPPC category the USAFR programmed manpower structure, its programmed manning and operating strength for FY 1984, FY 1985, and FY 1986. The USAFR structure increases by 6,800 spaces, but the programmed manning of that structure increases at a faster rate (7,100 people) (not counting IMAs who do not man the structure), thus improving the percent of the USAFR structure manned.

(c) Skill and Grade. Table VI-5 compares actual inventory to programmed manning plus individuals for USAFR personnel. Critical skills within the inventory were 98.2 percent manned as of 30 Sep 84.

(d) Experience. Table VI-6 compares programmed manning plus individuals to actual inventory. Trends show that the average enlisted grade was relatively constant while the level of experience increased. The average grade and experience of the USAFR officer corps remained stable.

TABLE VI-4
US AIR FORCE RESERVE
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in 000's) **

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR STRCT	PRGMD MNG	% MNG
STRATEGIC	2.1	2.1(0.1)	98.7	2.1	2.1(c.1)	98.7	2.1	2.1(0.1)	92.7
Offensive Strat Forces	2.1	2.0	98.7	2.1	2.0	92.7	2.1	2.0	92.7
Defensive Strat Forces		0.1(0.1)			0.1(0.1)			0.1(0.1)	
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	44.3	44.0(0.3)	99.2	47.1	46.7(0.3)	95.0	48.5	48.4(0.3)	99.8
Tactical Air Forces	10.4	10.5(0.3)	98.8	11.1	10.8(0.3)	95.0	11.5	11.5(0.3)	98.2
Mobility Forces	34.0	33.5(*)	96.4	36.1	35.9(*)	99.4	37.0	36.9(*)	99.5
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES	0.6	3.5(2.9)	98.5	0.6	3.4(2.9)	95.6	0.6	3.6(3.0)	95.6
Intelligence		1.8(1.8)			1.8(1.8)			1.9(1.9)	
Centrally Managed Comm	0.1	0.1(*)	97.1	0.1	0.1(*)	100.0	0.1	0.1(*)	100.0
Research and Development		0.9(0.9)			0.9(0.9)			0.9(0.9)	
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.7(0.2)	98.8	0.5	0.7(0.2)	95.1	0.5	0.7(0.2)	95.1
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	10.6	18.7(8.0)	100.0	12.0	21.0(12.3)	100.0	13.2	21.7(8.4)	100.0
Base Operating Support	6.5	8.9(2.5)	98.6	7.3	9.9(2.5)	100.0	8.4	11.1(2.7)	99.7
Medical Support	3.3	4.1(0.9)	98.1	3.9	5.4(1.5)	98.1	3.9	5.4(1.5)	97.6
Personnel Support	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0	0.3	0.3	100.0
Individual Training	0.1	1.3(1.2)	100.0	0.1	1.3(1.2)	100.0	0.1	1.2(1.1)	100.0
Central Logistics	-	0.8(0.8)	-	-	0.8(0.8)	-	-	0.9(0.9)	-
Centralized Support Act.	0.5	1.5(1.0)	98.4	0.5	1.5(1.0)	99.3	0.5	1.1(0.6)	99.3
Management Headquarters		1.0(1.0)			1.0(1.0)			1.0(1.0)	
Federal Agency Support		0.8(0.8)			0.8(0.8)			0.8(0.8)	
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	57.3	68.3(11.4)	98.5	61.6	73.2(12.3)	98.4	64.1	76.0(12.0)	98.9
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION		+4			-1.9			-1.8	
INDIVIDUALS		1.6			1.6			1.4	
END STRENGTH		70.3(11.4)			74.8(12.3)			77.4(12.0)	

* Less than 50

** Numbers may not total due to rounding

() Individual Mobilization Augmentees are shown in parentheses and are included in programmed manning totals.

TABLE VI-5
US AIR FORCE RESERVE SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in 000s)

		<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	
		<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
E1 - E4					
Number of Skills		16	2	22	40
PMI**		1.4	.3	18.2	20.0
Inventory		2.5	.3	10.1	13.0
Over/Short		+1.1	0	-8.1	-7.1
E5 - E7					
Number of Skills		20	9	12	41
PMI**		18.0	4.3	6.2	28.5
Inventory		26.6	4.3	5.2	36.1
Over/Short		+8.6	0	-1.0	+7.6
E8 - E9					
Number of Skills		5	7	24	36
PMI**		.2	.1	1.8	2.1
Inventory		.3	.1	1.5	1.9
Over/Short		+.1	0	-.3	-.2
Total E1 - E9					
Number of Skills		41	18	58	117
PMI**		19.6	4.8	26.2	50.6
Inventory		29.3	4.8	16.8	50.9
Over/Short		+9.7	0	-9.4	+.3
WO (Total Number)					
Number of Skills		1	0	0	1
PMI**		0	0	0	0
Inventory		1	0	0	1
Over/Short		+1	0	0	+1
01-03					
Number of Skills		13	4	19	36
PMI**		.2	1.2	3.4	4.8
Inventory		.4	1.2	2.3	3.9
Over/Short		+.2	0	-1.1	-.9
04-06					
Number of Skills		12	10	14	36
PMI**		1.0	1.1	1.3	3.4
Inventory		1.7	1.1	.8	3.7
Over/Short		+.7	0	-.4	+.3
Total 01-06					
Number of Skills		25	14	33	72
PMI**		1.2	2.3	4.6	8.1
Inventory		2.2	2.3	3.1	7.6
Over/Short		+.9	0	-1.5	-.6

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individuals

TABLE VI-6
US AIR FORCE RESERVE EXPERIENCE
PROGRAMMED vs ACTUAL INVENTORY
(in 000s)
FY 84

	Total People	People with Greater than 4 YOS	AVG-YOS	FY 85** Total People	FY 86** Total People
E1-E4					
PMI*	20.0	N/A	N/A	21.0	21.9
Inventory	13.0	3.6	3.1	13.2	13.9
E5-E7					
PMI	28.5	N/A	N/A	29.9	31.1
Inventory	36.1	36.1	12.1	36.9	38.6
E8-E9					
PMI	2.1	N/A	N/A	2.2	2.3
Inventory	1.9	1.9	25.2	1.9	2.0
E1-E9					
PMI	50.6	N/A	N/A	53.1	55.3
Inventory	50.9	39.1	10.2	52.0	54.6
WO (Total Number)					
PMI	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
Inventory	1	1	36.0	1	1
01-03					
PMI	4.8	N/A	N/A	5.0	5.1
Inventory	3.9	3.0	9.4	4.8	5.0
04-06					
PMI	3.4	N/A	N/A	3.5	3.6
Inventory	3.7	3.7	21.4	3.4	3.5
01-06					
PMI	8.1	N/A	N/A	8.5	8.7
Inventory	7.6	6.7	15.2	8.2	8.6

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

**Estimates

(e) Personnel Management.

1 Enlisted.

a Recruiting. The US Air Force Reserve placed emphasis on matching accessions to critical skills and programmed structure requirements. As noted earlier, critical skill manning was 98.2 percent as of 30 Sep 1984. The US Air Force Reserve exceeded its FY 1984 adjusted goals for both prior and non-prior service personnel. The actual numbers of enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1984 and the accession goals for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

USAFR Enlisted Strength Plan

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Accessions				
Prior Service	8,248	8,469	10,857	10,497
HSDG		7,854		
Non-Prior Service	2,577	2,682	3,814	3,688
Male		1,662		
Female		1,020		
HSDG		2,460		

The above data shows that 93 percent of the prior service accessions and 92 percent of the non-prior service accession were high school diploma graduates. In addition, 93 percent of prior service accessions and over 99 percent of non-prior service accessions were in the top three mental categories. This data shows the continued high quality of USAFR accessions.

b Retention. Retention/reenlistment rates for the US Air Force Reserve enlisted force for FY 1984 and goals for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

USAFR Retention Rates
(percent)

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Retention				
First Term	65	88	70	72
Career	80	89	80	80

The FY 1984 enlisted retention rates were the best ever experienced by the USAFR. Retention rates were favorable in the aggregate and in specific critical skills as well.

c Aggregate Population Stability. Since aggregate population stability is a measure of retention it is only logical that this factor should reach record highs.

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>83.1</u>	<u>83.3</u>	<u>83.5</u>	<u>83.6</u>
					87.1

d Unit Personnel stability. This category is also impacted by the strong retention statistics.

	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	73.9	72.0	73.2	74.9	78.6

2 Officer.

a Accessions. The US Air Force Reserve does not have specific accession goals for officers. It receives officers separated from the active force, other reserve status/components, and from the non-FAD commissioning program for qualified enlisted personnel who hold needed skills and are presently participating in reserve activities. The actual number of officers recruited in FY 1984 and the estimated requirement for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

USAFR Officer Strength Plan

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Est Reg</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Est Reg</u>	<u>Est Reg</u>	<u>Est Reg</u>
Accessions	2,008	2,031	2,200	2,130	

b Retention. Retention has not been a problem in the US Air Force Reserve. The FY 1984 aggregate population rate was 92.0 percent and unit population stability was 82.2 percent. Manning levels historically exceed the 90 percent level; therefore, no specific goals have been established.

(f) Readiness Assessment. The readiness of the US Air Force Reserve is a function of unit staffing, stability, occupational imbalances, and the level of experience. Improvement can be documented in three of these four areas. If the existing skill imbalances do not worsen substantially, the personnel readiness posture should remain unchanged or improve slightly through FY 1986.

(g) Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Programs. The purpose of the IMA program is to provide highly skilled individuals who augment active units during wartime or emergency situations. All IMA positions are reviewed annually as part of the Wartime Manpower Planning Exercise (MANREQ) and justified solely on the basis of wartime or contingency requirements for which the active forces are insufficient. An IMA is not authorized based on peacetime tasks or peacetime manning shortages. The US Air Force Reserve IMA program remains relatively stable for FY 1985 and FY 1986.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees

	<u>FY 84</u>		<u>FY 85</u>		<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
Total	11,232	11,633	11,973	11,899	
Category A	565	548	576	576	
Category B	9,667	10,579	10,797	10,723	
Category D	1,000	506	600	600	

(h) Full-Time Support Programs. Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel are Guardsmen and Reservists on active duty over 179 days who provide full-time support to the Reserve Components and are paid from Reserve personnel appropriations. They serve as the Chief of Air Force Reserve; assist members of the Air Reserve Forces Policy Council; advise and assist in developing and implementing Reserve Forces policies, procedures, and programs; and, in organizing administering, recruiting, instructing, and training the Reserve components.

Air Reserve Technicians serve in a civilian status and provide full-time support to an Air Force Reserve unit. They are members of the Air Force Reserve, perform all military training and duty in their unit, and must be available to enter active duty should their unit be mobilized.

	USAFR Full Time Support		
	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Active Duty Guard/Reserve	548	603	635
Air Reserve Technicians	7,973	8,305	9,042
Civilians	4,324	4,543	4,503
Active Air Force with AFR	691	744	654
Total	13,536	14,195	14,834

b. Individual Ready Reserves (IRR). The IRR consists of people who have recently served in the active forces or selected reserve and have remaining a period of obligated service. They are subject to being called to active duty during a national emergency declared by the President or the Congress.

Individual Ready Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
41.0	40.6	39.6

(2) Air National Guard.

(a) General. The Air National Guard (ANG) has programmed an increase of 3,169 between FY 1985 and FY 1986. Of this increase 2,369 are drilling Guardsmen and 800 are full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel. The drilling Guardsmen are required to support force structure changes such as the increased flying hours for the conversion of a C-130 unit to C-141's. It also supports increases in aerial port, aeromedical evacuation, and tactical control. The AGR increases support additional PAA at the ANG training units, force changes as noted above, increased aircraft maintenance requirements, the application of various manpower standards and new missions and equipment.

(b) Structure, Manning & Operating Strength.

Table VI-11 displays by DPPC category the ANG programmed manpower structure, its programmed manning and operating strength for FY 1984, FY 1985, and FY 1986. The Air National Guard manpower structure continues to grow. Between FY 1985 and FY 1986 the manpower structure increases 3,000 positions. These increases are in correlation with decisions to transfer missions from the active to the Reserve forces, such as C-5 and C-141 strategic airlift units. The Air National Guard continues to strive toward 100% manning of the wartime requirement as indicated by the increased percent manning between fiscal years.

(c) Skill and Grade. ANG skill and grade imbalances are depicted in tables VI-12 and VI-13.

The overall enlisted skill and grade averages in the ANG are caused by several factors: low number of authorizations for grades E1 to E4, unit conversions/new missions and the required time lag to realign or attrit resources, and filling some projected authorizations up to one year in advance. Overall enlisted shortages are mainly caused by the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassigned overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical area. Overall the ANG is 94.7 percent manned in enlisted critical wartime skills.

The officer grade and skill averages are caused by several factors: low numbers of authorized grades for O1 and O2, unit conversions/new missions and the required time lag to realign or attrit resources. The overall officer shortages are mainly in difficult to recruit medical specialties and engineering/high tech skills, and the inability of the ANG as a reserve component to reassigned overages in one geographical location to fill shortages in another geographical location.

TABLE VI-7
A.F. NATIONAL GUARD
PROGRAMMED MANPOWER STRUCTURE, PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in 000s)*

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY	FY 1984			FY 1985			FY 1986		
	PRGMD MNPWR	PRGMD STRCT	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR	PRGMD STRCT	% MNG	PRGMD MNPWR	PRGMD STRCT	% MNG
STRATEGIC									
Offensive Strat Forces	21.2	20.8	98.1	22.5	22.1	98.2	23.0	22.3	97.0
Defensive Strat Forces	10.7	10.5	98.1	11.0	10.6	96.3	11.3	10.6	93.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	9.7	9.6	99.0	10.7	10.8	100.9	10.9	10.9	100.0
TACTICAL/MOBILITY									
Tactical Air Forces	62.8	60.3	96.1	64.9	62.4	96.1	66.9	64.8	97.0
Mobility Forces	44.5	43.0	96.9	44.9	44.0	98.0	45.6	45.4	99.6
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES									
Centrally Managed Comm	2.7	2.6	99.2	12.7	12.6	99.8	12.8	12.6	98.4
Geophysical Activities	12.1	12.1	100.0	12.1	12.1	100.0	12.2	12.1	99.2
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES									
Base Operating Support	8.5	8.0	94.1	8.7	8.2	94.3	9.1	8.8	96.7
Personnel Support	2.9	2.9	100.0	2.9	2.9	100.0	3.0	3.0	100.0
Force Support Training	0.5	0.5	100.0	0.5	0.5	100.0	0.5	0.5	100.0
Centralized Support Act.	2.5	2.3	92.0	2.7	2.5	92.6	2.9	2.9	100.0
Management Headquarters	2.5	2.1	84.0	2.5	2.1	84.0	2.5	2.2	88.0
TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE	105.3	101.7	96.6	108.8	105.3	96.8	111.7	108.5	97.1
OPERATING STRENGTH DEVIATION	+.9					-2.3		-2.2	
INDIVIDUALS	2.4					2.4		2.4	
END STRENGTH	105.0					107.7		110.9	

*Numbers may not total due to rounding.

TABLE VI-8
AIR NATIONAL GUARD SKILL AND GRADE
ACTUAL INVENTORY VERSUS PROGRAMMED MANNING PLUS INDIVIDUALS
(in 000s)

	<u>OVER*</u>	<u>BALANCED*</u>	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>SHORT*</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
E1 - E4					
Number of Skills	50	10	33	93	
PMI**	3.5	3.2	21.6	28.4	
Inventory	6.0	8.0	14.2	28.2	
Over/Short	+2.5	+4.8	-7.4	-.2	
E5 - E7					
Number of Skills	30	34	38	102	
PMI	23.6	14.3	19.4	57.3	
Inventory	28.7	14.4	17.1	60.2	
Over/Short	+5.2	+.2	-2.4	+2.9	
E8 - E9					
Number of Skills	15	13	51	79	
PMI	.1	.8	4.0	4.9	
Inventory	.1	.8	2.9	3.8	
Over/Short	.1	0	-1.1	-1.1	
Total E1 - E9					
Number of Skills	40	34	28	102	
PMI	27.2	18.3	45.1	90.5	
Inventory	34.9	23.2	34.1	92.2	
Over/Short	+7.7	+4.9	-11.0	+1.7	
WO (Total Numbers)					
Number of Skills	5	0	0	5	
PMI	0	0	0	0	
Inventory	10	0	0	10	
Over/Short	+10	0	0	+10	
01-03					
Number of Skills	18	8	12	38	
PMI	1.6	1.7	2.8	6.2	
Inventory	2.3	1.3	2.1	5.8	
Over/Short	+.7	-.4	-.7	-.4	
04-06					
Number of Skills	4	11	23	38	
PMI	.2	1.1	5.7	7.0	
Inventory	.3	2.5	4.1	6.9	
Over/Short	+.1	+1.4	-1.6	-.1	
Total 01-06					
Number of Skills	22	19	35	76	
PMI	1.8	2.8	8.5	13.2	
Inventory	2.6	3.9	6.2	12.7	
Over/Short	+.8	+1.0	-2.3	-.5	

*See definitions at Appendix B.

**Programmed Manning Plus Individual.

(d) Experience. ANG trends for FY 1980-1984 are shown in table VI-9. The experience level is increasing while the average grade remains relatively constant.

TABLE VI-9
AIR NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE
ACTUAL/PROGRAMMED INVENTORY
(in 000s)

FY 1984

	Total People	People with Greater than 4 YOS	AVG-YOS
<u>E1-E4</u>			
PMI*	28.4	N/A	N/A
Inventory	28.2	7.6	3.2
<u>E5-E7</u>			
PMI	57.3	N/A	N/A
Inventory	60.2	59.4	14.0
<u>E8-E9</u>			
PMI	4.9	N/A	N/A
Inventory	3.8	3.8	28.4
<u>E1-E9</u>			
PMI	90.5	N/A	N/A
Inventory	92.2	70.3	11.3
<u>WO (Total Number)</u>			
PMI	0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	10	10	35.8
<u>01-03</u>			
PMI	6.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	5.8	5.0	10.6
<u>04-06</u>			
PMI	7.0	N/A	N/A
Inventory	6.9	6.9	20.0
<u>01-06</u>			
PMI	13.2	N/A	N/A
Inventory	12.7	11.9	15.5

*Programmed Manning plus Individuals

(e) Personnel Management.

1 Enlisted.

a Recruiting. The actual number of ANG enlisted personnel recruited in FY 1984 and the accession goals for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

	ANG Enlisted Plan			FY 85 Goal	FY 86 Goal
	Goal	FY 84 Actual*	HSDG		
Non-Prior Service (NPS)	6100	5222		4660	5140
Male				3309(86%)	
Female				1149(84%)	
Prior-Service (PS)	7795	7431		8826	8839
Male				6028(92%)	
Female				806(92%)	

*ANG attained 100.8 percent of its programmed end strength. Due to an increased rate of retention, it was only necessary to recruit 91 percent of the original accession goals.

b Retention. Retention Rates for the ANG Enlisted forces for FY 1984 and goals for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

ANG Retention Effectiveness Rates
(percent)

	FY 84 Goal	FY 84 Actual	FY 85 Goal	FY 86 Goal
First Term	65	66	65	65
Mid Career	70	67	70	70
Career	85	88	85	85
Overall	80	80	80	80

First Term, Career and Overall Retention Effectiveness Rates met or exceeded established goals for FY 1984.

c Aggregate Population Stability. The Air National Guard continues to maintain a stable force as reflected below:

	<u>Aggregate Population Stability</u> (Percent)			
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Officer	92.1	92.9	93.2	94.5
Enlisted	87.3	88.7	84.5	90.0

d Unit Personnel Stability. The Air National Guard continues to show a steadily increasing trend in unit personnel stability -- a 28 percent improvement since FY 1980.

	<u>Unit Personnel Stability</u> (Percent)				
	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Enlisted	71.0	81.1	80.6	90.5	91.0

e Officer Accessions. The actual number of ANG officers recruited in FY 1984 and accession goals for FY 1985 and FY 1986 are shown below:

ANG Officer Accession Plan

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>1/</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Goal</u>
	1438	984	1376	1785

1/ ANG attained 100.8 percent of its programmed total (officer and enlisted) end strength, however, officer strength was below program. This has been a special interest item for ANG commanders and desired levels should be achieved in FY 1985.

f Readiness Assessment. A continued high level of programmed manning, greater stability (particularly at the unit level), and an increasing level of experience will maintain and improve further the Air National Guard's overall readiness posture.

g Full-Time Support Program. Full-time support manpower represents an essential element for mission accomplishment and readiness of Air National Guard units. Full-time manpower authorizations, consisting of military technicians, active Guard and Reserve (AGR), and civil service personnel perform the day-to-day duties necessary for mission accomplishment and readiness objectives. Specifically, the full-time force

performs maintenance, training and support duties associated with unit equipage and mission objectives. Adequate full-time manning is a key factor in mission readiness. Half of the full-time manpower available to the ANG is dedicated to equipment maintenance. The remainder is dedicated to logistics, administration and other support functions. The two primary elements of full-time manpower programmed for the ANG are as follows:

	ANG Full-Time Support		
	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Military Technicians	22,160	22,401	22,792
Civilians	1,885	2,074	2,077
Active Duty Guard/Reserve (AGR)	5,773	6,469	7,269
Active Air Force with ANG	754	736	730
Total	30,572	31,680	32,868

2. Standby Reserve. The standby reserve consists of people who have completed their statutory military obligation and have chosen to maintain a reserve status. They are not in a pay status; do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs, but are liable for active duty in time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress.

Standby Reserve
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84 (Actual)	FY 85	FY 86
29.2	28.6	28.6

3. Retirees. Retirees may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the Air Force to satisfy mobilization requirements.

Retirees
(End Strength in Thousands)

FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
596.6	587.9	579.2

C. Civilian Manpower.

1. General. The key to achieving Air Force goals and objectives is the people who do the work. Air Force civilians comprise approximately 25 percent of the total work force. Included in civilian strengths are Air Reserve Force military technicians. These ANG/AFR reservists serve in their units on a full-time basis as civilians in peacetime and military upon mobilization.

2. Major Program Changes. Air Force civilian manpower authorizations increase by 10,345 or 4.0 percent between FY 1985 and FY 1986. This increase directly supports increased flying hours, increased emphasis on improving spare parts procurement, increased Reserve missions, and aircraft procurement (see chart below).




Table VI-10 shows civilian programmed manning and end strength for FY 1984, FY 1985, and FY 1986.

TABLE VI-10
CIVILIAN
PROGRAMMED MANNING AND END STRENGTH
(in 000s)***

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986
STRATEGIC	7.8	8.0	8.8
Offensive Strat Forces	3.3	3.4	3.6
Defensive Strat Forces	3.3	3.4	3.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces	1.1	1.1	1.8
TACTICAL/MOBILITY	27.9	28.5	29.8
Tactical Air Forces	14.9	15.4	16.0
Mobility Forces	13.0	13.1	13.8
AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES	22.0	22.3	23.4
Intelligence	1.9	2.0	2.0
Centrally Managed Comm	4.5	4.6	4.9
Research and Development	14.4	14.6	15.2
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.2	1.3
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES	191.0	197.7	204.7
Base Operating Support	86.6	87.9	90.3
Combat Installations	(49.1)	(50.7)	(51.9)
Support Installations	(37.5)	(37.2)	(38.4)
Medical Support	3.2	3.3	3.4
Personnel Support	1.9	1.9	2.3
Individual Training	5.0	5.2	5.4
Force Support Training	2.6	2.6	2.7
Central Logistics	73.7	77.9	86.9
Supply Operations	(30.4)	(35.3)	(38.2)
Maintenance Operations	(39.0)	(38.4)	(38.4)
Logistics Support Operations	(4.2)	(4.2)	(4.3)
Centralized Support Act.	10.3	10.5	11.0
Management Headquarters	8.6	8.6	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Deviations**	3.0	3.0	256.5
END STRENGTH		252.7	266.8

*Less than 50 spaces

**Difference between FY 1984 Program as of the FY 1986 BES and FY 1984 Actuals.

***Numbers may not total due to rounding.

One area where the Air Force uses primarily civilians is in wholesale logistics activities (materiel management, distribution, maintenance, contracting) at the Air Force's five Air Logistics Centers (ALCs), the depots. The core of the Air Force depots is an organic industrial base designed to be the ultimate repair source for critical workloads in peace and war. Our current industrial base is comparatively modern with a replacement value of over \$4 billion in plant and equipment. The Air Force has placed a high priority on maintaining its organic facilities in a high state of readiness. This requires continuous efforts to modernize, increase productivity, and ensure a proper mix of depot workloads.

More than 40 percent of the depot maintenance workloads is now contracted. The Air Force vigorously pursues contracting of depot workloads when it makes sense to do so in accordance with approved criteria. The remaining in-house depot workloads are necessary to the operating forces to sustain their operation in a wartime surge environment.

An important initiative reported in the FY 1985 DMRR was to ensure that the Air Force paid reasonable prices for spare parts. To achieve that result we have continued to recruit and hire new employees to man the newly established competition advocate offices at the Air Logistics Centers. The additional personnel authorized in support of this program have already made significant progress toward correcting acknowledged procurement problems.

3. Management Improvements. The Air Force personnel community continues to improve upon its automated personnel data system. A management information system for tracking the status of personnel requests has been in place since October 1983. The system allows management officials to determine where recruitment problems are occurring and to take prompt remedial action. In addition, it facilitates the ability of local officials to manage civilian pay. Other federal agencies have either adopted or expressed interest in adopting the AF personnel data system.

During FY 1982, Federal Employees Compensation Act costs within the Air Force grew by 10 percent. This growth was typical of what had occurred since the mid-70s. In FY 1983 and FY 1984 the number of personnel receiving injury compensation decreased as a result of Air Force initiatives. At the same time program costs have grown by less than one percent. We expect continued improvements in FY 1985.

During FY 1984 the Air Force completed 53 A-76 cost comparison studies at 36 locations covering approximately 1,600 authorizations. Contracts were awarded as a result of 31 studies while in-house operations were identified as more economical in 22 cases. These studies covered such diverse activities as protective coating and word processing.

Cost studies have been effective in identifying the most economical method for accomplishing various Air Force workloads. For example, in the first year of performance for a contract operated word processing center at Sheppard AFB, Texas, the Air Force estimates it will realize a cost avoidance of \$152,000 over the cost of an in-house operation.

Conversely, the pick-up and delivery function at Robins AFB, Georgia, remained in-house based on a cost study which indicated that the cost of an in-house operation was lower by approximately \$227,000 than the lowest estimated contract cost. Currently, the Air Force is conducting 540 cost comparison studies covering approximately 13,000 authorizations.

4. Position Management. The Air Force is conducting a program which seeks to reduce the number of GS/GM 11-15 positions or to achieve equivalent dollar savings. Within the Air Force civilian pay in the FY 1986 Budget reflects a savings of 8 percent. The Air Force will achieve this reduction in personnel costs through a combination of improved position management, a high grade ratio control system, and economies and efficiencies such as commercial activities, functional reviews, and the Component Sponsored Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Programs.

5. Civilian End Strength Ceilings. The Air Force welcomes the total elimination of the statutory civilian end strength ceiling for FY 1985. The test during FY 1985 once again provides us the opportunity to demonstrate we can manage without ceilings. During FY 1984, our industrial fund managers were able to structure their workforce better and to respond more readily to changing workloads. There was no appreciable increase in end-strength and our managers experienced no problems in managing the industrially funded civilian work force without end-strength ceilings. A ceiling free environment in FY 1985 will enhance readiness throughout the Air Force, through the use of more full time permanent, instead of temporary, appointments.

6. Recruiting. Lifting the limitation on DoD Cooperative Education Programs was most welcome. Cooperative Education Programs provide an effective source of well-qualified and trained manpower, especially in skill-shortage occupations within scientific and engineering disciplines. The Air Force intends to pursue this method of recruitment to be competitive with industry in filling highly technical positions.

7. Retention. Recruitment and retention are influenced by employee perceptions of the Air Force as an employer. Retention has always been good and increased productivity and high morale of the current work force reflects favorably on the Air Force as an employer.

8. Other - Moving Expenses. To maintain the desired state of readiness the Air Force must have a civilian force that is mobile enough to meet mission requirements. Civilian employees sometimes resist relocating when financial gains are negated by the cost of relocation. Improved entitlements have made the cost of relocating more bearable during the past several years. With continued sensitivity to this issue the Air Force should have no problem meeting its readiness objectives as they pertain to the mobility of civilians.

D. Mobilization Manpower.

1. Military. In section B we noted that the peak demand for military manpower occurs late in the scenario when force strength has stabilized and casualty replacement requirements peak. The peak manpower shortages occur earlier in the scenario. Peak shortfalls of approximately 127,100 occur at about M+40 and are the result of shortfalls in the active/reserve/guard force structure to meet initial deployment requirements, early casualty losses not yet offset by returns to duty, and the lag in the mobilization and training process.

As shown in Table VI-17, the shortfall remains relatively constant between FY 1986 and FY 1990. The increase in active component and Selected Reserve end strengths are sufficient to offset the increase in requirements. The major shortfall in medical which exists today will be largely met by FY 1990 through the Air Force FY 1986-1990 Program. The shortfall in security police does not reflect the recent memorandum of agreement with the Army, and the on-going implementation planning for Army assumption of the Air Base Ground Defense mission. Significant shortfalls in civil engineering, and lesser shortfalls in such areas as food services and transportation, will persist.

Major emphasis is being placed upon enhancements in the mobilization and training processes which, if successful, will reduce mobilization time for pretrained individuals by at least two weeks and improve the Air Force's ability to quickly provide refresher training or cross-training. As a result, the Air Force will be better able to meet wartime shortfalls with pretrained individuals and current service personnel, and better able to match peacetime and wartime skills requirements.

2. Civilian. In peacetime the requirement for civilian manpower is represented by the peacetime authorized civilian work force. On M-Day, the requirement for civilian manpower increases to reflect the support requirements associated with mobilization buildup and preparation of military forces for deployment/employment. Civilian positions are created to support the buildup and concurrently, positions are terminated in activities that are not required in wartime.

At M-Day, the civilian workforce is reduced by the loss of civilian employees subject to call-up as reservists, retired military, and draftees. To avoid calling up civilians in essential positions, the Air Force continuously screens individuals in the Federal government who are also members of the Ready Reserve or are retired military personnel eligible for recall.

TABLE VI-11
WARTIME REQUIREMENTS VERSUS SUPPLY
 (in 000s)

FY 1986 ^{1/}

MILITARY MANPOWER

	<u>Pre-M</u>	<u>M-Day</u>	<u>M+30</u>	<u>M+40</u>	<u>M+60</u>	<u>M+90</u>	<u>M+120</u>	<u>M+150</u>	<u>M+180</u>
Trained Manpower Demand	772	773	878	946	990	992	978	967	958
Trained Manpower Supply	756	758	778	819	883	916	945	974	1004
Manpower Over/Short	-7	-17	-100	-127	-106	-76	-32	+8	+47

FY 1990 ^{1/}

MILITARY MANPOWER

Trained Manpower Demand	827	830	933	1001	1045	1047	1033	1023	1013
Trained Manpower Supply	820	812	835	877	943	980	1009	1038	1068
Manpower Over/Short	-7	-17	-98	-124	-102	-68	-24	+15	+56

FY 1984 ^{2/}

CIVILIAN MANPOWER

Demand	233	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	251
Supply	233	174	174	174	174	174	174	174	174
New Hires Required		77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77

^{1/}From the FY 86-90 WARMAPS POM submission.

^{2/}From the latest civilian WARMAPS submission.

The Air Force plans to offset the shortfall in civilian manpower after M-Day by using civilian employees who are currently in other than full time permanent civilian status, i.e. they may be converted from their peacetime temporary, part time, or intermittent status to full time permanent status. Additional manpower sources include available new-hires provided by the United States Employment Service and the Office of Personnel Management, and retired Federal civilian employees. Skill shortages in critical occupations such as logistics management, engineering, aircraft systems repair, clerical, and materiel handling make such positions prime targets for the utilization of retired Federal civilian employees.

Although Air Force civilian mobilization planning has room for further improvement, we have progressed in defining the problems and developing possible solutions. We expect that during FY 1985 and FY 1986 continued refinements in this area will result in substantial improvements in our ability to plan for mobilization.

E. Manpower Management Improvements. The Air Force is aware of the continuing need for productivity improvements and strives to minimize resource requirements while maximizing overall capability. Major manpower management improvement initiatives under way at this time include:

1. Functional Reviews. The Air Force is actively pursuing a major initiative, through its Management Engineering Program, to accomplish functional, or efficiency, reviews of in-house activities. A concerted effort is being made during the 1980's to increase productivity and reduce operating costs by eliminating unnecessary and inefficient work practices. Under this initiative, virtually every Air Force function will be analyzed for ways to increase operating efficiency without decreasing effectiveness. To gain efficiencies, prime emphasis is being placed on removing unnecessary work requirements and enhancing operations through streamlined procedures and state-of-the-art equipment. Work requirements levied on Air Force functions are being investigated to ensure validity and currency. Further, during the review process, wartime taskings are being studied to ensure that peacetime economies are not taken at the expense of our war fighting capability. Manpower savings resulting from functional reviews will be used to fund new programs or validated, unfunded requirements.

2. Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI). PECI programs improve management efficiency in two important ways. First, these investments provide a funding alternative for productivity-improving equipment and facilities not funded in the normal budget process. Secondly, savings resulting from such investments are redistributed to accomplish validated but otherwise unfunded requirements. Since the OSD-sponsored Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) program began in FY 1981, Air Force has received over \$210 million based on initiatives which are expected to generate \$3.1 billion in life cycle savings, a return on investment of nearly 15 to 1. These

same projects also represent a savings of over 2,700 manpower and equivalent authorizations. In addition to the money received through the OSD program, the Air Force will be investing approximately \$20 million of its own money in FY 1986 for Fast Payback Capital Investment (FASCAP) and Component Sponsored Investment Program (CSIP) projects. Our financial goal is to more than double current savings by the end of the decade, thus continuing our efforts to improve the distribution of critical manpower resources.

3. Long Range Skill Projections. The Air Force developed a skill projection routine to estimate grade and skill detail of manpower requirements in the outyears of the FYDP. The routine displays the full FYDP in grade and skill detail permitting a longer range planning horizon and greater support for recruiting, training and personnel planners. Major changes within the FYDP will still create significant fluctuations from year to year, however, the methodology provides a means to quickly evaluate the outyear grade and skill impact. As we move closer to the FYDP outyears, the projection for a given year (i.e., FY 1990) will change with each change to the FYDP, improving the accuracy. As we gain experience working with this new tool we should be able to develop additional enhancements to more accurately forecast outyear skill distribution.

III. Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC).

A. Strategic.

1. Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Act' ve Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	241	241	241
FB-111	56	56	56
B-1B	0	:	18
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	31	23	9
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	997
Peacekeeper			3
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANG KC-135	104	104	104
AFR KC-135	24	24	24

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1986, we have 15 B-52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, one B-1 squadron, 32 active force and 16 smaller Reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, two Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	54.0	53.5	54.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	10.5	10.6	10.6
AFR	2.0	2.0	2.0
Civilian	3.3	3.4	3.6

The FY 1985 active duty military manpower decrease is due to decreases in the B-52 bomber and KC-135 tanker programs (-625) and the Titan II missile program (-1042). These decreases offset increases in B-1B and FB-111 bomber programs (+944) and Air Launch Cruise and Peacekeeper missile programs (+221).

The FY 1986 active duty military manpower increase is due to increases for B-1B bomber deployment (+1480), KC-135 tanker flying hour increase (+394), and Air Launched Cruise Missile and Peacekeeper missile deployment (+498). These increases are partially offset by decreases from B-52 bomber rebasing (-600), Titan II missile deactivation (-1003), and Minuteman missile deposturing for Peacekeeper deployment and military-to-civilian conversion for helicopter maintenance (-311).

The FY 1986 civilian manpower increase relates to a military-to-civilian conversion for missile support helicopter maintenance (+232).

2. Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Active Force</u>			
F-106	54	36	0
F-15	36	54	72
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANG F-4	126	126	126
ANG F-106	66	66	66

FY 1986 Air Force Strategic Defensive Forces include aircraft and ground radars of Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard, and ground radars of Alaskan Air Command for atmospheric tactical warning/attack assessment, airspace control and limited defense. To perform this mission in FY 1986, the Air Force will employ a force of four active F-15 squadrons, four Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, and seven Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include five Regional Operations Control Centers and 61 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Force Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military			
Active	6.5	6.5	6.1
Selected Reserve			
ANG	9.6	10.8	10.9
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	3.3	3.4	3.4

The FY 1986 decrease in military manpower results from the deactivation of two F-106 squadrons (-1136) and redefining the Joint Surveillance System Radar requirement (-77). These decreases are partially offset by the activation of one F-15 squadron (+661) and phase-in of the East Coast Over-the-Horizon-Backscatter Radar (+107).

ANG increases between FY 1984 and FY 1985 are a direct result of the decision to transfer more of the continental air defense mission to the Reserve forces. The increased manpower is tied to the conversion of a tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor unit (+966), the transfer of three detached alerts to the ANG mission (+34), and increased spaces to accommodate a 3 PAA increase in an F-106 unit (+111). In addition, ANG manpower has been added for priority "B" NORAD security (+39). The additive ANG manpower spaces in FY 1986 result from increases in response to NORAD policy to increase target levies in ANG ADTAC gained units for exercises and night deployed target sorties (+44), establishes, for the first time, full and part-time manpower in the intelligence functional area (+22), and provides consolidated base personnel offices manpower (+11).

3. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. In FY 1986, Control and Surveillance Forces include one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance, 27 PAA EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers, and four E-4B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include

the NORAD Command Post in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; five Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning sites; eight SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command System. Control and Surveillance Forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.9	12.3	12.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.7	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.1	1.1	1.8

The FY 1985 active military increase results from increases for the Consolidated Space Operations Center (+240), Automated Data Processing Architecture for the North American Defense Cheyenne Mountain Complex (+91), Airborne Command and Control Systems (+78), and the SLBM Radar Warning Systems (+75).

FY 1986 active military increases are a result of the Consolidated Space Operations Center (+394) and activating Robins and Goodfellow SLBM radar warning sites (+181). The military increase is partially offset by converting SLBM radar warning maintenance from military to civilian (-367) after being identified as a contracting candidate.

The FY 1986 civilian increase is a result of SLBM radar warning maintenance being identified as a contracting candidate (+367), Consolidated Space Operations Center (+103), Worldwide Military Command and Control System (+65), activating Robins and Goodfellow SLBM radar warning sites (+49), and enhancements to the Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment Network (+51).

B. Tactical/Mobility.

1. Tactical Air Forces.

<u>Air Force Tactical Air Forces</u>			
	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents	24.1	24.4	24.8
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	77	77	78
Reconnaissance Squadrons (RF-4C and TR-1) <u>1/</u>	8	8	8
Special Operations Force Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne Warning and Control Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne TACS Squadrons (O-2, OV-10, OA-37)	7	6	6
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	2	3	3
Electronic Combat Squadrons <u>2/</u>	3	3	3
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ARF TAC Fighter Wing Equivalents	11.8	12.0	12.2
ANG Fighter/Attack Squadrons	33	33	33
ANG Reconnaissance Squadrons (RF-4C)	6	6	6
AFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	10	10	10
AFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANG Airborne TACS Squadrons (O-2, OA-37)	4	3	3
ANG Electronics Combat Squadron <u>3/</u>	1	1	1
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10) (AFR-Assoc) <u>4/</u>	2	2	3

1/ Includes TR-1/U-2 Training and Augmentation Squadrons

2/ Includes EF-111A and EC-130 H (Compass Call) squadrons.

3/ Includes 8 PAA EC 130E squadron.

4/ Associate squadrons provide one-half of the wartime required aircrews for utilization with active USAF squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft (for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance), tanker/cargo aircraft, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces includes air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, missile operations crews, and weapon systems security, GLCM and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, civil engineering RED HORSE squadrons (Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) and tactical intelligence squadrons.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

Military

Active	105.0	109.1	112.7
Selected Reserve			
ANG	43.0	44.0	45.4
AFR	10.5	10.8	11.5
Civilian	14.9	15.4	16.0

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from force structure increases (+2105), Ground Launched Cruise Missile force structure growth (+1171), increased air base ground defense (+34), special program growth (+409), increased communication consoles and improvements for AWACS (+169), and other Command and Control/Electronic Combat improvements (+644). These increases are offset by transfer of the 615 ACW Squadron to the German Air Force (-149), contract adjustments for simulator maintenance (-170), and the temporary drawdown of a weapons storage area in Europe (-171).

The active military increase in FY 1986 results from force structure increases (+1844), Ground Launched Cruise Missile force structure growth (+855), special program growth (+329), increased consoles and improvements for AWACS (+206), new Ground Mobile Force - SATCOM terminals (+131), increased air base ground defense requirements (+113), Joint Operational Capability and satellite terminal support growth (+190), increased flying hours and maintenance manpower per flying hour for Special Operations Forces (+199) and other command and control improvements (+263). These increases were offset by a Tactical Air Control System drawdown and restructure (-302), military-to-civilian conversions (-119), and contract adjustments for simulator maintenance (-147).

The civilian increase in FY 1986 results from the replacement of ANG F-4 aircraft with F-15 and F-16 aircraft (+229), increased reserve participation in the KC-10 associate maintenance program (+178), military-to-civilian conversions (+119), and contract adjustments for simulator maintenance (+98). These increases are offset by a decrease in ANG F-4 aircraft (-243).

The ANG increase in FY 1985 is due to establishment of two civil engineering (RED HORSE) units (+431) and an increased Air Base Defense mission (+242). Mission changes include three tactical reconnaissance units increasing primary authorized aircraft (PAA) (+922) offset by the conversion of one RF-4 tactical reconnaissance unit to a fighter interceptor (-914), a tactical air support 18 PAA unit (-648) to a C-5 3 PAA strategic airlift unit and a F-4 tactical unit increasing from 18 PAA to 24 PAA (+74) spaces. Other increases include F-4 maintenance spaces (+130) and manpower requirements to support Systems Trainer and Exercise Module (STEM), Rapid Deployment Force plans officers, Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), F-16 and A-7 simulator support, environmental health technicians and ground explosive safety personnel (+203). Manpower standard

requirements to support supply, transportation, fuels, and consolidated base personnel offices account for additional spaces (+292). To allow the ANG to achieve 100 percent of its wartime requirement, a gradual increase in spaces were programmed (+281).

The ANG increases in FY 1986 can be attributed to the modernization of the tactical fighter force. Two F-4 units will convert to F-15 and F-16 aircraft, some F-4 C/D model aircraft will convert to the special capability F-4E model and two F-4 units will increase PAA from 18 to 24 increasing manpower 413 spaces. Additional manpower is also required in support of more Systems Trainer and Exercise Module (STEM) equipment (+85) and the complement of manpower for A-10 Inertial Navigation Systems equipment spaces (+7) is complete. Tasking for forward air control posts (FACPs) has been revised upward by one per FACP requiring an increase of 17 spaces and an increase of 45 spaces is required to meet current CONUS Army's TACP deployment requirements. Gradual builds in munitions begins in FY 1986 encompassing 248 spaces to sustain combat sortie rates and rapid assembly of conventional A-7 munitions. Also, 215 spaces are added to fill AF wartime Prime RIBS shortfalls. The gradual build-up of F-4 maintenance personnel to support a maintenance manhour per flying hour factor from 31 to 34 adds 130 spaces. The inclusion of ANG units to support Central Command (CENTCOM) war plans increases manpower 132 spaces in the intelligence area. Manpower standard requirements to support one additional billet for each Consolidated Base Personnel Office account for an additional 44 spaces. The remaining 323 spaces increases the manning level from 99.0 percent in FY 1985 to 99.3 in FY 1986. The decision to reduce ANG participation in air base defense results in a decrease of 242 spaces.

AFR increases in FY 1985 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of its tactical fighter force, increases in KC-10 aircrews and the first increment of AFR personnel in the KC-10 maintenance program. In FY 1986, additional KC-10s are assigned and the second increment of maintenance personnel are required.

2. Mobility Forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces (Sqds)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	8	8	8
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	34	34	33
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (AFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	6	5	5
Strategic Airlift (AFR-unit equipped)	0	1	2
Strategic Airlift (ANG-unit equipped)	0	1	2

- 1/ Associate airlift squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evacuation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces include crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces, administrative airlift, and special operations forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
<u>Active</u>	39.5	39.1	39.6
<u>Selected Reserve</u>			
ANG	17.3	18.4	19.4
AFR	33.5	35.9	36.9
<u>Civilian</u>	13.0	13.1	13.8

Active military decreases in FY 1985 result from the transfer of C-5A aircraft (8 PAA) to the Air Reserve Forces (-430), the phase-out of CT-39 aircraft and associated maintenance (-479) and application of the Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) standard to the C-141 (-80). These decreases are partially offset by increases for the European Distribution System (+198), aerial port (+186) and command and control workloads (+104), and active support for Reserve C-5A aircraft (+97).

The civilian end strength increase in FY 1985 results from the addition of C-5As to the AFR (+151) and ANG (+130). These increases are partially offset by the phase-out of CT-39 aircraft (-125), and the transfer of C-5As from Military Airlift Command (-43).

In FY 1986 the active military increased due to the delivery of 5 PAA C-5Bs (+375), aerial port workload increases (+314) and transfer of the 1st Helicopter Squadron (+170) from Centralized Support Activities. These increases are partially offset by decreases for transfer of 4 PAA C-141s to the ARF (-97), transfer of 8 PAA C-5As to the ARF (-85), identification of C-130 simulator maintenance as a contracting candidate (-70) and phase-out of 8 CT-39 aircraft (-69).

Civilian end-strength in FY 1986 increased due to identification of C-130 simulator maintenance as a contracting candidate (+70), delivery of the C-5B (+39), increased maintenance to support the 1985 beddown of

AFR C-5A (5 PAA) aircraft (+346), ANG C-5A (3 PAA) (+135) and transfer of the C-141 to the ARF (+273). These increases are partially offset by the phase-out of 8 PAA CT-39 aircraft and the resultant decrease in aircraft maintenance (-22) plus consolidation of ARF C-130 aircraft (-158).

ANG manpower increases in FY 1985 are due to the conversion of the tactical air support (0-2) unit to a C-5 strategic airlift unit (+702) and establishment of a Mobile Aerial Port for this unit (+127). Further, 109 spaces are required for the build up of existing aerial port flights. Growth of 156 spaces are also programmed in support of an increase for aeromedical crews.

The increase in ANG spaces to 994 in FY 1986 are +343 spaces required to support the increased flying hour program of the 3 PAA C-5 unit, a decrease of -359 spaces coupled with a manpower requirement for +644 spaces for the conversion of an 8 PAA C-130 unit to a 4 PAA C-130/2 PAA C-141 unit. Aerial port flights increase by 53 spaces to meet MAC wartime requirements and 134 spaces provide increases in crew composition of aeromedical evacuation crews and also establishes a new mobile aeromedical evacuation staging flight. Manpower standards support one additional space per Consolidated Base Personnel Office for an additional 20 spaces. To accommodate Air Force wartime Prime RIB shortfalls, 108 spaces are programmed.

The AFR increase in FY 1985 is the result of transferring 8 C-5s to the Reserve Forces (-414) operating and supporting the first AFR equipped C-5 unit (+1,254), increasing aerial port capability (+482), and partially offsetting wartime shortfalls in aeromedical evacuation (+336).

The AFR increase in FY 1986 is the result of operating the first AFR equipped C-141 unit (+661), transferring 4 C-141s to the Reserve Forces from the associate program (-127), assignment of new C-5Bs in the associate program (+170), conversion of C-130s to C-141s (+188), enhanced aerial port operations (+208), plus AFR equipped C-5 maintenance (+131), and aeromedical evacuation crews (+115).

C. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

1. Intelligence. This category includes manpower for selected National Foreign Intelligence Programs and other Air Force intelligence related activities. The Air Force Intelligence Service and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the two Air Force organizations whose primary mission is intelligence; however, nearly all major Air Force organizations also support these activities.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.7	16.1	16.4
Selected Reserve			
AFR	1.8	1.8	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	1.9	2.0	2.0

Except for an increase in electronic combat intelligence support (+28) in FY 1985, the reasons for all other manpower changes in the Intelligence DPPC are classified.

Effective use of the ARF has enhanced our intelligence potential to respond to crisis situations. This is especially true in those disciplines where Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) have more expertise than the active component. For example, they man Indications and Warning Centers and train less experienced active force personnel.

The proper force mix, however, is imperative to meet expanded mission requirements effectively. Most intelligence activities require access to information so sensitive that control and dissemination of data to those individuals only randomly associated with its exploitation is considered inadequate for security protection. Additionally, during this period of rapid technology growth, most intelligence functions require technical expertise and continuity of knowledge far in excess of what may reasonably be expected of personnel available less than fulltime. Detecting the nuance within a multitude of indicators demands unique skills. Thus, intelligence personnel must be well trained, current in their speciality and cleared for access to highly classified information and the most sensitive sources available for exploitation. Continuing technological advances make the retention of these special skill levels an ongoing full-time task.

2. Centrally Managed Communications. This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.7	16.8	17.0
Selected Reserve			
ANG	12.1	12.1	12.1
AFR	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	4.5	4.6	4.9

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in Air Force communication programs (+70), satellite ground station terminals (+18), worldwide engineering and installation (+46), and Defense Communication Agency support (+29).

The active military increase in FY 1986 results from increases in Defense communication Agency support (+63), worldwide engineering and installation communications (+18), long haul communications (+61), and satellite ground station terminals (+89) with offsets in Air Force communication programs (-167).

The civilian increases in FY 1986 results from increases in Air Force communication programs (+194), satellite ground station terminals (+46), and worldwide engineering and installation communications (+91).

3. Research and Development. This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.1	12.7	12.8
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.9	0.9	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	14.4	14.6	15.2

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in aircraft maintenance (+208) and in acquisition and related programs (+369).

Civilian increases in FY 1985 are associated with spare parts acquisition (+163) and other test and acquisition efforts.

Increases in active military for FY 1986 results from increased acquisition, test, and evaluation programs (+143).

FY 1986 civilian increases are associated with spare parts acquisition (+71), special programs (+343), acquisition programs (+131), and other test and evaluation (+100).

ARF participation in this area consists of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) who provide valued support to the Research, Development and Acquisition efforts. The full-time active manpower, however, is required to ensure continuity in all phases of weapon systems conception and development to ensure we are getting the best technological product at the best price and within the time constraints imposed by mission requirements.

4. Geophysical Activities. The manpower in this category supports active and Reserve weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities.

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.3	8.3	8.4
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.5	0.6
AFR	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.2	1.3

The active military increase in FY 1986 results from increases in NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellite Operations (+124), and space shuttle operations support at Vandenberg Air Force Base (+19). This is partially offset by a military to civilian conversion of nonmilitary essential authorizations in Air Weather Service (-62).

The civilian increase in FY 1986 is a result of the military to civilian conversion of non-military essential authorizations in Air Weather Service.

The increase in ANG resources in FY 1986 of 39 spaces is the result of a manpower transfer replacing the active force MAC technical advisors.

D. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

Accounting for Base Operating Support (BOS) manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the BOS category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. The Air Force also includes all manpower providing food, transportation and supply type services in the BOS category and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These accounting differences between Services preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

1. Base Operating Support. BOS has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

a. Base Operating Support - Combat Installtions. This categry contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as air traffic control operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, data automation, and supply.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	118.3	119.1	118.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.9	2.9	3.0
AFR	8.6	9.5	10.5
<u>Civilian</u>	49.1	50.7	51.9

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from the beddown of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (+683) Consolidated Space Operations Center support (+100) and transfer of Misawa base operating support from support installations (+538). This increase is partially offset by conversion of non-military essential positions to civilians (-544).

The civilian increase in FY 1985 results from Ground Launched Cruise Missile support (+166), Okinawa family housing support (+95), support to DIA at Bolling AFB (+85), the transfer of Misawa base operating support from support installations (+582), and conversion of non-military essential positions to civilians (+544).

The decrease in military spaces in FY 1986 results from contract program adjustments, conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian (-115), and the transfer of base operating support spaces accountability at Bolling AFB to support installations (-565). This increase is partially offset by increases in strategic and tactical force structure growth (+677), and beddown of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (+820).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1986 results from adjustments in the contracting program and conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian (+2,086), strategic and tactical force structure growth (+237), and beddown of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (+172). This increase was partially offset by the transfer of base operating support spaces accountability at Bolling AFB to support installations (-403), and economies and efficiencies (-448).

This active manpower represents daily, peacetime workload in support of active force missions and is most suitable for the active component.

The moderate increase in ANG spaces in FY 1986 results from 26 spaces for NATC Air Base Satellite Communications and 13 spaces to provide adequate Comptroller support for 1,000 personnel assigned to geographically separated units in Western Washington.

The AFR increases in FY 1985 (+833) and FY 1986 (+1026) partially offset civil engineering wartime shortfalls.

b. Base Operating Support - Support Installations. This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance of auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries, and commissaries.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations,
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	45.5	45.8	47.1
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.3	0.4	0.6
<u>Civilian</u>	37.5	37.2	38.4

The active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in medical war readiness (+633), and troop issue readiness (+335). This increase is largely offset by conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian (-259) and the transfer of Misawa base operating support to combat installations (-538).

The civilian decrease in FY 1985 results from the transfer of Misawa base operating support to combat installations (-582). The decrease is partially offset by the conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian (+259).

The increase in military spaces in FY 1986 results from increases in medical war readiness (+1076), health services expansion in family practice support (+100), medical support for Ground Launched Cruise Missile (+49) and the transfer of base operating support spaces accountability at Bolling AFB from combat installations (+565). This growth is partially offset by conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian and contract adjustments (-379).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1986 results primarily from increases in converting non-military essential positions to civilian and contract program adjustments (+808), additional medical quality assurance evaluators (+141), and transfer of base operating support spaces accountability at Bolling AFB from combat installations (+403). This increase is partially offset by economies and efficiencies (-225).

The AFR increase in FY 1985 (+100) and FY 1986 (+250) offset surge wartime training requirements.

2. Medical Support. Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.8	15.1	15.4
Selected Reserve			
AFR	4.1	5.4	5.4
<u>Civilian</u>	3.2	3.3	3.4

The Active military increase in FY 1985 results from increases in the medical war readiness program (+130) and other medical initiatives (+183) such as family practice support and occupational/environmental health laboratories.

The civilian increases in FY 1985 (+137) and FY 1986 (+58) result from medical support for increased force structure and support for occupational/environmental health laboratories.

For FY 1986, the military increase (+228) is mainly attributable to medical war readiness.

The FY 1985 AFR increase (+1257) supports a contingency hospital and medical personnel wartime shortfalls.

3. Personnel Support. Included in this category is manpower to support all recruiting activities (recruiting, examining, and personnel processing), American Forces Information Service, Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team, honor guards, and other activities such as drug and alcohol training, equal opportunity race relations training, and civilian education/training development.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Military			
Active	6.4	6.4	6.5
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.5	0.5	0.5
AFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
Civilian			
	1.9	1.9	2.3

The active military increase in FY 1986 results from increases in the Armed Forces Radio and Television Services (+37) for Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) Site 5 (Woensdrecht, Netherlands), and support for the AF Corrections Program at Ft Lewis (+36).

The Civilian increases in FY 1986 (+400) support establishment of a civilian intern program to groom college graduates for Air Force career programs in shortage skills.

4. Individual Training. Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees, Students, and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
Military			
Active	22.4	22.6	22.9
Selected Reserve			
AFR	1.3	1.3	1.2
Civilian			
	5.0	5.2	5.4

The active military increase (+190) in FY 1985 results from instructor/staff support for both increased officer accessions and non-prior service enlisted accessions (60,000-65,000), and for curriculum development initiatives due to weapon system changes (+488). The increase in FY 1985 is partially offset by a reduction in undergraduate flying training production and contract adjustment (-298).

The civilian increases in FY 1985 (+194) are a result of identifying word processing centers at the Technical Training Centers and at the Defense Language Institute as contracting candidates.

For FY 1986, the military increase (+251) results from increased syllabus requirements for both navigator and pilot training (+194) and increased initial skills and skill progression training requirements (+173). The increase in FY 1986 is partially offset by reductions in curriculum development workloads, OTS production, and contract adjustments (-116).

The FY 1986 civilian increase (+215) is a result of cost comparison actions in the training establishment.

The FY 1986 AFR decrease (-100) allowed funding support for other, higher priority programs.

5. Force Support Training. Included in this category is all manpower required to conduct strategic, tactical, and mobility support training. Also included are tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training.

Air Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.5	26.5	27.4
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.3	2.5	2.9
<u>Civilian</u>	2.6	2.6	2.7

The active military increase in FY 1986 (+866) results mainly from C-5B training for active and ARF (+246), F-4E and F-16 training initiatives (+234), chemical/biological defensive training (+199), and C-5 aircrew training (+51). The remaining increases (+136) result from increased support for the field training detachments (FTDs) to accommodate weapon system changes and strategic offensive and defensive training initiatives. Above increases reflect a partial offset of -57 spaces based on identifying simulator maintenance as a contracting candidate.

The civilian increase in FY 1986 (+88) results mainly from cost comparison study initiatives for simulator maintenance on C-130 and HC-130 simulators at Kirtland and Little Rock AFBs.

The ANG increase in FY 1985 is due to increased F-4 PAA at ANG operated training schools at Kingsley Field, OR, and McConnell AFB, KS (+229).

The increase in ANG FY 1986 spaces results from 266 spaces required for the six additional aircraft programmed to be assigned to the training unit at Tucson, Arizona and 82 spaces for the increased PAA at the RF-4 training school, Boise, Idaho.

An ANG civilian increase of 76 spaces in FY 1986 is related to expansion of the tactical fighter aircrew training mission.

6. Central Logistics. Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily in the Air Force logistics Command.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.0	5.2	5.1
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.8	0.8	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	73.7	77.9	80.9

The increase in military spaces in FY 1985 results from increases in support of the European spares distribution system (+31), weapon system acquisition and upgrade (+56) and increased distribution, inventory, item management maintenance and engineering workloads (+61).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1985 results from increases for spares acquisition (+2686), enhanced spares costing (+250), weapon system acquisition and upgrade (+656), increased flying hours/PAA logistics support (+125), improved logistics readiness and sustainability (+655), and contract adjustments (+476). These increases are partially offset by decreases in depot maintenance industrial fund manpower (-642).

The increase in civilian spaces in FY 1986 results from increases for spares acquisition (+68), increases in flying hours and aircraft inventory (+769), improved inventory accuracy (+250), enhanced distribution operation readiness (+211), increased weapon system engineering and technical support (+394), special program support (+236), and weapon system acquisition and upgrade (+1256). These increases are partially offset by decreases (-180) in support for the Logistics Civilian Career Program.

The FY 1986 AFR increase (+100) satisfies surge requirements in the Air Logistics Centers.

7. Centralized Support Activities. The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.9	15.5	15.2
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.1	2.1	2.2
AFR	1.5	1.5	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	10.3	10.5	11.0

The active military decrease in FY 1985 is the result of an internal 5 percent reduction in selected Separate Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units and contracting foreign student pilot training support at Williams AFB (-243). The active military decrease in FY 1986 is the result of the realignment of the First Helicopter Squadron to mobility forces (-170), and conversion of non-military essential positions to civilian (-370).

The civilian increases in FY 1986 result from converting non-military essential positions to civilian (+370) and increased support at the Western Test Range (+50) and Air Force Data Systems Design Center (+20).

The ANG increases in FY 1986 are the result of 134 spaces to accomplish a wide span of increased responsibilities ranging from equipment upgrade at the permanent field training sites and gunnery ranges, full-time legal and contracting support at State Headquarters, to developing tactics and weapons delivery procedures at the Fighter Weapons Office and accommodating the support aircraft change from C-7 to C-130 in Hawaii.

The FY 1986 AFR decrease (-400) allowed funding support for other, higher priority programs.

8. Management Headquarters. The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Departmental Headquarters Air Force Secretariat, and the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau and Air Force Reserve), Departmental Support Activities, major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Systems Command Product Divisions. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.5	17.3	16.9
Selected Reserve			
ANG	0.1	0.1	0.1
AFR	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	8.6	8.4	8.8

Over the period from 1968 to 1984 the Air Force reduced management headquarters more than 29,000 authorizations. The effect of those actions has been a cumulative reduction of 55 percent in management headquarters manning as compared to a total Air Force end strength reduction during the same period of 33 percent.

The Air Force requests support of our management headquarters program as requested in the FY 1986 Budget.

9. Federal Agency Support. This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis.

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
 (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.3	0.3	0.3
Selected Reserve			
AFR	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50.

E. Operating Strength Deviation. The manpower management system of the Air Force records authorized strength for force units as opposed to the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the acutal in-place strength because of fluctuations in manning. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. Historically, the number of students and transients tend to be higher in the summer than on average due to seasonal variations in recruiting and PCS moves; hence there are fewer numbers of people in operating units at the end of the fiscal year. The Air Force accounts for this by projecting year end vacancies in field units in a separate undistributed, manpower program element or account.

Operating Strength Deviation
(End Strength In Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	-5.9	-8.5	-6.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	+ .9	-2.3	-2.2
AFR	+ .4	-1.9	-1.8

F. Individuals. The Individuals account contains manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets. The manpower in the individuals account is based primarily on end strengths required for training military people and moving them to and between duty assignments. Many years are also included to cover unit personnel losses due to prolonged sickness, criminal confinement, and holding while processing out for disciplinary separation.

1. Transients. Air Force manpower in this category accounts for personnel in travel, leave, or proceed status while under PCS orders.

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.6	14.0	14.6

The active military increases for FY 1985 (+419) and FY 1986 (+628) result from the increased PCS moves associated with overall Air Force end strength increases.

2. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining, patients in a hospital for over 90 days, and personnel awaiting discharge for disciplinary reasons.

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.5	0.5

The active military decrease in FY 1985 (-85) results from updated programming factors..

3. Trainees and Students. This category accounts for people undergoing basic military and initial skills training, and all other formal training in courses at least 20 weeks long.

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	41.9	43.3	43.6
Selected Reserve			
ANG	2.4	2.4	2.4
AFR	1.6	1.6	1.4

The active military increase in FY 1985 is the result of increased officer and enlisted accessions (+1651). The increase is partially offset by reductions in undergraduate flying training (-187), graduate education (-143), and the Airmen Education and Commissioning Program (-55).

The active military increase in FY 1986 is the result of increased skill training requirements in highly technical AFSCs (+555) and increased requirements for under graduate navigator training (+35). The increases are partially offset by reductions in officer production (-158), and further reduction in both the Airman Education and Commissioning Program (-55) and graduate education programs (-41).

4. Cadets. This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER PROGRAM

I. Introduction. In 1958, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to integrate under a single agency "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department, whenever (he) determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency". Since that time, the Secretary has utilized that authority 18 times. Today's Defense Agencies vary widely in their functions and missions: they provide communications, mapping, intelligence, education, logistics and other support to the military Services and other parts of the federal government. Underlying each Agency are the economies and efficiencies they have brought to the Defense community. By eliminating duplication of effort within the Services, the Defense Agency structure permits the Services to devote a greater portion of their resources to their primary military missions.

This chapter contains the manpower programs of the following organizations:

Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Staff
- Field Activities
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
 Defense Audiovisual Agency
 Defense Communications Agency
 Defense Contract Audit Agency
 Defense Investigative Service
 Defense Legal Service Agency
 Defense Logistics Agency
 Defense Mapping Agency
 Defense Nuclear Agency
 Defense Security Assistance Agency
 Strategic Defense Initiatives Organization
 Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
 US Court of Military Appeals
 Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency

II. Manpower Programs. Except for the National Security Agency, which is excluded in accordance with Public Law 98-36 and the Defense Intelligence Agency whose manpower levels are classified information in accordance with the Director of Central Intelligence, the combined manpower programs of the Defense Agencies are shown in the following table. All military strength displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are active component and are included in Service active component strength in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, details may not add to totals due to rounding.

Defense Agencies Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	6.4	6.6	6.8
Civilian	<u>84.2</u>	<u>87.6</u>	<u>89.5</u>
Total	90.7	94.2	96.4

The FY 1984 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strength, while programmed manpower space authorizations are shown for FY 1985 and FY 1986. Actual civilian strength is typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot be refilled immediately. This accounts for all apparent FY 1984 to FY 1985 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower program of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined Defense Agency manpower program is displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

A. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

1. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department.

OSD Staff Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	0.5	0.4	0.5
Civilian	1.2	1.3	1.4
Total	1.8	1.7	1.8

2. DoD Field Activities. These activities perform designated services on a DoD-wide basis to the Military Services and other DoD organizations. Their programs are more limited in scope than those of a Defense Agency. These organizations are described below.

a. Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff, four Defense Agencies and other assigned DoD organizations in the National Capital Region.

WHS MANPOWER PROGRAM
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	0.1	0.1	0.1
Civilian	0.4	0.4	0.4
Total	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>

b. The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program, including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of this program.

AFIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	60	65	65
Civilian	128	138	138
Total	<u>188</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>203</u>

c. The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages payment for medical care in nonmilitary facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

CHAMPUS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	9	7	7
Civilian	217	222	222
Total	<u>226</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>229</u>

d. The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military Services.

TRIMIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	33	34	34
Civilian	34	62	62
Total	<u>67</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>96</u>

e. The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, or substantial growth.

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	3	3	3
Civilian	26	30	30
Total	<u>29</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>33</u>

f. The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas, administers and operates a junior college in Panama, and administers Section 6 schools in Puerto Rico and the continental United States.

DoDDS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Civilian	12.2	12.6	12.6

The increase in FY 1985 is due to increased enrollments in overseas schools.

B. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to aid them in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

OJCS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	1.2	1.2	1.2
Civilian	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>

The manpower increase in FY 1985 reflects the additional personnel required to perform analytical functions to influence the planning programming and budgeting system of DoD.

C. The Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG, DoD) is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department. The office initiates, conducts and supervises such audits and investigations in the DoD that the IG deems appropriate and provides policy direction for audits and investigations relating to fraud, waste and abuse and program effectiveness.

DoD Inspector General Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.9	1.1	1.1
Total	<u>1.0</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

The increase in manpower in FY 1985 and FY 1986 will permit the auditors to maintain the momentum of greater emphasis on audits of the acquisition process. The Inspector General is devoting an increasingly greater number of manyears to this area, paralleling the expenditure of funds by the Department on the acquisition process. It will also allow for increased criminal investigations focusing on white collar crime. This area has been identified as the major area in the Department requiring additional coverage. The IG's criminal investigators were specifically established to address this area. They have been responsible for 55 percent of all indictments, 44 percent of convictions, and 29 percent of monetary recoveries or fines for cases returned by DoD to the Department of Justice. Additional resources in FY 1986 will permit continuation of this effort. Lastly, it will permit inspectors to concentrate on special inquiries received through the Hotline and to extend inspection coverage to entities within the Department who had no previous inspection capability or coverage.

D. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) manages high-risk basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise by adversaries and offer potential for major increases in U.S. defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA uses the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industry, educational and research institutions, and individuals.

DARPA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>

E. The Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA) provides audiovisual production, acquisition, distribution and depository services and certain other audiovisual services which can be performed more efficiently on a centralized basis.

DAVA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>

*less than 50

F. The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) is responsible for engineering and management of the Defense Communications System and system architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems. DCA provides engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network. They also procure leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	1.7	1.7	1.9
Civilian	1.8	1.8	1.9
Total	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>3.8</u>

The civilian and military increases in FY 1985 and FY 1986 reflect program growth in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System and in defense communications services.

G. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is responsible for assisting Department of Defense procurement authorities world-wide in achieving sound contract pricing by evaluating proposals submitted by contractors for proposed contracts, verifying the propriety and acceptability of costs charged to flexibly priced government contracts, and deterring contractors' inefficient practices. The agency also provides contract audit services to about 30 other Federal agencies at contractor locations where DoD has a continuing audit interest, or where it is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view.

Contract audit work load is generated by procurement and contract administration activities. The approved funding level for the DoD procurement and research and development programs directly affects the workload of DCAA. Other factors affecting contract audit workload are DoD procurement policies, the implementation of existing Cost Accounting Standards (Public Law 91-379), reviews required under Public Law 87-653 (The Truth in Negotiations Act), new or expanding programs of non-Defense agencies, and audits performed for the military departments in connection with the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.

DCAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Civilian	4.2	4.6	4.9

The increase in civilians in FY 1985 results from an increase of 185 spaces to implement management initiatives designed to improve the Agency's ability to perform detailed defective pricing reviews, and to perform expanded intensive labor audits, which focus on contracts where DoD's vulnerability to labor mischarging is highest. The remaining 300 space increase is to accommodate workload changes associated with a revision to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which lowers dollar thresholds for contract price proposal audits.

The increase of 222 civilian end strength in FY 1986 is based upon increased audit workload resulting from growth in DoD's procurement accounts. Specifically, these additional personnel will achieve greater savings by reducing the level of unaudited costs incurred by Defense contractors.

H. The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) conducts personnel security investigations, law enforcement investigations for DoD Components and other investigations directed by the Secretary of Defense. It also administers defense industrial security programs on behalf of the DoD and other Federal departments and agencies.

DIS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	*	0	0
Civilian	3.3	3.7	3.7
Total	3.3	3.7	3.7

*Fewer than 50 spaces

The absence of military end strength after FY 1984 reflects implementation of a civilianization program directed by the Congress. The civilian increase in FY 1985 and FY 1986 is required to support the increasing workload and to improve the quality of investigations and inspections.

I. The Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA) consolidates the functions of the OSD legal staff with the legal staffs of the Defense Agencies. The legal staffs of the Defense Agencies and OSD field activities remain with their current organizations while operating under the supervision of the DoD General Counsel/Director DLSA.

DLSA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	-	-	-
Civilian	59	59	59
Total	59	59	59

J. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, general and electronic supplies, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property reutilization and disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the Defense Agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities.

DLA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	1.0	1.0	1.0
Civilian	48.9	50.3	51.4
Total	<u>49.9</u>	<u>51.3</u>	<u>52.4</u>

K. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) provides mapping, charting, and geodetic (MC&G) support to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and other DoD components through the production and worldwide distribution of maps, charts, precise positioning data, and digital data for strategic and tactical military operations and weapons systems. It serves as Program Manager and coordinator of all DoD MC&G resources and activities and carries out statutory responsibilities for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data.

DMA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	8.8	8.8	9.1
Total	<u>9.2</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.6</u>

The manpower increases in FY 1985 and FY 1986 are required to support the ballistic missile program, manned bomber/cruise missile program, and tactical operations.

L. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) provides support, including staff advice and assistance, to the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DoD components, as appropriate, in matters concerning nuclear weapons through consolidated management of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile; management of nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons effects research programs; scientific research in the field of radiobiology and related matters that are essential to the medical support of DoD; and for such other aspects of the DoD nuclear program as may be directed.

DNA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.6
Civilian	0.7	0.7	0.8
Total	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>1.4</u>

The manpower increase in FY 1986 is primarily to support new requirements in radiobiology research, acquisition of nuclear survivable systems, strategic defense initiatives, and other expanded missions/operations.

M. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.

DSAA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

N. The Strategic Defense Initiatives Organization (SDIO) was organized in FY 1984 to manage the research and technology programs of the Strategic Defense Initiative Program. This comprehensive program will develop key technologies associated with concepts for defense against ballistic missiles.

SDIO Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	9	40	45
Civilian	7	65	80
Total	16	105	125

O. The Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) provides education in health sciences to individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

USUHS Manpower Program
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	0.8 ^{1/}	0.8 ^{1/}	0.8 ^{1/}
Civilian	0.8	0.8	0.8
Total	1.5	1.6	1.6

^{1/} Does not include 626 students in FY 1984, 629 in FY 1985, and 626 in FY 1986 who are students at USUHS.

P. The US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA) serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for a year or more.

USCMA Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Civilian	41	49	49

Q. Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency (JTC³A) was established during FY 1984 to ensure the interoperability of tactical command, control and communications systems for joint and combined operations. It subsumed the Joint Tactical Communications Office (TRI-TAC) and the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS), both of whose programs were formerly shown within the U.S. Army. Although considered a Defense Agency, the manpower to staff this agency is currently shown within Service totals and has not yet been included in Defense Agency totals because of its recent establishment.

JTC³A Manpower Program
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>
Military	66	166	169
Civilian	212	212	220
Total	378	378	389

III. Programmed Manpower By DPPC. The following tables show the combined military and civilian manning programs of the Defense Agencies by DPPC.

TABLE VII-1
DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1984 Actual	FY 1985 FY 1986	FY 1986 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>0.8</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	--	--	--
Defense Strategic Forces	--	--	--
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.8
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Force			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>2.1</u>
Intelligence	*	*	*
Centrally Managed Communications	1.3	1.3	1.4
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	*	*	*
Personnel Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Individual Training	0.7	0.8	0.8
Force Support Training	--	--	--
Central Logistics	1.0	1.1	1.1
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	*	0.1
Management Headquarters	1.8	1.8	1.9
Federal Agency Support	--	--	--
Total	6.4	6.6	6.8

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The military strengths in Defense Agencies shown above are also included in individual Service tables.

*Fewer than 50

TABLE VII-2
DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN MANPOWER
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1984 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1985 FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1986 Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	--	--	--
Defense Strategic Forces	--	--	--
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.6	0.6	0.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Force			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.9</u>	<u>10.3</u>
Intelligence	0.2	0.1	0.1
Centrally Managed Communications	1.0	1.0	1.1
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	8.4	8.6	8.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>73.8</u>	<u>77.1</u>	<u>78.7</u>
Base Operating Support	6.0	5.8	5.8
Metical Support	0.4	0.4	0.4
Personnel Support	12.2	12.7	12.7
Individual Training	0.6	0.7	0.7
Force Support Training	--	--	--
Central Logistics	42.1	43.6	44.7
Centralized Support Activities	8.7	9.8	10.2
Management Headquarters	3.9	4.1	4.2
Federal Agency Support	--	--	--
Total	84.2	87.6	89.5

Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

CHAPTER VIII

COST OF MANPOWER

I. Introduction. DoD outlays for manpower are estimated to be \$118.2 billion in the President's FY 1986 Budget request. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs, provides an overview of manpower cost trends, identifies and discusses detailed FY 1986 manpower costs, and provides selected military and civilian pay rates.

II. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

A. Cost Categories. The manpower cost categories discussed in this chapter are described below:

1. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund active component military pay, cash allowances, matching Social Security contributions (FICA), enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, permanent change of station travel expenses, the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind), and the cost of individual clothing. Beginning in FY 1985, the Military Personnel appropriations also funded the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC 74.

2. Defense Family Housing Costs are incurred to lease, construct, and maintain family housing for military personnel. This category also includes funds to pay civilians who operate and maintain family housing. Since pay for all DoD civilians is counted under another category, "Civilian Costs," in this chapter, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian compensation and compensation-related costs and does not reflect the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.

3. Military Retired Pay. Prior to FY 1985, military retired pay was funded by the Military Retired Pay appropriation. This appropriation, managed by DcD, provided funds for the compensation of military personnel retired from previous service. Commencing in FY 1985, DoD implemented a new accrual accounting system for military retired pay. Under this concept, accrual costs are budgeted in the Military Personnel accounts and subsequently transferred to a new Military Retirement Trust Fund. Retired pay is paid from the trust fund. Unfunded liability for retired pay will be liquidated over a period of time to be determined by the DoD Retirement Board of Actuaries. This Board of Actuaries also determines an amortization schedule for the transfer of funds from the general fund of the Treasury to the new DoD Military Retirement Trust Fund.

4. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six Reserve Components, fund inactive duty drills; active duty for training; ROTC; full-time guard members and reservists for organization, administration, instruction training, maintenance and other logistical support; educational and bonus programs; training; the Health Professions Scholarship Program; and management and training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

5. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs, which are funded by specific appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations according to function performed. Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hire employees. Also included are DoD contributions to retirement and to health and life insurance for civilian employees. Nearly 90 percent of DoD civilian costs are paid from the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations or from industrially - funded activities largely financed by O&M funds. Much smaller percentages of civilian costs are paid from the RDT&E, Military Construction, and Family Housing appropriations.

6. Personnel Support Costs are incurred in carrying out the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependents Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total BOS)
- Other Personnel Support

Direct personnel costs are not included in personnel support costs, since they are included in previously defined cost categories.

B. Cost Trends. Table VIII-1 shows trends in manpower costs and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1986 budget and selected historical years.

C. Pay Raise Assumption. Pay raises granted in recent years and the pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1986 budget are shown in Table VIII-2. The figures for General Schedule and Wage Board employees are for base salary only. The military figures are the overall average percentage increase in basic pay, basic allowance for quarters, and basic allowance for subsistence. The figures are expressed as percentage increases over the previous year's pay scale.

TABLE VIII-1
DEFENSE MANPOWER COST 1/
(Outlays, \$BILLION)

	Actual							FY 1986 President's Budget Budget Request	
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 78	FY 80	FY 82	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86
	49.5	77.3	77.6	103.0	132.8	182.9	220.8	246.3	277.5
Total Defense									
Manpower Costs									
Direct Manpower Costs									
Military Personnel									
Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	25.1	33.3	38.5	42.7	60.5	64.0
(Retired Pay Accrual)								(15.2)	(15.9)
Def Family Housing Costs 2/	.5	.4	.7	1.1	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.7	2.8
Military Retired Pay									
Appropriation 3/	1.2	2.1	5.1	9.2	13.7	14.9	16.5	-	-
Reserve and Guard									
Personnel Appropriations	.7	.9	1.6	2.0	3.0	3.8	4.9	7.4	8.8
(Retired Pay Accrual)								(1.8)	(2.3)
Civilian Costs 4/	7.5	10.6	14.1	18.9	22.3	26.1	29.1	30.3	29.9
Subtotal Direct Manpower Costs	22.2	33.0	43.7	56.3	73.9	85.3	95.7	101.0	105.3
Personnel Support Costs 5/	1.7	2.8	2.9	4.2	5.2	8.3	9.6	10.9	12.7
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	60.2	79.1	93.6	105.3	111.9	118.2
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End Strengths (000s)									
Military									
Active	2,687	3,547	2,161	2,061	2,040	2,097	2,138	2,152	2,178
Selected Reserve 6/	953	922	925	788	861	974	1,046	1,077	1,124
Civilian 4/									
Direct Hire	1,141	1,370	1,016	935	916	945	1,000	1,002	1,020
Indirect Hire	34	36	94	81	75	83	85	85	87
Total	1,175	1,406	1,110	1,016	991	1,028	1,085	1,088	1,107
Retired Military	435	651	1,012	1,243	1,330	1,391	1,449	1,478	1,509
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NOTE: Detail may not add due to rounding.

- 1/ Data exclude civil functions, NSA, and special programs for disadvantaged youths.
- 2/ Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.
- 3/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not reflected in this appropriation prior to 1985.
- 4/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations -- e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.
- 5/ Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category.
- 6/ Includes National Guard and reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

TABLE VIII-2
PERCENTAGE PAY RAISES

<u>FY</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
74	4.8	4.8	10.2 <u>1/</u>
75	5.5	5.5	8.9
76	5.0	5.0	9.0
77	4.8	4.8	8.3
78	7.1	7.1	7.9
79	5.5	5.5	5.3
80	7.0	7.0	6.4 <u>2/</u>
81	11.7	9.1	9.1
82	14.3 <u>3/</u>	4.8	4.8
83	4.0	4.0	4.0
84 <u>4/</u>	4.0	3.5	3.5
85 <u>5/</u>	4.0	3.5	3.5
86 <u>6/</u>	3.0	-5.0	-5.0

1/ Includes approximately 4 percent catch-up increase upon the release from economic controls effective the first pay period after April 30, 1974.

2/ Wage board raises were limited by legislative action each year after 1979.

3/ Enlisted basic pay raises for FY 1982 ranged from 10 percent for pay grade E-1 to 17 percent for E-7 through E-9. All warrant officers and commissioned officers received a 14.3 percent increase.

4/ Raise effective January 1, 1984.

5/ Raise effective January 1, 1985.

6/ The FY 1986 proposed military pay raise is budgeted to be effective on July 1, 1985, which is three months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.

III. Detailed FY 1986 Manpower Costs. The costs in this section are derived from budget support detail submitted to Congress and, therefore, are stated as total obligational authority (TOA). Since these estimates are expressed as TOA, they will not agree with the cost data (outlays) provided elsewhere in this chapter.

Table VIII-3 provides a detailed breakout of FY 1986 manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements, indexed in the margins of Table VIII-3, are discussed in more detail following the table.

1. Active Component Basic Pay is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. It currently ranges in FY 1985 from \$6,883.20 a year for a new recruit to \$68,700.00 a year (effective January 1, 1985) for grades O-9 and above. These rates will increase with the approval of the July 1985 pay raise. The amount of basic pay a member receives is a function of pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total cost of basic pay is determined by the number of manyears distributed across grade and length of service (see table VIII-8).

2. Active Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 USC 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Military Personnel account and transfers funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust fund from which payments are made to retirees. Accrual estimates are determined by applying a fixed normal cost percentage rate (50.7%) to basic pay amounts in the Military Personnel appropriations.

3. Active Component Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. There are two BAQ rates for each military grade: one for members without dependents and another for members with dependents. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters or who are assigned to field or sea duty receive a partial BAQ payment. BAQ costs are a function of overall strength, the grade and dependency status distribution of the force, and the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ in FY 1985 effective January 1, 1985 is from \$1,602.00 a year for an E-1 with less than four months active duty and no dependents to \$7,930.80 a year for a flag/general officer with dependents (see table VIII-8). The costs of in-kind housing are not shown in this category, but are included in the family housing and base operating support categories.

4. Active Component Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) is paid to military members receiving BAQ who reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States or who are assigned overseas, but whose dependents reside in high housing cost areas of the continental United States. It is a function of the number of military families residing off post in high housing cost areas of the continental US and the cost of housing relative to national median housing cost (NMHC).

5. Active Component Subsistence represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). All officers receive BAS at the same rate, which effective January 1, 1985, is \$1,274.16 a year. Enlisted members receive either "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or BAS. There are three BAS rates for enlisted personnel. Except for those with less than four months active duty, enlisted members receive \$5.06 per day (\$1,846.90 annually) when on leave or authorized to mess separately (which is the most common form of BAS), \$5.72 per day when a mess is not available, or \$7.57 per day when assigned duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available. Those

TABLE VIII-3

FY 1986 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
 (from FY 1986 Presidents Budget in TOA-\$M)

<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DoD Wide</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Index</u>
<u>Military Personnel Appropriations</u>								
1 Basic Pay	11,146	8,207	2,560	9,501			31,408	1
2 Retired Pay Accrual	5,651	4,160	1,298	4,816			15,926	2
3 Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	1,384	1,164	309	1,281			4,138	3
4 Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)	269	437	107	297			1,109	4
5 Subsistence (In-Kind and Cash Allowance)	1,295	934	305	1,044			3,577	5
6 Bonuses	274	282	113	101			770	6
7 Other Pay	243	567	42	266			1,118	7
8 Other Allowances	357	225	73	230			885	8
9 FICA	786	581	181	672			2,220	9
10 PCS Travel	1,102	612	194	971			2,879	10
11 Cadets	34	35	33	33			101	11
12 Miscellaneous	326	144	52	144			665	12
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>22,768</u>	<u>17,340</u>	<u>5,234</u>	<u>19,356</u>			<u>54,798</u>	
- Reimbursables (Pay and Allowances)						-460		
<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>22,712</u>	<u>17,221</u>	<u>5,217</u>	<u>19,188</u>		<u>64,339</u>		
<u>TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>	<u>22,712</u>	<u>17,221</u>	<u>5,217</u>	<u>19,188</u>		<u>64,339</u>		
<u>Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations</u>								
13 Pay	2,850	664	141	837			4,491	13
14 Retired Pay Accrual	1,502	335	71	422			2,330	14
15 Allowances	807	197	42	202			1,248	15
16 Clothing	141	26	9	20			196	16
17 Travel	299	99	22	91			512	17
18 Other	225	34	4	46			309	18
<u>Direct Obligations</u>	<u>5,825</u>	<u>1,354</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>1,618</u>			<u>9,086</u>	
<u>TOTAL RES/GRD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS</u>	<u>5,825</u>	<u>1,354</u>	<u>290</u>	<u>1,618</u>			<u>9,086</u>	

TABLE VIII-3 (Cont'd in 2d)

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DOD Wide</u>	<u>Total DOD</u>	<u>Index</u>
19	Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-pay)							3,284	3,284
<u>Civilian Costs 1/2/</u>									
20	Salaries	9,015	8,705		6,193	2,962	2	26,877	20
21	Health and Life Insurance	301	290		206	99		896	21
22	Retired Pay (DOD Contribution)	701	677		482	230		2,090	22
	Direct Obligations	10,017	9,672		6,881	3,291	2	29,863	
	<u>TOTAL CIVILIAN COSTS 1/2/</u>	10,017	9,672		6,881	3,291	2	29,863	
<u>Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>									
23	Individual Training		1,160	1,163	61	1,106	13		3,503
24	Medical Support	696	215		528	1,561			3,000
25	Recruiting and Examining	308	64		53	44			469
26	Overseas Dependents Education								25
27	Base Operating Support (50%)	2,203	1,556		361	2,527	82		371
28	Other Personnel Support	73	169		20	62			26
	<u>Total Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>	4,440	3,168		495	4,266	2,027		6,729
	<u>TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS 1/</u>	42,994	31,415		6,002	31,953	5,318	3,286	120,968

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Navy civilian costs and support Costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.

2/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Defense Family Housing, Military Court of Appeals, Civil Defense, and Military Assistance Accounts.

with less than four months active duty (E-1) receive \$4.68 per day, \$5.29 per day, and \$7.00 per day, respectively. The emergency ration rate is rarely used. Subsistence costs vary with the total number and grade distribution of many years, the number of people receiving cash in lieu of in-kind allowances, and the cost of food to DoD.

6. Active Component Enlisted Bonuses include both Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses. Enlistment Bonuses (\$137 million TOA) are paid as an incentive for people to enlist in shortage skills. High-quality Service personnel enlisting in selected combat and some combat support skills receive this incentive in return for additional service obligation. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by law is \$8,000.00, but the actual level is a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market and of Service requirements. Reenlistment Bonuses (\$633 million TOA) include Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and Regular Reenlistment Bonuses (saved-pay). All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date of PL 93-277 (June 1, 1974) receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2,000.00 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of reenlistment bonuses to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. This law replaced the Regular and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). The SRB is given only to qualified people reenlisting in a critical and shortage skill during the first 14 years of active military service. The current maximum SRB level is \$30,000, however, no more than 10 percent of the bonus payments awarded during any fiscal year shall exceed \$20,000. The SRB concept is intended to apply the principles of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill-by-skill basis. Effective January 15, 1982, SRBs may be paid in a lump-sum payment up to 50 percent of the bonus with the rest paid in equal installments over the reenlistment period.

7. Active Component Other Pays include Incentive, Special, and Special Duty Assignment Pay. Incentive Pay (\$459 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty and career incentive pay for submarine and aviation duty. Total incentive pay costs are dependent on the number and grade distribution of qualifying personnel. Special Pays (\$603 million TOA) include a number of pays designed to encourage continuation on active duty, such as bonuses for medical and nuclear-qualified officers, certain aviators in undermanned communities, and pays to provide recompense to people performing certain types of duty, such as sea duty and diving duty. Special Duty Assignment Pay (\$35 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those meeting special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain people.

8. Active Component Other Allowances include uniform allowances, overseas station allowances, family separation allowances, and separation payments. Uniform Allowances (\$355 million TOA) include the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted members entering active duty and to most officers upon commissioning. Included in these allowances are the costs of uniform maintenance for enlisted personnel with more than six months of active service. Overseas Station Allowances (\$472 million TOA) are paid to certain military personnel serving in designated areas outside the

continental United States to reimburse them for increased costs of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates vary by geographical location and by the availability of commissary and post exchange facilities. Family Separation Allowances (FSA) (\$58 million TOA) are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents. FSA Type I, equivalent to the "without dependents" BAQ rate, is paid to members assigned on permanent duty outside the U.S. or in Alaska when government housing is not available. FSA I is designed to offset the added expense of maintaining two houses. It is not paid a member assigned in Hawaii or on permissive orders. FSA Type II is a set monthly amount of \$30.00 for the added expenses of enforced family separation due to permanent duty in an area where dependents are not authorized but where quarters are provided the member, on duty aboard ship or temporary duty away from home for a continuous period of more than 30 days. Separation Payments (\$359 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: (a) members with unused leave for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; (b) members separated for physical disability reasons; (c) officers separated for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion; and (d) reserve members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. Public Law 94-212 limits to 60 days the total terminal leave in a career for which an individual can be paid. The FY 1977 Authorization Bill (PL 94-361) prohibited quarters or subsistence payments for any leave accrued after 31 August 1976.

9. Active Component FICA Contributions are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law (7.05% of basic pay up to \$39,600 in calendar year 1985).

10. Active Component PCS Travel is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. Table VIII-4 shows detailed PCS costs by type and Service for FY 1986.

TABLE VIII-4
FY 1986 PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) COSTS
(\$MILLIONS-TOA)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	136	88	31	72	328
Training travel	56	66	8	32	162
Operational travel	73	124	38	138	373
Rotational travel	567	197	84	556	1,404
Separation travel	157	73	21	107	358
Travel of Organized Units	27	18	*	1	46
Non-Temporary Storage	33	10	4	30	76
Temporary Lodging Expense	54	36	8	35	132
Total Obligations	<u>1,102</u>	<u>612</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>971</u>	<u>2,879</u>
Less Reimbursements	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>
Total Direct Obligations	<u>1,097</u>	<u>609</u>	<u>192</u>	<u>970</u>	<u>2,868</u>

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Number less than a million

11. Cadet Pay and Allowances includes the pay and allowances of those cadets and midshipmen attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

12. Miscellaneous Costs include death gratuities and apprehension of deserters. Death gratuities (\$7 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. Funds for apprehension of deserters (\$5 million TOA) cover the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control. Unemployment compensation (\$158 million TOA) is for payment to eligible ex-service personnel. Fiscal Year 1984 was the first year of budgeting this entitlement. Survivor benefits (\$54 million TOA) provides funds for payment of benefits provided by the Veteran's Administration to spouses and children of deceased service members. This fund was previously budgeted in the Defense Retired Pay Appropriation. The new Education Assistance Program (\$121 million TOA) will provide additional benefits above those provided by the Veteran's Administration for active duty personnel entering service after June 30, 1985 and before July 1, 1988 and who meet all other eligibility requirements.

13. Reserve Component Pay includes drill pay, pay for periods of active duty for training of reserve component people, and the pay of reserve component full time support personnel.

14. Reserve Component Retired Pay Accrual provides the funds (accrual costs) necessary to fund the retired pay accrual provision contained in 10 U.S.C. 74, the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94). Under the accrual concept, each Service budgets for retired pay in the Reserve Personnel account and

transfers funds on a monthly basis to the new Military Retirement Trust Fund from which payments are made to retirees. Accrual estimates are determined by applying a fixed normal cost percentage rate (50.7%) to basic pay amounts in the Reserve Personnel appropriations.

15. Reserve Component Allowances include BAQ, subsistence, the other allowances including special and incentive pays and FICA payments for reserve component people.

16. Reserve Component Clothing includes both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits.

17. Reserve Component Travel includes the cost of travel and transportation of reserve component people.

18. Other Reserve Component Military Personnel Costs include monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarships, and Platoon Leader Class); new educational benefits for those who enlist, reenlist or extend for six years during the time period of July 1, 1985 to June 30, 1988; educational assistance; disability and hospitalization benefits; death gratuities; administrative duty pay; and management and training costs for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

19. Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

20. Civilian Salaries are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, holiday, incentive, and special pays.

21. Civilian Health and Life Insurance includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs.

22. Civilian Retired Pay (DoD Contribution) is the DoD contribution, as employer, to the Civil Service retirement fund. This is currently 7 percent of employees' basic salary for General Service and Wage Board employees.

23. Individual Training includes all the non-pay costs of individual training, including recruit training, flight training, professional training, Service Academies, and other training of individuals.

24. Medical Support includes the non-pay costs of medical support, including CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), military hospitals, and some research and development activities.

25. Recruiting and Examining (\$469 million TOA) is the non-pay costs of recruiting (including advertising) and examining military personnel.

26. Overseas Dependents Education (\$371 million TOA) includes the non-pay costs of this program.

27. Base Operating Support (50%) (\$6,729 million TOA) includes half of the non-pay part of Base Operating Support (BOS) costs. The 50 percent factor is an estimate of the portion of non-pay BOS costs related to the support of people.

28. Other Personnel Support Costs (\$324 million TOA) is a miscellaneous category covering the non-pay costs of personnel administration, civilian education and development programs, and other personnel activities.

IV. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The current civilian pay rates are shown in Tables VIII-5, VIII-6, and VIII-7. The General Schedule pay rates are in Table VIII-5. Wage Board pay rates are in Tables VIII-6 and VIII-7, for Appropriated Fund and Nonappropriated Fund employees, respectively. Note that the Wage Board pay table entries are representative averages for wage areas. Each wage area has its own distinct pay table. These tables are included as samples only.

Current military pay rates are shown in Tables VIII-8 and VIII-9. Table VIII-8 contains the active military basic pay rates, as well as Basic Allowance for Quarters and Basic Allowance for Subsistence rates. Table VIII-9 lists the pay per training weekend for military reserve personnel. A training weekend is defined as four four-hour training periods. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills, which varies by individual according to his level of authorized participation.

Table VIII-10 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay, quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances, variable housing allowance (VHA), and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because BAS, BAQ and VHA allowances are not taxed. Figures shown in Table VIII-10 are the average cash and in-kind RMC for each pay grade and longevity step, assuming that the total housing allowance received by members living off post is the sum of BAQ plus VHA and the value of in-kind quarters is equivalent to the BAQ rate.

All of these tables are as of 1 January 1985.

TABLE VIII-5
ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES

STEP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$9,339	\$9,650	\$9,961	\$10,271	\$10,582	\$10,764	\$11,071	\$11,380	\$11,393	\$11,686
2	10,501	10,750	11,097	11,393	11,521	11,860	12,199	12,538	12,877	13,216
3	11,458	11,840	12,222	12,604	12,986	13,368	13,750	14,132	14,514	14,896
4	12,862	13,291	13,720	14,149	14,578	15,007	15,436	15,865	16,294	16,723
5	14,390	14,870	15,350	15,830	16,310	16,790	17,270	17,750	18,230	18,710
6	16,040	16,575	17,110	17,645	18,180	18,715	19,250	19,785	20,320	20,855
7	17,824	18,418	19,012	19,606	20,200	20,794	21,388	21,982	22,576	23,170
8	19,740	20,398	21,056	21,714	22,372	23,030	23,688	24,346	25,004	25,662
9	21,804	22,531	23,258	23,985	24,712	25,439	26,166	26,893	27,620	28,347
10	24,011	24,811	25,611	26,411	27,211	28,011	28,811	29,611	30,411	31,211
11	26,381	27,260	28,139	29,018	29,897	30,776	31,655	32,534	33,413	34,292
12	31,619	32,673	33,727	34,781	35,835	36,889	37,943	38,997	40,051	41,105
13	37,599	38,852	40,105	41,358	42,611	43,864	45,117	46,370	47,623	48,876
14	44,430	45,911	47,392	48,873	50,354	51,835	53,316	54,797	56,278	57,759
15	52,262	54,004	55,746	57,488	59,230	60,972	62,714	64,456	66,198	67,940
16	61,296	63,339	65,382	67,425	69,468*	71,511*	73,554*	75,597*	77,640*	
17	71,804*	74,197*	76,590*	78,983*	81,376*					
18	84,157*									

* The rate of basic pay payable to employees at these rates is limited to the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule, which is \$68,700.

TABLE VIII-6
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUND)

GRADE	WG-RATES					WL-RATES					WS-WD-WN RATES					WD-WN PAY LEVEL		
	STEP 1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
1	\$ 6.39	\$ 6.56	\$ 6.93	\$ 7.19	\$ 7.46	\$ 7.04	\$ 7.33	\$ 7.62	\$ 7.92	\$ 8.21	\$ 9.48	\$ 9.87	\$ 10.26	\$ 10.66	\$ 11.05			
2	6.84	7.12	7.40	7.69	7.97	7.52	7.83	8.14	8.46	8.77	9.02	10.33	10.74	11.16	11.57			
3	7.28	7.58	7.88	8.19	8.49	8.01	8.34	8.67	9.01	9.34	10.36	10.79	11.22	11.65	12.08	1		
4	7.72	8.04	8.36	8.68	9.00	8.49	8.84	9.19	9.55	9.90	10.80	11.25	11.70	12.15	12.60	2		
5	8.15	8.49	8.83	9.17	9.51	8.97	9.34	9.71	10.09	10.46	11.23	11.70	12.17	12.64	13.10	3		
6	8.58	8.94	9.30	9.66	10.01	9.44	9.83	10.22	10.62	11.01	11.66	12.15	12.64	13.12	13.61	4		
7	9.00	9.38	9.76	10.13	10.51	9.91	10.32	10.73	11.15	11.56	12.09	12.59	13.09	13.60	14.10	5	1	
8	9.43	9.82	10.21	10.61	11.00	10.37	10.80	11.23	11.66	12.10	12.51	13.03	13.55	14.07	14.59	6	2	
9	9.84	10.25	10.66	11.07	11.48	10.83	11.28	11.73	12.18	12.63	13.02	13.46	14.00	14.54	15.08	7	3	
10	10.26	10.69	11.12	11.55	11.97	11.29	11.76	12.23	12.70	13.17	13.54	13.90	14.46	15.01	15.57	8	4	
11	10.68	11.12	11.56	12.01	12.45	11.74	12.23	12.72	13.21	13.70	14.19	14.68	15.17	15.66	16.15	9		
12	11.09	11.55	12.01	12.47	12.94	12.20	12.71	13.22	13.73	14.24	14.73	15.22	15.71	16.20	16.70	10	6	
13	11.49	11.97	12.45	12.93	13.41	12.64	13.17	13.70	14.22	14.75	15.00	15.53	16.06	16.61	17.17			
14	11.90	12.40	12.90	13.39	13.89	13.09	13.64	14.19	14.73	15.28	15.81	16.47	17.13	17.79	18.45	8		
15	12.32	12.83	13.34	13.86	14.37	13.55	14.11	14.67	15.24	15.80	16.75	17.45	18.15	18.85	19.54			
16																		
17																		
18																		
19																		

TABLE VIII-7
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL HOURLY AVERAGE SCHEDULE (NON-APPROPRIATED FUND)

GRADE	NA-RATES					NL-RATES					NS-RATES				
	STEP 1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	\$ 3.65	\$ 3.80	\$ 3.95	\$ 4.10	\$ 4.26	\$ 4.01	\$ 4.18	\$ 4.35	\$ 4.51	\$ 4.68	\$ 4.88	\$ 5.08	\$ 5.28	\$ 5.49	\$ 5.69
2	4.02	4.19	4.36	4.53	4.69	4.43	4.61	4.79	4.98	5.16	5.25	5.47	5.69	5.91	6.13
3	4.41	4.59	4.77	4.96	5.14	4.85	5.05	5.25	5.45	5.66	5.84	5.87	6.10	6.34	6.57
4	4.76	4.96	5.16	5.36	5.56	5.24	5.46	5.68	5.90	6.12	6.24	6.49	6.74	6.99	
5	5.12	5.33	5.53	5.75	5.97	5.55	5.79	6.03	6.27	6.51	6.29	6.55	6.81	7.08	7.34
6	5.45	5.68	5.89	6.12	6.35	5.96	6.21	6.45	6.68	6.94	6.61	6.89	7.17	7.44	7.72
7	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.48	6.73	6.32	6.60	6.87	7.13	7.40	6.96	7.27	7.57	7.86	8.15
8	6.10	6.36	6.62	6.88	7.13	6.73	7.01	7.29	7.58	7.86	7.33	7.63	7.93	8.23	8.54
9	6.47	6.74	7.01	7.28	7.55	7.13	7.42	7.71	8.01	8.31	7.75	8.09	8.42	8.73	9.06
10	6.82	7.11	7.38	7.67	7.95	7.49	7.83	8.14	8.44	8.75	8.18	8.51	8.85	9.20	9.55
11	7.16	7.46	7.76	8.07	8.37	7.89	8.21	8.54	8.88	9.20	8.60	8.96	9.32	9.68	10.04
12	7.50	7.83	8.14	8.46	8.76	8.26	8.61	8.95	9.30	9.64	9.02	9.39	9.78	10.15	10.53
13	7.85	8.18	8.51	8.83	9.16	8.64	9.00	9.36	9.72	10.08	9.43	9.82	10.21	10.61	11.00
14	8.20	8.54	8.88	9.22	9.56	9.01	9.39	9.77	10.14	10.52	9.84	10.25	10.66	11.07	11.48
15	8.53	8.89	9.25	9.60	9.96	9.39	9.78	10.17	10.56	10.95	10.24	10.67	11.10	11.52	11.95
16											10.67	11.11	11.55	12.00	12.44
17											11.10	11.56	12.02	12.48	12.95
18											11.52	12.00	12.48	12.96	13.44
19											11.95	12.45	12.95	13.45	13.94

TABLE VIII-8
MILITARY BASIC PAY (MONTHLY)
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1985

YEARS OF SERVICE

PAY UNDER 2 GRADE	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
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COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

0-10	5069.40	5247.90	5247.90	5449.20	5247.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90
0-9	4493.10	4610.70	4708.80	4708.80	4828.50	5029.50	5129.50	5449.20	5449.20	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90	5724.90
0-8	4069.50	4191.30	4290.90	4290.90	4290.90	4610.70	4828.50	5029.50	5247.90	5449.20	5667.20	5667.20	5667.20
0-7	3381.60	3611.40	3611.40	3611.40	3773.10	3773.10	3992.10	4191.30	4610.70	4927.50	4927.50	4927.50	4927.50
0-6	2506.20	2753.70	2934.00	2934.00	2934.00	2934.00	3033.60	3513.30	3693.00	3773.10	3992.10	4329.50	4329.50
0-5	2004.60	2354.10	2516.40	2516.40	2516.40	2516.40	2592.90	2732.10	2915.10	3133.20	3413.40	3532.50	3532.50
0-4	1689.60	2057.40	2194.80	2194.80	2235.30	2354.30	2453.30	2633.70	2753.70	2874.60	2954.10	2954.10	2954.10
0-3	1570.20	1755.30	1876.50	2076.30	2175.60	2254.20	2493.30	2554.80	2554.80	2554.80	2554.80	2554.80	2554.80
0-2	1369.70	1495.20	1796.10	1856.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70	1895.70
0-1	1188.60	1237.50	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20	1495.20

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER

O-1F	2076.30	2175.60	2254.20	2375.70	2493.30	2592.90	2592.90	2375.70	2452.50	2534.70	2732.10	2732.10
O-2E	1856.70	1895.70	1955.70	2057.40	2136.00	2194.80	2194.80	2076.30	2157.00	2235.30	2313.90	2313.90
O-1E	1495.20	1597.20	1656.00	1716.00	1775.70	1856.70	1856.70	1856.70	1856.70	1856.70	1856.70	1856.70

WARRANT OFFICERS

W-4	1599.60	1716.00	1716.00	1755.30	1835.10	1916.10	1996.50	2136.00	2235.30	2313.90	2375.70	2452.50	2534.70
W-3	1453.80	1577.10	1577.10	1597.20	1616.10	1734.70	1835.10	1895.70	1955.70	2014.20	2076.30	2157.00	2235.30
W-2	1273.50	1377.60	1377.60	1417.80	1495.20	1577.10	1636.80	1695.80	1755.70	1816.80	1876.50	1935.90	2014.20
W-1	1061.10	1216.50	1216.50	1317.90	1377.60	1436.70	1495.20	1557.30	1616.10	1675.80	1734.30	1796.10	1796.10

ENLISTED MEMBERS

F-9	1660.60	1902.90	1945.80	1990.50	2034.90	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50	2074.50
F-8	1089.60	1176.00	1219.80	1262.40	1305.60	1347.00	1390.20	1433.40	1498.20	1540.80	1584.00	1604.70	1712.40
F-7	937.20	1021.80	1064.40	1109.70	1150.80	1192.60	1236.60	1300.20	1341.00	1384.20	1405.20	1405.20	1405.20
F-5	822.60	895.50	938.70	979.80	1044.00	1086.30	1129.80	1171.20	1192.80	1192.80	1192.80	1192.80	1192.80
F-4	767.40	810.30	857.70	924.60	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90	960.90
E-3	723.00	762.30	793.20	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70	824.70
E-2	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40	695.40
E-1>4	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40	620.40
E-1<4	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60	573.60

TABLE VIII-8 (Continued)

**MONTHLY
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1985**

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS FULL RATE/ PARTIAL RATE/ DEPENDENTS	WITH DEPENDENTS	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES
O-10	\$537.30	\$50.70	\$660.50
O-9	537.30	50.70	660.90
O-8	537.30	50.70	660.90
O-7	537.30	50.70	660.90
O-6	493.20	39.60	599.40
O-5	465.30	33.00	552.30
O-4	426.50	26.70	504.90
O-3	345.30	22.20	420.90
O-2	278.10	17.70	360.90
O-1	238.50	13.20	323.70
W-4	391.20	25.20	453.90
W-3	330.30	20.70	405.90
W-2	297.00	15.90	379.50
W-1	251.40	13.80	330.90
E-9	315.30	18.60	429.90
E-8	292.20	15.30	400.50
E-7	249.30	12.00	372.60
E-6	221.40	9.90	337.80
E-5	204.90	8.70	300.30
E-4	177.60	8.10	259.50
E-3	172.50	7.80	238.50
E-2	146.40	7.20	238.50
E-1>4	133.50	6.90	238.50
E-1<4	122.70	6.90	213.60

Members with dependents in grades W-1, W-3, O-2, O-3 and O-7, and those without dependents in grades W-1, W-3 and O-2 will receive slightly higher BAO than shown because of a "save-pay" provision adopted when Congress approved the new BAO table.

1/ Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 part IV of the Executive Order 11157, as amended.

2/ Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and part IV of the Executive Order 11157, as amended.

TABLE VIII-9
RESERVE PERSONNEL PAY PER TRAINING WEEKEND**

		YEARS OF SERVICE												
PAY UNDER 2 GRADE		2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE DUTY AS AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR WARRANT OFFICER														
O-10	675.92	699.72	699.72	699.72	726.56	726.56	782.16	838.12	894.20	949.96				
O-9	594.08	614.76	627.84	627.84	643.80	643.80	670.60	726.56	782.16	838.12				
O-8	542.60	558.84	572.12	572.12	614.76	614.76	643.80	670.60	699.72	726.56	755.68			
O-7	450.88	481.52	481.52	481.52	503.08	503.08	532.28	558.84	614.76	657.00	657.00			
O-6	334.16	367.16	391.20	391.20	391.20	391.20	404.48	468.44	492.40	503.08	532.28			
O-5	267.28	313.88	335.52	335.52	335.52	335.52	345.72	364.28	388.68	417.76	441.76	455.12		
O-4	225.28	274.32	292.64	292.64	298.04	311.24	332.44	367.16	383.28	393.88	393.88			
O-3	209.36	234.04	250.20	276.84	290.08	300.56	316.76	332.44	340.64	340.64	340.64			
O-2	182.56	199.36	239.48	247.56	252.76	252.76	252.76	252.76	252.76	252.76	252.76			
O-1	158.48	165.00	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36	199.36			
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	213.23	228.80	228.80	234.04	244.68	255.48	266.20	284.80	298.04	308.52	316.76	327.00	337.96	
W-3	193.84	210.28	210.28	212.96	215.48	231.24	244.68	252.76	260.76	268.56	276.84	281.60	308.52	
W-2	169.80	183.68	183.68	189.04	199.36	210.28	218.24	226.24	234.04	242.24	250.20	258.12	268.56	
W-1	141.48	162.20	162.20	175.72	183.68	191.56	191.56	199.36	207.64	215.48	223.44	231.24	239.48	
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9														
E-8														
E-7	145.28	156.80	162.64	168.32	174.08	179.60	185.36	191.12	199.76	205.44	211.20	213.96	228.32	
E-6	124.96	136.24	141.92	147.96	153.44	159.04	164.88	173.36	178.80	184.56	187.36	187.36	256.68	
E-5	109.68	119.40	125.16	130.64	139.20	144.84	150.64	156.16	159.04	159.04	159.04	159.04	159.04	
E-4	102.32	108.04	114.36	123.28	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	128.12	
E-3	96.40	101.64	105.76	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	109.96	
E-2	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	92.72	
E-1<4	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	82.72	
E-1<4	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	76.48	

* Two training assemblies on each of two successive days - (four days of basic pay)

** Drill pay is limited to \$763.12 by level V of the Executive Schedule.

TABLE VIII-10

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Averages

	PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													
		UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS															
C/S															
O-10															
O-9															
O-8															
O-7															
O-6															
O-5															
O-4															
O-3															
O-2															
O-1															
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER FOUR YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS WARRANT OFFICERS OR ENLISTED MEMBERS															
O-3E															
O-2E															
O-1E															
ALL 03	27963.39	30376.34	31963.85	34589.86	35881.84	36909.12	38519.03	40139.84	41572.60						
ALL 02	23836.11	25433.91	29316.23	30108.35	30669.36	32131.23	33664.52	34494.71	35246.34						
ALL 01	20530.53	21155.10	24433.19	25252.77	26571.01	27328.68	28999.15	28857.86	29895.33						
ALL CO	21558.90	23703.13	28051.42	33494.31	34739.84	36073.11	38793.27	41848.64	43348.81	49043.53	51538.94	56518.20	60318.73	68548.10	

TABLE VIII-10 (Continued)

REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION (RMC) - ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL
Cash and In-Kind Pay Grade Average

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE												WARRANT OFFICERS	
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
<hr/>														
W-4														
W-3														
W-2														
W-1														
19418.05	23558.98	24471.59	24968.74	25950.83	27005.46	27777.14	28548.98	29308.67	29308.67	30102.70	30875.76	31644.10	32260.94	
21334.21	21346.27	22632.71	23390.15	24137.40	24872.44	25663.79	26416.77	27165.91	27929.07	28795.17				
<hr/>														
ALL WD	19418.05	21353.98	21790.85	23530.22	24548.84	25563.56	27034.39	28451.03	30524.57	31962.47	33369.04	35554.27	39037.94	42473.83
All OFFP	21552.40	23677.77	27894.60	33239.48	34409.65	35516.79	37961.25	40555.51	42248.38	46926.23	50053.25	52990.27	57692.56	63955.01
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CHAPTER IX
MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

I. U.S. Strategic Forces

END FY 1986 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
OFFENSIVE		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1009 ICBM	CONUS	
20 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111/B-1)	1 Guam 19 CONUS	
33 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 31 CONUS	Deter nuclear and conventional attack against the US and our allies, our military forces and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>USAFR</u>		
3 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
35 SSBNs		
4 Submarine Tenders (for SSBNs)		
DEFENSIVE		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
4 Interceptor Squadrons (F-15)	CONUS	Airspace control (tactical warning/attack assessment) and wartime damage control
<u>ANGUS</u>		
11 Interceptor Squadrons (F-4, F-106)	CONUS	

II. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces. Forward deployments of US tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY MAJOR 1986 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Deter North Korean aggression and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in ejecting North Korean forces.
<u>Special Mission Brigades</u>		
Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal and force presence in Central America.
<u>Armored Cavalry Regiments</u>		
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	W. Germany	Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft 1/</u>		
<u>Sixth Fleet 2/ 3/</u>	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict. Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
2 Multipurpose Carriers		
18 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines		
11 Auxiliaries		
1 Amphibious Ready Group 4/		
2 ASW Patrol Squadrons		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Middle East Force</u> <u>2/ 3/</u> 1 Flagship (AGF) 4 Surface Combatants	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific</u> <u>2/ 3/</u> 2 Multipurpose Carriers 28 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines 6 Auxiliaries 2 Amphibious Ready Groups <u>4/</u> 4 ASW Patrol Squadrons	Western Pacific and Indian Ocean	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.

- 1/ These numbers and locations are representative and continually subject to change due to vessel acquisitions, deployment changes, decommissionings, and new conflict crises.
- 2/ Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- 3/ SIXTH and SEVENTH Fleets are providing units from the assigned forward deployed forces to the Indian Ocean in response to JCS tasking for presence in that area.
- 4/ An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consists of 3 to 5 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked.

Marine Corps Forces

Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
III Marine Amphibious Force 3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces and logistical forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-) 3d Force Service Support Group (-)		
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat) Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific and intermittently in the Indian Ocean.

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

15 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in forward areas. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for a NATO conflict.
12 Squadrons	West Germany	
1 Squadron	Netherlands	
3 Squadrons	Spain	
2 Squadrons	Iceland	
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany, Italy, England. (US Based)	
38		

Pacific

2 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence.
6 Squadrons	Japan	Provide close air support,
6 Squadrons	Korea	gain air superiority, and
14		provide interdiction and
		reconnaissance for
		an Asian conflict.

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, TEWS, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Europe

2 Squadrons 1/ 1 Squadron 2/	W. Germany United Kingdom	Provides transportation, air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.
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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	
<u>Pacific</u>		
1 Squadron	Japan	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.
2 Squadrons <u>1/</u>	Philippines	

- 1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.
2/ Includes rotational squadron.

UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

END FY 1986 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) <u>1/</u>	Fort Riley, Kansas
4th Infantry Division (M)	Fort Carson, Colorado
5th Infantry Division (M) <u>2/ 3/</u>	Fort Polk, Louisiana
6th Infantry Division (Light) <u>3/</u>	Alaska
7th Infantry Division (Light) <u>4/</u>	Fort Ord, California
9th Infantry Division (Motorized)	Fort Lewis, Washington
10th Mountain Division (Light) <u>2/</u>	Fort Drum, New York
24th Infantry Division (M) <u>2/</u>	Fort Stewart, Georgia
25th Infantry Division (Light) <u>4/</u>	Hawaii
1st Cavalry Division <u>2/</u>	Fort Hood, Texas
2d Armored Division <u>1/</u>	Fort Hood, Texas
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky

- 1/ These divisions have one brigade forward deployed in Europe.
2/ Composed of two active component and one reserve component brigades.
3/ To be activated in FY 1986 as a light infantry division with one active brigade previously designated as 172d Infantry Brigade) and one reserve component brigade (round-out). A second active component brigade will be added in FY 1987.
4/ Composed of three active component and one reserve component brigades (round-up).

Army Separate Brigades

177th Armored Brigade	Fort Irwin, California
194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade (M)	Fort Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas
75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger).	Fort Benning, Georgia

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas

Reserve Components

	<u>Army Divisions</u>	
26th Infantry Division		Massachusetts/Connecticut
28th Infantry Division		Pennsylvania
29th Infantry Division (L) <u>1/</u>		Virginia/Maryland
35th Infantry Division (M)		Kansas/Kentucky/Nebraska
38th Infantry Division		Indiana/Michigan
40th Infantry Division (M)		California
42d Infantry Division		New York
47th Infantry Division		Minnesota/Illinois/Iowa
49th Armored Division		Texas
50th Armored Division		New Jersey/Vermont

1/ This division is activated in FY 1986 by combining the assets of two existing separate brigades (the 58th and 116th Infantry Brigades) that are no longer shown as separate brigades in this report.

Army Separate Brigades 1/

29th	Infantry Brigade 2/	Hawaii
30th	Infantry Brigade (M)	North Carolina
32d	Infantry Brigade (M)	Wisconsin
39th	Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
41st	Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
45th	Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
48th	Infantry Brigade (M) <u>3/</u>	Georgia
53d	Infantry Brigade 4/	Florida
73d	Infantry Brigade 4/	Ohio
81st	Infantry Brigade (M)	Washington
92d	Infantry Brigade 4/	Puerto Rico
157th	Infantry Brigade (M)	Pennsylvania (USAR)
187th	Infantry Brigade 4/	Massachusetts (USAR)
205th	Infantry Brigade 4/	Minnesota/Wisconsin/Iowa (USAR)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
218th Infantry Brigade (M)	South Carolina
256th Infantry Brigade (M) <u>3/</u>	Louisiana
30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
155th Armored Brigade <u>3/</u>	Mississippi

1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) provides school support and is not included.
2/ Round-up brigade for active component division.
3/ Round-out brigade for active component division. Round-out brigades have not been designated for the 6th and 10th Infantry Divisions.
4/ Designated for theater defense roles.

UnitLocationArmy Armored Cavalry Regiments

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio/West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho/Oregon/Mississippi
163rd Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana/Texas
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Tennessee

Navy Ships and AircraftActive

<u>Tycom/Second Fleet/Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
5 Multipurpose Carriers	
1 Battleship	
137 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines	
69 Patrol Combatants, Mine Warfare Ships, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	
10 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

<u>Tycom/Third Fleet/Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
4 Multipurpose Carriers	
1 Battleship	
104 Surface Combatants and Attack Submarines	
68 Patrol Combatants, Amphibious Ships, and Auxiliaries	

Reserve Surface Components

<u>Second Fleet and Western Atlantic</u>	U.S. East Coast and Western Atlantic
7 Surface Combatants	
10 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	
7 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

<u>Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific</u>	U.S. West Coast and Eastern Pacific
3 Surface Combatants	
6 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships	
3 Auxiliaries	
6 ASW Patrol Squadrons	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
Reserve Air Components	
Commissioned Aircraft Squadrons	Various locations throughout CONUS
13 ASW Patrol	
4 Fighter (VF)	
5 Attack (VA)	
1 Strike Fighter (VFA)	
1 Photo Reconnaissance (VFP)	
2 Electronic Warfare (VAQ)	
2 Airborne Early Warning (VAW)	
2 Tanker (VAK)	
2 Helicopter ASW (HS)	
2 Helicopter Light ASW (HSL)	
2 Helicopter Light Attack (HAL)	
1 Combat Search and Rescue (HC)	
2 Composite (VC)	
11 Transport (VR)	
Marine Corps Forces	
Active	
I Marine Amphibious Force	
(1st Marine Division/3d Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service Support Group, plus supporting elements).	Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.
II Marine Amphibious Force	
(2d Marine Division/2d Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service Support Group plus supporting elements).	Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.; MCAS, New River, N.C.; and MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.
1st Marine Brigade	
3rd Marine Regimental (Rein), Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting Brigade Service Support Group).	MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
7th Marine Amphibious Brigade (Command Element)	
(HQ 27th Marine Regiment/Marine Air Group 70 (Nucleus)/Brigade Service Support Group 7 (Nucleus)	Marine Corps Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif. (Operational Units will be assigned from Marine Amphibious Forces as directed to support Near-Term Prepositioned Forces)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Division Wing Team</u>	
(4th Marine Division/4th Marine Air Wing/4th Force Service Support Group).	Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces ^{1/}

Active

58 Squadrons <u>2/</u>	CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama
53 CONUS	
3 Alaska	
1 Hawaii	
1 Panama	

Reserve Components

58 Squadrons	CONUS, Puerto Rico
56 CONUS	and Hawaii
1 Hawaii	
1 Puerto Rico	

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, electronic combat, tanker/cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.

2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces ^{1/}

Active

28 Squadrons <u>2/</u>	CONUS and Alaska
27 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

Reserve Components

55 Squadrons <u>3/</u>	CONUS and Alaska
54 CONUS	
1 Alaska	

1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.

2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.

3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons; C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR associate squadrons; one ANG C-5 squadron; one unit equipped USAFR C-5 squadron; and one ANG C-141 and one USAFR C-141 unit equipped squadron.

III. Active Component Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country. The tables shown on the following pages reflect active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and country for FY 1984 through FY 1986. The FY 1984 actual data count people where they are actually located on 30 September 1984 to include people on temporary duty for over 30 days. The FY 1985 and FY 1986 data show people where they are projected to be permanently assigned and show all patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees and cadets in CONUS rather than where they may actually be located at the end of the Fiscal Year.

TABLE P309A

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE		
						431,370	431,370
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	318,968	468,328	270,163	149,107	149,107		
ALASKA	20,662	8,098	1,586	2,122	2,122	10,766	10,766
HAWAII	47,648	19,222	12,960	8,703	8,703	6,763	6,763
AMERICAN SAMOA		1	0	0	0	0	0
GUAM	9,175	37	4,715	377	377	4,046	4,046
JOHNSTON ATOLL	140	133	0	0	0	7	7
MIDWAY ISLANDS	12	0	12	0	0	0	0
PUERTO RICO	3,877	474	3,181	178	178	44	44
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	102	59	30	0	0	13	13
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U. S.	12	10	1	0	0	1	1
WAKE ISLAND	6	0	0	0	0	6	6
TRANSIENTS	58,362	20,552	13,629	7,910	7,910	16,271	16,271
AFLOAT	168,462	0	168,462	0	0	0	0
TOTAL-U. S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,627,427	516,914	474,739	166,487	166,487	469,287	469,287

FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(II) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE

AUSTRIA	26	4	120	20	2
BELGIUM*	2,484	1,354	100	30	979
CYPRUS	13	4	0	9	0
DENMARK*	58	8	18	10	22
FINLAND	18	4	2	10	2
FRANCE*	73	213,276	341	36	40,012
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	253,722	213,276	341	93	0
GIBRALTAR	3	0	3	0	0
GREECE*	3,711	523	470	13	2,705
GREENLAND	329	0	0	0	329
ICELAND*	3,117	2	1,839	106	1,170
IRELAND	14	2	0	55	0
ITALY*	14,809	4,359	4,790	257	5,403
LUXEMBOURG*	10	3	0	7	0
NETHERLANDS*	2,823	835	15	10	1,363
NORWAY*	2,226	443	42	17	1,124
PORTUGAL*	1,725	64	396	10	1,235
SPAIN*	9,436	20	4,012	214	5,190
SWEDEN	15	1	7	7	5
SWITZERLAND	44	20	0	21	3

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL
SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
TURKEY*	5,449	1,278	101	18	4,052
UNITED KINGDOM*	28,823	213	2,291	348	25,971
AFLOAT	24,782	0	22,875	1,907	0
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	351,683	222,028	37,329	3,148	89,178
(1) EUROPEAN NATO (2) EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED	(326,775) (323,103)	(221,993) (218,190)	(14,447) (14,396)	(1,169) (1,169)	(89,166) (89,348)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	746	9	434	10	293
BURMA	12	4	0	6	2
CHINA	23	5	3	12	3
HONG KONG	42	11	15	11	5
INDONESIA	47	11	14	11	11
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	45,761	2,646	7,504	20,643	14,968
MALAYSIA	26	14	2	8	2
NEW ZEALAND	68	4	48	5	11
PHILIPPINES	15,319	45	5,332	665	9,277
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	40,735	29,221	3,373	133	11,058
SINGAPORE	26	2	14	8	2
THAILAND	105	55	19	14	27
TONGA	18	1	0	0	0
AFLOAT	121,299	32,028	29,326	2,760	35,659
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC					
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	6	0
ALGERIA	8	2	0	6	0
BAHRAIN	98	4	93	0	1
BANGLADESH	99	3	0	6	0
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,253	0	1,239	0	14
CAMEROUN	8	2	0	6	0
CHAD	11	3	0	6	0
CONGO	0	1	1	6	0
EGYPT	1,048	913	26	25	84
ETHIOPIA	7	0	0	6	0
GABON	6	0	0	0	0
GHANA	9	1	0	8	0
INDIA	32	15	3	19	5
ISRAEL	77	23	9	26	19

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
IVORY COAST	10	3	0	7	0
JORDAN	29	16	0	8	5
KENYA	39	9	2	19	9
KUWAIT	28	17	2	8	1
LEBANON	25	10	0	15	0
LIBERIA	20	8	3	7	2
MADAGASCAR	7	0	2	5	0
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0
MALI	6	0	0	6	0
MAURITIUS	6	0	0	6	0
MOROCCO	54	17	2	18	15
NEPAL	8	12	0	6	0
NIGER	6	0	0	6	0
NIGERIA	18	4	0	11	3
OMAN	19	2	1	10	6
PAKISTAN	34	7	2	18	7
ST HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	2	0	0	0	2
SAUDI ARABIA	597	249	63	20	205
SENEGAL	11	0	2	9	0
SEYCHELLES	4	0	0	0	4
SOMALIA	26	16	2	6	2
SOUTH AFRICA	20	2	2	12	4
SRI LANKA	9	0	3	6	0
SUDAN	25	8	0	8	9
SYRIA	29	2	0	7	0
TANZANIA. UNITED REPUBLIC OF	31	0	0	7	0
TUNISIA	31	19	2	7	3
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	8	2	0	4	2
BURKINA FASO	6	0	0	6	0
YEMEN (SANAA)	17	7	0	6	4
ZAIRE	30	10	0	14	6
ZAMBIA	5	0	0	0	0
ZIMBABWE	6	2	0	4	0
Afloat			13,223	130	412
TOTAL-AFRICA. NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	13,353	1,370	14,684	530	412
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE					
ANTIGUA	77	2	74	0	0
ARGENTINA	19	2	5	5	5
BAHAMAS, THE	45	1	16	7	7

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL			ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
	12	3	4				
BARBADOS				0	0	7	0
BELIZE				0	0	0	0
BERMUDA	1,493	0	1,404	0	89	0	0
BOLIVIA	155	5	1	1	7	2	2
BRAZIL	48	12	7	12	22	7	1
CANADA	542	17	395	5	5	121	2
CHILI	19	3	1	1	13	13	2
COLOMBIA	33	12	2	0	13	6	0
COSTA RICA	14	5	0	0	9	0	0
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,347	0	1,889	456	2	2	2
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	18	5	3	3	8	2	2
ECUADOR	22	4	0	0	8	7	0
EL SALVADOR	61	25	0	0	23	3	0
GUATEMALA	165	159	0	0	6	0	0
GUYANA	18	1	0	0	6	0	0
HAITI	7	4	2	0	7	1	0
HONDURAS	12	747	2	0	88	19	0
JAMAICA	846	846	0	0	11	1	0
MEXICO	14	1	3	3	10	0	0
NICARAGUA	32	11	3	12	7	6	1
PANAMA	10	6,620	0	0	156	2,187	1
PARAGUAY	9,354	6,620	391	391	7	7	1
PERU	42	3	0	0	0	0	0
ST CHRISTOPHER-NEVIS-ANGUILLA	26	5	7	0	0	0	0
SURINAME	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
URUGUAY	12	2	4	4	7	2	0
VENEZUELA	37	5	6	6	8	16	0
AFLOAT	4,787	7,672	4,124	4,124	663	1,675	0
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	20,094	2,341	2,341	2,341	2,406	2,406	0
(SI) ANTARCTICA	65	0	65	65	0	0	0
(SI) EASTERN EUROPE							
BULGARIA	9	2	0	0	5	2	4
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	0	0	6	6	0
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	48	42	44	44	6	1	1
HUNGARY	13	4	3	3	11	1	1
POLAND	15	3	0	0	11	1	1
ROMANIA	14	3	0	0	10	1	1

TABLE P309A

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1984

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL			NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
	ARMY	AIR FORCE	LAND FORCES			
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	51	8	4	4	33	6
YUGOSLAVIA	18	4	1	3	9	4
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	179	67	5	88	88	19
(17) UNDISTRIBUTED						
ASHORE						
TOTAL-UNDISTRIBUTED	413	100	149	0	0	164
INITIAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES						
ASHORE	510,730	263,266	89,899	29,727	127,838	127,838
AFLOAT	449,470	263,266	34,099	24,267	127,838	127,838
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	61,260	0	55,800	5,460	0	0
ASHORE	2,138,157	780,180	564,638	96,214	597,125	597,125
AFLOAT	1,908,435	780,180	340,376	190,754	597,125	597,125
	1,229,722	0	224,262	15,460	0	0

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED

TABLE P309A

ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	TOTAL			NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVAL			
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	1,317,840	475,920	263,734	143,886	434,300	
ALASKA	20,635	7,640	1,970	188	10,937	
HAWAII	46,656	18,918	12,489	8,574	6,715	
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	0	0	0	
GUAM	9,126	35	4,503	389	4,199	
JOHNSTON ATOLL	122	116	0	0	6	
MIDWAY ISLANDS	48	0	48	0	0	
PuERTO RICO	3,575	473	2,869	171	66	
U.S. TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	75	33	35	0	7	
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	11	10	0	0	1	
WARE ISLAND TRANSIENTS	7	0	0	0	7	
Afloat	67,868	19,880	28,234	6,939	12,755	
Afloat	166,467	0	166,487	0	0	
TOTAL-U. S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,632,435	523,026	480,369	160,147	468,893	

FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(I) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE

AUSTRIA	28	4	0	3	21	
BELGIUM	2,819	1,164	137		31	
CYPRUS	15	4	0		10	
DENMARK	65	8	22		11	
FINLAND	18	4	2		10	
FRANCE	75	13	9		40	
GERMANY (FED REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)	250,629	209,66	373		94	
GIBRALTAR	3,731	473	572		16	
GREECE	316	0	0		0	
GREENLAND	0	0	0		0	
ICELAND	3,206	2	1,909		106	
IRELAND	15,266	2	0		6	
ITALY	10	3,908	5,244		254	
LUXEMBURG	0	4	0		6	
NETHERLANDS	2,976	926	17		9	
NORWAY	202	54	42		15	
PORTUGAL	1,831	62	526		13	
SPAIN	9,151	23	3,584		210	
SWEDEN	19	1	4		8	
SWITZERLAND	31	5	0		23	
					3	

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
TURKEY	5,175	1,205	110	20	3,840
UNITED KINGDOM	30,246	156	2,294	344	27,452
AFLOAT	27,243	0	27,211	32	0
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	353,148	217,088	42,057	1,279	92,724
(*EUROPEAN NATO) (EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED)	(325,783)	(217,068)	(14,837)	(1,169)	(92,709) (92,709)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	719	7	449	8	255
BURMA	12	4	0	6	2
CHINA	23	4	3	12	4
FIJI	1	0	1	0	0
HONG KONG	42	11	15	11	5
INDONESIA	49	11	15	12	11
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	5,391	2,398	7,361	26,009	16,623
MALAYSIA	21	8	2	9	2
NEW ZEALAND	67	1	51	6	9
PHILIPPINES	15,407	44	5,269	660	9,434
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	41,333	29,740	380	56	11,157
SINGAPORE	23	2	13	7	1
THAILAND	106	53	12	13	28
AFLOAT	33,607	0	27,632	5,775	0
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	143,401	32,283	41,403	32,584	37,531
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	6	0
ALGERIA	8	2	0	6	0
BAHRAIN	95	3	3	0	12
BANGLADESH	8	2	3	6	9
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	1,312	0	1,308	0	4
(INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)					
CAMEROON	7	1	0	6	0
CHAD	9	1	0	8	0
CONGO	8	1	1	6	9
EGYPT	1,309	1,216	32	27	35
ETHIOPIA	7	6	0	7	0
GAMBIA, THE	1	0	0	0	1
GABON	6	0	0	6	0
GHANA	9	1	0	8	0
INDIA	34	5	0	19	4

TABLE P3C9A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
ISRAEL	76	20	8	28	20
IVORY COAST	12	3	2	7	0
JORDAN	29	16	0	8	5
KENYA	42	9	17	14	2
KUWAIT	28	17	4	17	20
LEBANON	29	10	14	16	20
LIBERIA	17	0	3	7	0
MADAGASCAR	8	0	0	6	0
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0
MALI	6	0	6	6	0
MAURITIUS	6	0	0	0	0
MOROCCO	49	11	20	20	13
NEPAL	8	2	6	6	0
NIGER	6	0	3	6	0
NIGERIA	19	2	13	12	3
OMAN	30	27	3	8	17
PAKISTAN	37	37	0	19	8
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	2	0	0	0	2
SAUDI ARABIA	715	230	32	18	385
SENEGAL	111	50	22	9	0
SEYCHELLES	4	0	0	4	2
SOMALIA	23	43	44	6	23
SOUTH AFRICA	20	112	12	0	0
SRI LANKA	10	0	3	7	0
SUDAN	30	22	207	10	13
SYRIA	12	0	0	9	0
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	0	0	8	2
TUNISIA	20	0	0	0	0
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	12	3	0	0	0
BUKINA FASO	16	30	0	0	0
YEMEN (SANAA)	17	7	0	0	0
ZAIRE	21	60	0	0	0
ZAMBIA	6	2	0	0	0
ZIMBABWE	8	2	0	0	0
AFOLOAT	3,000	1,110	1,617	1,890	2,298
TOTAL-AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	7,148	0	0	0	548
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE					15
ANTIGUA	80	0	79	0	0
ARGENTINA	22	3	5	3	0

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY-MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
BAHAMAS, THE	59	0	52	6	1
BARBADOS	9	1	2	6	0
BELIZE	2	1	1	0	0
BERMUDA	1,592	0	1,512	80	0
BOLIVIA	14	4	1	7	3
BRAZIL	57	11	10	24	12
CANADA	543	10	430	11	92
CHILE	23	3	4	13	3
COLOMBIA	26	7	4	14	3
COSTA RICA	14	5	0	14	0
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,518	0	2,081	435	2
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	17	3	3	9	2
ECUADOR	28	4	3	9	12
EL SALVADOR	4	20	1	22	4
GRENADE	6	0	0	6	0
GUATEMALA	21	6	0	14	1
GUYANA	6	0	0	6	0
HAITI	12	3	0	8	1
HONDURAS	118	12	3	11	92
JAMAICA	14	1	3	10	0
MEXICO	31	10	3	13	5
NICARAGUA	13	5	0	8	0
PANAMA	9,327	6,600	489	155	2,083
PARAGUAY	13	3	1	7	2
PERU	31	5	12	8	6
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	0	0	0	1
URUGUAY	14	2	3	7	2
VENEZUELA	41	5	6	9	21
AFLLOAT	978	0	0	978	0
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	15,680	6,724	4,708	1,894	2,354
(5) ANTARCTICA	6	0	66	0	0
(6) EASTERN EUROPE					
BULGARIA	10	2	0	6	2
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	0	7	3
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	46	38	0	8	0
HUNGARY	12	3	1	7	1
POLAND	18	3	2	12	1
ROMANIA	14	3	0	10	1

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1985

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL			NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE			
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	62	8	7	7	39	8
YUGOSLAVIA	19	4	2	9	4	4
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	192	62	12	98	20	0
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	520,035	257,774	90,931	38,153	133,177	133,177
ASHORE	455,207	257,774	34,778	29,478	133,177	133,177
ALOAT	64,828	0	56,153	8,675	0	0
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,152,470	780,800	571,300	198,300	602,070	602,070
ASHORE	1,921,155	780,800	348,660	189,625	602,070	602,070
ALOAT	231,315	0	222,640	8,675	0	0

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
U. S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS)	4,328,001	476,623	265,792	145,304	440,282
ALASKA	21,991	8,949	2,011	188	10,843
HAWAII	45,256	16,941	12,918	8,528	6,869
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	0	0	0
GUAM	9,172	35	4,529	389	4,219
JOHNSTON ATOLL	122	116	0	0	6
MIDWAY ISLANDS	48	40	48	0	0
PUERTO RICO	3,613	473	2,904	171	65
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	75	33	35	0	1
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U. S.	11	10	0	0	
WAKE ISLAND	7	0	0	0	
TRANSIENTS	69,040	20,262	29,005	6,702	13,071
AFLLOAT	176,566	176,566	0	0	
TOTAL-U. S. TERR. AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,653,903	523,443	493,808	161,282	475,370
FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	28	4	0	21	3
BE, GERM.	2,809	1,449	137	31	1,492
CYPRUS	15	4	0	10	1
DENMARK	65	8	22	11	24
FINLAND	18	4	2	10	2
FRANCE*	75	13	9	40	13
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)*	252,291	209,166	377	94	42,654
GIBRALTAR	3	0	593	0	0
GREECE*	3,706	120	0	16	2,677
GREENLAND*	349	0	0	0	349
ICELAND*	3,456	2	1,908	106	1,440
IRELAND	15,584	3,920	5,397	254	6,013
ITALY*	15,10	4	0	6	0
LUXEMBOURG*					
NETHERLANDS*	3,675	946	17	9	2,903
NORWAY*	201	54	42	15	2,90
PORTUGAL*	1,837	62	530	13	1,232
SPAIN*	9,257	23	3,624	210	5,400
SWEDEN	19	1	4	8	6
SWITZERLAND	31	5	0	23	3

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
TURKEY*	5,117	1,139	110	20	3,848
UNITED KINGDOM*	30,071	162	2,356	344	27,209
AFLLOAT	27,582	0	27,550	32	0
TOTAL-WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE.	356,407	217,088	42,681	1,279	95,359
(*EUROPEAN NATO) (-EUROPEAN NATO PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED)	{328,703} (326,414)	{217,068} (216,834)	{15,122} (15,114)	{1,169} (1,169)	{95,344} (93,297)
(2) EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	748	7	478	8	255
BURMA	12	4	0	6	2
CHINA	23	4	3	12	4
FIJI	1	0	1	0	0
HONG KONG	42	11	15	11	5
INDONESIA	49	11	15	12	11
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	52,789	2,031	7,472	26,884	16,402
MALAYSIA	21	8	2	51	9
NEW ZEALAND	67	1	44	5,352	660
PHILIPPINES	15,578	44	5,382	660	9,522
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	41,551	29,746	3,382	56	11,367
SINGAPORE	23	2	13	7	1
THAILAND	106	53	12	13	28
AFLLOAT	34,183	0	28,408	5,775	0
TOTAL-EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	145,193	31,922	42,204	33,459	37,608
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	6	0	0	6	0
ALGERIA	8	2	0	6	0
BAHRAIN	95	3	80	0	12
BANGLADESH	8	2	0	6	0
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (INCLUDES DIEGO GARCIA)	1,364	0	1,360	0	4
CAMEROON	7	1	0	6	0
CHAD	9	1	0	3	0
CONGO	8	0	2	6	0
EGYPT	1,322	1,215	32	27	48
ETHIOPIA	7	0	0	0	0
GAMBIA, THE	1	0	0	0	0
GABON	6	0	0	6	0
GHANA	9	1	0	8	0
INDIA	34	5	6	19	4

TABLE P309A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	ARMY			MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE	
	TOTAL	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL	NAVY	AIR FORCE	
ISRAEL	76	20	8	28	28	20	
IVORY COAST	12	3	2	7	7	5	
JORDAN	29	16	0	8	8	5	
KENYA	43	9	18	14	14	2	
KUWAIT	28	17	14	17	17	0	
LEBANON	29	10	16	16	16	0	
LIBERIA	17	7	3	6	6	0	
MADAGASCAR	8	0	2	6	6	0	
MALAWI	2	2	0	0	0	0	
MALI	6	0	0	6	6	0	
MALDIVES	6	0	0	6	6	0	
MOROCCO	44	11	5	20	20	8	
NEPAL	8	12	0	6	6	0	
NIGER	6	3	2	0	0	0	
NIGERIA	19	3	4	12	12	3	
OMAN	31	2	7	18	18	8	
PAKISTAN	37	7	3	19	19	2	
ST. HELENA (INCLUDES ASCENSION ISLAND)	2	0	0	0	0	0	
SAUDI ARABIA	704	230	72	18	18	4	
SENEGAL	11	0	2	9	9	0	
SEYCHELLES	4	0	0	6	6	2	
SOMALIA	25	12	3	12	12	3	
SOUTH AFRICA	20	0	0	6	6	0	
SRI LANKA	10	0	3	7	7	0	
SUDAN	30	0	0	10	10	0	
SYRIA	12	8	2	8	8	0	
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF	8	0	0	0	0	0	
TUNISIA	20	7	2	9	9	2	
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	12	3	1	6	6	2	
BURKINA FASO	6	0	0	6	6	0	
YEMEN (SANAA)	17	0	1	9	9	5	
ZAMBIA	20	6	0	6	6	0	
ZIMBABWE	8	0	0	6	6	0	
AIR-OCEAN	3,000	1,110	1,890	2,298	2,298	554	
TOTAL-AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	7,200	1,617	1,617				
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE							
ANTIGUA	101	0	0	9	9	1	
ARGENTINA	22	3	5	5	5	5	

TABLE P300A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY			NAVY		MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE	
		ARMY	ARMY	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE
BAHAMAS, THE	59	0	52	6	6	0	1	0	0	1
BARBADOS	9	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BELIZE	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
BERMUDA	1,586	0	1,506	80	0	0	0	0	0	0
BOLIVIA	15	4	11	10	24	3	0	0	0	0
BRAZIL	57	11	10	453	111	12	12	12	12	12
CANADA	566	10	4	4	13	92	92	92	92	92
CHILE	23	3	4	4	13	3	3	3	3	3
COLOMBIA	28	7	4	4	14	3	3	3	3	3
COSTA RICA	14	5	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,541	0	2,104	435	0	0	0	0	0	0
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	17	3	3	3	9	2	2	2	2	2
ECUADOR	28	4	3	3	9	12	12	12	12	12
EL SALVADOR	47	20	1	22	4	4	4	4	4	4
grenada	6	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	0
GUATEMALA	21	6	0	0	14	0	0	0	0	0
GUYANA	6	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
HAITI	12	3	0	0	8	1	1	1	1	1
HONDURAS	125	12	3	3	11	99	99	99	99	99
JAMAICA	14	1	3	3	10	0	0	0	0	0
MEXICO	31	10	3	3	13	5	5	5	5	5
NICARAGUA	13	15	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
PANAMA	12	3	518	155	0	0	0	0	0	0
PARAGUAY	9,530	6,544	1	7	2,313	1	1	1	1	1
PERU	31	5	12	8	6	6	6	6	6	6
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
URUGUAY	14	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
VENEZUELA	40	0	6	6	9	20	20	20	20	20
AFLOAT	168	0	0	0	168	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL-WESTERN HEMISPHERE	15,139	6,668	4,798	1,084	2,589	2,589	2,589	2,589	2,589	2,589
(5) ANTARTICA	66	0	66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(6) EASTERN EUROPE										
bulgaria	10	2	0	0	6	2	2	2	2	2
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	38	0	7	0	0	0	0	0
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	46	12	33	1	8	1	1	1	1	1
HUNGARY	12	18	3	2	12	1	1	1	1	1
POLAND	18	3	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
ROMANIA	14	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	62	8	7	39	8
YUGOSLAVIA	19	4	2	9	4
TOTAL-EASTERN EUROPE	192	62	12	98	20
 TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	 324,197	 257,357	 92,492	 38,218	 136,130
ASHORE	459,264	257,357	35,427	30,353	136,130
AFLLOAT	64,933	0	57,069	7,865	0
 TOTAL WORLDWIDE	 2,178,100	 780,800	 585,300	 199,500	 611,500
ASHORE	1,936,601	780,800	352,666	191,675	611,500
AFLLOAT	241,499	0	233,634	7,865	0

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

IV. European Troop Strengths. The Department intensively manages its European troop strength to ensure that manpower is held to the minimum level consistent with security requirements. The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act established a ceiling of 315,600 (excluding GLCM manning) on the number of military personnel who can be permanently assigned to duty ashore in European NATO nations at the end of FY 1984. This was the same as the FY 1983 ceiling; however, it provided for a higher ceiling of 320,000 if four conditions were met. It also exempted 2,600 military personnel associated with the support of the Ground Launched Cruise Missile System from both ceilings. On September 25, 1984, the Secretary of Defense notified the leaders of both Houses of Congress that the four conditions specified by Section 1103(b) of the Act were met. Even with this higher ceiling of 322,600, however, it should be noted that this strength is still about 3,700 people below the projected end-strength that was the basis for the FY 1984 Presidents budget.

Section III of this Chapter presents actual strengths, by Service, by country, at end -FY 1984 for European NATO nations and other countries. Because of the pressing need for all the military personnel we had previously planned to have in Europe, we attempted to manage our strengths to use all the authority allowed within the ceiling; we hit the 322,600 ceiling within 1.6 percent (503 people) at end- FY 1984. As the table below shows, all the Services, except the Army, were at or below the internal ceilings established within the Department. The Army exceeded its target because the historical summer losses that it predicted to occur again in FY 1984 failed to materialize. We are working with the Army to implement additional management actions to preclude this situation happening again.

FY 1984 Military End-Strengths Permanently Stationed
Ashore in European NATO Countries

	Total DoD	Army	Navy	Air Force	USMC
Troop Ceiling	322,600 ^{1/}	216,906	14,783	89,742 ^{1/}	1,169
Actual	323,103	218,190	14,396	89,348	1,169

^{1/} Includes 2,600 military spaces to support the Ground Launched Cruise Missile System in Europe.

The FY 1985 DoD Authorization Act enacted a permanent ceiling of 326,414 on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at the end of each fiscal year -- the level requested in the FY 1985 Presidents budget. This legislation was different from that enacted in the past two years, however, in that this Act provides no exception for GLCM and makes the ceiling permanent for all future years, not just the budget year.

In FY 1985 we plan to assign 326,059 military personnel in European NATO countries as specified in the tables for FY 1985 in Section III of this Chapter. This strength is about 3,000 below the level we originally projected prior to preparation of the FY 1985 President's budget. The

Senate Appropriations Committee's (SAC) report on the FY 1985 Appropriation Bill recommended that DoD hold the number of "Air Force military manpower stationed in Europe at the end of the FY 1985 to the 89,900 end strength planned for FY 1984." Despite attempts to reduce its previously planned FY 1985 strength in Europe, the Air Force will exceed the SAC recommended level by about 2,900 people.

The FY 1986 European strength requirement was the subject of extensive discussions during both the internal Defense program and budget reviews. It was concluded that DoD needs 329,869 U.S. military personnel (including 4,650 for GLCM) permanently stationed ashore in European NATO countries at end-FY 1986. However, to comply with the law, the Department further reduced this strength by not deploying a C-130 squadron to Europe, eliminating improved manning increases, reducing needed growth in intelligence and communications activities, and making other programmed and actual force structure reductions in the Army, Navy and Air Force. The following table traces the major changes in our military strengths in Europe from the FY 1984 data shown in last year's Defense Manpower Requirements Report to our currently projected end- FY 1986 strengths:

Army

Military End
Strength in Europe

<u>FY 1984 Column (FY 1985 President's Budget)</u>	216,686
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Multiple Launched Rocket System	+1143
Restationing of the 2-67 ADA to CONUS	- 622
Restationing of the 2-43 ADA from CONUS	+ 485
Restationing of the 4-27 FA (ILRS) from CONUS	+ 118
Division Air Defense System	+ 297
Improved Nuclear Chemical Biological Defense	+ 246
Corps Intelligence Improvements	+ 149
Bradley Fighting Vehicle	+ 118
Improved TOW Vehicle System Support	+ 109
NORTHAG Support	+ 91
Quick Fix System	+ 125
Unit Realignments (to standard doctrinal designs)	+1039
Improved Theater Communications	+ 430
Division 86 Redesign	-3,379
Net all Other Changes	+ 33

<u>FY 1985 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)</u>	217,068
--	---------

Restationing of the 2-3 ADA (PATRIOT) from CONUS	+ 485
Manning Enhancements	- 141
Long Range Reconnaissance Companies	+ 286
Reenlistment NCO	+ 42
Corps Augmentation	+1,358
Transportation and Ammunition Unit Activations	+ 422
Heavy Division Refinement	-1,698
Civilian Substitution	- 526
Engineer and Maintenance Unit Inactiviations	- 422
Missle Support Detachment	- 40

<u>FY 1986 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)</u>	216,834
--	---------

Air Force

FY 1984 Column (FY 1985 President's Budget)	89,742
---	--------

Vehicle/Facility Colocated Bases	+ 85
CT-39 Reduction	- 141
Medical	+ 137
Chemical Biological Defense/Air Base Ground Defense	+ 62
F-16 Cadre/Avionics Trng to CONUS	- 38
Transfer Security Assistance from EUCOM to CENTCOM	- 47
Forces Structure Changes (TR-1, F-15, F-111, etc)	+ 877
GLCM	+2,142
NATO AWACS	+ 24
Prepositioned Equipment	+ 23
European Distribution System (EDS)	- 148
Net All Others	- 9

FY 1985 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)	92,709
---	--------

Force Structure (TR-1, F-15, F-16, PLSS, F4, etc)	+ 946
GLCM	+1,977
Chem-Biological Defense	+ 23
Air Base Ground Defense	+ 130
Air Base Survivability	+ 92
Medical	+ 176
Manning Reductions	- 539
Mil to Civ Conversions	-1,967
Comm/C3CM	- 244
GDIP/TAC Crypto Intel	- 111
Net All Others	+ 105

FY 1986 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)	93,297
---	--------

Navy

FY 1984 Column (FY 1985 President's Budget)	14,783
---	--------

Strategic, Tactical and Mobility Forces	- 50
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance	+ 90
Communications	+ 92
Real Property Maintenance	- 126
Intelligence	- 83
Medical/Dental	+ 31
Management Headquarters	- 9
Other Base Operations Support	+ 103
Geophysical/Weather	+ 6

FY 1985 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)	14,837
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Strategic, Tactical and Mobility Forces	+ 30
Intelligence	+ 31
Communications	+ 80

Weather Services	+ 11
Base Operations Support	+ 128
Net all others	- 3
<u>FY 1986 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)</u>	15,114

Marine Corps

<u>FY 1986 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)</u>	1,169
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(The Marine Corps reports no changes and will remain at same levels as reported in last year's report in FY 1985 and FY 1986.)

DoD Total

<u>FY 1986 Column (FY 1986 President's Budget)</u>	326,414
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We continue to remain firmly opposed to Congressional ceilings on our European troop strengths and are seeking repeal of the permanent ceiling contained in Section 1002, DoD Authorization Act, 1985 (PL 98-525). As we have stated on many occasions, we face today a growing Soviet threat in Europe (for some unclassified details, see Chapter IB (Threats to U.S. Security Interests), FY 1986 Annual Defense Report). Both we and the allies have agreed, in the face of this growing threat, to make every effort to improve NATO's defenses. Recent progress at the NATO ministerials attests to this common commitment. In order to uphold our part of this commitment, DoD must have the flexibility to adjust its troop strengths as the situation requires. We will continue to work to keep the number of military people in Europe to a minimum consistent with our need to have a strong deterrent partnership with our allies.

Although we will meet the ceiling in FY 1986, the need for continued growth in our NATO defense capabilities in the years to come will be hindered by the ceiling. This is particularly true for the GLCM portion of our theater nuclear force. An appropriate response to our need for GLCM growth would be for the Congress to provide an exclusion to the ceiling for GLCM.

In conjunction with meeting Congressional ceilings and managing military end-strength, the JCS determined that USCINCEUR has authority to prioritize US military strength levels for USEUCOM and non-USEUCOM billets in the NATO European theater (ashore). USCINCLANT, in coordination with USCINCEUR, has the same authority for Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores. As a result, a European Troop Strength (ETS) Management Plan Memorandum of Agreement was developed that established USCINCEUR as the focal point for all US troop strength matters in the region and formalized ETS management relationships among the JCS, Services, USCINCEUR, USCINCLANT, Service Component Commands, Defense and other government agencies, and the Intelligence Community. For FY 1986, USCINCEUR has proposed decrements in order to meet the FY 1986 Congressional ceiling of 326,414. After the JCS review and Secretary of Defense approval, necessary adjustments will be made to current Service European projections to comply with the statutory ceiling.

APPENDIX A
MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

I. Introduction

This appendix provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1985

II. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions that alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1985 DMRR by component are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY		CIVILIAN	
			FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1984	FY 1985
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE						
Industrial Security Clearance Review	Management Headquarters, Defense Agencies	Centralized Support Activities	0	0	*	*
<u>ARMY</u>						
Strategic Modernization	Centralized Support	Management Headquarters	.3	.3	*	*
Real Estate and Construction Administration	Logistical Support Operations	Base Operating Support Support Installations	-	-	1.7	-
Real Estate and Construction Administration	Logistical Support Operations	Base Operating Support Combat Installations	-	-	0.1	-
<u>AIR FORCE</u>						
Training Aircraft (AMG)	Individual Training	Force Support Training	-	-	1.0	0.7
						0.8

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AC: Active Component

Authorized Strength Report: A Marine Corps term synonymous with programmed manning.

Auxiliary & Support Activities: Include the following

Auxiliary: Intelligence
Centrally Managed Communications
Research and Development (R&D)
Geophysical Activities

Support: Base Operating Support (BOS)
Medical Support
Personnel Support
Individual Training (less students)
Central Logistics
Centralized Support Activities
Management Headquarters
Federal Agency Support

Billet: A programmed manpower structure space that defines by grade and occupation a job to be performed which is associated with a specific unit or organization (see position).

Balanced Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individual's (PMI) meets the following criteria:

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 95% and \leq 105%
100-499 people	> 90% and \leq 110%
less than 100 people	> 95% and \leq 115%

Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM): Military personnel assigned to tactical units who are actually employed in civilian positions in support activities. BMM usually occurs when civilian position requirements have been identified, but no civilian personnel are authorized due to budget or end strength ceiling constraints.

Careerist: A service member with more than four years of completed Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS).

- Critical Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory is equal to or less than 85% of the desired population for the fiscal year.
- Distributable Billets: A Navy term synonymous with programmed manning.
- End-Strength: The sum of operating strength and the "Individuals" account on the last day of the fiscal year.
- First-Termer: An enlisted service member who has completed four years or less Total Active Federal Military Service (TAFMS).
- Force Structure Allowance: An Army term synonymous with programmed manning.
- Force Structure Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.
- Funded Peacetime Authorizations: An Air Force term synonymous with programmed manning.
- Grade: The pay grade requirement of a billet or the pay grade possessed by a service member.
- Individuals: Transients, trainees, patients, prisoners, holdees, cadets and students -- personnel not filling programmed manning structure spaces. This "overhead" is required to maintain the programmed structure at one hundred percent of programmed manning.
- Lateral Movement: A reclassification action resulting in a change of a service member's primary occupation.
- Manning Level: Synonymous with programmed manning
- Occupation: The specialty skill requirement of a billet, and the skill qualifications of personnel. Occupations are defined according to the following coding systems.
Army: SSI (officer), MOS (Enlisted)
Navy: NOBC (officer), Rating/NEC (enlisted)
USAF: AFSC (officer & enlisted)
USMC: MOS (officer & enlisted)
- Occupational Field: An aggregation of discrete occupations.
- Operating Strength: An Army term identifying that portion of end strength assigned to units in the programmed structure. The term is synonymous with the following for the other Services:
Navy: distributable strength
USAF: assigned strength
USMC: chargeable strength

For the Selected Reserve, "trained strength in units" is equivalent to operating strength.

Operating Strength Cycle:

The annual variation in operating strength resulting from seasonal fluctuations in the number of personnel categorized as "Individuals."

Operating Strength Deviation:

The absolute difference between total operating strength and programmed manning at a point in time or the average difference (expressed in man-years) for the entire fiscal year. These people, rather than manning programmed positions in the force structure where they were programmed to be, are carried in one of the Individuals Accounts.

Overage Occupation:

An occupation in which the inventory when compared to the programmed manning plus individuals (PMI) meet the following criteria:

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	> 105%
100-499 people	> 110%
less than 100 people	> 115%

Position:

Same as Billet above,

Programmed Force:

The set of units and organizations that exists in the current year, and which is planned to exist in each future year of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP).

Programmed Manpower Structure:

The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for all units and organizations in the programmed force, defined as the Table of Organization (or its equivalent) structure for operational units, and for auxiliary and support activities the structure associated with peacetime workload requirements.

Programmed Manning:

Those spaces in the programmed manpower structure planned to be filled. The term "programmed manning" recognizes that 100% fill of the programmed manpower structure may not always be desirable or achievable within fiscal and manpower constraints. The term "programmed manning" is synonymous with:

Army: Force Structure Allowance
Navy: Distributable billets
USAF: Force Structure Authorizations, and
 Funded Peacetime Authorizations
USMC: Authorized Strength Report

RC: Reserve Component (includes Selected Reserve and National Guard); the Air Force also uses the term Air Reserve Forces (ARF).

Round out: An Army term wherein RC units are assigned to AC divisions to make up the difference between the number of AC units required in a standard division configuration and the number of AC units they actually have. These RC units are scheduled to deploy with the AC division, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Round Up: An Army term wherein RC units are assigned to AC divisions to augment the division structure. These RC units are scheduled to deploy with AC divisions, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Shortage Occupation: An occupation in which the inventory, when compared to programmed manning plus individuals (PMI), meets the following criteria:

<u>Skills with PMI of</u>	<u>% of PMI filled</u>
500 or more people	< 95%
100-499 people	< 90%
less than 100 people	< 85%

Skill: Same as occupation.

Stability: Aggregate: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the Service continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Unit: The percentage of personnel who have remained in the same unit continually for one year as of the date the statistics are calculated.

Staffing: The process of distributing personnel to fill programmed manning targets in accordance with assignment policies, tour length constraints, and projections of the trained operating strength population.

Wartime Manpower Structure Requirement: The aggregation of billets describing the full manning requirement for all units and organizations in the programmed force, defined as the Table of Organization (or its equivalent) structure for operational units and for auxiliary and support activities the structure associated with wartime workload requirements.

APPENDIX C

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORY DEFINITIONS

1. STRATEGIC. The DPPCs in the Strategic category consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that have as their fundamental objective deterrence of and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces and bases overseas, and our allies.

Offensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for land-based ICBMs; sea-based SLBMs, ballistic missile submarines and supporting ships; long-range bombers and refueling tanker aircraft; strategic cruise missiles; and operational headquarters for these forces.

Defensive Strategic Forces. This category contains program elements for interceptor aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems, including directly supporting communications, command, control, and surveillance and warning systems.

Strategic Control and Surveillance. This category contains program elements for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), airborne satellite and ballistic missile early warning and control systems, satellite and orbiting objects surveillance systems, and supporting radar and optical sensor systems.

2. TACTICAL/MOBILITY. The DPPCs in the Tactical/Mobility category consist of land forces (Army and Marine Corps), tactical air forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps), and mobility forces (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

Land Forces. This group consists of DPPCs for Army and Marine Corps comprising division forces and theater forces.

Division Forces. This category contains program elements for Army and Marine divisions, nondivisional combat brigades/regiments, other nondivisional combat forces, and tactical support forces (including helicopter support units of the Marine Air Wings). Program elements for the procurement and stockpiling of Army and Marine war reserve materiel and for the Army and Marines Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force are also included in this category.

Theater Forces. This category contains Army program elements for theater-wide and specialized units, including separate infantry brigades stationed in Alaska, Berlin, Panama, and the Caribbean; units in Europe that provide for supply, maintenance, and security control of nuclear ammunition support of NATO; theater surface-to-surface missile units; tactical surface-to-air missile units; theater heavy engineering battalions for support of other Services; theater psychological operations, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare units; and their supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units. Also included are similar reinforcing units in Forces Command.

Tactical Air Forces. This category contains program elements for Air Force, Navy, and Marine fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; direct support aircraft, armament and electronics maintenance units, and weapon system security units; multipurpose aircraft carriers; air-launched tactical missile systems and ground launched cruise missiles; tactical air control systems; Fleet Marine Force direct support aircraft; and operational headquarters for these forces. Also included are program elements for Air Force resources for the Joint Tactical Communications Program (TRITAC) war reserve materiel and the Air Force Component of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

Naval Forces. The DPPCs in the Naval Forces group include the Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fleet air defense forces, amphibious forces, and supporting forces.

Warships and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Forces. This category contains program elements for surface combatant ships (cruisers, battleships, destroyers, and frigates), fixed wing and helicopter ASW squadrons, attack submarines, mines and mine countermeasures, and tactically supporting forces. Also included are program elements for air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ordnance and missiles.

Amphibious Forces. This category contains program elements for amphibious assault ships, supporting ships and tactical support units, coastal/river forces, Navy special warfare forces, the Navy components of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, explosive ordnance disposal forces, and inshore undersea warfare forces.

Naval Support Forces. This category contains program elements for forward logistical supporting forces, carrier-on-board delivery squadrons, intermediate maintenance activities, fleet support ships, underway replenishment ships, construction forces, deep submergence systems, and fleet telecommunications. Also included are program elements for tactical intelligence, war reserve materiel, and the TRITAC program.

Mobility Forces. This category contains program elements for strategic, tactical, and administrative airlift; sealift, and land movement of passengers and cargo by both military and commercial carriers, including military cargo, tanker, and support ships; and the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet. This category also contains program elements for tactical medical airlift squadrons, air and sea port terminal operations, traffic management, integral command and control systems, aerospace rescue and recovery, Air Force special mission forces, and the non-management headquarters activities within the Joint Deployment Agency.

3. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the auxiliary activities category consist of those major Defense-wide activities conducted under centralized OSD control. Included are DPPCs in intelligence, centrally managed communications, research and development, and geophysical activities.

intelligence. This category contains program elements for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense, consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program, including intelligence communications.

Centrally Managed Communications. This category contains program elements for the long-haul Defense Communications System, the military Service's communications systems, satellite communications systems, communications security, communications engineering and installation activities, and the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center. Excluded are program elements for base and command communications, intelligence communications, and communications systems dedicated to strategic, tactical, or WWMCCS missions, and management headquarters.

Research and Development Activities. This category contains all research and development (Program 6) program elements, except those for weapons systems for which procurement is programmed during the FYDP projection and for program elements identifiable to a Support Activities DPPC such as Medical or Personnel Support. Also excluded are operational systems development and other program elements not in Program 6 but containing research and development resources.

Geophysical Activities. This category contains program elements for meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities, including the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, the Air Force and Navy weather services, navigational satellites, oceanography, and mapping, charting and geodesy activities.

4. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. The DPPCs in the Support Activities category consist of the base operating support functions for both combat and support installations; centralized activities, services and organizations providing medical and personnel support; individual and force support training; central logistics; management headquarters; federal agency support; and other centralized support activities.

Base Operating Support - Combat Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the strategic, tactical, airlift and sealift commands (Program 1, 2, and 4), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, installation audiovisual support, and air traffic control. Also included are resources for installation headquarters administration and installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions.

Base Operating Support - Support Installations. This category contains program elements for the operation and maintenance of installations of the auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands (Program 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9), including supporting real property maintenance, base communications, and installation audiovisual support. Also included in this category are all family housing activities and health care in station hospitals and medical clinics. These program elements include resources for installation headquarters administration; installation operational, housekeeping, and service functions; and commissaries.

Medical Support. This category contains program elements for medical care in DoD required medical facilities, including medical centers, and laboratories and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DoD facilities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of medical research and medical equipment and systems.

Personnel Support. This category contains program elements for provision of varied services in support of personnel, including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, Section 6 schools, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, civilian career training and intern programs and the VEAP program. This category also includes research and development program elements for human factors and personnel development research.

Individual Training. This category contains the staff and faculty program elements for formal military and technical training and professional education of military personnel conducted under centralized control of Service training commands. Program elements include those for recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities. This category also includes research and development program elements in support of new or improved training equipment, techniques, and technology.

Force Support Training. This category contains program elements for Air Force and Naval advanced flight training conducted by combat commands; Navy training conducted at sea and ashore in direct support of submarine, surface combatant, surveillance, and mine warfare forces; fleet level training at fleet training centers, submarine schools and anti-submarine warfare schools; and certain Army and Marine Corps force-related training activities. Included are resources for fleet readiness squadrons, and Air Force combat crew training squadrons.

Central Logistics. This group includes DPPCs for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities.

Supply Operations. This category contains program elements for the operation of supply depots and centers, inventory control points, and centralized procurement offices and for military personnel support to DLA. It also includes resources for POL pipeline and storage operations and other resources specifically identified and measurable to centralized supply operations.

Maintenance Operations. This category contains program elements for the centralized repair, modification, and overhaul of end items of equipment and their components conducted at depots, arsenals, reprocessing facilities, and logistic centers.

Logistics Support Operations. This category contains program elements for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are program elements for industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment, logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services.

Centralized Support Activities. This category contains miscellaneous Service program elements that provide centralized support to multiple missions and functions that do not fit other DPPCs. Specifically included are non-management headquarters program elements for unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, combat developments, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, Defense Technical Information Center, personnel administration, audiovisual activities, criminal investigations, claims, service-wide support, DCAA activities, and other miscellaneous support.

Management Headquarters. The DPPCs in this category consist of five DPPCs for Management Headquarters as defined in DoDD 5100.73: Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support - Combat Commands, and Service Support - Service Commands.

Management Headquarters - Defense Agencies. This category contains the management headquarters program elements for OSD, OJCS, and the defense agencies. The defense agencies are discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

Management Headquarters - International Military Organizations. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of international military organizations. Examples are: NATO, United Nations Command (Korea), etc.

Management Headquarters - Unified Commands. This category contains the program elements for the military Services' support of the headquarters of the unified commands. Examples are: US European Command, US Pacific Command, etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Combat Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of the combat commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 1, 2, and 4. Examples are: US Army, Europe; US Navy, Pacific Fleet; Strategic Air Command; etc.

Management Headquarters - Service Support - Support Commands. This category contains the program elements for the headquarters of support commands, i.e., those in FYDP Programs 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Federal Agency Support. This category contains program elements for military and civilian DoD manpower assigned on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis to support other federal agencies.

5. INDIVIDUALS. The DPPCs in this group account for military personnel who are not force structure manpower. They are transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, students, trainees, and cadets.

Transients. This category contains only the Transient program element, which consists of active duty military personnel in travel, leave enroute, or temporary duty status (except for training) while on Permanent Change of Station orders.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees. This category contains only the Personnel Holding Account program element that consists of active duty military personnel who are dropped from the assigned strength of an operational or training unit for reasons of medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation nonavailability.

Trainees, Students, and Cadets. This category contains active service officer students, active enlisted students, active enlisted trainees, Service Academy Cadets/Midshipmen, and active officer accession students.

APPENDIX D

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS

J. Introduction. This appendix describes the procedures each Service uses to determine its overall manpower requirements and the appropriate mix of military (active and reserve), civilian and contractual elements.

II. Army

A. Overview. Army manpower requirements are determined through an eighteen month detailed process. The Defense Guidance, computer simulations, and Major Command and Army Staff analyses are applied to the existing force to develop structure alternatives that may include unit activations, inactivations, conversions, or mission transfers. This is a dynamic process linked to the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Force levels and risks are reconciled with projected resources (restrictions on dollars, end strength, equipment, facilities, expected Host Nation Support, etc.). Once the force structure has been determined, AC and KC mission assignments are made, and resource priorities are determined. The result of this structure process is three groups of manpower requirements: manpower in units with wartime missions; manpower for non-combat organizations; and the non-distributable portion of the end strength, used to account for those "Individuals" (mainly trainees, transients, patients, prisoners, and students/cadets) necessary to support the force.

B. Determination of Manpower Requirements. As implied above, all manpower requirements within the Army fall within three categories: those units with wartime missions - the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units, those units with non-combat missions - the Table of Distributions and Allowances (TDA) units, and the Individuals Account.

1. Manpower Requirements Within TOE Units. Manpower requirements for Army units with wartime missions are developed through analytical techniques which focus on the type of mission to be performed. These requirements are shown in Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), which provide varying military manpower and equipment requirement levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. TOE unit manpower requirements are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities which provide the capabilities for mission accomplishment are identified (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams).

- The number of combat type positions in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or the number of weapons included. Each weapon has a specific number of operators. Rifle squad or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability with a manageable span of control.

- The number of personnel for TOE service and support activities (such as mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by the application of Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC), which are based on engineering data, field training exercises, workload data, professional experience, and other sources of technical information.

A TOE prescribes the structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options (from full manning to cadre levels) for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding the unit at full or reduced capability. A unit organized at full TOE capability is defined as having the minimum essential personnel and equipment for sustained operations. TOEs specify requirements only, however. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an actual unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment and reflects manpower and equipment constraints. The approved MTOE document is the authorization for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment, frequently at a reduced level from full TOE requirements.

The Army's strength request, then, is for personnel to fill a constrained number of MTOE authorized spaces and does not represent a request for the TOE full complement of personnel required to perform wartime missions.

2. Manpower Requirements Within TDA Units. Organizations developed to accomplish peacetime, specific, local support missions for which no appropriate TOE is available are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA). TDA units are usually non-deployable units organized to fulfill mission, functional, and work load obligations at a fixed support establishment in CONUS or overseas.

The organizational structures of TDA units are developed to attain minimum essential staffing, the most effective use of personnel, and the most efficient operational capability. TDA units, unlike MTOE units include civilian manpower, and include military manpower only when absolutely essential for the mission or to maintain a rotation base in the continental United States and Hawaii for personnel stationed overseas.

Manpower requirements in TDA units are developed and validated by the application of manpower staffing standards and the employment of manpower survey teams. Manpower standards are developed and applied functionally, while manpower surveys are organizational in nature. Both processes seek to eliminate inefficiencies in organizations and to define the minimum essential manpower needed to accomplish the mission.

TDA authorizations may be equal to or less than the validated TDA requirements depending upon availability of resources. When authorizations are less than full TDA requirements, the reduced capability is defined in the unit's capability statement. Personnel and equipment fill is based on authorizations, as it is in MTOE units, not on requirements.

The structure of TDA activities changes substantially upon mobilization; therefore, a new authorization document, a mobilization (MOB) TDA, is prepared. Mobilization TDAs reflect increased or decreased work loads due to changed missions upon mobilization. Savings in manpower are due to reduced or eliminated functions, longer work weeks, and the use of such additional assets as Individual Mobilization Augmentees and borrowed military manpower diverted from uncommitted or late deploying units. Unless otherwise stated in the mobilization order, MOB TDAs replace their peacetime counterparts upon mobilization.

3. Individuals Accounts. Individuals are soldiers not assigned to units at a particular time. They include trainees, transients, holdees, students, and cadets (TTHS). The number of people required in the Individuals Accounts is projected based upon history and expected policy changes that are input to a computer-generated model called the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students Forecasting Model. Although the people are not under the direct control of unit commanders, they are not unwanted "overhead." Soldiers in the individuals accounts are there because they are leaving, entering or receiving Initial Entry Training; moving between assignments; attending school; are in a hospital or prison; or separating from the military. Individuals, therefore are necessary to sustain the operations of the Army.

The TTHS Forecasting System operates in conjunction with the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Program Using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) system, the Army program to project Army manpower requirements through budget execution and program years. These systems interact with each other to forecast the number of Individuals (trainees, transients, holdees, and students) for the active component portion of the Army Manpower Program.

C. Determination of the Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) Mix.

1. Objectives. AC forces are normally better suited for forward deployment and rapid deployment missions, while RC forces are usually more appropriate for follow-on and sustaining missions. The mix of AC/RC forces must achieve a balance between capabilities and risks to achieve:

- a. Credible deterrence.
- b. Sustainment of forward-deployed forces.
- c. Rapid deployment without mobilization.
- d. Realistic RC readiness and deployment requirements.

2. Decision Rationale. The final AC/RC mix is the result of careful, long-range force planning and includes estimates of the RC unit's

ability to attain the needed mission capabilities. General considerations in this decision are:

- a. Can an existing reserve unit displace (through roundout or affiliation) an active unit and provide the capabilities needed upon deployment?
- b. If no existing reserve units currently meet capabilities needed for roundout or affiliation, can an existing unit be converted to provide these capabilities?
- c. If a unit is considered for conversion or if a reserve unit activation is deemed necessary...
 - (1) Can sufficient skilled personnel be recruited (or backfilled from the converting unit) to man the unit (avoiding potential conflict/competition with adjacent units)?
 - (2) Is there sufficient grade structure to ensure adequate promotion and retention of personnel once the unit is converted or activated?
 - (3) Can the skills required for effective unit employment be established and maintained with the available schedule of drills (considering skill complexity and likely skill deterioration)?
 - (4) How long will it take for the unit to attain the readiness level required to fulfill the mission?
 - (5) Are required facilities reasonably available within the time frame required (new construction or lease)?
- d. What other force structure actions have affected the unit that may lead to unacceptable delays in attaining mission capabilities (minimize unit turbulence)?
- e. In the case of National Guard units, is it likely that the governor will accept the mission?

III. Navy

A. Manpower Requirements Determination

1. Manpower Management Systems. The Navy determines manpower requirements through the Navy Manpower Engineering Program (NAVMEP). Its principle objective is to fully support the planning, programming, and budgeting system with emphasis on relating manpower requirements and authorizations to funded programs while achieving economic and efficient manpower utilization. NAVMEP is an umbrella program which includes: (1) Ship and Squadron Manpower Document Programs; (2) Efficiency Review (ER) Program; (3) Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) Program; (4) Commercial Activities (CA) Programs; and other manpower determination approaches such as macro-models developed at more aggregate

levels of detail. Other manpower determination programs that complement NAVMEP include: (1) Military Manpower/Hardware Integration Program (HARDMAN); (2) Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS); and (3) Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). NAVMEP will shorten the time needed to document manpower requirements and will ensure that all programs which contribute to the overall documentation effort are coordinated and jointly managed.

The objectives of the Manpower Requirements Determination Process are:

- To identify the quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements to support the accomplishment of all assigned missions in the operational forces and the associated shore support establishment;
- To allow the timely identification of manpower requirements of the training implications and operations of new weapons systems and platforms; and
- To determine the wartime mobilization requirements for various scenarios for the total force, both military and civilian.

2. Operating Forces. As the Navy grows, it establishes additional active component positions to meet ship, squadron, and support requirements ashore for the growing fleet as well as to provide sea-to-shore rotation in support of positions at sea. Operating force programmed manpower structure for the fleet is determined through the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document Systems.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) identifies manpower requirements for individual ships predicated on ship configuration, computed work load, Required Operational Capabilities, and Projected Operational Environment (ROC and POE). It determines the level of manpower essential to the operation, maintenance, and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The SMD program covered 94 percent of all ships at the beginning of FY 1985.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) identifies requirements for aviation squadrons that relate work load to the operating tempo defined in the ROC and POE statements. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual updates of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and Training Squadrons, while updates for all other squadrons are scheduled for 24-30 month intervals. The SQMD program covered 100 percent of active and reserve squadrons at the beginning of FY 1985.

3. Shore Support Establishment. The Efficiency Review (ER) Program has become an integral process in staffing standards development in the SHMD Program under NAVMEP. The ER process applies to all shore functions not covered by the CA Program. Efficiency reviews are being conducted at field activity as well as headquarters staff levels. The ER process reviews existing directives, policies, and procedures to eliminate unnecessary tasks. Following the application of various organizational

analysis and methods improvement techniques, a most efficient organization (MEO) is developed. The resulting MEO provides a statement of manpower requirements for the activity studied, which will then be used to develop an ER based staffing standard for Navy-wide use. For one of a kind activities the ER MEO becomes the standard. Efficiency Review projections for the SHMD Program are as follows:

	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87
Spaces To Be Reviewed	15,000	40,000	60,000
ER Estimated Savings	<u>2%</u>	<u>2%</u>	<u>2%</u>
Spaces To Be Saved	300	300	1,200

4. Navy Manpower Mobilization System. The Navy plans and programs total wartime manpower requirements through the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS). NAMMOS requirements are reviewed annually with regard to specific functional categories, changes in the scenarios and force structure, and mobilization training requirements. When the review is completed, mobilization manpower quantity and quality requirements are entered into the billet accounting system to enable publishing of activity level manpower authorizations.

As a system, NAMMOS was designed to make maximum use of existing system, methodologies, and data bases. To determine operational mobilization manpower requirements, NAMMOS uses the Ship Manning Document and Squadron Manning Document programs. Based upon current force tables, annually each active fleet and Naval Reserve Force ship and aircraft is listed and active duty billets authorized compared to SMD and SQMD requirements. The difference between billets needed and those authorized is the mobilization increment identified in NAMMOS.

The NAMMOS methodology as applied to shore commands is an extension of SHMD. The NAMMOS and SHMD systems employ a common functional classification of manpower covering all support mission areas. The NAMMOS system, however operates at a significantly higher level of aggregation than does the SHMD system, which is oriented to the work center level. Thus, the NAMMOS system is more flexible and responsive in the determination of mobilization manpower requirements for alternative scenarios.

B. Active/Reserve Mix Determination Process

1. Organization. Within the last year, the Navy has established a new process for determining the most appropriate mix of active and Reserve forces. A permanent flag officer billet was added to the Plans, Policy and Operations Directorate of the Chief of Naval Operations Staff (OPNAV). This flag officer was designated Total Force Advocate and given membership on the Navy's Program Development Review Committee (PDRC). From this vantage point, the Total Force Advocate can introduce new force mix initiatives into the Navy's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. He can influence the treatment of these initiatives, and monitor the implementation of the ones selected for programmatic support. Subordinate to the Total Force Advocate, a newly established

Active/Reserve Mix Branch assesses the Navy's mission requirements in light of potential Naval Reserve contributions. The products of the assessment effort become force mix initiatives and are described to the Congress annually in a report which accompanies the Navy's budget submission.

2. Analyses. The Active/Reserve Mix Branch of OPNAV is supported by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and employs a specific decision logic to accomplish its assessments. This logic begins with a review of the Navy's Maritime Strategy, with particular emphasis on total force development issues. Each potential change in the Navy's force structure is analyzed to determine whether some degree of Reserve participation could be accommodated. The Navy is committed to allocating as many tasks as possible to the Naval Reserve in the interest of minimizing growth in active duty end-strength. The analysis performed by CNA takes the following course:

a. Readiness. Potential alterations to the Navy's total force mix are first examined for their likely impact on war readiness. The readiness of individual Reserve ships and aircraft squadrons differ from their active component counterparts, primarily in the areas of training and older equipment. In a broader sense, however, the inability of most Reserve units to deploy routinely to forward operating areas (due to the part-time availability of their Reserve crewmembers) deprives those units of opportunities to work closely with the Navy's deployed battle groups in frequent close proximity to the Soviet fleet. Thus, macro level readiness is considered as well as individual unit readiness in force mix analysis.

b. Demographic practicality. While the active Navy can recruit from the national population at-large and can assign personnel to any location, the Naval Reserve must adjust to the demographic realities of the civilian employment structure. CNA analyzes potential alterations to the Navy's total force mix to determine whether sufficient numbers of skilled personnel (preferably Navy veterans) can be matched with proposed additions or changes to the structure of the Naval Reserve. One product of this analysis is an improved perspective on needed bonuses and other incentives.

c. Cost. With the aid of models which have been correlated with those used by OSD, CNA makes a determination of comparative costs between active and Reserve accomplishment of the same function. Typically, the annual manpower and operations costs for a Reserve unit are less than for an active component counterpart. Equipment costs are considered essentially equal. Initial establishment and recurring maintenance costs, however, frequently offset other cost savings to some degree.

3. Implementation. Total force mix initiatives which test successfully against all three criteria (with order of priority: readiness, demographics, cost) are introduced into the Navy's annual PPBS deliberations by the Total Force Advocate. Each step in the entire active/Reserve determination process is carefully coordinated with the Director of the Naval Reserve, who is ultimately responsible for the implementation of those mix initiatives which finally receive programmatic support.

IV. Marine Corps

A. General. Marine Corps manpower requirements emanate from the types of forces deemed necessary to accomplish specific roles and missions in support of the national security objectives. These requirements are the planning force, which is formulated in conjunction with the latest WARMAPS scenario in the fiscally unconstrained atmosphere of the Joint Strategic Planning System. The planning force is published in the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). It provides for reasonable assurance of success (minimum level risk) in the execution of the Marine Corps portion of the national military strategy. However, it is fiscally impracticable to maintain the planning force in peacetime, as it requires full mobilization to attain. A somewhat smaller force is therefore developed to accomplish the wartime mission without mobilization. This smaller force is the programmed force. It accepts certain identified risks, and represents Marine Corps decisions made in light of realistic fiscal and manpower constraints and desired readiness requirements. Active/Reserve force mix decisions are an important consideration in the Marine Corp's manpower requirements determination process and development of its programmed force.

B. Manpower Requirements Determination

1. Operating Forces. The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, light armored vehicle, tank, assault amphibious vehicle, artillery, reconnaissance, combat engineer, and command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to produce Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) for amphibious or other combined arms operations.

Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games, field tests, and military judgment.

Manpower needs for Marine aviation units are based on the support the ground combat forces require. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment are used to estimate the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability that, when divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors dictate the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Consideration of the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft

per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The FSSGs of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, landing support, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the MAF. When the size of the forces and the density of equipment of the task organized MAGTF have been established, the combat service support required is determined using criteria that incorporate maintenance, service, and supply concepts.

2. Support Forces. Determination of the manpower requirement for support activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the Total Force manpower requirements for support activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate Defense Planning and Programming Category in Section III of Chapter V.

C. Active/Reserve Force Mix Determination

1. General. The Marine Corps makes active/reserve force mix decisions consistent with the Marine Corps' Total Force policy. This policy states that the general criteria for determining whether a capability should be placed in the active component or reserves are: peacetime commitment and force projection, responsiveness, reserve accession, rotation base and cost.

a. Peacetime Commitment and Force Projection. It is the Marine Corps view that, unless partial or full mobilization is declared, peacetime forward deployed requirements must be met, with few and very limited exceptions, by active forces. The Marine Corps holds this view because of the length of time and distance away from CONUS of the forward deployments and the limited time allowed for reserve forces to serve on active duty in peacetime. At this time, Marine Corps units must meet peacetime forward deployment requirements in the Mediterranean, the Far East and the Indian Ocean areas. The deployments are normally for six months and are fulfilled by active forces deploying on a rotational basis from CONUS.

b. Responsiveness. In addition to the peacetime forward deployed requirements, the Marine Corps is tasked to respond rapidly to various contingency requirements. The response requires that Marine Corps combat and support forces must be in a posture to deploy and engage in combat before mobilization of reserves can be effectively executed. This need for rapid response leads to the active Fleet Marine Force units being structured into Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) which provide a balanced war fighting capability. These MAGTFs are a combined force consisting of Marine Corps ground, air and combat service support forces.

They take maximum advantage of the combat potential inherent in a closely integrated air-ground team, under direction of a single commander. Examples of a MAGTF are the units that participated at Grenada and in Lebanon.

c. Reserve Accessions. As in the Navy, there are certain military skills that can best be acquired by being on active duty. Reserve units requiring these skills are therefore dependent on accessions of prior service personnel possessing these skills. For example, Aviation Pilots and Radar Intercept Officers in the Marine Air Reserve consist of officers who have served a period of obligated active service. Therefore, in certain mission areas, the size of the Marine Reserve depends on the size of the active Marine Corps and on the ability of local reserve units to recruit prior service personnel with appropriate skills within geographic drill boundaries.

d. Rotation Base. The Marine Corps requires a certain level of active forces to maintain a rotation base for its forward deployed force. Including the supporting base structure, in FY 1985 the Marine Corps will maintain approximately 25,600 Marines deployed in Japan, 2,000 in the Mediterranean area, and 1,800 more afloat in the Far East and Indian Ocean area. Most of these Marines and units are deployed for six months to one year without dependents and must be replaced at the forward deployed location. In addition to the units that are already forward deployed outside of the U.S., other units are on a 24 to 48 hour immediate alert status to respond to various contingencies. The active force rotation base must provide for the time needed for predeployment training, personnel leave and transportation of units or personnel to their forward-deployed locations.

e. Cost. The quantity and types of units are carefully and continuously monitored for cost effectiveness in a peacetime environment. Certain capabilities not readily required in the active forces may be placed in the reserve forces. Examples of these types of forces include graves registration units and Intelligence Translator Teams.

2. Results. The Total Force sponsor within Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) is the Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) Department. PP&O ensures continuity of effort in making force mix decisions and translates USMC missions and taskings into requirements for force structure. These missions and taskings are stated or implied in CINC OPLANS approved by the JCS or contained in OSD guidance. As missions and tasks fluctuate, PP&O consults with appropriate structure/functional sponsors and, if necessary, proposes structural changes. The mix proposals from PP&O are forwarded to the Requirements and Programs (R&P) Department for validation against approved requirements. Subsequently, R&P coordinates the development of the proposals into POM initiatives for the Planning Programming, Budget System (PPBS) cycle. The culmination of the POM effort is an evaluation by the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps' (ACMC) Committee on the value and appropriateness of each Total Force structure initiative. The Committee recommends a decision to the Commandant. Once approved, all structure decisions are published by R&P as the official USMC troplist and the acquisition process is initiated to arrive at our desired capability.

The Marine Corps retains or places in the active component only those forces essential for timely compliance with stated contingency and readiness missions. It puts all others in the reserves.

D. Summary. Total force manpower requirements of all organizations are critically examined on a regular cycle. Structure and manning reviews are conducted at both the Headquarters Marine Corps and field levels, and are verified by Headquarters Marine Corps on-site survey teams. This procedure assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an identified level of risk. Marine Corps active force increases between FY 1985 and FY 1986 reflect necessary manning of the total structure. This is a result of force modernization and an improvement in readiness to meet operational commitments, and to support assigned missions as they relate to deployable forces. Accordingly, the responsiveness required to meet assigned contingencies precludes placing the increase in structure within the Reserve Component.

V. Air Force

A. Introduction. The Secretary of Defense provides broad planning and programming guidance to the Services based on the President's national security policy and objectives. The Air Force translates this guidance into force structure. The size and the composition of the force structure provide the basis for programmed manning. The program is determined principally through an engineered process designed to identify military essential requirements in support of wartime taskings and to incorporate all available economies and efficiencies. Manpower is not a program in and of itself, but an integral part of every program -- a prime requisite to the achievement of approved levels of national defense. As new programs are approved, we must provide the critical manpower needed to insure successful implementation and operation. This appendix contains a description of the Air Force Management Engineering Program to explain how it determines manpower requirements. In addition, it contains a section on factors considered when placing new or expanded missions in the active or reserve forces. Finally, it presents the decision logic used when considering commercial activities.

B. The Air Force Management Engineering Program (MEP). The Air Force determines manpower requirements through its Management Engineering Program (MEP). This program utilizes industrial engineering work measurement techniques and computer simulation models, such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM), to develop manpower standards and guides documenting manpower needs. The MEP thus contributes to increased combat readiness by providing for the most efficient and effective use of Air Force manpower. The annual application of manpower standards against force structure work load estimates determines the numbers, category, and distribution of manpower authorizations.

As early as 1959, the Air Force identified a need to accurately determine manpower requirements. This resulted in the establishment of the Manpower Validation Program (MVP) - a forerunner to the current

MEP. The MVP concentrated on manpower standards with limited base or command application. By 1961, the focus had shifted to deriving common Air Force-wide standards, and AFM 25-5 was published to provide standard methods and techniques. In 1964, we emphasized the methods improvements side of the program and formalized the Management Advisory Services (MAS). At the same time, we assigned Management Engineering Teams (METs) to major Air Commands (MAJCOMs) and located them at installations world-wide. In 1973, an internal study recommended refinements to strengthen the program even further. Management acceptance of these recommendations is reflected in our current Functional Management Engineering Team (FMET) concept, i.e. the dedication of an entire team of industrial engineers and technicians to a single function such as maintenance or civil engineering. This concept was tested in 1974 and proved very successful. The following year we began to implement the concept and today there are ten FMETs. The need for formal and full-time direction of these teams dictated the establishment of the Air Force Management Engineering Agency (AFMEA) in early 1976.

The Director of Manpower and Organization at HQ USAF (AF/MPM) is the office of primary responsibility for the MEP. AFMEA, located at Randolph AFB, TX, directs and supervises manpower standards development, provides technical guidance, schedules Air Force-wide studies, accomplishes a quality control of standards documentation, and is the approval authority for all standards. The ten FMETs that report to AFMEA develop and maintain manpower standards for Air Force common functional areas (civil engineering, supply, security police, etc.) In addition to the FMETs, there are 140 command METs, located at virtually every major installation throughout the world. These METs develop and maintain command unique standards, single point standards, and manpower guides; and assist FMETs in Air Force-wide studies.

The MEP has produced manpower standards that cover approximately 67 percent of current Air Force authorizations. The remaining 33 percent are covered by manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on formal work measurement techniques. We prefer guides where standards development is not practical. For example, when the Air Force is inexperienced with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out, we use manpower guides.

The MEP continues to emphasize incorporating productivity improvements into the standards development process. Activity in this area ranges from refinement of present procedures to testing new concepts of standards development. Initiatives include: early and systematic identification of manpower requirements during systems acquisition, improving the wartime manpower determination process, improving control of both workload data reporting and manpower standards application, and development of new manpower standards under a functional or efficiency review methodology.

The MEP has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility because of experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent basis upon which to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this procedure assures that manpower requirements will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force levels. This systematic procedure supports the fundamental task of programming, which is to translate Air Force approved plans and requirements into time-phased resource packages including people, money, and materials.

C. Active/ARF Decision Criteria. The FY 1984 DoD Authorization Act directs the Services to review missions for integration into the Reserve forces. Specifically, the Congress wanted to know what changes will be accomplished to provide the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment and greater integration with the active force? This section outlines the criteria used in the Active/ARF mix decision process.

The Air Force considers five criteria when making active/reserve mix decisions: mission requirements, manpower and personnel, modernization, mobilization and cost.

1. Mission Requirement Considerations. The primary consideration in the Active/ARF decision process is mission requirements. If mission requirements dictate that forces be forward deployed, these forces are better suited for the active component. These active forward deployed forces must also have an adequate source of replacement forces in the CONUS that can be assigned to support the overseas commitments. About 80 percent of the ARF is composed of part-time military personnel whose livelihood depends primarily upon full-time civilian employment. Therefore, the Air Force must carefully scrutinize the extent that missions require significant full-time peacetime activity. Missions requiring large peacetime workloads are most suitable for the active force, because transferring them to the ARF could require nearly the same number of full-time personnel, resulting in little or no cost savings.

2. Manpower and Personnel Considerations. Manpower and personnel considerations include ARF capability, manpower availability, and the impact on our ability to maintain a capable, active force.

a. Total Force capability is highly dependent on personnel who are competent and reliable. By recruiting prior service personnel into the Guard and Reserve, the Total Force retains needed experience and amortizes training costs over an extended period. Because of their experience and inherent job stability, ARF prior service personnel maintain their proficiency within the reduced training time available. However, when the mission of an established unit is changed or the weapon system is converted, the conversion process can be longer than that of the active force. Readiness is decreased in both active and ARF units during the period of conversion.

b. Availability is the second consideration in manpower and personnel. Most ARF personnel live within commuting distance of their unit of assignment. A proposal to establish new units or expand existing units must consider whether the regional population base will support the growth in the numbers of additional people and technical disciplines required, and whether adequate facilities exist. Since non-prior service personnel gain experience slowly in a part-time environment, the ARF should continue to rely heavily on already trained prior service personnel. Any significant ARF growth must be planned and time phased to allow for recruiting and training of personnel and facility development.

c. The Air Force first priority is maintaining a Total Force that is capable and ready to go to war. The active force requires experienced rated personnel for operations, planning, inspection, training, and other staff overhead requirements to support both active and ARF components. Because these jobs are full-time peacetime requirements, they are best suited for the active component. The transfer of an operational flying unit to the reserves reduces the ability of the active component force to maintain sufficient aircrew members to accomplish these operational requirements. Transferring an active component mission to the ARF rarely reduces the number of rated experienced personnel above wing level, but it does reduce the capability to train and gain experience for personnel above the wing level. Currently, the Air Force is limited in its ability to produce enough experienced pilots with the cockpits available. Consequently, the transfer of additional cockpits may impact the long-term readiness of the total force.

Many support functions are suited to part-time personnel in peacetime, especially where the primary mission is a wartime surge requirement. In FY 1986, the ARF is increasing responsibilities in medical support, civil engineering, and aerial port units. Increases in these areas help offset wartime manpower short-falls. However, sufficient support personnel must remain in the active force to perform the peacetime support mission and the expanded mission that may occur short of mobilization.

3. Modernization Considerations. Over the past five years, a concerted effort has been made to equip the ARF with newer and more capable systems. This trend is in concert with the increased early deployment role of AFR units under many contingency plans. The Air Force pursues a force modernization policy that provides new equipment to forward deployed forces first to assure the best systems are available for initial combat; second, to early deployers, both active and ARF; and third, to all other forces. While recent Air Force action has placed new production aircraft directly into the ARF, a larger share of older systems have historically been retained in the ARF due to deployment priorities, lower utilization rates, potentially higher levels of aircrew and maintenance experience in the older systems, and personnel stability. However, until complete weapon system phase-out, active forces should retain a portion of older systems to assure active component attention to their combat viability and support.

4. Mobilization Considerations. A decision to mobilize reserve forces signals the degree of national resolve of a U.S. response to crisis situations. Under periods of rising tension this decision can directly affect future actions of adversaries and allies. The active component must be large enough to provide a flexible response capability for contingencies short of mobilization. However, a significant number of ARF volunteers can be expected to complement the active force during these contingencies. Due to the heavy reliance on ARF missions in such areas as strategic airlift, Air Force planners must remain cognizant of mobilization requirements in the active/ARF decision process.

5. Cost Considerations. The ARF minimizes costs through reduced peacetime activity, low full-time manning and by utilizing funds and support structure already required and existing in the active component. The active component force provides all research and development funds; the majority of initial and recurring training such as pilot and navigator instruction; and the stock fund, depot maintenance and investment item procurement structure. The ARF reimburses the Air Force Industrial Funds for depot maintenance costs, with the exception of military personnel costs. For items procured from the stock fund, the ARF reimburses the fund at the standard Air Force prices, which do not include the majority of overhead costs. By maintaining these forces in the Reserve at lower activity rates, the Total Force benefits from savings in investment, O&M, base operating support, and military personnel costs. By retaining the experienced former active component members, we are able to maximize the return on the initial and recurring training costs previously invested in these members.

D. Commercial Activities (CA). The Air Force uses a mix of military (active, Reserve, and National Guard), federal civilian employees, and contractors, as well as Host Nation Support (HNS), to satisfy mission requirements. This practice helps provide sufficient military personnel to meet wartime commitments while taking advantage of the experience and continuity provided by civilian employees and the economies often generated by contracting.

Guidance for determining whether to accomplish commercial activity (CA) work load in-house or by contract is provided in OMB Circular A-76. Generally, A-76 reaffirms the Government's policy of reliance on the private sector for goods and services. While recognizing that certain functions are inherently governmental in nature and that others must be performed in-house for national defense reasons, the Circular directs all other CA workload be reviewed to determine the most cost-effective method of operation.

The Air Force has established an aggressive program and has long been considered a leader in the implementation of A-76. First, determinations are made as to the work load that military members must perform based on military essentiality. Criteria for military-essential positions include combat and direct combat support duties, maintenance of favorable overseas rotation indices, and career progression requirements. Additionally, in-house positions are retained that must be manned

by Air Force military or civilian employees, because of inherent management responsibilities or to comply with applicable statutes or regulations. All remaining CA work load is considered eligible for contract. From these eligible work loads, the Air Force develops a cost-comparison program by identifying candidate activities that will be cost studied for possible contract performance.

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